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Comprehensiveness—consideration
difficulties

from

the viewpoint of the plain-man.

with sufficient abstractness.

however.

whoie--poses no theoretical
All that

Perhaps abstract thought

The West has not held

power and we value power.
is

of the

so, traditionally.

But the

human

We

is

needed

is itself

is to

problematic,

say that thought

situation resulting

think

is

from such thought

one of increasing polarization among men.

Human

thought divides one into self and abstract concept of self- -into

subject and object.
self -alienated, the

While some say that a person can reflect and yet not be

human

ation is inevitable, but

impact within himself.
thus increasing

its

I

situation suggests otherwise.

I

assume

that alien-

also assume that no individual could tolerate

He must

dangers.

its full

take sides and project alienation onto society,

But to

remain whole he then must try

that his opponent's position is equally true

and necessary.

to recognize

The whole

is

a

vi

dilemma.
Neither operationalism nor ordinary language analysis
seems an appropriate

approach

to this

concept of wholeness.

conflict within the thought of two writers.

the objective in

examine

I

the objective

is to

is to

A more

basic problem

such values (which are abstractions)

According

process

in a

An immediate problem

explain how there can be social agreement

of different values.

behavior.

the subjective.

see oneself and others merely as physi-

cal bodies with different behavioral tendencies.

Lindblom

to

Lindblom

To emphasize. the

subjective

all

if

is

among

a multiplicity

very existence of

to explain the

one encounters

particular

is

agreement arises and values appear.

is to

see different people as aspects of one

mind, or at least as operating within one conceptual framework.
leans this way.

His problem

within a conceptual

is

framework

in

Mannheim

one of explaining how to achieve autonomy

or,

more immediately, how

rigidities of bureaucratic -technological society.

precisely

for

just through the clash of opposing values

it is

of bargaining, that social

as a conflict- -a

Charles Lindblom tends to side with

human nature and Karl Mannheim with

To emphasize

it

to

escape the

Mannheim suggests

that

it

is

recognizing one's necessary conceptual and social boundaries that

one escapes from them.
If

the

the whole is a dilemma, then the clearer and simpler one's position--

more

it

can be summarized- -the more immediately one-sided

To embrace wholeness, such
with

its

opposition.

it

must

be.

a one-sided position must be tacitly identified

In the spirit of

Hegel,

I

interpret the thought of Lindblom

Vll

and Mannheim as beginning

in a

narrow, clear position which, because

fully though tacitly identified with its
opposite, has little meaning.

development

of their thought as attempts to loosen this
identity,

meaning, while yet retaining

moves

it,

and hence preserving the whole.

the debate partly out of society and into the
person's

becomes broader, more complex, and
I

is

see the

hence increasing

The attempt

own thought- -it

safer.

argue by analogy that planned society can

dialectical struggle

I

it

itself

among conceptual frameworks

in

be interpreted as a

which the smaller provide

purpose to the larger and the larger provide means to the smaller.

I

thus

reject the view that there is only one correct scale of social understanding.
Social reality

It

is both,

in

is

neither a large technocratic bureaucracy nor a small community.

necessary conflict with each other.

Every human has both
the whole at his

in

own best

right and duty to take personal responsibility for

level of understanding.

One result

will be an increase

personal stress, especially among those most facile with abstractions, but

hopefully another result will be social survival.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

This

is

an essay about comprehensiveness or wholeness

in

decision-

making, about what we mean when we talk about "seeing the big
picture" or
"taking an overview.

"

If

you ask the one who has to do

mayor, the chief planner--he
It

is

apt to

means struggling with mutually

demands.

In short,

it

means

answer

that

it

it-

-the governor, the

means personal agony.

exclusive, yet equally and highly worthy,

to confront

dilemma.

In this

essay

I

want to

speculate about that answer.

Maybe

this confrontation with

Maybe

for

human

society

alienated.

someone
is

to be a

On

to the extent that

we

will externalize

this view, the hot

wars between

price

we must pay

Of course this
speculate

in

temporary aberration.
to be a

whole

is

a side.

tolerate this struggle

And

in joining with others

and magnify the struggle --and increase

and their neighborhoods, and
for our

we cannot

we must choose

cities

we

not a

whole human being or something

within our individual selves,

dangers.

is

necessarily to be a center of opposing forces --to be self-

In that case,

of like choice,

dilemma

all

nations, the cold

its

wars between

those other societal wars will be the

own inner peace.

mere

daring ways.

speculation.

As

But the times almost

demand

that

the result of growing limits both on physical

1

2

and social resources we face the real
possibility, internationally,
to adopt a "lifeboat ethics" in
which the death of whole peoples
of survival for others.

And

it

is little

of

may

havmg

be the cost

consolation to know that at the national

and urban scales the required cost may be only
increasing poverty, crime,
and mental disease among those sacrificed.

My
is

a

that

It

of

is

essay

dilemma and
dilemma.

an elaboration and defense of

is

this supposition that the

whole

that the price of social peace is our
willingness to internalize

The essay means

to be

not a promise of solution to the

an instance of the action

human

condition.

It is

it

recommends.

an offer, on behalf

urban planners, to share that condition.

Planners

My

in

a Quandary

research began as a response to a concrete

difficulty

which profes-

sional urban planners of the United States have recently encountered.

no longer sure what they are supposed to

They are

do.

Until the 1960's, urban planning in the United States largely meant

physical planning.

Physical planning was a response to the congestion, pollu-

tion, deterioration, and, in general, the physical chaos, of the early industrial

city.

to be.

It

was

not a deeply thought out response because

The obvious

solution, so

plan" for a city's growth.

it

seemed, was

to

it

make

apparently didn't need
a "comprehensive

This comprehensive plan would focus

in

a map,

which would separate polluting factories from residences, would establish
limits on the height and coverage of buildings so as to reduce traffic and light

3

problems, and would otherwise organize the city

iri

the

same way

that an

architect would organize a well designed house for a
docile client.
But the city

was not a house and

States, until the 1930's, the city

market forces.

was

the client

little

more

was

not docile.

United

than an arena for the play of

And even afterwards market forces continued

initiating role in physical development.

In the

to play the

main

At their best the planning maps did

not say what would happen but only what was allowed, and even then
exceptions

were easily gotten by those with

War

Following World

II,

sufficient

economic power.

a wide range of federal grant

programs were

established or expanded to fund certain aspects of urban growth.
substantial funding

was

for suburban single family housing, an intercity express

highway system, and some very limited redevelopment

Some funds were also provided, mostly

to the

the plan -making upon which other grants

many

opportunities, urban planning

out the 1950's and for

The most

most

were

became

of the

urban cores.

smaller cities and towns, for
often conditioned.

Given these

a high growth profession through-

of the 1960's.

People seldom question their basic assumptions when things are going
well.

Not until the later 1960's were there any general doubts within the

profession that planners really could take a comprehensive view, as they

understood
cies had

it,

and could apply

become

it.

By that time, however, two opposing tenden-

evident.

Firstly, planners discovered that their comprehensive approach

more

difficult than

expected and that they really had not been using

it.

was

On

the

~
4

one hand, the market system was

still

making the most important decisions

the location of industry and business
and the general suburban
the other,

when planners did intervene they were most

effective

intervened on the side of the middle class or the
rich.
to

movement.

A

when they

redevelopment project

assemble land for business, or an exclusionary zoning
ordinance

a suburb from low tax generators, would succeed.

to protect

But a plan for public housing,

or to improve the parks and schools of a ghetto area, was
very likely to

Thus the planners were not helping everyone

Some planners saw nothing
was a sign

when he

at last

fail.

extent.

For them

it

recognized that planning,

government, was essentially a process

interest groups.
that

same

upsetting in this first discovery.

of the planner's maturity

like all else in

to the

On

of bargaining

among

Granting that the rich had more power, these planners assumed

even the poorest would gain enough, since the economy was constantly

growing and there was a basic consensus about matters

in liberal societies.

Other planners were equally sanguine about the discovery but for virtually

They attacked

opposite reasons.

the depersonalizing inequitable features of

large scale industrial society and saw the ideal of comprehensiveness as one

more example

of

such features.

They were glad enough, therefore,

limited success.

They were confident

ly self-sufficient,

communities would provide enough social order.

'For a more extended discussion
text, chap.

V, pp.

310-17, 318-22.

to

see

its

that an agglomeration of small, relative-

of liberal

*

and radical planning, see

5

The second thing many planners discovered was

some kind

of

comprehensive approach.

of federal grants, they

than

it

Previously bemused by the easy money

had often taken their own profession less seriously

They had been content

deserved.

the desperate need for

esthetics or efficiency.

argue

to

But these grounds

were

its

need on grounds of

not greatly persuasive in a

growing economy, one which apparently could afford waste and disorder
more
than

it

could afford restrictions on private enterprise.

plenty for everyone (or everyone
It

is

when we face

scarcity.

who

is

noticed) that

it

not

a

more

if it is

is

planning.

truly comprehensive

on a stronger argument, survival.
to halt

favor of revitalizing central cities and older small towns.

decentralization

when there

we most need

According to the environmentalists, we must try
in

is

Outsiders, and especially those in the environ-

mental movement, made the strongest call for

approach and they based

It

suburban sprawl

They favor

achieved by concentrated settlements.

mass transportation over

the expressway system.

them argue, as well, for

a greater sharing of wealth and

basic needs of disadvantaged groups.

They also favor

The more thoughtful

more

All these aims require a

of

attention to the

more

inclusive

viewpoint, and probably a broader control, than has previously been available
to public planning.

And they are

far

more

controversial.

Buffeted by these opposing viewpoints, the present day planner

understandably perplexed.
call

them "liberal planners,

as they are.

The

The proponents
"

of interest

is

group planning,

often

I

shall

assure him that things are going pretty well

critics of industrial society,

I

shall call

them "radical

just

6

planners,

"

are equally sure that things need drastic
improvement, but they

agree with the liberals that the traditional
comprehensive plan
it.

Some

of the environmentalists

more

call for a tougher

They want

is

no way to get

overlap the two previous groups, but others

inclusive planning, especially on physical matters.

states to take back

from the

planning powers and they prefer

more

and counties much of their

cities

action at the national level also.

While

the liberals and radicals envision an explicitly political
planning, environ-

mentalists tend to favor the traditional view that planning

They suggest

is

above politics.

that the environmental planner, in particular, is sensitive to
a

long range public interest which should override the immediate concerns of

elected officials.

2

The concept

of

comprehensiveness

society need to plan itself as a whole?

is at

If it

is

must

it

mean an

explicit large

the need for explicit large scale control met,

through something like liberal and radical modes

itself,

Does

does, can this occur indirectly, as

the liberal and radical planners suppose, or

scale control? Or, again,

the center of this dispute.

prehensiveness perhaps a composite of

all three

of

planning?

Is

com-

approaches?

9

^"Because of the breadth of the preceding discussion about the planner's
situation, and because the points are generally well accepted within the
profession, the writer has not attempted to provide documentation. If there

a quarrel with what has been written,

is

it would be that the categories of planners
overlap more than has been suggested and that the writer has said little about
the systems -analytic approach which many planners consider to be dominant.
On the latter point, systems analysis is the present day variant of the same
rationality model which underlay the earlier mapped plan approach. This

rationality

model

is

discussed

footnotes 25, 26, chap. V.

in text,

chap. V, pp. 311-13,

see also text

7

My
problem

essay
of

is

a response, at the level of theory, to this very
immediate

American urban planners.

must now leave
reappear later

the

Because the response

most concrete aspects

of that

problem.

do mean by comprehensiveness.
this, specifically,

is

what

In the first part

because

I

my

The need

1

essay provides.

(Chapter

II)

I

The

is to

know

just

what we

And

effort divides into three

propose a method of concept examination

have misgivings about the appropriateness,
In the

to the concept of

com-

second part (Chapters

III

apply this method to the writings of two important planning theorists.

In the third part

(Chapter V)

the practical implications of

As was said
is

I

But they will

for a concept examination.

is

prehensiveness, of the methods now extant.

and IV)

theoretical

on.

At the theoretical level, the planner's quandary

parts.

is

earlier,

I

consider,

my method

my

in

and

a rather wide ranging discussion,

its

applications.

total effort can best be called speculative.

It

speculative not in having no connection with the current literature, but in

making unconventional interpretations
can be summarized as

a

of that literature.

These interpretations

series of suppositions and such a series

below as the most appropriate precis

of the essay.

is

presented

Note, incidentally, that

1

treat the terms comprehensiveness, wholeness, and completeness as synonyms

throughout all that follows.

Suppositions about Wholeness

1.

Western Civilization traditionally has believed

that the capacity for

8

abstract thought was perhaps the distinguishing
feature of the whole human
being.

But suppose that this capacity, which
allows us to imagine something

different and better both

m

ourselves and

ates us from ourselves and each other.
self consciousness

we became

in society,

is

also that which alien-

Such a result would occur because

in

divided into subject and object and, then,

because we projected that division onto the social
world.

Suppose that our

humanness

will not allow us completely to reject the
objective side of our nature

and thus

become spontaneous and unthinking

to

that neither will

it

our responses.

And suppose

allow us completely to reject the subjective side and thus
to

become mere centers

of

mechanical behavior or model points

Then we are saying

ial relations.

in

that to be a

whole human

of

is

external soc-

necessarily to

be self alienated.
In that case, the

problem --as there

is

work

of the thinker cannot be to

show a way out

of the

no way that would not destroy a person's humanity.

thinker's work, instead, is to display the structure of the problem so that

have an understanding of what must be endured and can devise a plan

to

The

we

share

the burden equally.

2.

If

the subject and object sides of a

human, then knowledge about him,
sciences,
to

is

not obtained

know about

human are both present

the kind of knowledge provided by the social

from some outside world

of neutral facts.

a person's overt behavior, his objective side,

about the meanings he himself puts into that behavior;
his subjective side.

Thus

if

within that

we want

to

If

we must know

we must know,

know the meanings

we want

of

that is,

human concepts,

9

we

will find

point to.

them

to be internal meanings; there is nothing
"out there" to

furthermore, these internal human concepts are each
a unity

But,

For each

of opposites.

is

a unity of the objective and subjective sides
of the

human.
3.

mean

it

of

What does

mean, though,

it

that they are internal to

humans?

If

a

each human or internal

human could absorb

in himself, then the

to say that concepts are internal?

to the

Does

whole society

the full burden of his self alienation with-

concepts would have to be internal to himself, as he would

have taken into himself the alienation previously projected onto society.

what could

it

mean

mean something

to

say that the concepts were internal to himself?

like the following (the

define, say, a "traffic

me
to

is

not fully developed).

problem" as a problem when

that "so

could

If

and so ahead

I

of

at the stop light doesn't start up fast enough, " that is not a concept internal

me.

But

all the

if I

leave this nearest cause of

intermediate connections until

beneficiary

of,

may

be called internal.

given in Chapter
4.

my

aggravation and trace through

return to myself as tacit supporter and

I

say, a competitive inegalitarian system which results in differ-

ent frustration tolerances, then

is

example

It

But

II

A more

my

concept of

a traffic

complete example

of

problem more properly

such an internal meaning

on pages 94-96.

Suppose that no human could

fully

absorb his subject-object tension

within himself but had to choose sides and thus project his tension onto the

larger society in the form of public issues.
part, internal to the society as a whole.

Then human concepts would

be, in

This means that these concepts,

10

which

by conjecture are always a unity of opposing
forces, would now be

defined not wholly by a conflict within the person
but also, in part, by a conflict

its

within the society.

No concept could be understood except

in

contrast to

opposite.

The preceding suppositions are very abstract

but

it

was necessary

they be set forth to provide the foundation for what
follows.

can be defended, the defense appears

in

discussion of a degree of reality logic.

appear below are the bases for the

Chapter

II,

that

Insofar as they

and particularly

in the

The more specific suppositions which

last section of

Chapter

II

and for the later

chapters.

5.

The

last section of

the following suppositions.

written extensively on

or a major part of

it,

some

Chapter

II is

Consider the

based on, and gives some defense
life

social topics.

thought of a person

Suppose that

this

of,

who has

person's thought,

takes one side of a certain public issue.

If

asked

guess the point of his thought process, we normally would say that

it

to

was an

attempt to reach consistency and at the same time to reach a subtlety adequate
to the objective facts of

human experience.

Suppose, now, that neither consistency nor a correspondence to external
facts is possible but that the thinker is on one side of a hard social

generated by human alienation.

dilemma,

Suppose that his earliest thought begins with a

primitive intuitive concept which includes both sides of the dilemma.
that the

is

development

of his thought is not truly a

Suppose

reaching for consistency but

instead an attempt to hold onto his primitive faith in the identity of both sides

11

of the

dilemma, while

at the

same time he increasingly

distinguishes the two

so that he can accept one side and ever more fully reject
the other.

suppose finally that his "success"

assume

in doing this requires

the side of his opponents while he

must

him

And

explicitly to

explicitly contrast that position

with his own.

These are the suppositions, or main features,

method
is

of concept examination.

I

of

what

1

call a dialectical

suppose, so far as the concept of wholeness

concerned, that the appropriate method of concept examination

ope rationalize wholeness nor to explore how we
Instead

I

'

is

neither to

all ordinarily use that

term.

see the method as a tracing of some person's response to a dilemma

he faces.

Charles Lindblom has argued that the process

6.

is

I

not an obstruction to coordination but is a

examine

his

way

arguments through the perspective

of pluralist

to coordinate.

of

my

In

faith in the

ibility,

even

opment

of his thought is an attempt to maintain this identity, while

and coordination.

Chapter

dialectical method.

suppose that he begins his thought widi a kind of primitive
identity, of bargaining

bargaining

I

III

I

compat-

suppose that the devel-

more sharply

distinguishing out the concept of bargaining so his claim that bargaining can

coordinate will not be merely tautologous.

I

suppose, finally, that he explicitly accepts the basic assumption of

those liberals

who believe

in central planning.

He assumes,

that there is a consensus on important public matters.

is

in

other words,

Because there

is,

possible for bargaining to coordinate probably about as well as central

it
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coordination.

were

But this is not the whole of his position,

the result would be trivial.

The

1

suggest, since

if it

significant position is that people with

widely different desires can coordinate by bargaining.

In

order to say the

he needs to contrast explicitly his own model of decision-making with

latter,

those of central-planning liberals so as to suggest that his model does allow

more

conflict despite his consensus assumptions which imply the opposite.
7.

Karl Mannheim has argued that the knowledge people have, as well

as their beliefs,

affected by their social conditions.

is

from a "perspective,
possible for

some

"

a conceptual framework.

in

begins his thought with a faith

in the

case the belief

is that

Chapter

IV.

I

to

that

it

am

is

supposing there that he, too,

compatibility of apparent opposites.

"systematization,

"

evolving conceptual structure, has intrinsic to
of that structure.

Mannheim adds

reality

people, at least to loose themselves from their perspectives.

His arguments are considered

this

But

They see social

by which he means a sort of
it

the notion of truth independent

suppose that the development of his thought

I

In

is

an attempt

maintain this suggested identity of conceptual structure with conceptual

freedom while
it is

same time

at the

distinguishing out the idea of freedom so that

not simply a label for whatever the conceptual structure permits.

I

suppose, finally, that Mannheim assumes, in the thought

a position often associated with totalitarian political regimes.

I

am

This

describing,

is

the

position that there is one best conceptual structure at a certain time, although
that one is always in process of evolution.

historical destiny.

Because there

is this

The view suggests an embracing

embracing history,

it is

possible to

13

achieve conceptual freedom; such achievementmatic, however,

is just

is

automatic.

That

is

auto-

another expression of that trivial result one
gets by

identifying destiny and freedom.

The

significant position would be that a

person can become free of his conceptual structure and
not within
able to say the latter,

it

Mannheim needs

to contrast his

model

it.

To be

of social reality

with that of the totalitarians to show that his allows a
true freedom, despite
the assumption he shares with

The key

my

to

them which suggests the opposite.

examination

of the thought of

Lindblom and Mannheim

is

the supposition that they both face problems which are logically
impossible,

by the criterion

of

formal

logic.

Hence they must be understood

to be elab-

orating their respective dilemmas instead of resolving them.

The results

of the concept examinations in Chapters

except negatively, conclusions to be applied

in

Chapter V.

insights into the structure of our response to dilemmas.

can be brought to the last chapter only as analogies.

which may also be found
8.

in the practice of

Chapter V, that the burden
I

suggest that

it-

I

it

is

dilemmas

to

some

only one correct scale of

a structure

is

I

extent extern-

suppose, in

not spread uniformly.

most easily avoided by those who are most able

to

generate

Within this class are the planners.

suppose further that the principal expression of
is

Hence the results

urban planning.

-the meritocracy or administrative class.

there

not,

Rather, they are

own inner dilemmas,

of these social

and IV are

They suggest

Having assumed that every human being must

alize and thus put off upon society his

III

this inequity is belief that

human understanding- -one

true whole.

And
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I

suggest that the presently accepted
scale

petence of

sense

in

many members

of society.

I

may have passed beyond

suppose finally that there

the

may

combe a

which simpler, narrower, conceptual
frameworks may be as wholistiic

as broader ones.

I

argue that this supposition implies a different
relationship

between the high level professional or administrator
and other people than
that to

which we are accustomed- -a relationship
more stressful

precisely because

it is

These then are
I

call

more meaningful

my

to the

former

to the latter.

principal suppositions.

They are

not undefended, but

them suppositions because they are unconventional interpretations

social experience and because they are in

some cases

of our

too wide-ranging to

permit in-depth defense.
is

It

time now to take a deeper look

at the

as preparation for the concept examinations

Two Problems

I

of

concept of comprehensiveness,

Chapters

in

III

and

IV.

Comprehensiveness

have alluded to two problems encountered respectively by Lindblom and

Mannheim, problems which

I

call

dilemmas.

I

consider them to be problems

both of comprehensiveness as a concept and of comprehensiveness as that to

which the concept refers.

(Comprehensiveness

reasons already presented

in supposition 2.

is

above,

a

human concept

we cannot draw

distinction, in such cases, between concept and referent.

and, for
a

sharp

)

Before the 1960's, most professional planners in the United States would

have recognized only one of these problems of comprehensiveness.

The

15

problem for them was how

to

achieve

How

it.

could the society achieve an

overview of urban physical problems
and a control of those problems,
within
the bounds of a free enterprise,
pluralist politics? Apparently

some countries
enviously.

of

But

it

was seldom thought

the society

identified an opposite problem.

societies generally, and the resulting problem

How

and self-sufficient communities within
identifying this other

that

whatever may be the failures

it.

problem look

in

happen here.

This condition of bureaucratic suffocation

hensiveness but how to avoid

happened

American planner looked

the

more broadly and conclude

of large scale bureaucracy,

per se.

to

some American planners have

Recently,

They examine

Western Europe, toward which

it

is it

is

is not

we are
of

all captives

urban planning

true of industrialized

how

to achieve

compre-

possible to achieve relatively small

the larger social order?

Planners

to the Republic of China or to other third

world countries for their models.

The
problem.

problem

first

It is

the

of

comprehensiveness

is

what

I

call the social control

problem which concerns Charles Lindblom and also concerns

those designated as liberal planners.

The second problem
abstract form

it

is the

is

what

I

call the social

change problem.

problem addressed by Karl Mannheim

writings which especially concern me.

In its

in

immediate form

In a

more

those of his

it is

the

problem

of radical planners.

I

want

to consider, briefly, the philosophical roots of these

The Social Control Problem.

two problems.

To see comprehensiveness as raising

a
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control problem

is to

Thomas Hobbes'

thought.

motion and,

like the

adopt a viewpoint with roots
3

aspect of

For Hobbes, human beings are merely matter

Hume, each human could be described

In the later

language of David

as loose and separate from all others.

not separate in having distinctly different understandings.

Indeed they do not have understandings at

all if

by this

meant something

is

involving an intimate mixture of facts, values, and reasoning.

Humans do

experience sensations but these sensations will be the same for

all

who ex-

Also, humans can give arbitrary general "names" to similar

perience them.
sensations.

in

elements of which they are composed, they themselves

have only mechanical relations to each other.

Humans are

in the positivist

From

these names

it is

possible to deduce consequences.

But,

because the names are arbitrary many alternatives are possible and the

system

of

knowledge deducible from one set will differ from

from another.

that deducible

Thus, human understandings differ from each other not

themselves but because different humans make different choices

in the

in

naming

of similar sensations.

All

humans are governed by passions

(i.

e.

,

forms

of the

motions which

they make), and these are in all cases directed to the same general goals --self

preservation and self aggrandisement.

humans are attracted

Apparently the ultimate reason that

to different specific goals,

and may acquire different

This brief and somewhat
over-simplified presentation of his thought emphasizes the mechanistic side of
it.
The discussion is based primarily on W. T. Jones, A History of Western

^Hobbes

is

Philosophy, Vol.

not a wholly consistent thinker.

II

(New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co.

,

1952), chap.

22.
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knowledge,

is

because they are different physical bodies.

Perhaps the dominant

general human passions

of the

expressed as an intense quest for security.
passion

lose what

assume

little

that

then this

Humans

produce a "war of

is to

such that even the strongest

security they might gain through their strength.

says they are--simply matter

of all against all should raise

will have no

way

preservation-

Unfortunately the effect of that

all against all"

men are what Hobbes

war

is self

But

in

if

we

motion-

no problem of social control.

to reflect on their situation and imagine the desira-

bility of social order.

The Hobbesian view

of

human nature

is

not preposterous.

anyone who maintains that

of the view held by

human beings must be
virtue of explaining

all significant

reducible to sense experience.

human

And

differences and separateness.

It

is

a variant

knowledge

it

of

has the great

Both are due to the

existence of different physical bodies.

Given

this

view of human nature, however, a social control problem only

appears when the view becomes inconsistent.
to the

war

of all against all is an

absolute sovereign

who maintains

According

to

Hobbes the response

agreement among men, ceding power
order.

But this response

assumes

to

that

an

men

can, in fact, reflect.

In

stated.

any case, the social control problem
If

there

is

itself

can now be concisely

a plurality of individuals with competing preferences,

can these preferences be ordered into a collective preference

to

which

all

how
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will agree? 4

For

preference then

it

if

all

do not agree and hence do not accept the collective

does not function as a truly collective preference.

So stated, the social control problem

is

almost the same as what

otherwise called the collective choice problem.

Because

I

assume no

is

existing

or enduring consensus on procedures or policies, but assume instead a
sharp
conflict,

I

emphasize the necessity for any collective preference

to be

unan-

imous.

The difference between my approach
and that of most others consists

in

my

to the collective choice

assumptions,

problem

first, that the

problem

is

logically impossible to solve and, second, that this logical impossibility does

not

mean an end

to intellectual effort on the topic.

tion of that effort.

The

first

assumption

and some writings of Robert Paul Wolff.
to the reader, is defended in

Chapter

The Social Change Problem
the opposite of Hobbes'.

.

II

I

It

simply means a redirec-

perhaps share with Kenneth Arrow

The second, which may seem absurd
at

Some

pages 74-81.

thinkers take a position virtually

Hegel, in his philosophy of history,

is

thought to

4 This statement of the problem, with the exception of the reference to

unanimity,

is

similar to that of Kenneth Arrow.

See text, chap.

II,

p. 76.

^This version therefore differs from that of writers such as J. M.
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock who, in the Calculus of Consent also emphasize
at least near unanimity, but who assume that such near unanimity is possible.
For a discussion and critique of their view, see Brian Barry, Political Argument (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), chaps. XIV and XV.
,
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do so. ^

His views provide one of the
philosophically most extreme founda-

tions of the social change problem.

for Hegel there

only mind.

is

ultimately be but one mind.

an aspect of

itself,

And

Where
if

there

for

is

Hobbes there was only matter,

only mind then there can

No mind would be

able to know another except as

there being no neutral standard by
which both could

com-

pare themselves.
Mind, or Absolute Spirit as Hegel otherwise
calls

temporal process

of infinite self-realization.

discussed

in

some

of the

unfolding of Objective Spirit

which

is

whole.

wholly real.

"Mind,

this actuality.

In the

"

most "applied"
it is

is

a largely non-

But there is a phase of this

process --the phase of "Objective Spirit" --which occurs
is

it,

in time.

of Hegel's writings.

That phase
Yet even in the

only the whole, the process of world history,

Individual persons are contingent differentiations of the

says Hegel, "has actuality, and individuals are accidents
of

"7

phase of Objective Spirit even single states are only passing

This discussion draws from the following sources: Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, "The Philosophy of Right," trans, by T. M. Knox and "The
Philosophy of History," trans, by J. Sibree, Vol. XLVI of Great Books of the
Western World ed. by Robert M. Hutchins (54 vols; Chicago: Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc., 1952); Herbert Marcuse, "Reason and Revolution, " and
George H. Sabine, "Hegel's Political Philosophy, " in Essays in the History of
Political Thought ed. by Isaac Kramnick (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice -Hall, Inc., 1969); and G. R. G. Mure, The Philosophy of Hegel
,

,

(London:

Oxford University Press, 1965).

7

Hegel, "The Philosophy of Right," ["Addition 100" of "Hegel's Additions
to the Philosophy of Right"], p. 133. Also see ["Addition 94"], p. 132; and
["Addition 152"],

p.

141.
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phases, although they do seem to have a higher reality
than individuals.

A

state is higher not because

people whose individuality

higher because

it is

is

it

rooted

is,

as for Hobbes, a contract

in their

among

physically distinct bodies.

is

It

an organic moral community and creates individuals.

It

creates individuals not of course as bodies but as conscious thinking
and
willing beings.

They

exist as such only because they are

members

of this

community.
Hegel

not primarily concerned to argue this view but to assert

is

part of his description of dialectical development.

what constitute a number of arguments.

community
to

is

a

meaning framework.

only truly free

when

some

He argues

give, however,

that

human wants

that a

person

is

as opposed

nobody

social group; and that the individual

his choices are not

is

merely arbitrary but arc influenced

by their content- -a content already present as the customs and laws
society.

as

All are aspects of the claim that the

merely physical ones are socially conditioned;

definite except by limitation to

He does

it

of a

g

Each stage

in the historical

state, is called by

development

Hegel the spirit of a people.

of this higher reality, the

This spirit

is

something

a world view and a national character existing as a single entity.

^This

summary

of his

phrased from a summary

arguments on

in Sabine,

It is

like

less

the general point is largely para-

"Hegel's Political Philosophy,"

p.

318.

becomes definite by limitation to a social
of
Right," ["Addition 130" of "Hegel's
"The
Philosophy
Hegel,
group, see
Additions to the Philosophy of Right"], p. 139.

On

the particular point that a person

-
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exclusively a

way

of seeing than a

way

of

being and

it

comprises

all

aspects

of social life.

The succession

of

dominant states

particular "world historical individuals.

is

achieved through the agency of

"

Spirit is not a discrete being

who

can act apart from individuals; Hegel does not argue that the
self-conscious
ness of Spirit could occur

in the

absence

of

any individual self-consciousness.

But world historical individuals further the goals of Spirit by intensely pur-

suing their own self-interest.

Hegel speaks as

if

They are

not

aware

of these goals.

the self-interest of world historical individuals

was inevitably

But he acknowledges at other times that the interests of such

unethical.

individuals, like those of other wise individuals within the state,

serve ethical purposes, though

y ".

Sometimes

in this

case a higher ethics.

may

naturally

^

the history of the world occupies a higher ground than that on
which morality has properly its position; which is personal character, the
conscience of individuals, their particular will and mode of action,.
They who on moral grounds, and consequently with noble intention, have
resisted that which the advance of the spiritual idea makes necessary,
stand higher in moral worth than those whose crimes have been turned into
the means --under the direction of a superior principle --of realizing the
purposes of that principle. "
Then Hegel adds:
"But in such revolutions both parties generally stand within the limits of
the same circle of transient and corruptible existence. Consequently it is
which those who stand upon ancient right and
only a formal rectitude,
order maintain. The deeds of great men, who are the individuals of the
world's history, thus appear not only justified in view of that intrinsic
result of which they were not conscious, but also from the point of view
.

.

.

.

.

.

"

occupied by the secular moralist.
But then Hegel concludes again that history has really nothing to do with
morality. Hegel, "The Philosophy of History, " p. 184.

.
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From
is

Hegel's viewpoint, at least as

no social change problem.

it is

expressed

in his history,

there

The world historical individuals are as much

subject to historical destiny as are any others.

A

social change problem can be identified in Hegel's
thought only

that thought is treated in a

inconsistent.

way which others (probably

appears only

It

if

we suppose

that

not Hegel)

when

would call

some people could become

independent not only of their present social milieu but of any evolving social
milieu.

The social change problem may then be stated as
together with
standing,

its

concepts,

is

the source of

how can anyone independently

This problem
relativism.

is

human

follows.

If

society,

individuality and under-

alter his nature or his understanding?

what others may call the problem

The term relativism implies

that the

of cultural

problem

is

or social

logically

im-

possible to solve since individuality and understanding are relative to the
society.

I

want

I

accept that implication.

to argue,

not necessarily

Again, as with the social control problem,

however, that something's being a logical impossibility does

mean

These problems

that

of

it is

no longer worth thinking about.

comprehensiveness are problems

and Mannheim respectively address themselves.
shall

examine their

and give

efforts.

its rationale.

This

First, though,

is the

I

to

which Lindblom

Starting at Chapter

III,

I

must explain my methodology

purpose of Chapter

II.

CHAPTER

II

A DIALECTICAL METHOD OF CONCEPT EXAMINATION
"There are two kinds

of truth,

small truth and great

You can recognize
because

its

a small truth

opposite

The opposite

truth.

is a

falsehood.

of a great truth is

another truth. nl
Niels Bohr

This

is

a dissertation in political science.

who holds

a conventional view of science

problems

I

problem.
will

that fact, the

reader

likely to be perplexed by the two

have identified: the social control problem and the social change

He may agree

wonder

if

that they exist,

if

not perhaps in the

form given, but

they are really problems of scientific knowledge rather than of

applied knowledge.

forms

is

Knowing

of social

How

a group of different free -thinking people can agree on

order- -is not

that, for

example, a matter more

of technique

than of science?

^Quoted in I<eo Rauch, The Philosophy of Hegel, Monarch Notes and
Study Guides (New York: Monarch Press, Inc., 1965), p. 27.
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My
the

response to the reader's perplexities

problems are problems

problems there might

be.

of

It

is

a conditional one.

Whether

science depends on what kinds of scientific

depends on whether, indeed, there might be

problems which were truly problems

of theoretical

knowledge and yet which

were better described some other way than as science.
In this

The

edge.

lem

chapter

first

describe three sorts of problems of theoretical knowl-

two are widely acknowledged and discussed.

of empirical associations --what

other? The other
tific

I

is

the

problem

terms? The third problem

foundations in a

movement

This third problem

is

phenomena are

a speculative one on

of thought

the prob-

is

truly associated with each

of concepts --what are the

is

One

my

meanings

of scien-

part but

has

which has previously been

it

influential.

also a conceptual one, but of a different kind.

I

call

it

a

dialectical problem.

Following the review of these problems,
theory and expediency for thinking

it

necessary

comprehensiveness as dialectical ones.
of a suggested

method

I

shall present

to

consider the problems of

for dealing with such problems.

From Empirical Problems

Empirical Problems --The Positivist Viewpoint
I

reasons of

The chapter concludes with discussion

Conceptual Problems Distinguished

which

my

.

According to one view,

shall call the positivist, research problems are empirical.

They are

primarily problems of data reliability- -the statistical problems of assuring
that if

we repeated an observation or experiment,

all conditions

being the same,

25

we would be
is

likely to get the

part of the

world

in

more general

some sense

same

results.

This view of research problems

positivist position according to which the
empirical

directly confronts us, and hence allows us
to formulate

general hypotheses about this world with assurance that
there

them. 2

(Many scientists would now agree, though,

hypothesis to prove

it

attempts to disprove
It is

approach

true.

it.

We

human

we do

a

way

to test

not test a

do so to show that the hypothesis resists

)^

not possible to identify something, unambiguously, as a
positivist

to

research, since any piece of scientific work could be said to in-

volve both positivist and non-positivist elements.
at least

that

is

emphasizes

behavior.

the

former view.

4
In this

example our

It

But the following

example

builds on Skinner's approach to

first step is to

advance a hypothesis --

say that the rewarding of "cooperative" human behavior

^In the philosophy of science, there

is likely to

increase

may

be few present-day writers who
could be described unequivocally as positivists. But some writers approach
that position more closely than others, among them being Ernest Nagel and
perhaps Carl Hempel. In the application of scientific method, the emphasis

on data reliability is still very influential. See, for example, Fred Kerlinger,
Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
1965).

Here, the scientific method is described without hesitation as a study
Most of the book concerns data collection and measurement,

of relationships.

and statistical tests

of relationships.

J This is the falsifiability
criterion

advanced by Karl Popper. For a
Modern Masters (New York:

discussion of it, see Bryan Magee, Karl Popper
The Viking Press, 1973), pp. 15-18.

^See

B.

F.

Skinner, Beyond

Books, 1971), chaps.

1,

7,

8.

,

Freedom and Dignity

(Toronto:

Bantam
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the

amount

of that behavior.

suppose we select a group

Then we devise a

of children

Let us

and provide them with craft materials

which they can use either for making objects
struct a large but simple doll house which

(cooperative activity).

test of this hypothesis.

keep

to

or to con-

be sent to a children's hospital

is to

After the craft session

(self -activity)

is

over, those

who spent any

time on cooperative activity are called back, unbeknown
to the others, and are
given special praise.
conditions, to see

if

At a later date the session

is

repeated, under the

same

the "cooperators" have increased the percentage of time

spent in that way.

From
is to

a positivist viewpoint, the

most important problem

in this

research

assure that the associations we discover about the particular sample

children would be true of the entire universe of children.

assure that the findings are not due simply

There
iously.

It is

often called the validity

izing concepts.

a different one).

(It

is

"

is

one not taken so ser-

problem or the problem

In the

example given, we need
"

to decide

"increases

of operational-

in

what

is

meant by

cooperative behavior,

"

Following Hume, positivists tend to hold that concepts have

meanings because the more basic ones,
perience.

it

also a problem of going from a sample to the whole but

concepts like "cooperative behavior,

and "rewards.

is to

to chance.

another problem for positivists but

is

The problem

of

And because they have

at least,

this kind of

are reflections of sense ex-

meaning we can

test,

by sense

experience, the propositions in which they occur. ^

^Logical positivists express this
while practicing scientists

in a verification

more commonly speak

theory of meaning,

of operationalism.
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Having

this faith that

experience comes labelled, so to speak,
positivists

would assume that we could fairly easily
agree on the meanings
ative behavior" etc.

Cooperative behavior means, among other things,
making

a doll house rather than making things
to keep.

among

praise,

havior can

of "cooper-

other things.

And an increase

mean an increase

in the

Rewards means words
in the

time spent on

it

amount

of

of a certain be-

relative to time spent

otherwise.

The importance
not be overestimated.

of giving

The

very specific instances of these concepts can-

positivist is anxious to assure that he has elimin-

ated the effects of any variables, other than those whose
association he
studying.

is

Thus, he must be able to take some very narrow and highly con-

trollable situation and generalize to something

much broader.

He sees no

great difficulty in doing so, however.
I

conclude that

mainly problems
latter

if

research problems are empirical problems, they are

of predictability.

They are also problems

meaning but the

problems, though important, are not severe, since we know what our

concepts

mean

in

experience.

They mean

their overt instances --nothing more. 6

Conceptual Problems --The Contexualist Viewpoint
less

of

common, way

of seeing

.

There

is

another,

research problems which places emphasis pre-

cisely on the question of meanings.

According

to this view, the

primary

admittedly the most extreme version of ope rationalism, but
modified versions tend to weaken the positivist faith that experience comes

^This

is

ready labelled and, hence,

to

depart from positivism.
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research problem

is

conceptual problem.

to get clear about the concepts

From

we are

using--it is a

this perspective, the cooperative
behavior re-

search described above raises a question more
serious than that

The question

reliability.

The children

in

is

of statistical

whether we are really studying cooperation

our supposed research were not asked to report on
their

motives, and we can assume that this was for reasons of
objectivity.
positivist

would argue that there

is

objects of sense experience.

The

no way to be sure of someone's real

motives, even for the person himself.

He would note

that motives are not

But in the absence of reports about motives,

do we know that the behavior was indeed cooperative?

work on

at all.

A

how

child might choose to

the doll house because he liked the excitement or bigness of the project

and not to help

There

is

in a

common

a positivist

effort.

argument which explains away

that

we have been misled by

that

we can do something

this difficulty.

It

is

the peculiarities of the social sciences into thinking

there that we could not do in science generally.

like other objects of science, people

can appear to exemplify a concept

Un-

of

interest by a self report as well as by other verbal, and by non-verbal, be-

havior.

But, as stated above,

we can never be sure

that

someone

is

manifest-

ing cooperation, or fear, or intelligence, or anything else just because he says
so.

as

According

to the positivist view,

we conceptually

we do any other phenomenon- -a concept

is

simply

identify

all of its

human utterances
overt instances.

This view of concepts, however, raises a second apparently intractable
difficulty.

How can

the concept be general?

How can

a study of the

cooperation which means making a doll house for
others rather than toys for
oneself tell us anything about the cooperation which
means being willing to

accept peacefully the ascension of a political leader
with
if

he has been elected by a majority of the citizens?

science, as the development of general laws,
all,

is

If it

whom

one disagrees,

cannot do this, then

impossible.

Science, after

can never study the whole of anything but must always look
This positivist difficulty, which

point, has

prompted some people

I

shall

at instances.

examine more closely

to adopt a different,

at a later

"contextualist" view of

research.

Their claim

instances.

Such concepts are defined by the context of other concepts within

which they are used.

is that

If

general concepts are not defined by pointing to

we want

narrow overt behavior, then we

to study a cooperation

which

is

more

than a

will have to look at a cooperation in which

general meanings are already an integral part.

We

could look again at our

study of the children since there are surely meanings in their actions, but
these meanings would be relatively simple and inarticulate.

advantage from the positivist viewpoint but
Suppose, instead, that

we

the election of a chief executive.

it is

may

be an

not an advantage otherwise.

study the adult reaction, in two countries, to
In

country

A

(an industrialized, free enter-

prise system) the election appears to be peacefully accepted.
(an

That

underdeveloped but also free enterprise system)

coup d'etat during which the elected chief executive

^Sorne philosophers of science

who are

it is

is

In

country B

soon followed by a

replaced with a

leftist

particularly associated with this

view are Stephen Toulmin, Thomas Kuhn, and Norwood Hanson.
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military junta.

From

a positivist viewpoint,

more cooperative
is

attitude

among

it is

its

obvious which country manifests a

citizens and the

major research problem

simply that of determining what factors might
be associated with

this atti-

tude.

From

the contextualist viewpoint, however, what
counts as cooperation

depends on one's conceptual or theoretical framework.

framework

is

The problem

And

one's conceptual

a matter of the distinctions which are considered
most important.
for the contextualist is to determine what distinctions
are most

basic.

We
if

we

did

might view the two countries through quasi -Marxist spectacles and

we would be making

certain characteristic distinctions.

We

would

distinguish between exploited and exploiting peoples and also between a precapitalist, a purported free -enterprise capitalist, and a socialist stage of

economic development.

From

this view, the competitive

favor the strong and ruthless.

system of country

And because

it

was a

A

would necessarily

capital intensive

system

the effect of the system would be to further widen the gap between the power of

these strong and ruthless,

who controlled

the capital, and those people

who

did

not.

Though

the

system generated surplus

capital, through industrialization,

this capital could not be applied to the needs of the locally exploited except just

so

much

as to keep them pacified.

Otherwise there would be interference with
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the

market system.

Given this unacceptable capital outlet
and given the re-

sulting inadequate income of the
locally exploited, country
find outside

Some
As

market opportunities and outside opportunities

of these opportunities

the stronger country,

A

would be

A

would need

to

for capital use.

such underdeveloped countries as

in

could dictate the terms of

its

B.

economic relation-

ships with B and the result could be to inhibit
the development and maintain the

poverty of

B.

Given

this

A

view of countries

behavior of country

A

and

B,

we would conclude

'

that the election

reflected apathy rather than cooperation -since the

power group would hold

office after any election

welfare to keep the public pacified.

On

and would always provide enough

the other hand, the behavior of the coup

supporters in country B reflects the only true cooperation discernable
country.

It

is

in cither

deliberate and is directed at a goal beyond self -interest --the

goal of eliminating the country's status as a pawn.

Of course, once country B

had embraced a socialist system then, on our view, cooperation would
to

same

not need

appear as anti -system.

We

see that

if

the concept of "cooperation in a capitalist country" occurs

in a quasi -Marxist context, then

cell, as this is

From

it

must be

the cooperation of a revolutionary

implied in the concepts of exploitation and historical determinism.

within an opposing, capitalist, context one would deny that the

controllers of capital were an elite and privileged group or that the relations
of developed to underdeveloped countries

economically stimulating.

were more exploitive than they were

Instead the claim would be that economic power

is

-
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widely distributed and that such power differences as
exist represent,
significant degree, the hard

work

of those

whom

spective of the free enterprise capitalist, a

they favor.

From

more appropriate way

to a

the per-

carve up

to

reality would be by a distinction between politically free
and politically unfree

regimes.

Given economic freedom, then, so long as a people were free

vote, to join political parties, and to participate similarly,
one could

to

assume

that the peaceful ascension of an elected leader did indeed
reflect cooperation

and conversely that a coup-ridden polity reflected

its

absence.

Furthermore,

one could also assume that these meanings of cooperation were enduring ones,
since one would not acknowledge any inexorable tendencies in history and
certainly not any tendencies that would greatly alter the democratic rules of
o

the

game.
Ostension--A Problem for Positivism

Faced with the

.

difficulties in both

positivist and contextualist approaches to theoretical knowledge,

for one to choose between them.

us that his findings

seem

to

mean what he

A

positivist

says they

may have

mean

it is

difficulty in

not easy

persuading

but these findings at least

have some basis other than his own expectations --he has an obvious

concern for "stubborn

fact. "

While the contextualist

is

deficient in this

respect, while he seems dangerously close to defining the facts to suit himself,

^This illustration of the contextualist approach draws its principles, but
not the specific illustration, from Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political
Science," in Philosophy, Politics and Society, Third Series, ed. by Peter Las

lettandW. G. Runciman (Oxford:

Basil Blackwcll, 1969), pp. 25-57.
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yet for this very reason he, too, has
his own virtues.

must mean what he says they mean, and
findings

we are mostly concerned

At least his findings

this is not a trivial result since
the

with are those about

human

actions.

such

In

research, the researcher always has himself
as object.
It is

in

because human beings seem

any event, that one

to explain the

to

do so.

if

immediate source

prefer the contextualist approach.

movement from meaning

presence of meaning

seems

may

to be the

one

is

to fact, at least

a contextualist.

of

If it is

meanings,
difficult

one does not deny the

By contrast, the positivist

Consequently he faces a severe problem, the problem of

ostension.

The problem

of ostension

(I

shall treat ostension as

denotation), is the problem of teaching a

instance of that meaning.

mental tenet

empiricists that the mind

we gained

meaning by pointing

The possibility

of faith for positivists

is

.

It

synonomous with

is

of ostension

expressed

seems

in the

a mirror reflecting reality.

to a

sensed

to be the

f

unda-

claim of the British

While he denied that

the concepts of objects in this way, the grandfather of positivism,

David Hume, seemed quite ready

to

admit that smaller elements,

bits of

sense

Q

experience, were so learned.

9 David

Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge
The Clarendon Press, 1888), pp. 15-16. [Bk. I, Pt. I, sec. VI,
first par. ] Hume was not wholly consistent, however. At some points he
suggested that one could have impressions of objects. See David Hume, "An
,

(Oxford:

Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, " ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge,
XXXV of Great Books of the Western World ed. by Robert M. Hutchins
vols; Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), pp. 455-56. [sec.
,

no.

13.]

Vol.
(54
II,
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The tendency

of positivist thinking, since-

exasperating increase
to be present but

it is

Hume, has been toward an

in subtlety on this point.

more

illusive

Faith in ostension

and inconsistent.

argued that a denoting phrase never has a meaning
sition in

which

it

occurs has a meaning. 10

textualist position,

were

it

not

known

still

seems

Bertrand Russell has

in itself but that the

This view would look

that Russell also

had

like a

propocon-

faith in the existence

of "hard data" as the only ultimate source of knowledge,
hard data consisting

principally in personal sense data and logical laws. 11
A.

J.

Ayer, the best known spokesman for that variant of positivism

described as logical positivism, has persuasively and explicitly argued against
*
ostension. 12

it.

Then, at other points

He has developed a

in the

same work, he

verification theory of

significant non -tautological proposition
1

is

tacitly has accepted

meaning according

meaningful only

to

if it is,

which any
or

somehow

o

entails, an observation statement.

10Bertrand Russell,
"On Denoting," Mind

,

XIV

(1905), 479-93.

1]

See W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
1952), p. 986. The original source is Bertrand Russell,
Our Knowledge of the External World (Chicago: Open Court, 1929), pp. 75-77.
,

,

12 See text
1

p.

36.

o

-^Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (2d ed.

Dover Publications,

Inc.

,

n. d.

).

In this dissertation, the

;

New York:

writer shall not dis-

cuss the intricacies of the verification theory or the subtle modifications which
Suffice it to say that he asserts the
in his first formulation of it.
a statement can be tested by a range of sense -contents occurrences
and not by a single one. And, if this is possible, it apparently is so either,
because we have some a priori theoretical framework which tells one which

Ayer made
meaning of
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The reason why recent

positivist philosophers continue to
maintain, and

yet are ambivalent about, their faith in
ostension

an impossible way to learn and has seemed
so
impossible, that

or a sign of

is,

is

because ostension seems

at least since Plato.

It

seems

to learn about anything by referring to an
instance of

it

14
it.

Plato, indeed,

made

the still broader claim that no reference to

some-

thing outside oneself could teach one.

You argue

man cannot enquire either about that which he knows,
or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has
no need to
enquire; and if not, he cannot;^ for he does not know the very
subject
about which he is to enquire. 10
that a

'

Augustine believed that ostension was possible but that

it

was due

to a

sense -contents are relevant and which are not or. because the sense -contents
themselves will tell that. Ayer does not want to say the former and thus
seems committed to the latter, which is the faith in ostension. See pp. 5-16
and 35-41. To the writer, the statement which most reveals Ayer's faith in
ostension

is

the following:

what is required to verify a statement about a material thing is
never the occurrence of precisely this or precisely that sense -content,
but only the occurrence of one or other of the sense -contents that fall
within a fairly indefinite range" [p. 12].
".

.

.

l^The writer's use of the term ostension is deliberately broad. It
encompasses all methods of defining which refer to an instance of the thing
defined, which is why the term is made synonymous with denotation. It also
encompasses, additionally, all methods which define by reference to a sign
in its physical existence.

1D Plato,

"The Dialogues of Plato, " ed. by Benjamin Jowett, Vol. VII
of Great Books of the Western World ed. by Robert M. Hutchins (54 vols;
Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), p. 179. ["The Meno, " 80.]
,
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divine illumination.

"For
and

asked what walking

then how shall

.

.

walking only so far as

word
sign.

is

in the

when

.

it is

the thing of which

The

still,

or doing something else,

avoid having the asker think that walking
consists

I

I

walked?.

.

.

And what

"For when a sign

a sign,

have said about this one

I

we thought could be shown without

it

can teach

given me,

is

me

the sign, what do

it is

if it

nothing, but

if it

thing about

it.

And

in

it

name

cannot merely

is

going beyond what

immediately given.

classifying

it

in

The ambivalence toward ostension,

a

.

not

we

17 Ibid.

,

p.

17

that

".

.

a sentence

.

One

is to

must say some-

merely "registering"

means

"

general philosophy,

shall see.

In the 1920's

The Age of Beby Anne Fremantle, The Mentor Philosoexcerpts

The Medieval Philosophers ed.
phers (New York: The New American Library, 1954),
,

it

me knowing

odier, and this

at the level of

Augustine, "Concerning the Teacher,

lief:

If

not knowing

o

parallel in the philosophy of science, as

16St

is

some way or
I

is

finds

it.

a situation;

describing a situation, one

a sense -content; one

me

Ayer remarks

language point to an object without describing

in

finds

learn from the sign?"

I

positivists acknowledge the difficulty.

express a proposition,

its

that empiricists suppose.

the thing itself could not teach one, neither, said
Augustine, could

what thing

has

way

." 16

the sign of the thing.

cannot

am

I

will be true of all the others which

As

of

was not possible

by walking immediately, try to teach without
a sign what has been

if I,

asked.
in

am

if I

It

41.

l^Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic,

p.

91.

p.

in

38.

-
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there was a simple faith as
expressed in Percy Bridgman's classic
notion of

operationalism.

Bridgman held

must be defined by

more

at the

concerned.
of the 1920's

same time,

The problem

Yet he apparently supposed that such
concepts

not, in fact,

simply descriptions of the operations
performed.

of ostension soon

if

was

to be a nominalist, but the
physicists' concepts

became

evident, therefore.

of operations represented a different
concept, as

beyond Bridgman,

meant nothing

the highly general concepts with
which science

He was claiming
were

every scientifically meaningful
concept

a set of performable physical
operations and

than those operations. 19

were,

that

If

every set

Bridgman claimed

(or going

every even temporally or spatially different
set

ations represented a different concept, as

it

of

oper-

logically should have) then gener-

alization from, and even repeatability of,
operations would be impossible.

have already encountered

this difficulty in trying to generalize

We

from supposed

research on cooperative behavior among children.
Recognizing this difficulty in classic operationalism, positivist
philoso-

phers of science proceeded to modify the notion.

Some changes were minor-

20
the suggestion, for instance, that operations might be only
hypothetical.
But gradually there

was a major change --the

shift

toward the view that scientific

19 For a brief discussion of Bridgman's
position, see Carl G. Hempel,
Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice -Hall,
Inc.

,

1966), pp.

91-93.

20Bridgman, himself, allowed for this in his later writings. See
G.
Schlesinger, "Operationalism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1st ed.
V, 544.
,
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concepts do not stand alone but are
part of a theoretical framework. 21

There

remain, today, differences of opinion
as to the relative weight

and

observation

in the

inclined, with

with others.

of theory

grounding of concepts, even among the
positivistically

Hcmpcl giving an increasing emphasis

theory by comparison

to

general, though, the criticisms of ostension
have been

In

decisive- -at least at the philosophical level,
and at least to the extent
positivi.st

approach

is

now usually combined with

Two

If

we are

to

the contexualist one.

Kinds of Conceptual Problems?

conclude that scientific problems are,

conceptual problems, can we also conclude that there
of conceptual

agree that

it

problem?
is

correct.

The positions
realm

And

believe that this conclusion
In this

section

the

more general
problems

I

is

in the first instance,

but one principal type

drawn but

is often

dis-

in the

philosophic distinction between empiricism

of those

analogues in philosophy generally.

I

shall try to say why.

and contextualism are expressions,

of positivism

of science, of a

and idealism.

I

thai the

two approaches to science have their

The empiricist, as

I

describe him, believes

2*Ibid. Also on this point, Ernest Nagel argues that the evidence for a
purported scientific law is more satisfactory if, instead of supporting the law
by itself, it supports it as part of a system. See Ernest Nagel, The Structure
of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
1961), pp. 04-67, 68-70. For a particularly influential and concise statement of the view that knowledge confronts experience
as a whole, and from a man who sometimes calls himself a nominalist, see
,

"Two Dogmas

W.

V.

LX

(January, 1951), 20-43.

O. Quine,

of

Empiricism,"

T he

Philosophical Review

,
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that there is a

world wholly independent

entities of this

world are completely loose and separate from
each other inso-

of consciousness and, hence, that
the

far as any influences of consciousness
upon

them are concerned.

are no entities --only transitory sense impressions.
for the empiricist

is

to be associated.

The associations have swallowed

The

world

that there are only associations but no
categorized objects

known must be

the categories.

a product of consciousness.

thus integrally related to every other.

is

ist is that

Accordingly, the problem

idealist believes that, since consciousness is
essential for knowing,

the world which is
the

Indeed there

Every

The problem

entity in

for the ideal-

there can be only one ultimate conceptual category- -the
knowing

All associations are part of the definition of that concept.

Thus

this

self.

category

has swallowed the associations.

When

philosophers of science argue that inquiry occurs within the bounds

of a conceptual

framework but

is

nonetheless open to observational tests, they

are adopting a middle way between idealism and empiricism.
of a middle

position,

way tends

to carry with

whereas what

is at least

it

the suggestion that there

as likely

is that

the middle

corporates, in microcosm, that larger debate of which

For example,

the "middle

way"

in

But the concept

American

it

is

is

only one such

way simply

in-

the middle way.

politics is a code phrase

used to

characterize one's own position, leaving the implication that one's opponent

is

an extremist.
I

shall argue that there is a kind of contextualism, a kind of emphasis on

conceptual problems, in the philosophy of science which seems dominant at the
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time

of writing

and has tended

to

argue that there are important

acquire the

title of

middle way.

difficulties with this particular

shall then

I

middle way and

shall then sketch out features of a
possible alternative.
In distinguishing

"logic. "

Hence,

I

two kinds of conceptual problems,

use the term not

in the

shall use the

I

present sense, where

it

term

refers to

the principles of prepositional connections
(syntax alone), but in an earlier and

broader sense which also includes questions

of

meaning. 22

Within logic there are three traditional laws of
thought which are sup-

posed

to be

necessary and sufficient for correct thinking.

has been developed as a formal syntactical system
longer fundamental.

seem

But they

to

in

Present day logic

which these laws are no

remain fundamental

in that

pre -formal

meta-logic without which the formal system could not have been
designed. 23

The three laws

of thought are:

Contradiction, and the

Law

formulate these laws.

Since

of

I

the

Law

of Identity, the

Excluded Middle.

am

concerned with logic as implicated

itional formulations are probably best.

of Identity

of

asserts that

Non-

There arc different ways

attribution of meaning, as having a semantical dimension,

The Law

Law

I

to

in the

believe the trad-

These are as follows.

A

is

A.

22 A presumed value in removing questions of meaning
from formal logic
was the hope that one might, thereby, avoid the paradoxes which had been dis-

covered within
23

New

On

all

attempts to render logic systematically complete.

this point,

see Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (2d ed.

York: The Macmillan Company, 1961),

p.

273.

;

41

The Law

A

is

of

Non-Contradiction asserts that the propositions

A

is

B and

not B cannot both be true.

The Law

of

Excluded Middle asserts that either

For both emf
absolutes.

ir.

cists

and idealists, logic and

For empiricists

like

Hume

its

A

B or

is

A

is

not

B.

laws are taken as

or the logical positivists, the laws of

thought are absolute because they are tautologous.

For

idealists like Spinoza,

the laws are absolute because they are constitutive of reality itself.

But in

any middle way between empiricism and idealism, logic cannot be wholly

The empiricists must be wrong

absolute in either sense.

suppose a sharp

to

distinction between contingent consequential facts and certain but tautologous

And

and inconsequential logic.
distinction between an

the idealists

must be wrong

ephemeral deceptive world

of fact

in their

sharp

and a certain and

unchanging world of logically related ideas.
Consequently,

if

there

more than one middle way between empiricism

is

and idealism, the differences between them may well have
the laws of logic is

A

Degree

of

most

qualified,

Truth Logic

.

to

which most becomes a matter

The apparently dominant form

ism, at present, seems associated with doubt about the Law
Middle.

The claim

is

of precise definition.

made

We

do with which of

that our

of

of

degree.

of contextual-

Excluded

most important concepts are incapable

cannot definitely say of them either, that they force

that they prous to see reality, permanently, in a certain restricted way or,
that reality.
vide us with accurate but highly fragmented glimpses of

claim

is

obviously advantageous since

it

This

avoids the criticisms of both con-
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textualism and positivism.

Alston says, that

".

.

.

But the disadvantage,

if

such,

the fact of vagueness forces us to

is,

as William

make some

qualification in the supposedly self-evident 'Law of Excluded
Middle.

We

are no longer certain that

Now

if

A must

either be B or not be

sort of
" ,24
.

.

B.

our concepts were wholly vague so that there could be no
progress

toward deciding whether or not A was

To hold

cist scepticism.

B,

then

we would

be retreating to empiri-

we must claim

to a middle way,

that our important

concepts are capable of an increasing precision as we willfully alter them, as
outside reality forces us to alter them, or as both events happen

more

Bertrand Russell has aptly described this general process,

together.

discussing John Dewey's approach to inquiry.

He speaks

of object

or less
in

and subject

rather than of outside reality and concept but the thrust of the position

is

similar.
Inquiry,

it

one of which

is evident,

is

some kind

of interaction

between two things,

called the object and the other the subject.

There seems
assumption that this process is more or less in the nature of an
oscillation of which the amplitude gradually grows less, leaving it possible
to guess at an ultimate position of equilibrium, in which, when reached,
the subject would be said to 'know' the object, or to have arrived at
'truth' concerning it.
is

to be an

^

It is

because this version of contextualism,

this

approach to conceptual

problems, must assume that concept and "reality" gradually approach each

24\villiam

Jersey:

P.

Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs,

Prentice -Hall, Inc.

,

1964), p.

New

96.

25 Bertrand Russell, "Dewey's New Logic," in Pragmatic Philosop hy, ed.
by Amelie Rorty, Anchor Books (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.

,

1966), p.

316.
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other, while never completely
merging, that

I

For we customarily use the term truth

logic.

describe

it

as a degree of truth

to characterize a

correspondence

between inner concepts and outer experiences.
distinguish five interrelated features of any
degree of truth logic.

I

some, and often

least

such a conceptual

L

There

is

all,

of these

are evident

in

those works which set forth

logic.

an "external reality " consistently independent
of one's

concepts (although the difference between reality
and concepts

Thus, although a degree of truth logic

lute).

is

most important feature, though sometimes

This

There

is the

is

Law

of

3.

it

This

.

is

it

is

the

the least explicit.

is

Excluded Middle.

for conceptual change to occur

sometimes from

not abso-

a certain openness of concepts and conceptual
frameworks.

second most basic feature and

qualification of the

is

a contextualist position

one which tends toward empiricism more than toward
idealism

2.

At

necessarily associated with a
It

sometimes from

is this

openness which allows

the side of the concepts per se,

the side of that which is conceptualized.

Concepts undergo e volution toward improved forms.

Consequently,

does not follow, because concepts influence what we see as facts, that all

concepts are merely relativistic.
4.

The evolutionary process occurs through

of investigators or the

framework
effort.

is

broader community

the actions of a

of language users

a shared phenomenon, and changes in

it

.

A

community

conceptual

represent a collective

44
5.

occur

in

The collective actions
response

to evident

of these investigators are not arbitrary,
but

problems

Although concepts are not absolutes

.

but are ever open to change, the problems which
generate this change do have

a certain absoluteness about them, at least at any
given point

There are
of truth logics.

a

number

of directions in thought

These are represented

time.

which may be called degree

some advocates

by:

in

of multivalued

logics; ordinary language philosophy, at least as represented
by Wittgenstein;

some recent philosophy

next follows

I

and some of pragmatism.

of science;

In

what

shall briefly review certain of the writings involved.

William Alston has argued

that

many concepts are necessarily vague

because we do not know what conditions are necessary and sufficient for
applying them.

26

These are concepts

for

which we cannot readily distinguish

between those (analytic) features which help define the term and those (synthetic) ones

which are factually true

Consider the concept
thing then,

(a)

among

want

27

--it

Belief that a certain act might help

I

may

I

will try to

act aggressively

if

perform

"Motives and Motivation,
especially pp. 404-06.

"

,

me

achieve

If

1

want some-

chap.

45 of text are the writer's.

"

it

increases the

that act.

5.

my

attempts to achieve

pp.

it.

Also see his essay on

Encyclopedia of Philosophy

27 Alston, "Motives and Motivation,
p.

many expansions.

frustrated in

26Alston, Philosophy of Language

given on

has

other things:

likelihood that

(b)

of

which the term refers.

of that to

,

404-06.

1st ed.

The

,

V, see

illustrations

(c)

I

may

be reminded of

when

it

I

think of other things associated
with

not obvious that one or another of these
expansions

It is

is

purely analytic

while the rest are purely synthetic.

Alston agrees that empirical evidence
struction but he would deny that

A

it is

(a)

in a

way, a conceptual con-

a neat, tightly integrated, construction.

concept does influence the perceived facts.

wants those to which expansions

is,

and

(c)

Presently we tend to identify as

are applicable.

But

always do so, and thus the expansions are not purely
analytic.
(c)

it

the

smoker

is

regards

of a cigarette,

(a) it is not

even

fluence concepts.

If

if

it

more

likely to withhold

(b),

on the other hand,

is

not purely synthetic.

also true that empirical considerations in-

is

expansion

is

As

he believes this to be an effective act to

Expansion

concepts influence facts,

it

Concerning

he associates one with the other.

if

certain that a businessman

achieve higher sales.

then

don't

questionable, for example, whether the thought of cancer
will remind

evidence about product safety

If

we

(b)

became securely established knowledge,

might well acquire a degree of the analyticity of the other expansion.

Alston intimates that there
the concept want- -we accept

is

most

a

way

in

which we

all

customarily do use

of a set of concept expansions but do not

unequivocally commit ourselves to any one.

We

want to leave open the

possibility, mentioned just above, that concept expansions previously thought

synthetic will acquire a degree of analyticity.

Hilary Putnam makes similar points about the analytic -synthetic

46
distinction.

28

He argues

that there

stipulative and thus purely analytic.

volved

and

in the

There

concept of man, for example.

most are present we label

if

are many concepts which cannot be purely

analogous concepts which

may

is

no one

common

attribute in-

There are a cluster

that entity a

man.

In

of attributes

science we deal with

be called "law -cluster concepts.

"

These are

concepts like "energy" which figure in many laws but play
diverse roles within

Any one

them.

law, even one thought definitional, can be changed and

we

feel

that the identity of the cluster concept has stayed the same.

When we
change

in the

see Einstein's change in the concept of kinetic energy or see a

concept of a straight

optics, these are not

Putnam.

mere changes

line,

resulting in part from experimental

in stipulation of isolated

concepts, says

The concepts exist within conceptual frameworks which

reflect.,

in

varying degrees, both convention and the import of experience.

For Putnam, as for Alston, many concepts are permanently open.
not surprising then to find him, also, suggesting qualifications to the

Excluded Middle, although the earlier essay

in

which he suggests

It is

Law

this

of

does

not itself argue for conceptual openness.

tion,

^Hilary Putnam, "The Analytic and
Space, and Time Minnesota Studies
,

(Minneapolis, Minnesota:
Putnam's argument draws
2 9Hilary

the Synthetic,

" in

Scientific Explana-

Philosophy of Science, Vol. Ill
University of Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 358-97.

in part

in the

on Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism.

Putnam, "Three-Valued Logic," Philosophical Studies

(October, 1957), 73-80.

,

"
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What

is

m ost

noteworthy

in the cited

writings of Putnam and
Alston, as

of others to follow, is
that they maintain the
distinction between concepts
and

outer reality.

Both writers acknowledge
the existence of purely
analytic and

purely synthetic statements. 30

problem has an empiricist
cept and reality.

In

Consequently, their particular
conceptual

tinge.

other words

the

It is

it is

problem

of the

gap between con-

once again the problem of
ostension.

To

talk of the difficulty in
connecting the concepts of want
and energy with partic-

ular experiences, or with
other signs,

is to

as did Augustine for the concept
of walking.
variations,

how do we know where

to

make

essentially the

Among

same

point

a myriad of possible

draw the line?

But there is a difference between
these writers and the positives.
latter, insisting on the durability
of the

two epistemic poles, put their

30Alston, "Motives
and Motivation. "
"There are some statements involving 'want'
or 'desire' which
are true, do not enjoy that status through
embodying

some features

meanings

of the words involved. ...
analytic statements. ..."
[p. 405].

The

faith in

if

they

of the

At the other end there are purely
*

Putnam, "The Analytic and the Synthetic. »
Putnam intimates that change in
meaning does not mean a change in basic reality
and, hence, that there is a
realm one usually refers to as the synthetic.
"In the case of the

terms 'energy' and 'kinetic energy, we want to
say,
want to say, that the meaning has not changed
enough to
affect 'what we are talking about'. ..."
[p. 380].
or at any rate

He also

'

I

states that there can be purely analytic statements,
in the sense of
statements without exception, in cases where the subject
term is presumed
not to figure in any exceptionless natural laws.
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b ridging the gap, through operationalism. 31

Contextualists of the sort

now describing propose instead a gradual closing

of the gap.

According

I

am

to

them, concepts face experience collectively as a conceptual framework,
and

we see therefore depends on

the experience

that

framework.

bridge the epistemic gap because we are only immediately
one side which

is

our concepts.

But

We

could not

in contact

we can know we are closing

it if

with the
the

perplexities which appear in our concept usage should gradually lessen.

essays mentioned, neither Alston nor Putnam elaborates the notion'

In the

that our concepts function within conceptual

argued the case for
us look

with

now

at

that notion in

my

frameworks.

I

have already

earlier discussion of contextualism.

Let

two philosophers of science who are particularly associated

it.

According

to

Thomas Kuhn, much

a set of already accepted theories.

such a set together with methods

3lSome might say
do the reverse.

32

scientific

He argues

work consists

in

elaborating

that until the scientists have

of application, until there is a

shared

mind to matter as idealists
not symmetrical here. Since one's

that positivists collapse

But the relationship is

thoughts are closest to oneself, the rejection of these thoughts is a less convincing epistemological extreme than is the idealist rejection of matter,

granted that neither view is very convincing. As a demonstration of how foolish
someone can sound who tries to reject thought, see Skinner, Beyond Freedom

and Dignity

,

p.

21.

32 The discussion of Kuhn's thought

is

based on the following two works:

Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1st ed. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1962) and Thomas S. Kuhn, "Reflections on
My Critics, " in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge ed. by Imre Lakatos
and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University

Thomas

S.

;

,

Press, 1970).
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paradigm, they do not even know what

The concept

of oxygen, for

to look for.

example, does not stand alone but

integral part of the oxygen theory of combustion.

phlogiston theory, combustion occurred
phlogiston.

In the

in

According

is

an

to the earlier

the presence of air

process of combustion phlogiston escaped.

combined with
Hence, when

"oxygen" was isolated by the phlogiston chemist Priestly, his concept
was that
of "dephlogisticated air"

The example
reality

we

illustrates

And

see.

cult to accomplish,

it

and

this is not

what we today understand as oxygen. 33

how our conceptual frameworks structure

suggests that change

even though

it

in

the very

those frameworks will be diffi-

obviously occurs.

Stephen Toulmin takes an approach to science which

is

similar to Kuhn's.

These two men would agree with Alston and Putnam both

that there is an ex-

ternal reality apart from our concepts and that, because

many

are open, there

is

promise

length than the others

through which

how

of shortening the gap.

this

of

our concepts

But they describe at greater

process occurs, the community of investigators

occurs, and the problems to which the latter respond.

it

33 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
3

,

pp.

53-56, 69-72.

^Toulmin's philosophy of science is expressed most directly and concisely in Stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding: An Inquiry into the
Aims of Science Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers,
1961). The "growth" of scientific knowledge, especially as regards conceptual
change, is discussed in Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding, Vol. I: The
Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1972). The writer's discussion of Toulmin draws from both
,

sources, but principally from the latter.
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Both

men agree mat

those within a scientific discipline
can

move pro-

gressively from one conceptual framework
to an improved one, although

Toulmin emphasizes less the system and
cohesion

of the

framework.

Both

describe this movement as basically
evolutionary, although for Kuhn
internal dynamics involve periods of

framework

stability alternating with

periods of framework change whereas for
Toulmin the process
But

more

significant than these points of

its

agreement on process

each man gives of the role played by the community

is

continuous.

is

the discussion

of investigators.

Kuhn's views have undergone change on this point.

Consider

first

what

he says about periods of framework stability, those
which he calls "normal
science.

According

"

to his earlier views, the scientific

proselytizing function.

community serves

a

Students are expected to accept the prevailing paradigm

of a discipline on the basis of authority rather than that of
independent invcsti-

gation.

35
v

They have

little

competence

to do otherwise

and the texts do not

present fundamental alternatives.

More

recently, Kuhn has suggested that

much learning

of scientific

generalization occurs by a process of ostension in which the student

is

con-

fronted with a series of problem -solutions and told what generalizations they
illustrate.

ing, he

36
If

Kuhn

would seem

to

is

here proposing a pure correspondence theory of know-

have abandoned his basic theme that paradigms structure

dJ Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions

36 Kuhn, "Reflections on

My

,

pp.

Critics," pp. 270-73.

80-81.
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our knowing.

This would be a surprising

shift.

seems

But he

to be

making

the claim, already noted in the writings
of Alston and Putnam, that external

reality and concepts

somehow work together

culty with such a view --he observes that

we

in

knowing.

all learn to identify

byostension: father, mother, sister, dogs, cats.
about how reality and concepts work together.

which are the same for

which allow us
apparatus and
than another

must be

the

all.

The clustering

to identify, say, a

this, also,

is

is

the

dog or

same

Kuhn sees no

And

he gives

many

diffi-

things

some

detail

Reality appears as stimuli

of stimuli into similarity sets,

cat,

for all.

occur

in

our neural processing

That we see one thing rather

due to the educational programming of the apparatus, and this

same

as well since the persons in a discipline share the

same

history, an everyday language, an everyday world, and most of a
scientific
one.

37

Regarding periods of framework change, Kuhn acknowledges

that

individual dissent plays an important initiating role, but he holds that consolidation of the change occurs because

^ 7 Ibid.

it is

accepted by the discipline as a whole.

Kuhn's position here seems similar to Wittgenstein's
p. 276.
claim that ostensive definition is possible within a context but not completely
outside one. And, the context can change for both thinkers.
"One of the things upon which the practice of normal science depends is
a learned ability to group objects and situations into similarity classes
which are primitive in the sense that the grouping is done without an answer
to the question, 'similar with respect to what?' One aspect of every
revolution is, then, that some of the similarity relations change" [p. 275].
,

38Kuhn, The Structure

of Scientific Revolutions, p.

143.
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Such wide agreement

is

possible, according to his later
writing, for the

reasons that one can learn an existing
conceptual framework.
via stimuli, neural patterns, and

to

result of decision or choice however.

in

They are not ultimately matters

by techniques like those outlined above, one

already using

decision,

made

Toulmin,

... At no

it

point

was one aware

like

Kuhn, believes that the process

a priori standards.

Whereas Kuhn seems
share

in

of

"Exploring an alternais likely to find that

of having

reached a

a choice.

community accomplishes framework change

all

that

conceptual framework the

applying a priori standards but are more
experimental.

is

One evidence

^

Kuhn warns against calling these changes

one

old.

both the

shifts do indeed occur, he says, is
that historians regularly learn

make them.

tive theory

comes about

programming which are shared by

advocates of the new paradigm and the
followers of the

framework

It

same

But for

to

Toulmin

it is

is

in

which the scientific

not ultimately one of applying

not immediately of that sort either. 41

ground the possibility of framework

shifts on

what we

language and external stimuli, Toulmin emphasizes our shared

39 Kuhn, "Reflections
on

My

Critics,"

p.

277.

40 Ibid.
4 Toulmin,

Human Understanding

Toulmin argues that the ideas
systems but, rather, constitute
historically-developing conceptual populations. The test of a man's rationality
is not his application of the tests derivable from a static system, but is his
ability to make conceptual adaptations to new situations.
of a milieu do not

form

,

p.

static propositional

486.

53

problems.
to th ^ extent that men living in
different milieus have faced similar
collective problems, and developed
comparable collective activities --or
rational enterprises '-for tackling
•

•

;

them

'42

Se Pamllel

^"Prises

For Toulmin, conceptual change

in an organized manner,
we can
as defining corresponding forums
of

is literally

evolutionary- -a matter of

conceptual innovation and selection so as to
adapt to new situations.

The

selections involved are primarily the collective
judgments of the relevant
scientific

community, based on experience

And, as

iods.

in all cultures

and historical per-

in biological evolution, the rationality
of the

ultimately determined not by

men

judgments

is

but by history. 43

Having examined the Kuhn and Toulmin positions on the
functioning
the scientific

community, we must conclude

are the same.
tions and

Whether

community

meanings or as sharing

accomplishes by force

42 Ibid.

,

p.

492.

43 lbid.

,

p.

501.

"

the

in

is

of

that in a fundamental sense they

better described as sharing in sensa-

problems, what

of outside circumstance.

it

finally

accomplishes,

it

For Kuhn, the community does

.we shall find ourselves coming close to a view of 'historical
destiny' shared with
Vico and Kant, Epicurus and Hegel ... To
.

.

.

.

some --but

only

.

.

.

.

some --extent men could bring

their rational grasp of the

current situation to bear on their future expectations and patterns of life,
in such a way that they anticipated, and so were 'rationally pre -adapted'
to, the novel problem -situations that would face them in the future ....
the verdict of experience rewarded even-handedly those men whose rational
procedures and innovations proved, in the event, to meet the actual demands
"
of history most adequately
.

.

.

.
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not deliberately choose a

new framework.

And while Toulmin wants

em-

to

phasize the reasoning involved in conceptual
change, the success of a change

depends on historical destiny.

what the community does, for

The

So in neither case can we properly criticize
it

ultimately has no choice.

last of the five features

belief in evident problems.

I

identify in a degree of truth logic is the

Toulmin

is

quite explicit on this point, as

we have

seen, but the view has also been continuously present in
Kuhn's work.
scientist never finds a perfect
reality, says Kuhn.

fit

The

between the prevailing paradigm and external

The scientist knows

this is so not

because he can go com-

pletely outside the paradigm and look but because there are anomolies. 44
of the anomolies in the phlogiston theory, for example,

supposed

when heated

to lose phlogiston

after metal

in air

in later

that an object

was

and yet the material remaining

was so heated weighed more than before.

and most emphatically

was

One

Kuhn sometimes asserts,

work, that the anomolous experience

is

an

evident problem.

Most
and

of the puzzles of

normal science are directly presented by nature,
Though different solutions have been

all involve nature indirectly.

received as valid at different times
arbitrary set of conceptual boxes.

j.

nature cannot be forced into an

All of the writers mentioned above have probably been influenced by the

"ordinary language" philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

^^Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
45 Kuhn, "Reflections on

My

Critics, "

p.

263.

,

It is

thus appropriate

chap. IV.

This position

mittedly at odds with some passages in the earlier work.

is

ad-

55
to close the literature review
with a brief look at this position.

^

Wittgen-

stein explicitly denies that ostension
by itself can convey meaning,

attributes the view that

it

(lie

can to Augustine but Augustine's ostension

unusual kind, as we have seen.

)

an

is

Wittgenstein holds that ostension can work

within a context -what Kuhn above calls
an educational programming.

Contexts are for Wittgenstein like rules of a
game, and words have uses

according to the rules.

must understand
a series of
that a

the whole game.

person can engage

tie

to

them

all.

some super game--in

language games have

resemblances

in

in

common.

each other.

a piece in chess, for example,

Language

games which overlap each

they are part of

which

To understand

is

not one

game, however.

And these are

other.

For Wittgenstein

this

public

What language games do have
it

is

mean

which
is

It is

games such

does not

fact there is no one thing

Consequently

we

all

family

family resemblances, also,

together the various uses of a particular word.

What

for us is

most notable about

this

ordinary language position

is

Wittgenstein's belief that we can understand all the various language games.
It

is like the belief of

framework

to another.

Kuhn and Toulmin

that

we can pass from one conceptual

Wittgenstein's argument here seems to be that

we could

46 The writer's discussion of Wittgenstein's
thought is based primarily
on K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy (Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1969); the editor's introduction to Harold

Morick, ed.

Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds (New York: McGraw1967); and Max Black, "Wittgenstein's Views about Language,"
Margins of Prec i sion (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1970,

Hill Book

pp.

,

Company,

246-67.
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not even understand our

others.

For a word

to

own

situation

if

we could

not understand that of

have a meaning there must be a rule
governing

its

use.

But to have a rule is to be able to
check whether

it

is

Wittgenstein, and a single person cannot do
so.

It

would be the same as trying

to verify information in a

There

We

is

no sense

in a

newspaper by another copy

being followed, says

of the

same paper.

47

person's talk about experiences as being purely
inward.

48
can refer to our selves as objects but not as
subjects.
It

might be granted that Wittgenstein's argument

is

persuasive as to why

any group of people must share some language games
(though
this without qualifications) but

why must they share

lieve he gives a reason for the latter position.

I

do not grant

them?

all of

I

don't be-

The stated purpose

of his later

philosophizing was to dissolve philosophical puzzles by examining
our ordinary

47 Introduction

to Wittgenstein

and the Problem of Other Minds

,

pp. xvi-

xviii.

48 Ibid.

,

p.

xix.

"In his second argument, Wittgenstein attempts to show that the 'I' in
argument does not refer to an owner of experiences; and he

the skeptical

presents two reasons
applied in

.

.

.

First, no criteria of personal identity are

my avowing my thoughts and feelings
Thus Wittgenstein
am not talking about any particular entity but just about the
.

.

.

says that I
I_
experience of feeling pain itself. He does not maintain that all uses of 'I
or 'my' are nonreferentiaL but only what he calls die use of 'I' as subject
'

In

T's other use as

there

object,

is the possibility that

it

clearly refers

am wrong.

...

In all of

.

these cases,

And here we come

to his second
reason for holding that 'I' does not refer to an owner of experiences: he
says that where there is no chance of referring to the wrong person, it does
not make sense to speak of referring to a person at all " [Underlining of
the long passages is this writer's. J
I

.

.

.

"

language use, and an assumption
behind this purpose was that we simply
did,

have such an ordinary language. 49

in fact,

concluding this exposition of a degree of truth
logic,

In

out what

and

of

is

it

about Wittgenstein's notion of a rule that
makes

any similar contextualist position, that

cist philosophy tends to

it is

want

I

me

to point

say of

empiricist tinged.

absorb categories within relationships.

A

it,

Empiri-

purely

empiricist social science will treat persons as publicly
observable behavior
patterns, and
to

if it is

wholly consistent

chemical interactions.

ational flux.

The

When we say

self,

will reduce those behavior patterns

it

even the body, disappears into an associ-

that there are truly such things as mental concepts,

not just sounds in response to sense impressions, then

we depart from

empiricism toward a middle, contextualist, view.

if

the existence of conscious meanings or purposes

they are publicly shared, our position

There

is

ationism.

49

now a mental

life

but

it is

is

still

But

is

we then argue

that

only possible insofar as

analogous to that of the empiricist.
not an individual

The bleakness, the emptiness,

life,

it

is

an associ-

of the empiricist notion of people

Black, "Wittgenstein's Views about Language,"

p.

259.

"...

the general agreement among human beings that in fact makes it
possible for them to play the same language games --to speak the same
language on the whole --is a remarkable fact, by no means to be 'taken as

a matter of course.

'

That

men

constantly misunderstand, and not always

what is easily overlooked- -in moments of
pessimism, at least--is the extent of de facto agreement that makes the
very existence of a shared language possible. Human beings do, on the
whole 'agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions
but in form of life.
On the purpose of philosophy as the dissolving of philosophical puzzles, see
Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, pp. 86-88.
willfully, is obvious enough;

'
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remains.

For Wittgenstein there apparently was no
center

conscious subjectivity.

By this

I

mean more

large part a product of his social setting.

completely impossible.
reference.

of individual

than that an individual was in

mean

I

that personal

autonomy was

There was meaningful reference but no true

self

^

Critique of a Degree of Truth Logic

framework which was complete

in the

.

We

could speak of a conceptual

sense that

was shared by

it

all (or

more

accurately was the determinant of all thought), although the
framework was

incomplete

in the

framework

like the

sense that

it

could evolve.

above but which was also incomplete

reality could pierce through the

would

call

Or we could speak

framework

degrees of truth logics.

at points.

in that

of a conceptual

external

These are both what

Wittgenstein and possible Toulmin

better illustrate the first view, and the others mentioned

may

I

may

better illustrate

the second.

Whichever

How can

of these

two views one takes,

one judge, without being arbitrary, what

improved conceptual framework? According
judgment

it

is

made by

a

community

response to evident problems.

to a

faces a serious criticism.
is

degree of truth logic,

of investigators or language users

But this

answer

is

in

which a paradigm

My

Critics,"

and

in

mob

rule for his earlier

is

presented to students as dogma.

p.

234.

50see footnote 48.
51 Kuhn, "Reflections on

this

not convincing in itself.

Kuhn, for example, has been accused of advocating

view of normal science

an improved concept or an

^
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Consider

firs-, this

would probably agree

from

notion of evident problems.

that

facts of nature. 52

human

All the writers cited

values and purposes are not clearly
distinct

Values are an integral part of that
conceptual frame-

work without which we could see no

Why

facts.

then are problems any less

framework-dependent, since problems appear to be
values expressed
reverse form? Can

it

be that values are

of the here and nov than are

If I

the

problems?

can articulate a problem,

same degree

I

more

in

lacking in the full concreteness

don't see why.

I

can rephrase

of specificity or generality.

If in

it

as a value having the

some

city a certain

amount

of the housing stock is substandard, the corresponding
value is simply to

eliminate that substandard housing.

If I

see this particular housing problem

as part of a broader problem arising from the operation of
the economic sys-

tem then

just to the extent that

describe what

I

conceptual frameworks.

in the

from which

Broader

felt

to judge the

can

articulated values

worth of different

problems might be able

judge when these felt problems exist? Apparently

community

I

economic system, as regards housing.

seem no more capable than are

of providing an outside position

is to

can describe how this connection works

want to be different

Articulated problems

who

I

of investigators or of language users.

We seem

it

to do so, but

must be

to be

the

thrown back

on this notion of a meaning, purposive community as the one ultimate response

52

The writer

is

not advancing a fully instrumentalist view of knowledge,

on behalf of these authors.

He

is

making

the

weaker claim

not independent of facts but help structure them.

that

purposes are

60
to the criticism of a degree of truth
logic.

Now why assume
share as much

in

that the

community

is

correct?

Why assume

we

sense data and interpretation as Kuhn, for
one, says we do?

Wittgenstein's answer, and he gives the most definite
answer,

no choice.

that

To be conscious

is that

of something, to be able to conceptualize

we have
it,

requires that we already be following a rule- -that we
already share a con's

ceptual framework.
to

3

For Wittgenstein, though, we cannot present meanings

our subjective selves since the rule, being public,

jective selves.

such a way as

But

we can communicate with each

correct mistakes in meaning.

to

argument Wittgenstein has made
his version of

it

is

I

tells us nothing of

other, of course, and in

am

going to call the kind of

the "communication argument,

analogous to a pure empiricism,

in that

it

and because

'

concedes no

sense to reports of thoughts or sensations attributed to a subject,
it

I

shall call

the "empiricist version. "

The reader
cation argument

I

sub-

will

is

now ask whether

correct.

And

more

so.

empiricist version of the communi-

to that question

personally believe that the argument

idealist version--but no

this

It

is just

explains

1

have no unambivalent answer.

as correct as what

I

why we can have meanings, con-

cepts, and that is something which empiricism does not do well.

explains

why we can be mistaken about meanings, and

does not do well.

Bat the

problem with

this

S^Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception

shall call an

that is

It

also

something idealism

version of the communication argu-

of Philosophy, pp.

75-76.
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ment

is its

By

rejection of subjectivity.

itself, the position in

ordinary language philosophy that we
just do

share our concepts could lead to a
dogmatic sort of concept analysis.

I

shall

close this discussion of a degree of
truth logic by very briefly considering
one

example

of the ordinary language approach.

From

an examination of "The Concept of Interest
in Pluralist and Marxian

Analysis" Isaac Balbus concludes ".
concept 'interest'

is

more

far

.

.

that the

Marxian treatment

of the

consistent with the variety of meanings that
our

ordinary language acknowledges are entailed by the
concept, and

that, as a

consequence, Marxian analysis has both explanatory and
normative advantages

over Pluralist analysis.

"

54

Our ordinary language recognizes, says
equally important meanings of interest. 55
defines interest as what a person likes.
defines

it

Balbus, two very different yet

One, the subjective meaning,

The other, or objective meaning,

as what a person has a stake in or

is

affected by.

According

to

Balbus, Pluralism recognizes the first meaning only believing that no one can

be mistaken about his interests. 00

above

all,

analysis

is

But

Marxian analysis recognizes both and,

concerned with their interrelationship.

is

This

is

why Marxian

superior.

54 Isaac D. Balbus, "The Concept of Interest in
Pluralist and Marxian
Analysis, " Politics and Society I (February, 1971), 151.
,

55ibid.

,

p.

152.

56 lbid.

,

p.

155.
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Without probing the details of the
Balta essay
First, is

it

I

want to ask two questions.

likely that any theory as
widely accepted as the Pluralist theory
of

pontics would ignore an obvious use
of language? Secondly,

two very different meanings of a term

to

is it

possible for

be "equally important" in the sense

of "equally dominant?"

To

the first question

my

own answer would be

"no. "

Recent Pluralists

such as Robert Dahl affirm the existence
of a consensus on the most important

procedures or methods.

And they assert

which most people reason about.
into.

57

It

is

that the

consensus

is not

something they have been socialized

People thus have an "objective" interest in this
consensus in the

Now

Balbus sense.

of course the effect of society upon

them

benign effect rather than the malign one which Marxism
sees.
the point.

The point

is that

Pluralists, too, accept the

ings that our ordinary language acknowledges

57 Robert Dahl,
ty of

something

A

But that is not

variety of

p.

mean-

58

.

.

Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago:

Chicago Press, 1956),

"...

"
.

"...

considered a

is

The Universi-

132.

politicians subject to elections

must operate within the limits set
by their own values, as indoctrinated members of the society, and by their
expectations about what policies they can adopt and still be reelected.
In a sense, what we ordinarily describe as democratic 'polities' is

merely

the chaff.

conflicts.

surface manifestation, representing superficial
Prior to politics, beneath it, is the underlying consensus on
It

is the

policy that usually exists in the society
the politically active members. "

p.

a predominant proportion of

58 Balbus, "The Concept of Interest
in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis,
151. That pluralists may not label this consensus an objective interest,

the Marxian sense, is of

for

among

it

and that

it

minor significance.

The

fact is that they do allow

does have a specified relationship to subjective interests.

"

in

63

To

the second question, also,

the effect of a social system on

its

my answer
members

is

is "no. "

we assume

If

largely benign, (perhaps be-

cause affluence washes away system bias) then the dominant
concept
is

The objective, we take for granted.

the subjective.

system

is

dominant on that view.
interest of the

since that

change

But

if

of interest

the effect of the

malign then the objective concept of interest should become dom-

Whichever view we

inant.

that

is

If

take, the two

1

meanings

take the Marxist view

American people

is in

of interest cannot both be

I

cannot say that the real

a higher material standard of living,

what they say they want, and also that the real interest

socio-economic system to provide more meaningful

in the

a

is in

lives.

I

will

probably say, as Marx does, that objective interests are the source of subjective interests.

The Balbus essay
philosophy.

If

we

illustrates a troubling feature of ordinary language

really do consider the full variety of ways in which

an important concept we

may

well find that the uses are virtual contraries.

Hence our analysis does not much help us unless we assume
are dominant.

In that

case, a person

who

that

"we are communicating, after

our basic concepts.

" 59

^This writer does

that certain uses

disputes the uses so

to find himself confronted with appeals to look

argument

we use

more

all,

so

assumed

is

apt

carefully and with the

we must

really agree on

Wittgenstein suggested that his purpose

in

language

not say that Balbus, himself, takes such an over-

bearing posture, but that such a posture is given a rationale in the ordinary
language approach. Furthermore, there are those who do seem to

64

examination was not
is this

It

argue but

to

to give

very practical difficulty

reminders.

in a

degree of truth logic-its down-

grading of explicit debate over concepts
-which prompts

me

to look for

another

approach to conceptual problems.

A

Degree

second form
realism.

I

of Reality Logic.

of contextualism, a

I

want

to speculate that there

may

be a

second middle way between idealism and

believe that this speculation can lead to a
method of concept

ination which does give

more weight

This second form
Contradiction.

is

exam -

to debate.

associated with doubt about the Law of Non-

Whereas a degree

of truth logic asserts that our

ant concepts cannot be precisely defined, the conceptual
logic

I

most import-

now describe

asserts that these concepts are precisely defined but by their
contradictories

and contraries.

Because

a degree of truth logic

it

this logic is as

much

a form of contextualism as

too avoids the criticism of positivism that

we have

only a flux of sensations and don't really see a whole picture of reality.

because

it

envisions contradictory concepts

it

is

And

too avoids the usual criticism

Consider the following statements by Copi.
we do communicate with each other and understand the terms we
use, the intensional or connotative meanings involved are neither subjective

take

it.

"Since

[constituting the features of objects believed to be denoted by a term] nor
objective [all the features which are in fact common to all the objects
"
denoted by a term]
Now, it is agreed to use certain terms to denote certain objects, says Copi.
"The conventional connotation of a term is its most important aspect
for purposes of definition and communication, since it is both public and
.

.

.

.

can be known by people who are not omniscient" [Copi, Introduction
Logic, p. 109].

to

65
of contextualism that
In this

case

it

we are forced

does so because

if

to see reality

from restricted viewpoints.

we simultaneously see

a thing in contra-

dictory ways, then our vision must
be inclusive, whetever one

may

think of

that kind of inclusiveness.
In striking

this

contrast both to empiricism and to a degree
of truth logic,

second conceptual logic denies,

any gap between concepts and reality.
there

is

most sweeping way,

in the

By this

mean,

I

that there is

firstly, that

any possibility of defining a concept by pointing.

It

it

denies

denies the sug-

gestion of Alston, Putnam, or Kuhn that external reality
intrudes sometimes

and can help produce a conceptual change.

But

I

also mean, secondly, that

this logic denies the essential objectivity of
concepts.

It

denies a position like

Wittgenstein's according to which all meaningful concepts must
be capable of

being checked by something outside the person using them.
I

have now indicated the two main features

The two are closely

interrelated.

If

there

concepts must be defined by themselves.
informative unless

it

something about white

second contextualism.

nothing outside concepts then

is

But a self -definition is not at all

involves the negation of the concept.
if I

know

that

it

is not

implies, though, that a concept contains

Now

of a

its

not -white.

I

do begin to learn

That

I

do so necessarily

contradictory within

itself.

given a situation in which thought and reality are identical but

which thought becomes more informative as
contradictions,

we cannot say

it

becomes more aware

that thought can be mistaken.

always corresponds exactly to reality, since

it

is

identical to

in

of all its

For thought
it.

Therefore we

66

cannot speak now of a degree of truth
logic.
reality can be incomplete.

That

is

why

I

But this thought which is also

call this

second conceptual logic a

degree of reality logic.
At this point the reader

One might grant

ulation.

if it

I

were

may

well ask

if

speculation

that a degree of reality logic

not implausible, but might then insist that

say that reality and thought are identical?

don't exist--world peace for example.
internally contradictory?

servative does that
tive?

my

mean

If

the

We

same

The claim seems absurd.

it is

I

as saying that he

I

may respond

that,

in fact,

In the following

at

some

show

is

is politically

each

is

more

con-

not politically conserva-

may argue

that people have

of Non-Contradiction.

not

it is

But the reader

just is not equally plausible.

discussion

length the two

that

it

Law

do

say that concepts are

questioned the Law of Excluded Middle and ask why, therefore,
equally plausible to question the

Why

implausible.

can think of many things which

And why do

Of course

spec-

would be interesting,

claim that a certain person

I

is not idle

I

respond to these questions.

main features

I

of a degree of reality logic,

plausible than

it

may seem,

initially.

first

and

Then

I

consider

I

try to

make

a

brief point by point comparison of this logic with the main features of a degree
of truth logic.

The discussion

but in the present case
is

I

is followed,

shall consider the

Hegel whose work most represents what

The discussion concludes by referring
ter where

I

as earlier, by a literature review,

work
I

of a single writer, Hegel.

call a

degree of reality

It

logic.

the reader to material in the last chap-

attempt to illustrate the practical difference between the two

67

conceptual logics.

The Verstehen Method

--

As long as we focus on

the distinction between thought and reality

sciences there

yet has appeal to
to this

method

a

is

common

of inquiry

sense.

may seem

which tends

This

is

to

the natural sciences,

obvious.

But in the social

deny the distinction and

the Verstehen method.

method we learn about other human actions because

According

the actions are the

concepts and because we are somehow involved in the conceptual
framework of
these other people.

^

What underlies Verstehen
in distinguishing

may

an observation

indirectly mentioned earlier

way we see physical nature we do

they constitute nature.
But a

We

human

suppose that there
action

is different.

possibly have a meaning imposed upon
in the

I

between positivism and contextualism.

structure the

they operate.

is

it,

it

is

not

While our concepts

normally suppose that

something external upon which

While such an action may

also has a meaning within

absence of the latter meaning we are apt to say that there

This action

may

involve a bodily

movement

but

it

may

is

it,

and

no action.

take place only as a

~oT>ri lis description of Verstehen is not as applicable to

some authors,

associated with that approach --Max Weber, for example--as to others. This
is based primarily on the following sources:
Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Rout ledge & Kegan Paul, 1958; Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action
Viking Compass Book (New York: Viking Press, 1959); Essays by Ernest Nagel,
"The Subjective Nature of Social Subject Matter," Donald Davidson, "Actions,
Reasons, and Causes, " and May Brodbeck, "Meaning and Action, " in Readings
in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences ed. by May Brodbeck (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1968); and Don Martindale, "Verstehen, " International

writer's discussion of the approach

,

,

Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,

1st.

ed.

,

XVI, 308-13.
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process

in the

mind.

in thought is as

Stuart

much an

Hampshire points

out that a conclusion reached

action as any other. 61

by an action we mean something
conscious and

Hampshire also suggests
I

follow this interpretation. 62

Given the above features of a human
action,
that

meanings are internal by an example.

friend, sending a
of

narrow the
there

possibilities.

is a fair

A man

I

shall illustrate the point

waving could be greeting

message across a distance, directing

innumerable other acts.

traffic or doing

The societal context within which he
If

he

is

probability that he

for sure what he is doing then

we

that

is

a

any one

acting

may

standing in the center of an intersection
then
directing traffic.

is

But

if

we want

And we normally take

ask.

his

to

know

answer as

conclusive.

Furthermore, our hand waver's answer
the best predictor of his

own actions

(as if

is

conclusive not because he

is

he noticed that he often greeted

friends and so predicted that this was what he was doing now)
but because his
intention determined the nature of the action in the first place.

intention there would be only an

movement

as an action

it is

arm movement, and

if

Without that

anyone interpreted that

his interpretation, not the other person's, that

would be mistaken.

We

6l

see that there

is

a

domain

of

human experience, some would say

Hampshire, Thought and Action

,

pp.

the

90-91.

What Hampshire says, most explicitly, is that an intentional action
must be conscious, but he also seems to say the same of action itself. See
Hampshire, Thought and Action chap. 2, especially pp. 93-95, 119-21.
,
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most important

one,

where the common sense view

is that

thought and reality

are identical.

There

human

is,

action in the extreme form which

scious then he

me

he

that

is

Now

taken.

a

however, a serious problem with

is thinking.

But

if

I

have given

Verstehen approach
63

it.

If

a

man

his thoughts are his actions then

it

is

to

con-

seems

to

incapable of moral deliberation, because he can
never be mis-

it

is a

common

criticism of the Verstehen approach that

cannot be mistaken about his actions. 64

man

this

that he cannot be moral.

I

shall explain

my

But

it

is

less

it

common

supposes
to say

reasoning.

The problem that is described here and
perhaps, the only major problem of Verstehen,

in the following footnote is not,

but

it is

the one that shall be

discussed.
64

Despite their varying treatments of it, this problem of identifying
mistakes is a central point for Nagel, Davidson, and Brodbeck. Nagel views
the Verstehen approach as one of introspective analysis of psychic states
and

argues

that:

"...

the controlled study of overt behavior is nevertheless the only

sound procedure for achieving reliable knowledge concerning individual and
social actions" [Nagel, "The Subjective Nature of Social Subject Matter, "
[This writer's emphasis. J
p. 40].
Davidson disputes the claim that reasons and actions are logically inseparable. He argues, among other points, that one can be mistaken about
one's reasons, and that one can know one is mistaken because he can know the
connection between reason and action. Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and

Causes,

"

On

pp. 54-57.
this

same general problem

of identifying mistakes,

Brodbeck criticizes

the Wittgensteinian version of Verstehen on the ground that

"...

our understanding and knowledge of man is therefore a priori and
necessary rather than, as with the natural sciences, a posteriori and
contingent. " [Brodbeck, "Meaning and Action, " p. 60J.
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If

we conceive

the fact that a

man

of

human

action as always involving bodily

movement

then

could never be mistaken about his
actions would not imply

that he could not be morally
responsible.

Although some of his thought would

be identical to his actions, other
parts of his thought would consist in
spreading
before himself a series of alternatives
and making choices among them,

choices which would issue in action.

But

if

all of his thoughts

which he cannot be mistaken then his conclusions
definition.

We

are actions about

of thought are inevitable, by

are not apt to call someone morally responsible

if

his

moral

conclusions are inevitable.

One possible way around

this

problem would be

Wittgenstein on language and social relationships.

to adopt the position of

At least two recent Verste-

hen thinkers, Peter Winch and Stuart Hampshire, find

The rules which according

to Wittgenstein provide

it

appropriate to do so. 65

meaning

to

our concepts are

also simultaneously our social institutions and customs, and these
in a sense

are our actions. 66

Winch gives

this

example, among others:

65Winch, The Idea of
a Soci a l Science and

Its

Relation to Philosophy; and

Hampshire, Thought and Action. Winch grounds his work, explicitly, on
Wittgenstein's approach. Hampshire does not do so, but his discussion of how
one can communicate with another appears to draw from Wittgenstein. See
It is evident that the only Verstehen thinkers
pp. 55-61, Thought and Actio n.
whose work is discussed in this section are those who draw from Wittgenstein.
This is done because the writer's purpose is to criticize this sort of Verstehen
approach.
ot,

See Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and
pp. 121-28, 131-36.

Its

Relation to Philosophy

,

71

'/^

SlmPly mVented by

exJafn
wM^Hhappens when societies
explain what
idea which provides the criteria
'

'

of

members

come

what

of the conflicting societies.

are certain things which

1

is

into

who w * nt

armed

conflict.

appropriate

Because

my

in the

^ to

an
behavior of
It

is

country

must and certain things which

I

is at war there
must not do. 67

Wittgenstein's position appears to be a
solution to the problem of Versce-

hen because, while

ways

of describing

68

position),

it

holds that concepts and

how we follow

same

the fact that there is a rule

Hence one can distinguish,
But

the

when

in

the Verstehen

human

rule (and is thus a Verstehen

means

that one can

it

check for mistakes.

a sense, between moral and immoral acts.

method

is

associated with a position like Witt-

genstein's, the method ceases to be part of what

because

action are simply different

I

call a degree of reality logic

ceases to emphasize the subjectivity of a human action. 69

I

shall

elaborate again.
If

form

I

share the same rule with everyone else,

of life, then just so far as the rule affects

67 Ibid.

,

p.

if

my

I

am

involved in the

actions

i

am

same

not a subject.

127.

68in any case,

seems

to be a kind of

Verstehen position, as it apparently does to those Verstehen thinkers who build upon it. Of course,
Wittgenstein is not talking about introspection as a method of inquiry—and it is
this
latter method which is often, and this writer thinks more properly, associated
it

with the approach.

69The philosophic distance
between apparent behaviorists like Nagel and
Brodbeck and Verstehen analysts like Winch or Hampshire does not seem so
great as the former suppose. Both sides tend to reject introspection- -at least
as something possible apart from society. Both emphasize a public domain,

though for the former this tends to be a domain of sense experience while for
the latter it is a domain of shared concepts. The empiricist tinge in Wittgenstein's approach is discussed in this writer's text at pp. 57-58.

72
I

don't decide what to choose.

example, an instance

whether
it

is

this killing is

it

murder and should

national defense and should.

then

my

my

of killing is involved, then
the

whether to do the act or
of

The rule establishes

not, but

Now,
if

choices.

for

If,

shared rule will determine

not be done, or whether, as
in war,

of course,

I

must decide,

in the end,

the rule completely defines the
morality

action as a ^ubject is intellectually
empty and, hence,

really action according to Verstehen
analysis.

is

not

The action may be "mine"

in

the sense that a Sartre existentialism
would give to that term, but otherwise
it is

better described as the action of the
society in which, as an object,

I

am

immersed.
Perhaps no Verstehen thinker would claim,
though, that the rule completely specified action.

Certainly Peter Winch would not do so.

He dis-

tinguishes between the beliefs which exist within
a "mode of discourse" and

modes

of discourse as wholes.

70

This suggests what he elsewhere says

explicitly --that a rule is not a rigid formula but

the agent in changing circumstances. 71

method,

I

am

must be interpreted anew by

Now when

talking not about the narrowing of

I

talk about the

Verstehen

human choices which

the rule

involves but about those choices to which Winch alludes --choices
which

remain for

the person as a subject to

make.

And about these choices

I

still

do not

see how the actor can be mistaken; these he cannot check against a rule.

7 0winch,
p.

The Idea

of a Social Science and Its Relation to Phil osophy,

110.

71 Ibid.

,

pp.

62-65, 91-94.

So

73
the

problem

of

Verstehen-that we cannot morally deliberate
-seems

to

another response to the problem,
however-one which

is

persist.

There

more

is

satisfactory but is perhaps as

much

so.

no

Suppose we take seriously the

Niels Bohr quotation at the beginning
of this chapter that the opposite of a
great
truth is another truth, and suppose

we further assume

distinction between the true and the moral.

act in a

way which

is

Then

it is

that there is no sharp

possible for a person to

autonomous, yet substantive, while

person can check the meaning and hence the morality

at the

same time

of his actions.

This

the

is

why.

The person

acts,

wc are supposing, independently

and furthermore he cannot be mistaken
however.

If

of his

He can be incomplete,

he does not recognize the inherently tragic nature of human action

and thus sees only one side

immoral.

in his acts.

of social influences

He can

of a

moral issue

is

precisely then that he

is

identify his incompleteness without wholly sharing the views

moral opponents, though.

The

Now

human

is it

it

so odd to say that

nor be morally wrong but that
trial vs. free press.

it

conflict itself will

accomplish

that.

action cannot be mistaken in meaning

can be one-sided? Consider the issue of fair

Certainly there are strong arguments for a free press,

particularly in the coverage of courtroom proceedings and particularly in the

case of political offenders.

But there can be equally strong arguments for the

claim that press coverage makes a fair trial impossible and especially
those cases mentioned.

in just

74

There are many moral dilemmas such as

Do

they define the

assumed

is a

that they do.

human

reality,

human
I

situation?

discussion of Verstehen,

I

have

and reality are wholly identical, but

of

that this

necessarily filled with contradictions.

is

It

Are they pervasive?

have suggested that for the most important
part

action, thought

tragic identity.

In this

the above.

Contradiction -- The affirmation of contradiction
feature of a degree of reality logic.

I

second major

is the

want to suggest both that there can be

contradictory concepts and that there can be contradictions,
or dilemmas,
social phenomena.

upon

my

While the

first point is the

exposition of Hegel for

its

defense.

more fundamental

In

what follows

I

it

in

must wait

speak mainly

to the second.

This affirmation of contradiction may be more plausible than

To understand why we must

first look

it

seems.

back to the argument that can be made

for any contextualist position- -for any position according to which the facts

see depend in part on our conceptual framework.

we

Charles Taylor gives a

cogent version of that argument as he develops the thesis that political science
cannot be value neutral.
of contextualism.

72
I

I

have drawn on his argument

now look

at

it

in

my

earlier discussion

directly.

Taylor observes that for any range of phenomena there are an indefinite

number

of features that could figure in correlations.

Thus we cannot develop

explanatory theories of any breadth except as we identify the crucial dimensions

72 See pp. 29-32 of text and footnote
"Neutrality in Political Science. "

8.

The work referred

to is Taylor,

75

within which our phenomena can
vary.
to gather.

Otherwise, we do not know what facts

But in identifying the dimensions
of variation (henceforth

simply call them distinctions) we are taking
value positions.
see the difference

in political

judgment

in

Now

is to

shall

For example,

systems as primarily a difference

not the systems allow political freedom

I

to

whether or

in

have made, already, a value

favor of those which do allow such freedom.

a person might say that in

"overridden"

in a political

some cases

system --for example

political

in

freedom had

wartime.

But

if

to be

he went

further and argued that political freedom was not
the primary basis for distinguishing between polities, then he would have "undermined"
the theory
involved.

this since

And

it is

any way

Taylor's point that he would not be unscientific
of looking at

With the Taylor argument

phenomena involves some value
in

if

he did

position.

73

mind, can we imagine any major distinction

which would be an "outcast distinction" --a distinction never

used as a

to be

principal basis for differentiating phenomena? Certainly one must be very

careful before answering this question with a "yes.

"

It

is the

nature of con-

ceptual frameworks that those operating within them are not readily tolerant
of other perspectives.

the illustrations

I

An American

liberal would probably find unconvincing

use in discussing contextualism.

He would

label

73 In a later work, however, Taylor is very explicit
to the point that
some conceptual frameworks are superior to others, and that only those who
operate within the more adequate positions can know this. Charles Taylor,
"Interpretation and the Sciences of
1971), 3-51.

Man," Review

See especially pp. 46-47.

of

Metaphysics

,

XXV

(Fall,

76
"exploitation, *

"imperials" and similar concepts

with political realities.

There

is

as leftist jargon unconnected

But the Marxist would find such
concepts fundamental.

one distinction, however, which

outcast in Western thought.

It

is

is

very widely treated as an

the distinction between contradiction
or its

practical expression in dilemma,
on the one hand, and the absence
of contradiction, on the other.

phenomena

is to

To use

this distinction as a

imply that dilemma

there would be no point in so

is

often the

much emphasizing

primary basis for dividing

human

condition.

the distinction.

Thus the distinction makes a great difference.

If

there are

problems which represent logical impossibilities
then our
is to

the

learn how to live with the consequent dilemmas.

problems only appear

to

much

of

something as a dilemma

elaboration.

Our

But

many

social

intellectual response

if

we suppose

that

be dilemmas then we are saying that the
distinction

between contradiction and non -contradiction

appearance

Otherwise

is

We

is trivial.

obvious and

is a

are saying that the

point not deserving

effort should be directed instead at attempts
to resolve

these supposed dilemmas.

Let us consider, now, the collective choice problem and some
associated

problems

in

democratic theory generally.

According

to a precise formulation,

the collective choice problem is one of aggregating a multiplicity
of individual

preference orderings around alternate social actions. 74

The collective

74 This

is basically the formulation of Kenneth
J. Arrow, "Values and
Collective Decision-Making, " in Philosophy, Politics and Society Third Series,
,

ed. by Peter Las left
pp. 215-32.

and W. G. Runciman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969)

77

choice-democratic theory literature

is

particularly worth examining in

connection with our tendency to treat the
distinction between contradiction and
non-contradiction as an outcast distinction.

The reason

it

is

so

is

because there

are some writings which come perilously close
to admitting the distinction and
the treatment of those writings is illuminating.
I

shall look very briefly at three

works with

the intent not to

examine any

details (except in one instance) but simply to point out
what the writers claim to

have done and how they and others react to
Kenneth Arrow,

democracy,

in

in a

it.

rigorous formal proof, claims to have shown that

a widely accepted sense of that term,

argues, specifically, that there

is

is

He

is itself

an ordering and

dictated by a minority (provided there are at least three alternatives).

The reaction
of the

75

no rule by which individual preference

orderings can be aggregated into a social choice which
is not

impossible.

to

dilemma.

Arrow's work appears
76

And

I

believe that

to be largely

an attempt

Arrow himself shares

to find a

way

this desire.

out

He

75a brief presentation of this proof is made in the previously-cited work.
The proof is developed in more detail in Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and

New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press,
understand the Arrow proof, this writer has benefited from

Individual Values (2d ed.
1963).

In trying to

Thomas Conrad, "The
lished

Pli.

;

Collective Choice Problem in Political Theory" (unpub-

D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1968).

a chapter added to the second edition of Arrow, Social Choice and
Individual Values he responds to some of his critics. The thrust of their
,

criticism seems to be a claim that there
that there is a way out of it.

is

no true dilemma or, alternatively,

78

has described his conclusion
as "quite embarrassing.

Richard Wollheim has argued that
there seems
theory of democracy.
ine

[i.

e.

"

.

.

if

.

a

man expresses

seems

to be

committed

to be a

ity choice,

Wollheim

is

A

to the belief that

in the

and the mach-

then the man,

B,

the case and to the belief that B
ought to be the case. " 7 *
that there is no reasonable democratic

paradox

a choice for

democratic system] expresses a choice
for

to be a sound democrat,

" 77

A

if

he

is

ought to be

Whereas Arrow argue,

system which does not lead

to a

minor-

wondering how a person can adopt as his own
the

choice of a democratic system

if it

does not agree with his personal choice.

Wollheim sees no real paradox, however.
prepared to regard Democracy as inconsistent.

"I
" 79

doubt that any of us are

He proposes

a distinction

which, for him, shows that the two claims of his
hypothetical democrat are
compatible.
of

Other authors, while displaying the same

Democracy, propose other

distinctions. 80

Robert Paul Wolff has claimed that there

77 Kenneth

J.

faith in the consistency

is

no way to make the autonomy

Arrow, "Values and Collective Decision -Making,

"

p.

228.

78 Richard Wollheim, "A Paradox in
the Theory of Democracy, " in
Philosophy, Politics and Society Second Series, ed. by Peter Laslett and
W. G.
Runciman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 78-79.
,

79 Ibid.

of

,

p.

84.

SOsee, for example, D. Goldstick, "An Alleged Paradox in the Theory
" Philosophy and Public Affairs
II (Winter, 1973), 181-89.

Democracy,

,

79
of the individual compatible with the
legitimate authority of the state. 81

individual

is

morally autonomous he cannot be under a moral
obligation

the laws of any state.

and, hence,

But

a state

if

citizens have a

its

is

legitimate

moral obligation

it

to

it

obey

obey

its

is

Here Wolff

laws.

inconsistent.

On

cannot be possible, as Wollheim thinks, for a person's
own choice

to be compatible with the collective choice

the two differ.

if

Because Wolff, more than Arrow or Wollheim, seems
tinction

to

an

has a moral right to rule

has stated explicitly that the concept of a legitimate
state
his view,

If

between contradiction and non -contradiction,

it

is

to accept the dis-

worthwhile to con-

sider the work of one of his critics to see whether that critic grants the distinction

and operates within

it,

terms, undermines the theory.

or whether he denies

I

want

Reiman argues

Jeffrey Reiman.

SlThis claim

to

that

examine

it

and thus,

in

made by

just one point

"Moral authority

is

Taylor's

not a meaningful

a change in emphasis

from an earlier one which involved
subordinate to another. According to
the earlier point, the individual's highest obligation is to be autonomous and
anarchism is the only political theory consistent with autonomy. Because this
earlier point is the one for which a defense is explicitly made, while, in fact,
essentially the

is

same

point, but

made

it

an ttempt is being made to defend both points, Wolff's argument is confusing
and highly vulnerable to criticism. This writer believes it is possible, nevertheless, to isolate the later claim and focus on that.
Wolff's original claim, and his argument, appear in Robert Paul Wolff,
In Defense of Anarchism
Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1970). The altered claim was made in personal correspondence
reported in Tom L. Beauchamp and Ken Witkowski, "A Critique of Pure
Anarchism, " Canadian Journal of Philosophy II (June, 1973), 535.
,

,

82jeffrey H.

Robert Paul Wolff's

Reiman, In Defense of Political Philosophy: A Reply to
In Defense of Anarchis m, Harper Torchbooks (New York:

Harper & Row, Publishers,
Political Philosophy.

J

1972).

[Hereinafter referred to as

In

Defense of

80

moral concept because
Something
from. 84

contradicts the notion of moral obligation itself

it

moral because

is

of

Consequently there

what

is

it

is

and not because

of

where

not a meaningful conflict between

authority and moral autonomy since die former
does not exist.

it

"
,

83

comes

moral

If it

existed

there would be contradiction.
Notice that what Reiman has done

undermine Wolff's position by

is to

denying that there might be contradiction.

If

we, instead, accept the possibil-

contradiction then Reiman's statement converts to the claim
that "because

ity of

moral authority
moral

is

a meaningful

obligation. "

While

Wolff's position, does

autonomous

is to

it

I

moral concept

grant that

not

in its

it

contradicts the notion of

revised form this

come close? Wolff claims,

is

not exactly

at one point, that to be

be oneself the judge of moral constraints 85 and this seems

related to Reiman's claim that moral obligation issues from the inner char-

acter of something- -what

must judge

the

8 3 Ibid

.

to say is that

were

,

moral "what"

--and not from an outside source.
if

Each person

he does not depend on another for his moral

Thus, Reiman in his notion of moral obligation comes close to

standards.

if it

it is

it

84 Ibid.

From

the view of this writer, what

Reiman must mean
"moral authority is not a meaningful moral concept because"
would "contradict the notion of moral obligation itself. "

,

p.

,

pp.

2.

2-4.

85 Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism,

p.

13.

81

Wolff's notion of autonomy. 86

From

this

very brief look

at

some

literature that skirts the edge of the

distinction between contradiction
and non-contradiction
distinction is treated as an outcast.

And

it is

apparent that the

yet the fact that this literature exists

at all might well suggest that there
is something plausible in that
distinction,

especially

in the light of

Taylor's argument.

Features of a Degree of Reality Logic -- Having
examined,
detail, the plausibility of the

reality logic,

with what

I

it is

call a

two main features which characterize a degree

degree of truth
of

logic.

my

insist that contradiction

is

Before doing so, however,

claims.

reality are wholly identical, even in the

I

of

time to consider these and other features as they
compare

emphasize the tentative nature

What

a little

in

I

domain

1

want

to

do not insist that thought and
of

human

action, nor do

the nature of our concepts or of the

human

I

condition.

shall argue is that the possibility of these claims being
true is too

86

Reiman acknowledges that, in rejecting the concept of moral authority,
he appears to be agreeing with Wolff's defense of anarchism. But, according
to Reiman, there is for him at least a "theoretical possibility" of establishing
the existence of "legitimate" political authority, though not of moral authority.
Reiman's final position seems to invoke what this writer calls a degree

Reiman argues
moral authority are too purely
of truth logic.

that Wolff's concepts of
definitional.

In the

moral autonomy and
terms of Alston or Putnam,

one might say that Wolff's concepts assume too sharp a distinction between
the analytic and the synthetic.
Real moral autonomy involves an existent
social order, says Reiman, and cannot be completely opposed to legitimate
political authority.

75-79.

See Reiman,

In

Defense

of Political Philosoph y, pp.

4-5,

82

serious to be ignored. 87

The features
There

1.

concepts.

is

Hence

of a degree of reality logic

may

be listed as follows:

no "external reality " consistently
independent of one's

if

this logic is a contextualist position

tends toward idealism

more

than toward empiricism

.

it

must be one which

Now

one might argue

that this second conceptual logic simply is
idealism and not another middle

way, since to identify thought and reality suggests
a complete and closed
reality.

to

me.

I

Its

disagree.

The

reality

"completeness"

is

I

speak

of

seems

internally contradictory,

the completeness of contradiction, not the

logical order of an idealist philosophy such as that
of Spinoza.
2.

There

is,

as with the degree of truth logic, an openness of concepts.

But here they are not open because they are indefinite but
because their

87 Furthermore, the claims are
so broad that their proof tends to be
internal. There seems no way to test the validity of the Law of
Non -Contradiction without assuming, in advance, either that the law exists or that
it

does

Consequently, proofs against the existence of contradiction will
usually be found to be assuming that law. Logicians imbed all the laws of
thought within the metalanguage by which they talk about logic, and they can
not.

become

quite testy if anyone questions the metalanguage. Mure makes the
following important criticism of the logician's insistence on his laws of
thought and, specifically, his insistence on the law of non -contradiction.

has been objected to Hegel's Logic that he bases it on a flat denial
The objection suggests that this law is for
logic an unexaminable universal axiom to be accepted as an a priori datum.
Eut if it is, there is exempted from the logician's critical scrutiny what
is implied by this very objection to be an extremely important character
"It

of the law of contradiction.

of thought. "

[G.

R. G.

Clarendon Press, 1940),

Mure, An Introduction
p.

139.

j

to

Hegel (Oxford: The

83
definiteness

is

a product of conflict and tension.

determination by negation.

)

Hence

(In

other words there

is

definition is not a stable state, either of

rest or movement.

3.

Again, as with the degree of truth logic, concepts
undergo evolution.

But evolution does not here refer to a

awareness of the connection
cept

of reality

of the concept with

completely understood

is

merging

and concept but

every other concept

until the conceptual

whole

is

.

to

No con-

completely under-

stood.

4.

The evolutionary process does

not occur through the actions of any

pervasive community of investigators or language users but as a conflict be-

tween such communities.

The conceptual structure within which

concepts have their meaning
5.

The problems

to

individual

is that conflict.

which these communities respond are contrasting

problems and yet they ara interdependent o nes.
All these features of a degree of reality logic --identity of thought
(concept) and reality, definition by negation, completeness of definition de-

pended on completeness

of understanding of the whole,

development of

definitional completeness as social conflict, and social conflict as conflict of

different but interdependent problems (and thus perspectives)- -all these are

found in the philosophy of Hegel.
I

give an exposition of his thought.

I

shall attempt to reveal these features as

84

Hegel> Thought. 88
with those of

opposes

common

common

burden only

Hegel's views contrast sharply,

sense.

sense then

If

it

sharply from

common

many

respects,

one places the burden of proof on he who

falls

in the context of his

in

heavily on Hegel, yet he accepts this

own method and

method diverges as

this

sense as do his substantive positions.

He does

not

ultimately defend his views either by appeal to sense
experience or by the use
of

formal logic --that logic based on the Law

methods are for him relatively early,
phases of thinking.

Reality

The only adequate proof
this

is

of Non-Contradiction.

partial, and by

Both

themselves mistaken,

"Absolute Spirit" becoming conscious of

for any position is that

itself.

part of the description of

it is

development process, a process Hegel calls "dialectical.

"

88The discussion of Hegel's thought is based primarily on the following
secondary sources: Mure, An Introduction to Hegel
See previous full citation.
G. R. G. Mure, The Phil osophy of H egel (London: Oxford University Press,
1965). Michael Kosok, "The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic," in
Hegel: A Collection of Critical Es says, ed. by Alasdair Maclntyre, Anchor
Books (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
1972).
The following works, representing primary sources, were consulted:
Carl J. Friedrich, ed. The Philosophy of Hegel The Modern Library (New
York: Random House, 1954). Georg Wilheim Friedrich Hegel, "The Philosophy of Right, " trans, by T. M. Knox, Vol. XLVI of Great Books of the Western
World, ed. by Robert M. Hutchins (54 vols; Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica,
.

,

,

In.

,

,

1952).

Other secondary sources consulted were as follows: The discussions of
Hegel in Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis a nd Action: Contemporary Philos ophies
of

Human

Activity (Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).

Herbert Marcuse, "Reason and Revolution, " in Essays in the History of
Political Thought, ed. by Isaac Kramnic k (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice -Hall, Inc.
George H. Sabine, A History of Politic a l Thought
1969).
(3ded. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), chap. XXX.
,

;

85

form

A

Defense of Hegel by Formal Logic

of

argument unconvincing, there are passages

For those who

find his typical

in Hegel's

works and

in

those of his sympathetic interpreters which revert
to other forms of argument,
particularly to formal logic.

shall

I

employ some

of these

formal logical

arguments.

While

it

may seem

inconsistent to try to defend Hegel by methods he

himself rejected as inadequate, this

is not quite the situation.

does acknowledge formal logic as what

For him, the worth

some

method

Unctions.

is to

89
I

of such logic.

it

reveal

am
For

its

own

be called a lower phase method.

is not to find,

position free of contradiction.

such logic

than

of this

may

There

Firstly, Hegel

is

by a process of elimination,

no such position.

defect, the defect of

The worth

of

assuming absolute dis-

not proposing, however, to emphasize this particular use
it

could not support Hegel's position any more satisfactorily

could support other views.

Without, for example, absolute distinctions

between what he will call "philosophical science" and what he will
thinking of the "understanding"

it is

call the

not possible to say as emphatically as he

does that one posidon derives from the former and some other merely from
the latter.

But Hegel's

and that

is

my

sometime use

second point.

It

of formal logic can be construed in another way,

can be construed as a neutral method capable of

discriminating between the better and worse of other methods.

S^Mure, Thg Philosophy

of

Hegel, pp. 12-13.

Understood thus,

86

formal logic
is

is

something wholly other than Hegel's dialectical

Yet

logic.

it

perhaps only by means of something wholly
other that his own logic can be

defended.

Indeed, this conclusion seems, in the end,
to be a reaffirmation of

the dialectic itself.

Having acknowledged the legitimacy
I

would summarize the claim he wishes
knowledge.

is self

as follows:

And

To know

I

by saying

that:

logic,

knowledge

all

that claim

anything presupposes a relationship between the known
If

the object

knower then he could have no knowledge
is

to defend

Hegel by formal

would summarize the basic argument for

object and the knowing subject.

image

of a defense of

of

was completely foreign
Specifically,

it.

if

to the

the mental

apart from the real, one would need an image of the relation between

object and image to know that the two corresponded.

only an image of a relation one term of which

second order image really corresponds

need a third order image, and so on

is

But this

foreign.

To know

to that relation, one

to infinity.

90

image

is in

turn

that this

would therefore

To know anything

at all

therefore requires either that we reach the end of infinity (which we cannot do)

or that

we incorporate

the object of knowledge within the knowing subject him-

One must conclude

self.

another way,

A

is

a

form

corollary of the above point

90por one expression
p.

150.

is

a

form

of self

knowledge or, put

of self consciousness.

prototype of all knowledge.

Hegel,

knowledge

that all

is

that

human

self -consciousness is the

Here

is

of the

problem, see Mure, An Introduction

a sort of knowledge in which subject and

to
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object are clearly distinct and
yet a unity.
the self as subject and yet

Though they seem
its

I

corollary,

I

is

the

same

to follow by

self.

formal logic, the above conclusion and

As

I

do so

I

equate consciousness and self-consciousness.

always self consciousness

Now whether

or not knowledge

of

knowledge without

a

is

it

knower.

a

form

of self

how as
image

qualities, 91

is

where

not really separated.

It

makes

it

little

certainly

sense to

Yet there seems to be no knower on the

merely a resultant
is

what

Hegel separates them

consciousness

requires a self.

reasoning of empiricists such as Hobbes or Hume.

claiming that knowledge

In

But in both cases consciousness

The two are

in potential.

requires self-consciousness in that

speak

not carry conviction.

must give one prefatory remark.

both logically and, in a sense, historically.
is

self as object is other than

when stated so abstractly, probably do

shall begin again.

follows,

it

The

of

If

Hobbes

is

correct in

motions experienced some-

the subject to have these experiences?

The

of billiard balls rebounding on each other suggests, at most,
a flux of

sensation, not a point at which they are integrated.

The same
he claims, has

difficulty arises for

its

All non-mathematical knowledge,

basis in given "impressions" (which include such entities as

sensations, emotions and the will).

being copies of the more lively ones.
regular ways.

Hume.

Ideas are merely less lively impressions,

And they happen

Knowledge, states Hume,

9*See text chap.

I,

p.

16.

is just

to be associated in

an awareness of these associ-
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Even

ations.

that

much knowledge seems impossible, however,

subject of awareness

is itself

since the

nothing but a non-necessary association of ideas.

from what impression cou'd this idea [of a self] be deriv'd?.
must be some one impression, that gives rise to every
real
.

.

.

idea.

.

.

It

But self

or person

is not any one impression, but that
to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference.
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call
myself, I

always stumble on some particular perception or other,
of heat or cold,
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.
I never can catch myself
at any time without a perception, and never can
observe any thing

buTthe"

perception. y2

Hume
was a mere
engage

in

did have an explanation for the apparent existence of the self.
fiction of the mind.

But

how there could be

such fictions was not indicated.

Indeed,

a continuing

Hume

mind

It

to

suggested by his

explanation that no such mind existed.

Neither Hobbes nor Hume, then, can convincingly account for subjectivity.
Yet the existence of subjectivity

is

as certain to plain-man thinking as are re al

objects and the correspondence theory of truth
the side of the empiricists.

Common

Furthermore, the existence

plies that the subject is conscious of itself.

That

is at

sense

is

not all on

of the subject

im-

least part of what sub-

normally means.

jectivity

I

.

conclude that

if

the subjectivity essential to knowing cannot be reached,

starting from an external given, (whether of objects or sensations) then one

must apparently

start

from the subject

support from two other directions.

92 Hume,
sec. VI.

]

A Treatise

of

itself.

This conclusion gains further

First, consider again the infinite regress

Human Nature

,

pp. 251-52.

[Bk.

I,

Pt.

IV,

89
to

which a correspondence theory

of truth

seems

to lead.

To acknowledge

the

priority of the subject in knowing completes this infinite regress, in
a sense
(while of course denying the correspondence theory in

form).

completes the regress by assimilating

It

its

usual empiricist

infinity within the subject

itself as its essential attribute --the capacity for self reflection

transcendence.

Common

and thus self

sense recognizes the self as something that can

reflect on itself, can reflect on its reflection and so on.

Consider, secondly, the method of ostension, that method upon which

most empiricists ultimately ground

their views.

method, as we have seen,

producing unambiguous information.

Pointing,

jectival

the

it

is that of

seems, suggests an

knowing avoids

infinite

this difficulty.

problem which arises

is

not

number
If

The classic

difficulty of this

of applicable concepts.

Sub-

knowing truly begins with the subject,

how information could be correct

but

how

it

could be incorrect.

These, then, are some of the principal arguments
claim that

all

knowledge

is

self-knowledge.

In the

of

formal logic for the

following pages

I

shall

further elaborate that claim, first by briefly considering Kantian thought,

second by examining the Hegelian dialectic, third by discussing the Hegelian
notion of Spirit, and last by

some comments on Hegel's philosophy

Contrast Between Hegel and Kant -- Immanuel Kant holds,

of history.

in a

way, both

that the subject is epistemologically prior and that knowledge is ultimately

initiated by an objective reality.

To use

a simple metaphor, concepts are like

cookie cutters which cut "phenomena" out of the differentiated but otherwise

90

unknowable thing-in-itself. 93
ject is a cookie cutter
ically,

it is

produced.

not,

But

The

difficulty with this view is that

which cuts out phenomena then,

to continue

if

the sub-

metaphor-

presumably, a mirror which pictures the phenomena
thus

how then can

the

phenomena be known? Kant's response

appeal to something like unmediated sense experience. 94

is

an

The subject provides

only the forms of knowledge --certain very abstract
categories such as sub-

stance or cause and effect. Jf one has an experience

by these forms.

But

whether one has the experience

things in themselves.

It is

it

is

will be prestructured

determined somehow by

those which provide the matter of knowledge, telling

what particular substances there are or what particular instances
effect.

Thus for Kant, even as for empiricism, the subject does

of

not

cause and

seem

to be

truly prior in knowing.

It

was particularly

in

truly subjectival knowing.
status for concepts.

response to Kant that Hegel developed his views

For Hegel, such knowledge implies a different

They are not

thing basically different.

of

like cookie cutters

They are

developed reality within themselves.

like

which operate on some-

seeds which contain the potential of

Such knowing thus implies also a funda-

mentally different source of differentiation for reality.
division of reality into different determinate entities is

For empiricists the

assumed

a given.

judgment which must occur prior to
experience because they are presupposed by experience. They make experience
cohere in certain general ways.
93]viore precisely, there are acts of

the discussion in

Mure, An Introduction

to

Hegel

,

pp.

89-91.

91

But

if

reality unfolds

from the concept, differentiation appears

process, a process which Hegel calls the dialectic.

very

in this

Let us now consider that

process.

The Hegelian Dialectic

--

Michael Kosok has developed a very helpful

formalization of Hegel's dialectic.

drawn from early pages
If

all

knowledge

of that

is self

My

essay

95

discussion of

knowledge then

it

It

is

from these ascends

a

is

phenomena and

of increasingly high abstractions.

ical knowledge is an inverted pyramid.

A small

is the

empiricist oriented

a vast array of concrete sense

pyramid

Hegel's dialect-

a process which
In

largely

is

them exactly.

is reflection.

structural opposite of empiricism oriented thought.

we suppose there

principles

but does not follow

ical logic is the formal process of reflection.

thought

its

that

But dialect-

set of elements on an early

highly abstract level are capable, by reflection, of being analyzed from a

meta -level which brings
been formulated within
is

out properties about that level which could not have

it.

As reflection continues on ever higher

increasing complexity and concreteness.

simply one

of

moving from the abstract

The

Of course this process

is

not

to the concrete instead of the reverse.

The Hegelian "abstractions" already contain
the details of a mathematical

levels there

the concrete in potential

system are already contained within

its

much as
principles.

dialectical process occurs in what are analogous to temporal stages

but do not in fact exist in time; they are better described as logical moments.

95 Kosok, "The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic," pp. 237-49.
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Let us examine this dialectical process
rather closely.

something immediately present
is

both concept and reality.

moment

This element

of the reflection affirms that this

of affirmation implies that

exist

in the field of

from which

it is

is

reflected upon.

element

is

"Reflection

element

in

As

is

from

.

of determination or, to put

*'
.

.

.is regarded as the

it

1,96
It

is

is to

thereby also

another way, definition.

97

.

can imagine the something.

by Hegel "double negation.
a complete reflection since

I

But the very act

a questioning process producing determination by setting an

opposition with itself.

negation and

.

immediacy.

the assertion of the element implies

I

present.

first logical

since to mediate or reflect

.

a situation of

negation again refers to the assertion.

except as

The

distinguished- -namely the negation of the element.

(negate) oneself

moment

an element,

something other than the affirmed element must

essence of reflection and mediation.

the essential

is

consciousness, which element

This second moment, the moment of negation

remove

There

"

Only with
I

cannot think of

While the triad

I

its

negation, however, so the

cannot understand not -something

This third logical
this third

moment

moment can

I

is

labelled

be said to have

cannot think of an element without thinking of
its

negation without thinking of

of affirmation, negation,

its

its

affirmation.

and double negation

is

essential

for any reflection at all, and thus any determination of the element (or defin-

96 Ibid.

,

p.

240.

97 Ibid.

,

p.

241.
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ition of the concept), a single
triadic

process does not yield a complete

The element has only been defined as one

reflection.

possibilities --the possibility that

it

is

of mutually implied

implies the possibility that

it

is

not and

vice versa.

Because the element with which reflection begins
determinate, through that reflection,
reflection.

is

now necessary

moment

object of a triadic process.

Now

to reflect upon the

this

in the initial act of reflection is itself the

Similarly, the third level will involve twenty seven

process goes on

to infinity but by infinity is not

the endlessness of things which are themselves finite.

describing the process of self-knowledge.
individual

only potentially

This second level reflection will involve nine terms
instead of the

original three, since each

terms.

it

made

is

who because he can

What

is

reflect upon himself

own determining negation within himself)

is

Recall that Hegel

meant

,

meant here
is

is the infinitude of

(or in other

words has

the

his

internally infinite. 98

Clearly, then, the dialectical process never comes to an end except in
the sense that

it

always

conscious individual.

an

infinite

form

of a

movement

is_

at

an end as the continuing self-struggle of the self

Kosci; expresses this point by saying that "Reflection
of self-realization that can

completed product

process as a whole or an

:

never resolve

itself in the

the whole as a process is incomplete; only the

infinite totality

and not a product

98 See Mure, The Philosophy of Hegel

"Kosok, "The Formalization

,

p.

is

complete.

99

22, footnote 2.

of Hegel's Dialectical Logic, " p. 249.

is

94
In

summary,

sciousness.

the dialectical process is the development
of self -con-

There

is,

in the first step,

subject present as a state of non-

conscious harmony slightly disrupted by a vague
awareness of unease.

second step

this

awareness

confronting the subject.

of

unease

is

objectified— is made into an object

But in the third step the subject

realized in becoming aware that this object
total

It

process has

may

at least

is

becomes more

It is

"

fully

really an aspect of itself.

This

three descriptions, with their associated terminology.

be called the "development of self consciousness,

be called the "dialectic,

In the

or

it

may

"

as above, or

it

may
"

be called the "realization of the concept.

difficult to illustrate briefly the principles of the dialectical process,

since such brief illustration calls for concrete examples, and in Hegelian
thought what

I

is

highly concrete only occurs at a late and complex logical moment.

shall attempt two illustrations while recognizing that the simple examples

give employ concepts richer than they ought to be.

The

first illustration

I

em-

braces several levels of the dialectical process.

Consider a person emerging into physical consciousness with a headache.

There

is first that

vague sense of unease.

Next the person senses the headache

as a definite something apart from himself, say a vise within which his head

being squeezed.
is

Finally he

becomes aware

that this

is

supposed foreign pressure

really part of himself.

If

we use another expression

"realization of the concept, "

for the process,

we can describe

if

we

think in terms of the

that process a little differently.
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The

first step is the concept of a

concept actualized, and the third

headache
is

immediacy, the second

in its

the concept in

actualization.

its

is the

Only with

the three steps together is there really
the thought of a headache, the concept.

Of course the process can also be described by using the
most well

known terminology

of the dialectic.

The

first step is then said to be relatively

pure thought and to be relatively indeterminate.

second step, or antithesis,

and by

this step

it

is

called the thesis.

realized as one with

is

its

is the

other.

same

In the third step, or

The headache as

one.

odd to consider a headache as an aspect of a

but Hegel

self,

argues that everything, even the supposedly external world of nature,

mately such an aspect.

I

The

the thought negated- -confronted with its other --

objective and the headache as subjective
is not

is

begins to become something definite.

synthesis, the thought

It

It

shall carry the above

metaphor a

little

is ulti-

further to

suggest how this might be.

On

a second level of consciousness the person

is at first explicitly

aware

of his

headache but only dimly aware of the immediate social context within

which

it

arose.

Subsequently he comes to objectify this context

stress situations which confront him.

in the

form

of

Let us suppose, though, that through

psychological counseling he comes to recognize these situations as attitudes,

and thus aspects, of himself.

This third step completes a second triad and

already assimilates to the self that which prior to Freud might have been

considered external.

96

At

a third level the person begins with
explicit awareness of his

still

neurosis but

awareness

little

broader social context.

of its

With further

counseling he objectifies the context as, say,
over demanding parents whose

cumulative actions

opher he

may

still

confront him.

But with the insights of a social philos-

finally recognize that the competitive
society which helped

produce insecure overdemanding parents

which he finds

his

own

self identity.

is

Thus

the

same

society in terms of

like the stress situations, the

parental influence becomes, in a sense, an aspect
of himself.
In this

at least

metaphor

much

have not reached the natural world but

I

can be misleading.

We

headache and that

is

needed.

normally think that

it is

contexts of the headache.

the

But

if

the

is the

headache which becomes aware of

emerges from

My
plausible

itself a subject,

become aware
the

it

is to

a person

who becomes aware

that

it

is of

is to

is

itself,

more

the

be exact, one must think

though not a fully developed one.

new awareness, and so

second illustration

it is

metaphor

headache as

to

This metaphor, like any other,

same person who subsequently recognizes

of the

awareness

clear that

of social reality is conceivable as an aspect of the subject.

Nevertheless, a word of caution

of a

it is

Thus

it

then emerges from this narrow

than a headache, and then in turn

on.

a single level of the dialectic and shows

how

say that our social concepts, at least, are defined by their

opposites.

Let us consider the ideological dichotomy of political conservatives and

97
political liberals.

Do we know what a conservative

Clearly not.

we already have

Until

know what features

It

use some of the same words

in

may

a conception of conservatism

of sense experience are important.

share the same conception?

But there

by sense experience?

is

be a difference.

seems

so,

we

But then do

don't

we

all

because a conservative will probably

describing himself that his opponent would use.

For

the conservative these

words may be

concepts, while for his opponent they are empty categories.

Both

may agree

that the conservative believes society to be an
organic whole but the difference
is that the

conservative apparently sees

it

this

cause but the outcome of that way of seeing.

way and

And

his belief is not the

the liberal does not see

it

that way.

Now
that

if

one accepts Wittgenstein's position about language --the position

we do seem

to

share our basic concepts --one

argument very convincing.
is

But

it is

the best

no conclusive argument either way.

same

I

may

not find the preceding

will attempt.

And assuming

that

There probably

we do

not share the

conceptions, a conservative and a liberal must be defined by each other.

A

conservative, as such, would have

Hegelian reasoning.

He does

little

determinate character on

not acknowledge himself as a conservative nor

does he acknowledge other ideologies.

And

this is

because he tacitly assumes

society to be a kind of living organizm which can change only imperceptibly

and not by the independent agency of any of

its

members.

Still,

certain unease about conservatism, a vague sense of discord.

there

is

a

But the conserv-

ative only begins to be determinate, his sense of discord only begins to be

98

objectified--and then only as defensiveness-when
he
antithesis.

And

it is

his antithesis, the liberal,

is

confronted with his

who especially manifests

determinate character.

The liberal does not achieve determination
to say, he does not achieve

He achieves determination
let us

here call

self.

In this

it

by arguing, at

it

process he will necessarily see this status quo as

Hence

He

some ways

any other single experient.

of that concept will derive

Thus

from

its

contrast to the

will begin by arguing against tyranny and privilege.

the organicism of the conservative only

becomes conscious when

negated by the atomistic views of the liberal, but the latter views only

become clear

in contrast to

The Hegelian

if it is

what they negate.

"Spirit" --

dialectic indicate just

goes,

that of

in

from him-

the liberal then proceeds to defend greater social equality and
individual

status quo.

is

is

of the conservative position,

the organicist status quo, as something distinct

freedom the specific content

it

That

first, for a certain state of society.

becoming conscious

in

opposed to his individual concerns and

when

directly, however.

how

far

The preceding

illustrations of the Hegelian

from plain-man thought subject oriented knowing

developed with formal logical consistency.

which Hegel saw as a development of thought

The natural world was treated somewhat

is,

Of course, the reality

preeminently, social reality.

differently.

But in any case, whether

or not the notion of dialectical reality seems odd that of the subject surely does.

The Hegelian

subject, as potential, is

many

sorts of things "lower" than

99

an individual person.
headache metaphor.

That

it

has been already noted

is

in

connection with the

Concepts like quantity and thing, supposedly
actual

things like rocks or plants, and the

human himself

in his

primitive or child

state are all the subject in potential and at
various stages of its development.

The Hegelian
however, but
Mind,

"

"God.

is

"

subject, in its full development, is not an individual
person,

something "higher.

"

It

is

"Absolute Spirit," "Universal

Individual persons, as well as all the non-logical entities

which are lower than them, are merely contingent differentiations

There

being.

is

a formal logical rationale for such a view.

with numerous different subjects, by which

knowledge will differ for each.

But even

if

I

mean

other words, there

which happens
there

is

a

of

It

no

common

knowing begins with numerous

knowledge.

to repeat exactly that of

common

be singular.

is

knowledge,

it

He

every other.

clearly

knowing begins

different as subjects, then

identical subjects, no single subject has awareness of a
In

If

of this

seems

is

"common"

aware

On

the

reality.

of his reality

assumption that

to follow that the subject

Hegel so claims, although his subject

is

must

singular as a unity

numerous personal subjects.

is

Spirit is, of course, the subject of that dialectical process

which has

lC%his argument

Hegel

is

drawn from Mure, An Introduction

interesting that, for both Wittgenstein and Hegel, there

to

is

a

,

p.

91.

common

world of concepts. But, for Wittgenstein this commonality means that there
are no subjects --the usual conclusion for one with empiricist leanings. And
for Hegel the commonality means that there is only one subject- -which is
again the usual conclusion for one with tendencies toward idealism.
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already been illustrated.
consciousness.

The process

that is understood

it

through the dialectic that Spirit grows

It is

is

primarily logical, not historical, and when

does not seem so odd to find that abstract
ideas as well

as persons are considered subjects.

seems odd since rocks and
not the ultimate ones.

subject
like

is

Nevertheless, the general theory

still

plants are also subjects, and since persons
are

In addition,

reality as the self realization of a single

only describable by language which on positivist
assumptions sounds

outrageous hypostatization and anthropomorphism.

tions,

in self

which are close

caricature Hegel.

to

It is

plain-man thought,

it is

easy but not responsible.

From

those assump-

easy to criticize and even
If

his views are plausible

then so must be the language they require.
Social Implications of Hegel's Philosophy- -Two Views -Hegel's

philosophy as

I

have presented

degree of reality
they

make up

knowledge.

logic.

it

clearly reveals the first three features of a

Thought and reality are indeed identical.

the unity of the knowing subject since all knowledge

And concepts are indeed open

each other rather than being
that a concept

becomes

indefinite.

definite.

in the

For

it

sense of being

is in the

Together
is self-

in conflict

with

process of self -negation

Furthermore, the concept

is definite

only as

the continuation of the process in higher levels of reflection.

That Hegel's thought also reveals the
reality logic --conflict

last

two features of a degree of

among meaning communities and

dispute over the rel-

evant problems --is evident from the discussion of his history which

I

offered in

101

Chapter
social

101
I.

life,

History

is

a process of struggle

different states.

And

that

it

is

among

different

forms

of

implies that the different states see

different social problems.

Nevertheless, Hegel's social thought, unlike his
logic, departs from the
kind of contextualism

I

the historical process

am

trying to promote.

seems

and, secondly, that whether

supplant earlier ones.

to

it

come

to

an end

The reasons are,
(the struggle

does or not later stages

By contrast,

I

does not persist)

process seem

want to talk about a contextualism

which the conceptual struggle

is

where earlier stages continue

to be as real in their

Is it

in the

firstly, that

it is.

dialectic

in

eternal and, as will be clearer in Chapter V,

own way as are

later ones. 1

possible that Hegel might reasonably have constructed a different

philosophy of ethics and of history upon the same dialectical logic?
that

to

Hegel's logic

is

must be thought

self realization,

it

a timeless process in which all the

of as simultaneously present.

moments

is a

process which occurs

of the

But since every

step in the process occurs by negating, and thus referring back

ever, (though not his ethics)

suggest

Being a process of

can be thought of as a linear progression.

preceded, the process also seems completely circular.

I

to,

that

which

Hegel's history, howin

time and

is

usually

interpreted only as a linear progression.
In his ethics

and his history Hegel claims that the individual will only

101 See, text chap.

I,

pp.

18-22.

102 See, text chap. V,
pp. 356-67.
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become

free as he recognizes himself to be
part of society and ultimately a

part of the State-part of a form of ethical

be saying that an individual

forms

to social

customs.

dialectical process, as

and the state

is

But

it is,

in particular,

life.

Thus Hegel usually seems

to

free just insofar as he obeys the laws
and conif

the state is simply a late phase in a single

then one might also say that society generally,

are real only by contrast with individual persons

and that the subjective wills of individuals are as real and
moral as are the
laws and customs of society.

A
forms

similar argument can be made about Hegel's claim,

of ethical life --let us say world views since they are at least
roughly

that—both succeed and improve upon each other.
later

in his history, that

The argument

world views become real only by contrast with what precedes them, their

reality is dependent on the reality of those earlier world views.
later views are no
the later.

1

liberalism

is in

sense

is that if the

it

more an improvement on

Thus the

the earlier than the earlier are on

tried to illustrate this possibility before by showing that

if

political

one sense an advance on political conservatism in another

depends on conservatism for

its

own meaning.

(We have a

sense awareness of this converse relationship- -revealed
social contract theories of society.

common

in the perplexities of

Unless the supposedly atomistic individuals

of liberalism already share certain deep-rooted customs and beliefs, including

a theory of legitimate social rankings, they could scarcely agree on what sort
of social contract to adopt.

)
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I

want

to suggest, in closing this section,
that Hegel's logic,

social implications he could have drawn
from
stitute another

way

to explain

human concepts

The empiricist says we can know,

we see

that

if

we can

still

If

we

reject

it,

But

however, we
it

must be because

frameworks which structure our knowledge,

and that we can communicate our concepts
to Wittgenstein

without retreating to empiricism.

know, learn and teach, then

the world through conceptual

According

but apparently did not, con-

learn, and teach by pointing.

there are grave arguments against his view.

must assume

it

and the

to

each othe r.

and similar thinkers

it

seems

that

we under-

stand each other's concepts because we share them --we
somehow share the

same conceptual framework.
cept by contrast with

its

But according to Hegel

opposite.

we understand any con-

This Hegelian insight, carried further into

the social realm, would suggest that a

community

of investigators or of

language users could have meaningful concepts only in contrast to those of

opposing communities.

Hence the reason communication would be possible

across conceptual frameworks was because each side had
ing view in order to articulate

its

both sides of the relevant issue

The above theory

e.

assume

the oppos

thus each side was, in effect, on

.

of concepts

arguments are so widely available
(i.

own and

to

would explain why convincing ad hominem
in political debate.

An American

liberal

a reform liberal) finds that his ability to criticize system bias with

relative immunity rests on his

own favored position

in the

system.

One recent

-
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and striking example consists
but themselves avoid
status

makes

finds that his

its

possible.

own

of those

who favor busing

for racial integration

impact by the safe geographic location which their

An American conservative

a classic liberal)

(i.e.

interest in the current system rests on his ability
to under-

mine

it.

he

simultaneously destroying them by monopolistic practices.

is

For example, he may argue the classic virtues

Because the Hegel-based argument
to explain

assume
the

human concepts without

I

have just set forth

pointing, and because

the communicability of those concepts,

"communication argument.

"

Because

of capitalism

I

call

it

it

is

because

another way

must therefore

a second version of

this version explains

communication

as the product of self -consciousness, in which the object and subject are

necessarily

in contact since they

are two aspects of the same

version of the argument an "idealist version.

The

idealist version of the

a legitimate second
like to see a

more

I

I

call this

"

communication argument represents,

way between idealism and empiricism.

If

to

the reader

me,
would

detailed yet concise application of this approach than has

yet been given, he should turn to pages 386-89

which next follow

self,

in

Chapter

shall be applying the approach at

some

VI.

In the

chapters

length.

Comprehensiveness as a Dialectical Problem

We

have now reviewed three possible approaches to the examination

the concept of comprehensiveness.

We

of

could see the concept from an empiri-

a

105
cist viewpoint.

In that case, the

primary research problem would not be a

conceptual problem at all but would be the statistical-survey
problem of
correlating comprehensiveness in decision-making
with the conditions under

which

was most

it

likely to be achieved.

lem which was conceptual.
Secondly,
truth logic.

usage and

We would

we could see

But there would be a subsidiary prob-

need to operationalize the concept.

the concept

Our problem then would be

from the viewpoint

to

of a

degree of

examine carefully our ordinary

to do so with recognition of the perplexities

which empirical exper-

ience would sometimes reveal to us about that usage.

Or, thirdly, we might want to see the concept from the viewpoint of a

degree of reality

How we would proceed

logic.

in this last

case

is

not yet very

clear but apparently the process would involve the idea of an inner conflict—
conflict between two aspects of the

We

same

subject.

are now in a position to answer more fully the question posed at the

beginning of this chapter- -the question whether the problems of comprehen-

siveness identified

in

Chapter

theoretical problems.

I

I

are truly scientific problems or at least

said then that whether or not they were theoretical

problems depended on what kinds
I

want

to point out

now

of theoretical

that the substantive

problems there might

be.

But

research problem we identify already

implies a certain research approach and hence a certain theoretical problem.
If

the

problem of comprehensiveness

is

basically the problem how a

multiplicity of physically discrete individuals, with different values rooted in

"

106
their physical differences, can be
organized into a social whole, then such a

problem raises an empiricist research problem.
naive empiricism, that there
that connections

experience

(in

among

is

For

presupposes, with

an external reality of physical objects and

these objects are mental abstractions discovered
of

the case of theory) or

imposed upon

it

While on this view the problem of comprehensiveness
it

it

poses a theoretical problem.

That problem

(in

the case of practice).

is

a problem of practice

of course, to discover the

is,

conditions which correlate with effective achievement of social
order.
If

problem

the

individual is able to

of

comprehensiveness

become free

is

basically the problem

of the conceptual

how an

and social whole which

already exists, and which provides his identity as an individual, then
raises and simultaneously

is

a conceptual research problem.

In

loose oneself from the conceptual framework within which one

sary to become aware of that framework- -it
to speak,

and examine

it

from outside.

implied in a degree of truth logic.
in fact,

become

whereas for

common

common
sense

to

push

both

order to
it is

it

neces-

away, so

the kind of conceptual

problem

supposes that an individual could,

and reach a "beyond,

the degree of reality logic there is no beyond.

sense

me

to different virtually opposite approaches.

tells us that both

sense, and this

tells

it

is

necessary

at least partly free of his concepts

The two problems thus lead
Yet

For

This

is

is,

it

is

problems do

something

to reject something.

I

am

exist.

We

always willing

(Unless

to

could ignore

do when

common

we always accept common sense,
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in

which case there

use

no room for theoretical knowledge, we cannot
justifiably

to reject certain things

it

tell us that

common
I

is

what we

and not others.

first rejected really

sense when

it

tells

me

to accept

For more careful thought might

had merit.

)

But

something even

must accept opposites; for there may very well be truth

always respect

I

if

the result is that

in

both of those

opposites.

common

Since

siveness are real

provide

if

employ a

wholeness something

pointing implies that

which

it is

wholeness
Is

it

is

single method, and

of

comprehen-

I

desire that

it

to

That examination proceeds as follows.

which we can point? No.

a pointing at something.

If

there

The very act
is

of

any concept

singularly inappropriate to define by ostension then this concept of
is

the one.

wholeness then a combination

a state of evolution toward a
truth logic this

completeness,

I

problems

choice of method comes, instead, from an initial direct examin-

ation of the concept of wholeness itself.
Is

that both

cannot accept the diverse methodological implications they

the dissertation is to

My

should.

I

me

sense suggests to

is

is

more

of concept

definite

and social reality which

form? According

the condition of important concepts.

to a

is in

degree of

But wholeness, i.e.

not incomplete.

conclude that

from the standpoint

it

is

of a

best to examine the concept of comprehensiveness

degree of reality logic since any other method

concept examination seems to deny the very existence

of

of this particular

concept

-
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It

must be admitted, however,

that

my own

choice of method already pre-

supposes the kind of concept which comprehensiveness
must

supposes that wholeness

is

a unity of opposites.

be.

It

pre-

But this supposition, while

perhaps curious, does have an important source
of support

in

mathematical

logic.

A
diction.

satisfactory wholeness apparently must

This

is

embrace

what Hegel's concept of spirit does.

infinity

But

interpretation of Kurt Godel's incompleteness theorem.

it is

and contra-

also an alternate

Godel attempted

to

develop a complete formal systematization of the arithmatic of whole
numbers

an arithmatic which contains an

infinite

numer

of elements.

His attempt con-

sisted in mapping the assumptions of the system into the system

itself.

The

resulting product was found to be self-referential, however, and to result in
1

contradiction.

that

03

The more usual way

of describing Godel's conclusion is

any logically consistent system with an

essentially incomplete.

is

is

of

elements

is that

is

a system

complete as an inconsistent system. 104

a further argument to be

dialectical problem.

number

The alternate conclusion, however,

with an infinite number of elements

There

infinite

The two problems

made
of

for treating wholeness as a

comprehensiveness previously

±UJ For a brief discussion of Godel's
proof, see Ernest Nagel and James
R. Newman, "Godel's Proof, " in Contemporary Readings in Logical Theory,
ed. by Irving

M. Copi and James A. Gould (New York: The Macmillan Com-

pany, 1967).
*

^Something n^e

this conclusion is suggested by Kosok,

ization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic," pp. 263-64.

"The Formal-
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identified are not themselves
wholly consistent but incorporate
opposing views.

oversimplified them, in this section, so
as to show the tendency of their

I

methodological implications, but

in

each case there

is

only a tendency.

If it

possible for the atomism and behaviorism
of a Hobbes to yield social
order

is

(even

if

only in one act) then people cannot be
merely sources of impulse.

There must be some mind, some concept usage,
present.
for certain individuals to

somehow

And

possible

if it is

rise out of the social meanings of their

time, as Hegel asserts, then most of us
would conclude that there must be

neutral ground-sense experience --which provides
the foundation on which to

do

this.

The approach

of the

degree of reality logic

is

particularly sympathetic to

the inconsistent mixtures which both problems of
comprehensiveness

seem

to

represent.

A

final

argument for

rather than of theory.

the

method draws from considerations

The human condition,

ingly appears as one of dilemma.

We seem

at the

of expediency

time of writing, increas-

to be caught in

impossible choices

such as that between a livable environment and the satisfaction of basic material

needs or, more fundamentally, between the maintenance of what

is

good

in

industrial civilization and the reversal of the trend toward increasing poverty
in

many

non-industrial societies.

Perhaps a method which sees dilemma as

inevitable, and proposes to analyze

if

conditions are as bad as

cannot afford to ignore.

it,

is

a method worth investigating.

some commentators

maintain, the method

is

Indeed,

one

we
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A

Dialectical

In this last section of

examination which

method

language analysis but

of a

I

it is

A

II

is

Concept Examination

presented the method of concept

If it

in

analysts are using a method like that which

I,

few comments might be made about nomenclature.
" not

believe this

an analysis.

It

ordinary

happens that some or

their sort of ordinary language analysis which

"examination,

I

departure from that commonly employed

don't insist on the point.

many ordinary language
then

Chapter

of

shall use in the following two chapters.

I

something

is

Method

is

proposed,

also, want to use.

The method

is

an

does not seek to draw out abstract elements

and reduce them to a few even more abstract ones.

Its

purpose, on the con-

trary, is to display the gradual efflorescence of the concept
through increasingly richer specification.

It is

so first

in the

Within this focus

is

The examination

is "dialectical" in

loose sense of making argument the focus of

several senses.
its

concern.

included argument over first principles, over the axioms

which for conventional logic are unarguable, and consequently the method
dialectical in a second sense --that which Plato uses in the Republic. 105

the

method

is dialectical in the

This third sense

is

Finally

third sense that argument is understood to be a

series of completed arguments each of which
the last and each of which

is

is

grows from, and yet

successively more refined than
in a

way

rejects, earlier ones.

roughly the Hegelian sense.

105 T he Republic of Plat o, trans, by Francis MacDonald Cornford (London:

Oxford University Press, 1941), chap. XXIV.

[Bk.

VI, 509-11.]

Ill

My

proposed method

according

to

ever more

which reality

fully realized.

is,

in brief,

an analogue to the Hegelian position

a single subject or a single concept
becoming

is

Could we not see the

work

life

of

many an important

theorist as the attempt to develop the full meaning
of one concept? Plato's

work could be

plausibly understood as a continuing attempt to
define the Good.

Many medieval

thinkers were perhaps attempting to define God,
and

many

thinkers during the Renaissance were certainly attempting
to define Man.

writings of a country's judiciary are an attempt to define
Justice.

may

ists

If

The

Some novel-

be trying to define Fate, others Love, and so on.

we do see

a thinker's

work

in this

way, could we not imagine the

possibility both that his concept has no universal reference in experience
and
that

it is

not shared by all other minds --and would

his concept

must be defined by

its

own negative?

we
If

we do imagine

the definition of any concept requires the existence of
If

we

not then conclude that

its

further suppose that these concepts in question are

this then

opposite within itself.
still

social concepts,

not concepts which belong to the thinker alone, then the conflict of opposites in

any concept implies a social

Now

conflict.

given the previous assumptions, we

participation in a social conflict, though

it

sitions, is really a definition of a concept

we are

.

effectually examining the definition.

such assumptions,

is the

may

appears

And

say that the thinker's
to be a debate

thus

if

over propo-

we examine

the debate

Such an examination, based on

dialectical approach to concepts which

I

am

proposing.
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The Dialectica l_Method

m

Relation to the Ordinary Language
Approach

The ordinary language approach shares with
other contextual^ approaches
observation that there

is

we

the

no sharp distinction between facts and values,
between

description and normative evaluations.

immediate values,

.

Human

society, the source of all

also the source of the conceptual scheme
through which

is

identify facts.

Many

contextualists, whether

methods, appear to supplement
ever, to the effect that when

more or

less inclined to ordinary language

this first observation with a

we know

the description

second one, how-

we know

the norm.

Julius

Kovesi expresses the point, with respect to concepts, by observing
that we
cannot say that two objects are similar

while the other

we know

that

it is

tions, positions

more

is not.

bad.

in

every respect except that one

Once we know, for example,
106

that

something

is

a

is

good

murder

Others such as Kurt Baier 107 have taken like posi-

which would seem very close

to naturalism

were they based on

positivist assumptions.

The question
well be reversed.

I

If

have for this second observation

we already know

the

is

moral worth

106Julius Kovesi, Moral Notions (London:
pp. 26-28.

whether

of

it

could not as

something when we

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967),

Baier argues that, in value judgments, the identification of that which
is being judged about can only be made if one knows something about its purpose.

To know

a car is to know the purpose of cars and to know the latter is already
know something about the criteria for a good car. See Kurt Baier, The Moral
P oint of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics (abridged ed. New York: Random

to

;

House, 1965).
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know what

it is,

something

is

why could we

we argue

as

n ot equally well say that

out its

The apparent response

to

we already learn what

moral worth?

such a question by much of ordinary language

analysis, and by similar approaches, is that
our most important concepts are

concepts that we all share.

Consequently we could indeed reverse the sequence

but not to the point of producing a really intense
debate.

Gallie, for one,

argues that there exist "essentially contested concepts" but
he adds that these
concepts have reference to "exemplars" which are acknowledged
by

all (al-

though they are open and provide no one best set of defining features). 108

Kovesi asserts that a fundamental duality
notions.

Conceptualization

is

is

not possible, at least for

a public process.

".

.

.

moral

only those features of

our lives can be incorporated into these notions that are shared by any

and

turn the formation of the notion must itself be done from the point of

in

view of anyone.

"

1

09

By contrast with the view above, the method
do learn what something
debate
the

is

is

is

primarily as we argue

expected to be so fundamental that

same terms

of reference.

in a

I

propose

its

is

one in which

moral worth.

And

we

this

sense we do not even share

The reason we can nevertheless have

a debate

because our opponent's views are the necessary background condition for

108 W.
of

of us,

Language

Inc.

,

B.
,

ed. by

1962), pp.
1

09

Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts,

Max

Black (Englewood Cliffs,

121-46.

Kovesi, Moral Notions,

p.

55.

New

"

in

The Importance

Jersey:

Prentice -Hall,
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our own, and vice versa.
I

to

suggest now that this dialectical development
of concepts

common

sense as

latter position

is

a

everyone

is

seen to be engaged

a profession differ only in that they do
little

more

Their method

insight.

as amenable

the position of ordinary language
philosophy.
in

it

From

the

ordinary language analysis

just in the process of social interaction
and language use.
is

is

more

Those for whom

it

carefully and hopefully with

not ultimately an adversary proceeding

is

but is one of clarifying what things are.

The ordinary language approach makes sense since we do gain conceptual
clarity through relatively nonconflictual processes of day
to day social

discourse.
of intense

But

it

also

makes sense

moral debate.

the first instance an

to

view concept development as a process

This second approach, which

argument over

only very vaguely grasped.

It is

and

life

is

also pervasive,

the worth of something

whose nature

is in

is

only through an adversary process that that

nature becomes specified.

Consider the jury deliberations
ist

in a

murder

trial.

assumptions we know that these deliberations are not

Given
just a

here a certain human act and finding there the best label for
thing as a

human

it.

my

contextual-

matter of seeing

To know some-

act is already to know, in large part, the kind of act

the question remains whether the jury
ly in clarifying the nature of

murder

is

it is.

better understood as engaged primari-

in the light of their experience with this

particular event or in arguing about the intrinsic goodness or badness of that
event.

I

But

grant that judicial decisions are often interpreted in the former way

115

by legal theory.

But

and for that matter

I

would

in the

still

maintain that what goes on

privacy of the judges* chambers,

understood as an argument over moral worth.

in the jury

more

is

room,

aptly

As the argument reaches a

tentative conclusion the jury has "found" at once both the act and the
concept.

Arguments on such basic matters are never more than

We

course.
that the

might better say not that the argument reaches a conclusion but

argument

flictual- -concept.

evident.

tentative, of

is

the conclusion, that the

The

argument

is

the --internally con-

plausibility of this, as regards the present example, is

Consider the hung jury or the

split decision in

decisions are commonplace and hung juries would be

appeals court.

more so

if

Split

the juries

were

not so often pressured into decisions.

There are numerous other examples

of social life

strued as examples of dialectical concept examination.

which could be con-

Those which develop

military or diplomatic concepts such as "aggression" and "war criminal"
unfortunately tend to involve violence, so intense

there are

many examples which do

is the

moral argument.

But

not and these include not only the usual

activities of legislatures, political parties, voters, etc. but also the writing

of books.

Written arguments certainly can be seen as instances of dialectical concept examination.

I

do not refer to the obvious point that the sides

legislative debate can include written

writer

may make

of,

say, a

arguments as well as oral ones or

the case for his opponents as well as for himself.

I

that a

mean
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that the written

itself.

In

argument on one side of the debate can be seen
as a debate

what now follows

From

I

in

try to show why.

the view of a degree of truth logic, a
book length

argument rests

on a great number of distinctions and hence of
subsidiary concepts which can
be safely taken for granted because they are part
of a

argument then focuses on

common

The

culture.

a few remaining concepts, and these of course
can

vary only within the relatively narrow limits set by the
mass

of concepts that

are already assumed.
It

does not follow, however, that because the subsidiary concepts
are

assumed by
According

the author that they are therefore really free of inconsistency.

to a

degree of reality logic, an author's meanings

merely around a central tendency but
possibly even contradictories.

to the point of being contraries

And they are

the

more

because they are not the matter of prime concern.
the author

may

may vary

be found to be arguing with himself,

not

and

able to do so precisely

Thus within

his

argument

these contradictions are

if

present.

There

is

nothing greatly odd about this thesis.

ments can be plausibly interpreted

in quite different

acknowledged and gives rise to one

of the

scholarly interpretation
tation.

And we may ask

That someone's argu-

ways

is

commonly

major needs for scholarship.

But

is

usually motivated by a goal of the one best interpre-

if

this is a

reasonable goal, granting that

necessary one for the purpose of writing textbooks.

it is

a

Perhaps the author really

117
is

saying quite different

From

the standpoint of a degree of reality
logic the differing concepts

and propositions
reduction.

tilings.

in

some extended argument are

One's purpose

is to

not a target for scholarly

interpret these as an internal debate consti-

tuting part of the larger debate over a
certain concept or concepts.

phenomenon

And

this

of debates within debates itself constitutes
a specification of the

concept or concepts, the best specification possible. 110

Main Features
concept examination

and as the pattern

Even

of the

is to

Method

.

The purpose

of a dialectical

method

of

reveal, with increasing specification, a concept by

of defense of the

worth of the concept.

By worth

I

mean

one rejects the broader implications of the method, it still has
certain practical advantages. Firstly, it takes very seriously the
obvious
question to be asked of anyone arguing a position- -"Why should I believe
that?"
Despite its obviousness, this question is not emphasized by present-day
empiricists since for them argument is not primarily instructive. Ordinary
if

language philosophers, although they criticize the empiricist position, do not
seem to emphasize the question either. They employ argument to clarify
ordinary language as it contributes to the evolution of language and of the norms

embedded

For them, argument seems to be a recognition device.
Thus, the proposed method seems to this writer to fill a practical need.
And it does this without taking a skeptical position. It is concerned less with
therein.

evaluating the defense of a position than with simply displaying that defense in
its full complexity.
In doing the latter, it has a second practical advantage.
It treats an author's writings as worthy of an extended examination.
In an era

which emphasizes speed reading and rapid summary,

this

may

be a useful

counter force.

The practical advantages of the method are accompanied by some clear
An emphasis on the great complexity, and even inconsistency, in an author's work can easily degenerate into nit-picking. Even worse,
practical dangers.

it

may

lead one to overlook general principles which are there.

appear to be inconsistent, at
principles.

first,

may

Points which

actually be tied together by these

This writer recognizes these dangers.

118
centrally the "normative" value of the
concept but without supposing that this

value

is

wholly distinct from the "description" of the
concept.

value

is

meant ultimate goodness or badness, not instrumental
goodness or

badness

(as,

for example, in "fruitfulness for research"). 111

There are a number
of

method and

I

of features

be focusing on a defense which

enough psychic distance
is

or implied in the above statement

of Others -- Although

cept by examining the defense of

This

named

shall elaborate on several of them.

Focus on the Writings

lish

By normative

to

I

its

worth,

I

I

propose to examine a con-

will not, in an important sense,

myself produce.

If

I

did so

I

could not estab-

even approximate an adequate examination.

because a dialectical examination must be self referential.

Because

it

departs from the assumption of a generally shared and only vaguely conscious

conceptual framework,

it

must seek defense

of a concept's

worth

in

terms

of

that very defense, or of an opposition defense, or of a combination of both.

Hence

it

must look for argument within

the argument.

I

shall therefore focus

on other peoples' writings and on those which do more or less explicitly defend
a position about the worth of a concept.

Hold Back from Summarization -- The argument within a writer's argu-

ment

is

the object of a dialectical concept examination.

one must hold back from summarization.

m-Note
worth

that, in this description of

In

saying this,

To see
I

this

argument

don't suggest that

purpose, the writer speaks of the

and not the worth of that referred to by the concept.
obvious, from previous argument, that any permanently sharp distinction
between thing and concept is not acknowledged.
of the concept

It

is
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one can avoid that which summarization
implies, namely the presence of a

conceptual framework.
ceptual spectacles.
of

I

have of course been insisting on the ubiquity
of con-

Neither do

I

suggest that one could make any examination

an author's work, other than verbatim
repetition, without one's own analysis

and

in that

sense summary.

What

I

mean

is just

what

I

said.

One should hold

back from summarization as much as possible. 112

To

hold back from summarization

is the

obverse of the affirmative in-

junction to seek out and identify the different distinctions
and thus subsidiary

concepts, the different expansions of these concepts, and
the different argu-

ments and other points

of defense

which employ the concepts.

This

is

the

initial step.

Seek Patterns

major

step.

It is

of

Defense

Following the

the attempt to learn

initial step, is the

how an author uses

all the

second and

elements to

defend his position for or against the worth of the concept in question.

One

112

One might object that there often is not much complexity in an author's
work which could be overlooked. This writer is not so sure. Consider this
analogy.

Traditional studies of legislative activity focused on recorded votes,
public debates, committee hearings open to the public, and similar overt acts.
It is recognized, now, that even a single legislator's activity on a single bill

comprises a very large number

and even inconsistent actions, and
most obvious ones may be the
least interesting. As one moves from traditional models of politics, first to
pluralist models and subsequently to what, for lack of a more general term,
might be called new -left models, ever more of these other actions come into
of different

that those which have been traditionally the

clear view.

Why

should one not suppose, therefore, that a shift in viewpoint

might do the same for authors whose works would otherwise be considered
thin?

120

common approach would

be to cleanse the elements of any
definite contra-

dictions and ambiguities and then to
reconstruct what remained in a loosely

structured chain of logical syllogisms.

But

it

was precisely

my

point in giving

a rationale for a dialectical method
of concept examination that this approach

would not

and

do.

In

is just that

it

destroying the contradiction,

common approach

logical

the

argument and

word "argument.

I

mean, then, something broader and looser than

A

requires.
this is

"

It

why

may

I

point of defense need

if

for the pattern,

that relationship

I

yet accepted as convincing by
to

standards or
is

mean any

prove that

relationship

makes some sense as

there can be no structure

This

is

The simplest way, for example,

As

be a conventional

instead take a form that would be considered fal-

Thus democracy can obviously coordinate

them.

not.

prefer to use the word "defense" rather than

lacious by conventional logic and which
people.

destroys the inner debate

which one seeks.

By a pattern of defense
the

it

a whole.

A

can do B

coordination.

among

all the

is

various elements

often suggested that

among concepts which are ambiguous by

among arguments which, by

too strong a saying.

We

the

is to identify

if it is

It

many

same standards, are

conventional
fallacious.

cannot be that sure of the claim, in the ab-

sence of any attempt to find such a pattern.

An

Anticipated Pattern of Defense --The Dialectical Pattern

can be found where none

is anticipated.

The assumptions

logic suggest a pattern as well as a procedure.

Kuhn argue

that science is less

of a

--No

pattern

degree of reality

Historians of science such as

an inductive aggregating process than

it is

a
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succession of increasingly broader conceptual wholes incorporating

forms those which went before. 113
single person's thought.

It

We

makes sense

in

altered

might plausibly say the same of a
to see personal

knowledge as an

efflorescence of distinctions which successively destroy and reconstruct
conceptual frameworks.

For most people

some

it

sorts of writers

may

this

process goes unrecorded.

But for

well be captured in the chronology of their works.

For Kuhn those wholes within wholes can be deductively organized

after

the fact, so to speak, although that organization does not accurately describe

their historical development.

I

am

In the

realm

of social

phenomenon, however,

suggesting that the confrontation with conceptual structures of higher

levels

is

a perpetual one and does not appear only in their initial development.

The liberal-conservative

conflict in politics

seems

to be this sort of conflict.

So does the relationship between various geographic levels

of political

munity from the local community

precisely the view

to the nation state.

of a degree of reality logic that such conflicts

It is

must be perpetual, as they

define the concepts through a succession of conceptual wholes.
to anticipate is, then, one of

I

com-

The pattern

wholes within and against wholes.

shall proceed on this assumption by examining, in chronological order,

certain principal works of a single author.

And

I

shall

assume

that these

ll3 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
In his later writings,
however, Kuhn has deemphasized the impression, conveyed in this early work,
that scientific paradigms are complete conceptual frameworks which can
.

change only by revolutions.
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works do form some sort

of ultimate whole,

however incompatible they may

initially appear.

The Dialectical

The dialectical pattern, or

Pattern.

pattern of the inner debate within a thinker's
works,

is

in

other words the

revealed by identifying

the different levels of completed argument,
of conceptual whole, and then by

displaying the relationships between each completed
argument and the next

above

it.

I

shall first discuss certain basic features of the
arguments and

shall then outline the major steps taken to reveal the
whole dialectical pattern

or any one level of

it.

Features of the Arguments -1.

The argument

Each argument
under examination,

is

is

a conceptual structure.

an argument for or against the worth of the concept

in this

case the concept of comprehensiveness.

arguments are themselves understood

to be conceptual structures

Now

these

and are the

closest things to what on another view would be called conceptual frameworks.
If

concepts become specified in competition with each other and not by reference

to a

common

evolving culture then one cannot draw

much

of a distinction be-

tween a concept and the conceptual framework within which

it

makes sense.

Both are equally independent. Conceptual structures are struggles, both internally

and externally.
2.

A

They are not

completed argument

By a completed argument

ments should be circular

is

is

is

This

settings.

is

Hegel's viewpoint.

circular.

meant

not so odd.

a circular argument.

If

That the argu-

concepts are internally related then
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circularity

is

A

3.

form available other than contrast.

the only

higher level completed argument

is

richer

in distinctions

than

is

a lower level one.

By a higher level argument, or a more expansive
conceptual structure
(two terms for the

same

tinctions.

a

perceive

This
it,

is

is

less

Why

I

mean an argument

that is richer in

common meaning. The purpose

of the distinctions, as

does someone who has written a short essay on a certain
subject

said that he does so in order to

make richer

crete reality to which his discussion refers.

achieve a closer

fit

with that reality.

same subject?

He makes more

is

often

distinctions to

Another purpose often cited

is that

all share.

important to recognize that however much these two purposes

common

It

points of connection with the con-

does so to elaborate the cultural-linguistic setting which we

in

I

of richer distinctions is to better defend one's
case.

then proceed to write longer essays or books on the

have

sharp dis-

common, however.

The purpose

4.

thing)

may

he

It is

differ they

the typically western assumption that differentiation of

some

sort, whether these differences are material or cultural, has ontological
priority.

They assume

that the philosophic

can be unity as expressed

There

is

in

is to

an alternate assumption, however, which

is to

explain how there

such things as universals.

and some western thought and which holds
on this view,

problem

is

common

that reality is one.

to eastern

The problem,

explain how there can be any differences, not why there

is
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unity.

This

is

the

problem for Hegel and

his explanation is that differentiation
is

the self realization of a single subject.

On

this latter

assumption, a major reason for making more
distinctions

is

to defend one's case against the attacks directed
at one's earlier less differ-

entiated positions.

thought and

it is

This other purpose was supposedly

often attacked as an

one who will use distinctions

in this

wants to defend his theories at

improper one.

to scholastic

People argue that some-

way has no respect

all cost

common

He simply

for facts.

and hence a setback to his theory, from

sense experience, will always be countered by more distinctions.

argument supposes

that there are neutral facts of

some

sort.

If

But this

this is not so,

then the development of distinctions, particularly of social distinctions such
as

ends/means, politics/society or individual/group constitutes
development

of reality.

And

if

in itself the

concepts must be defined by their negatives, so

that the definition of a concept is not only social but a social conflict, then

the very nature of this conflict, this debate, that one pursues

it

it

is

by making more

distinctions.

Displaying the Pattern -discussion of methodology.

It

I

is

now come

to the

most

critical stage in

my

a detailed description of the dialectical

pattern- -the pattern of an author's inner debate.

The

dialectical pattern

is

displayed by showing that the following specific propositions hold with respect
to a reasonably large selection of the person's written works.

most commonly be essays or books

but they

may

The works

will

include book reviews, symposia

participation, personal correspondence and the like.
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Those propositions designated by

letters are

background propositions.

Those propositions designated by numbers are treated
as

argument process and these numbered steps
Chapters

III

of chronologically

works, or groups of works, both

of the pair

the later of the two is a higher level
the later is a larger circle with

more

incorporates

The

B.

will appear in the analyses of

IV.

With respect to each pair

A.
of

and

definite steps in the

proximate works, parts

are complete arguments and

argument than the earlier.

more

other words,

In

internal arguments on it- -because

distinctions --than is the earlier argument.

totality of an author's

works, considered relevant for

cept examination, can be seen as maintaining one side of a debate.

seems

pose a dilemma.

to

it

A common

sense view of the debate

this

con-

The debate

s uggests that

each side has as much merit as the other although each excludes t he other.
Perhaps this
debate

is

is

because each side

the "outer" or

is

understood

in opposition to the other.

This

"primary" debate.

Within each side of the outer debate there are two factions.

They arise

as alternate attempts to deal with the dilemma posed by that debate.

The

first

faction leans toward the other side of the debate, while still giving verbal

allegiance to

its

first faction.

It

own side

own

side.

The second

faction defines itself in opposition to the

wants to show that one can truly retain the advantages of one's

but without

its

disadvantages.

This debate within the outer debate

is

the "proximate outer" debate or "secondary" debate.

It is

the second faction which

seems

the

most aggressive

faction in the
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proximate outer debate.

Because

the strongest position that
is that the

the

it

its

position is logically so tenuous,
however,

can take, and consequently the one
usually taken,

other faction's position leads to logical
absurdity.

argument begins as a reductio ad absurdum.

not necessarily convincing unless

position which

is

it

But reductio

can be shown that there

not logically absurd.

Hence those on

arguments are
an alternate

the reductio or

"

The direct proof
of one's

is

other words,

this side of the proxi-

mate outer debate must provide a "direct proof
as well as
"indirect proof.

In

own side

a proof that

is

in the

it is

in fact

outer debate without

its

possible to gain the advantages

disadvantages.

The statement

of that possibility is called the "central theme" and
because the central

seems

to

pose a contradiction, the attempt

to defend

it

is

theme

what generates the

"inner" or "tertiary" debate.

The statement
works and
initial

is

of the central

more or

argument and

defend this theme.
C.

There

is

in the earliest of the author's

less continuously maintained in subsequent ones.

all the later

In

theme appears

ones are, in one sense, varying attempts to

another sense they are expressions of the theme.

also revealed in the earliest work a concept which

is the

subject of the theme and which

is

also present in all subsequent works.

be called the "central concept.

"

The dilemma

focus in this concept.

ever, but

is

The

It

is

comes

may

to a

not the concept at issue in that outer debate, how-

the negation of that concept.

making an assertion about

of the outer debate

It

the central

The central theme appears

concept—an assertion which

is

to be

simul-
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taneously definitional and non -definitional.

Stated from the point of view of

the concept, the theme asserts that the concept both
contains and does not

contain a certain feature.

The reason

for the curious nature of the central concept is because

the negative phase in the dialectical definition of the concept at
issue.

concept at issue
of

is

comprehensiveness, then the central concept

comprehensiveness.

But

is

the

the negation

the negative concept can only be understood by

if

reference to the positive, then this opposite of comprehensiveness
the

If

it is

is

somehow

same as comprehensiveness.
D.

The earliest argument

two arguments.

There

identity statement.

is

defense of the central theme

in

argument represented by the theme

the

And there

is

a

more

explicit

that theme,

itself as

an

Hence the tension present

concept and theme reappear, not surprisingly,

ment for

effect

argument which simultaneously

rejects and yet incorporates this identity statement.
in the

is in

in the first explicit

argu-

and they subsequently reappear between that argument and

any later argument.

The above propositions

set forth the general structure of a dialectical

Below are listed the propositions connected with particular

concept examination.

steps of that examination.

1.

Central Concept

The central concept

The central concept
alectic.

is

is stated.

It is

the analogue of the Hegelian antithesis.

central because negation

is

The central concept defines, by negation,

the active force of the di-

the concept in debate.
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2.

Other First Order Major Concepts

Here are stated both

the concept in debate, or thesis, and the concept

which defines the central concept, or synthesis.

Because we are talking about

a concept which is internally defined—not by reference to
anything outside
itself- -the synthesis concept

must appear

inconsistent.

It

defines the central

concept by negation, and thus appears as the opposite of that concept, but
defines itself as being identical to the concept in debate.

cept

is

the opposite of that concept.

In this

And

it

the central con-

second step we emphasize the

tendency to identify the thesis and the synthesis concepts with each other.

If

these concepts are the same, then both are in negative relation with the central

concept since we know from step
3.

Attempted Identity

of

1.

that the thesis concept is so.

Opposites- -Genesis of the Inner Debate.

This step merely states the inconsistency among the concepts which
results from steps
4.

Central

1.

and

Theme

2.

as an Argument in Potential.

The central theme asserts
concept

in debate,

although

it

understands the concept

concept, not the thesis concept.
of contraries is as a

way

that the central concept is identical to the

in debate as the synthesis

(The practical value in this apparent assertion

to gain the advantages in both sides of a

without the corrollary disadvantages.

)

The central theme

expression of the identity of opposites described

in step 3.

is

dilemma

hence a compact

It is,

terms, a complete reflection- -a concept both negated and with

its

in

Hegelian

negation.
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Now

the problem in defining a concept by

concept has been defined except as a possibility.

an argument

is

manner and
the central

in potential.

way

the best

war

is

A New

Here

It

the central

in a

theme

convincing

In that

theme as the object

the central

of

case

argument

also wants to be saying something meaningful and

it

I

could define peace, dialectically,

that, in the

progress

distinction which suggests a potential

6.

why

neither

way

to one is

through the other.

Distinction.

shown

it is

is

by an identity statement.

but this would convince no one that the

5.

new

do this

case there must be a difference.

in this

a

But

This

is that

wants to connect two concepts

theme as assertion and

are the same theme.

as

to

It

opposite

its

of

argument, the author introduces

meaning for

the central concept.

Cancellation of the Earlier Argument.
is

shown

that the effect of this

theme and risk denying

new

distinction, is to cancel the central

the position that the author is trying to make.

He would

go over to the opposing faction within the proximate outer debate.
7.

Initial

Development

Here one claims

of the

New Argument

that the author tries to use the distinction in such a

as to create a new argument which retains the advantages of the

8.

Self-Contradiction of the

New Argument

and leave the author
9.

in a

old.

in its Initial State.

But this attempt instead of strengthening the concept

it

is

shown

to

weaken

worse position than he was before.

Preservation of the Earlier Argument.

To avoid

this

problem

it

seems necessary

way

to reintroduce the earlier
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argument within
10.

the

new

one.

Circularity of the Completed Argument.

At this point the new argument
potential for

ment

meaning

in the

is

complete and does strengthen the

central concept, but

it

does so because the argu-

is circular.

The preceding propositions are completely abstract

at this point in the

narrative, but they have not been derived from purely abstract
thought.

They

are based on the application of certain tentative principles to the
Lindblorn and

Mannheim work.
Any attempt

In

to

what follows,

I

show

this application.

support the foregoing propositions cannot be a highly

rigorous one, however, any more than can the ordinary language approach.
is not

rigorous primarily because the hierarchy of conceptual levels which

It

I

identify is probably capable of expansion or contraction so that all the levels
of

argument might be found

in the initial

work

or, conversely, very few

be identified even over the range of a large body of work.

I

might

shall try to show,

nevertheless, that the work of at least two writers --and specifically their

otherwise perplexing inconsistencies --can be plausibly interpreted

in

terms

of

the above propositions.

Because the method of concept examination
apply

it

is

involved and lengthy

primarily to a single one of each writer's works.

choose that work which

to

and thus seems to contain

me seems

In

each case,

I

shall

I

the beginning of the author's line of thought,

in potential all that will follow.

CHAPTER

III

A NEGATIVE VIEW OF COMPREHENSIVENESS

THE PATTERN OF
IN

ITS

DEFENSE

THE WRITINGS OF CHARLES LINDBLOM
A

In this chapter,

interpret, in

I

ation, those writings in

pluralist bargaining

is

Problem for Lindblom

a

terms

of a dialectical concept

examin-

which Charles Lindblom argues that the process

way

to coordinate.

I

of

consider Lindblom' s argument

a response to the social control problem --the problem how the competing

preferences of a plurality of individuals can be ordered into a collective pref-

erence to which

all agree.

I

call

it

a control

problem because

if

people can

agree on policies and procedures then they can establish a social order--they
can control their society.

The social control problem, or

at least a less

appears to be another way to express the classic

ism --the likelihood
freedom

to

of disorder.

How can

extreme version

of

it,

difficulty of political plural-

a political

system which gives great

competing groups and individuals nevertheless achieve adequate

social coordination?

I

speculate that both problems present logical impossibilities.
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For the

132
latter

problem, evidence suggests that neither pluralism nor authoritarianism

can gain even

its

own

distinctive advantage without an effort to gain also the

advantage --and disadvantage --of the other.
in effect, to

serve freedom at the expense

Pluralist political

of authority,

1

systems claim,

but there is

much

evidence that these systems are themselves biased against some groups and
restrictive of their freedom.

2

coordination seems necessary.

adequate to do the

job.

To overcome

A more

this bias, authoritative social

perfect freedom has not been shown

Similarly, authoritarian political systems, in their

attempts to impose a total order even over freedom of thought, find they must

1-The writer is, here, using the

loosely, with the hope that the

manner

terms "freedom" and "authority" very
of use is generally clear.

^The attack against pluralist bias comes from many directions. For
some principal examples see the following works: Peter Bachrach and Morton
LV1
S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power, " American Political Sc ie nce Review
(December, 1962), 947-52. William E. Connolly, ed. The Bias of Pluralism
(New York: Atherton Press, 1969). John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial
State Signet Books (New York: The New American Library, 1967). Theodore
Lowi, The End of Libe ralism: Ideology, Policy and The Crisis of Public
J.
C. W. Mills,
Authority (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
1969),
Press,
E.
E.
SchattUniversity
1956).
The Power Elite (London: Oxford
schneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in
America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).
,

,

,

^There is an expressed hope among many critics of pluralism that the
development of a less biased system can be achieved through greater individual
autonomy. This increase in autonomy is supposed to result from a more
adequate childhood education, through consciousness raising among adults and
But the political systems most often cited as at least partly
in related ways.
exemplifying an improved society have not emphasized human autonomy. For
example, Cuba and the Peoples Republic of China are highly egalitarian societies
in many ways, but they also enforce substantial limitations on individual

freedoms. I am not saying that a system having less of the pluralist bias will
necessarily have more of the bias apparently inherent in central government
control. I say only that the evidence seems to point that way. Strong
evidence for the contrary view is not apparent.
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concede a degree of freedom at least to those who impose the order and, by
extension, to all whose cooperation

is

necessary for

its

success. 4

so complete as to embrace even the controller has been proclaimed
but

it

has not been achieved

in practice.

A

control

in

theory,

^

Despite such evidence as the above, Lindblom and other pluralists
believe that

it is

possible to resolve the classic problem of pluralism and

hence also to resolve a version of the social control problem.

I

assume,

^Lindblom makes this point in an early essay.
"No dictator is mighty enough to stay in power standing alone.
He
can only expect his orders to be obeyed by the leaders around him because
they find it in their interests to obey. Hence he cannot rule without offeringadvantages to them; and, knowing it, they indicate at what price their
loyalty can be won. These subsidiary leaders are in turn in the same
relation to their subordinates as is the dictator to them" [Charles E. Lindblom, "Bargaining: The Hidden Hand in Government," Research Memorandum RM-M34-RC. (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation,
.

1955), pp.

18-19].

[Hereinafter referred to as "Bargaining.

.

"]

For a defense of the general point as regards Soviet politics see Carl
A. Linden, Khruschev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964 (Baltimore,
Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).

^A control even over

the controllers is clearly supposed in Hegel's

notion of world historical individuals, and
cal materialism, as that

is

is

supposed also

most commonly interpreted.

in

Marx's dialecti-

In both

cases

historical necessity provides the control.

Although Lenin did not deny this historical necessity, his attempt, in
effect, to distinguish between the mistaken spontaneity of the working class
movement and the correct historical understanding of the socialists made the
Milovan Djilas argues in
notion dubious. See Lenin "What is to be Done?"

bureaucracy has become the new exploiting
class in the Soviet Union. At a more philosophical level, Alasdair Maclntyre
points out that while social control may extend even over basic conceptual

"The New Class"

that the political

frameworks, the controllers themselves cannot logically be confined within
these frameworks. Their own consciousness must be wider or they could not
be aware of what they do. See Alasdair Maclntyre, "A Mistake about Causality
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by contrast, that this belief
does

is

is

not warranted 6 and that what Lindblom actually

elaborate the dilemma intrinsic to the problem rather than
resolve the

problem.

But, to

me,

this is a

more valuable

function anyway.

The Lindblom Response as an Internalized Debate

If

we suppose

we may suppose

that the

achievement

that the horns of the

of

something poses a dilemma then

dilemma are represented by

sides in debate over the merits of that particular thing.
further, that in

human

actions the concept of a thing

then the concept will be

the thing,

made clear by

assumptions, a dialectical concept examination

meaning

of a concept but is an

means we argue about

social control
the term, is

argument over
it.

is

its

is

And

if

the opposing

we suppose,

virtually the

that debate.

same as

Given these

not a direct search for the

worth.

So to learn what

But control, in the loose sense

synonymous with comprehensiveness.

What

is

I

use

debated, then, is

the value of comprehensiveness.

in Social Science, " in Philosophy, Politics,

Peter

Las lett

and W. G.

and Society Third Series, ed. by

Runciman (Oxford:

Basil Blackwell, 1969).

^Perhaps the word "assume" should be emphasized here. This writer
is assuming, not arguing, that the social control problem presents a logical
impossibility. The point would be very difficult to argue, on either side, for
reasons given in text, chap. II, pp. 74-81.
^This
chap.

II,

pp.

is

the Verstehen position, which

67-74.

is

briefly discussed in text,
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If

Lindblom

how can

I

say, as

is

I

thought to be debating the value of comprehensiveness,

do in the chapter

that he takes the negative position?

title,

Although we shall find that he criticizes certain kinds of comprehensiveness
still his intent is to

show

pluralist process.

Should that not

I

say "No"

is

that there is a kind

is attainable

is that

through the

his position affirmative?

because of the sort of debate involved.

school debate where the first rule

mean

make

which

I

am

The reason

not talking about a

we agree on our basic concepts.

I

the sort that often happens in politics --debate over concepts so funda-

mental that the concepts by means of which we debate are the same as those
in dispute.

In

such debate the position one

is

most

already provided by one's conceptual framework.
of society as highly pluralistic,

I

truly defending is that

Lindblcm sees the structure

shall argue, and this precludes

ever truly reaching the position that comprehensiveness

is

him from

either possible or

of value.

Despite his conceptual commitment to social fragmentation, however,

Lindblom certainly does want

to

argue that this fragmentation can produce --

even perhaps be identical to- -social order.

It is

just through this attempt that

he internalizes within himself debate over comprehensiveness.

argue against the very conception

of society

He

is

which provides his terms

trying to

of

reference.

The purpose

of

my

examining Lindblom's argument with himself, and

also of Mannheim's with himself,

is to

show how a debate, and thus on my view
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how a dilemma, becomes
P attern of that Process.

internalized.

My

further purpose

But in these Chapters

III

and IV

about the intellectual internalization of dilemma.

is to

am

I

display the

talking only

talk about the necessary

I

tension pattern within the person's thought as distinct from that within
his
In

life.

Chapter V, however,

I

consider the internalization of dilemma within

the whole man.

A

Peculiarity of the Lindblom Position

Before ending these introductory comments,
qualification to what has been said.

I

I

must partly take back

Lindblom sees the social structure as fragmented.

when he
ists.

is

compared with Mannheim

must make one major

when he

but not

Lindblom seems to be a contextualist.

a sort of embracing conceptual order which

the statement that

That statement
is

is

compared with

true

positiv-

He sees democratic society as
is

not just a collection of atomistic individuals.

cohesive and consensual.

On

the other hand,

symbiosis as contextualist views of society are often thought

it is

to be.

It

is

not a

It is

an

order which emphasizes the competition rather than the cooperation among

groups and individuals.
the

same

Though he seems

to believe that

we

all

see through

cultural spectacles, Lindblom nevertheless manifests, in

my

view,

o

the tendency toward an atomistic view of society.

8

This point needs elaboration. Where Lindblom explicitly acknowledges
the idea of a contextualist epistemology (the idea that our knowledge is at least
partly the product of a conceptual framework), he asserts that there usually is
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I

have argued

in

Chapter

II

that philosophical tendencies
are as

portant as philosophical extremes.

Given this assumption,

I

im-

believe that

since Lindblom leans toward an
atomist view of society his inner debate

is

ultimately an attempt to show how
such a fragmented society can achieve
social order.

blom

is

This

is

how he himself describes

a contextualist, believing that

his work.

most democrats are part

ceptual order, his argument appears to be
the opposite.
trying to show that

it is

But because Lindof one con-

He appears

to be

possible to have real conflict in a society
that seems

too all consuming to permit this.

no generally shared conceptual framework and that where
there is the framework is inadequate. Indeed it is the usual absence of any such
shared viewpoint
which he gives as one of the reasons why pluralist decision
making is best.
Such decision making assures that all important views will
receive a hearing.

"It is

well known.

.

.

that the

mind

flees

from comprehensiveness,

that

an 'object of perception, or judgement, is referred, not
to the whole world,
but to a specific background or framework. "... our
minds determine what
is relevant and irrelevant, by imposing a
structure upon the problem situation.
This structure tends to vary from mind to mind; and though it is
true that on
occasion people can be brought to adopt similar structures, it
usually occurs
at the expense of comprehensiveness and may mean
that the most useful
insights are abandoned together with the structures of
assumption and interpretation that furnished them" [David Braybrooke and Charles
E. Lindblom,
A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (New York:

The Free Press,
of Decision

.

1970.

),

pp.

43-44].

[Hereinafter referredlo as Strategy

]

Similar points are made in other Lindblom writings. See Lindblom, "Bargaining,"
Also see Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through,"
p. 28.
Public Administration Review XIX (Spring, 1959), 88. [Hereinafter
referred to
as "Muddling Through. "J
,

Where Lindblom

not talking explicitly about conceptual frameworks but
rather about the consensual cultural social base which makes it possible for a
pluralist process to reach agreement, then he talks as if there were a generally
shared conceptual framework which was adequate. See the first part of footnote 20. By 1967 and 1972 he seems to be saying explicitly that there is such an
is

overall conceptual framework although by 1972 he

is

proposing that

it,

too,
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This reverse argument

is

the one

I

examine

in this

chapter because

its

assumptions are the only ones on
which the dialectical method can easily
work.
In the dialectical

method we assume

that society is an organization
of concepts

but not primarily one of publicly
shared concepts.
instead, that a concept
its

becomes

social-conceptual base.

conceptual base

in pluralist

problem of giving reality

On

the latter point

we assume,

definite in opposition to the shared
concepts of

Since Lindblom does

democracies,

it is

assume a dominant social-

easy

see his thought as the

to

to a concept in apparent opposition
to that base.

The

concept of bargaining, which assumes that
people have different understandings

and interests
It

method

is

(else they

would not need

to bargain) is

time now to examine Lindblom's attempt.

is that

such a concept.

A

first

the physical totality of a thinker's work, or
a

assumption of

major part

my

of that

work, can be seen as a meaningful intellectual whole, however
conflicting some
of the writings

in

my

may

appear.

Despite this assumption,

discussion of Lindblom, but

1

I

cannot be that inclusive

shall consider a fairly large

number

of his

essays and books.
Lindblom's most explicit writing

should be questioned.

See text

p.

in

defense of his position 9 on compre-

149.

Because Lindblom at first tacitly acknowledges a shared democratic culture and then does so more explicitly in 1972, this writer calls him a contexBut because in most of his train of thought Lindblom sees a plurality
competing conceptual frameworks the writer would also say that he leans
toward positivism and atomism.
tualist.

of

9At various points in
his writings Lindblom states that he is not arguing

a position about decision making but

is

only describing the process which
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hensiveness begins with an essay
entitled "Bargaining: The Hidden
Hand

Government"

(1955). ">

The thrust

of (his

essay has since appeared

nine other short works and in three
books.

Most well known
(1959).

11

of

them

is his

I

in

in at least

shall consider all of these efforts.

essay on "The Science

of

Muddling Through"

The essay was followed by two major books
-A Strategy

of Decision

prevails.

"...

this paper is one of a growing
family of ventures into clarification
of non-quantitative and largely non-theoretical
methods. One

noteworthy
characteristic of these studies is that they are
not argumentative: they do
not urge this or that method upon social
scientists; they merely make explicit and formalize the methods already
in use" [Charles E. Lmdblom,
"Policy Analysis," American Economic Review
XLVIII (June, 1958) p 298]
If this were generally true of
Lindblom's writings they would not be easily
suited to the writer's method. But this writer
would agree with Lewis Froman
that Lmdblom is, in a sense, both describing
and arguing. In a footnote to
chapter II of The Active Society Amitai Etzioni reviews
this question.
"Lindblom does not manifestly advocate a strategy which he calls
somewhat disaffectionately 'disjointed incrementalism.
Three reviews of the
Strategy of Decision point to this ambiguity. Morton
A. Kaplan notes: 'It
is not clear throughout the book if the authors
are more concerned with
whether disjointed incrementalism is a description of how people
do choose
or a prescription as to how reasonably to choose,
The Annals of the Am ercan Academy of Political and Social Science Vol. 352
(1964), p. 189.
'Whether the strategy is a description of a 'social process' or an alternative
'

,

,

'

'

,

ideal of rationality is not clear,

Victor A. Thompson, American Journal of
Vol. 70 (1964), p. 132.
Lewis A. Froman, Jr. concludes: 'As
Lindblom, the empirical theorist and Braybrooke, the philosopher, try to
suggest, it (the strategy) is really both, American Political Science Review
Vol. 58 (1964), p. 116" [Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society (New York: The

Sociology

*

,

'

,

Free Press, 1968) chapter

^First reference

U Ibid.

is in

II,

footnote 65]

footnote

8.
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(1963) 12 and

The

Intelligence of

Democracy

(1965)

13

-which together provide

the fullest statement of his views.

Preparatory to the concept examination,

summary
adequate

of

Lindblom's position.

summary

of his

views

is

My

purpose

encies

is just

is his

shall present an "illustrative"

in

doing so

is to

suggest that an

impossible since he seems to be taking

opposite positions on numerous points.

moreover,

I

This impossibility of summarizing,

what we should expect

if

the cause of Lindblom's inconsist-

attempt to deal with a social dilemma which he has intellectually

internalized.

Following the illustrative
itself.

I

I

proceed to the concept examination

first try to describe the overall dialectical

blom gives increasing
society.

summary

Then

I

process by which Lind-

reality to the concept of bargaining in a consensual

examine

in

depth the first step of this process.

That in-depth

examination focuses on his 1955 essay.

An

In

Chapter

II

Illustrative

I

Summary

argue the dangers

work, pointing out that interpretations
multiple.

For

my own

of Lindblom's Position

in

of

attempted summaries of an author's

any work can be and always are

approach, the summarizing process

is

a very cautious

12jbid.
1

3

Charles E. Lindblom, The Intel ligence of Democracy: Decision Making
Through Partisan Mutual Adjustment (New York: Free Press, 1965). [Hereinafter referred to as Intelligence of Democracy. J
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and halting one.
and

In

to introduce

order to emphasize the partiality
involved

some

of the perplexities

first

is a traditional

the

theme

hood
the

and main proviso

theme

in pluralist

of pluralist disorder.

is

of

thought which
But pluralists

it,

assuming

According

I

that there is at least

to a

who acknowledge

problem.

in the

the likeli-

Instead they focus on

They acknowl-

converse theme, one would focus on the problem of

And

deemphasize the background problem,

tacitly

background, the problem

in this

assuming

case too one would
that there

was enough

For the traditional theme, the immediate problem

would be the danger

problem would be

its

of losing

it.

very presence.

verse theme without losing the advantages of the traditional one.
to the other.

of social

For the converse theme, the immed-

Lindblom's theme seems an attempt to have the advantages

from one

There

enough social order.

this raises for safeguarding social conflict.

iate

say.

background but they don't deal

in the

conflict

I

have previously identified as

achieving social order while acknowledging,

social conflict.

which

safeguarding the opportunity for social conflict.

edge the other problem as being present
with

to everything

I

the instability of Lindblom's theme.

of disorder usually do not focus on this

problem

attempt,

which later will be examined,

append numerous provisos and contraindications

The

my

in

of the

He

con-

shifts

Usually his writing accords more with the former, but

some works, and passages

in

many

others, treat of the latter. 14

For now

14rhe following essays and books represent instances of a tendency

I

t
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merely recognize
of the

to

the presence of alternate

converse and,

my summary

in a

themes and proceed

sense, central theme.

have been indented

in

In

to a

summary

what follows, the provisos

order to set them

off clearly.

Lindblom's Central Theme
I.

Lindblom's central theme concerns pluralist democratic
societies and

involves the claim that such societies, and particularly
the United States, can

toward the traditional theme

in Lindblom's writing (although everything he
has
written displays that tendency to some extent).
Lindblom, "Policy Analysis, " pp. 298-312. See especially
In
p. 307.
this essay Lindblom argues that an incremental method
of policy analysis is
appropriate for the political fragmentation of a democratic pluralist

Since that kind of society

is

assumed

society.
to be best, so is incrementalism.
Lind-

blom does not argue

that this method will optimize or coordinate, however,
though he intimates that it may. LJnfortunatcly it is not clear whether he is
intimating that the incremental decision method can itself coordinate or whether
the pluralist political process can do so.
Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
See especially pp. 73,
129-31. In the first part of this book Lindblom much elaborates the incre.

mental method. His primary argument for that method seems to be, as in the
preceding essay, the claim that it fits democratic politics. Comments about
the coordinating power of incrementalism do occur, and it is even claimed that
they represent the mam theme of the book, but what is particularly emphasized
is the ability of disjointed incrementalism to consider a wide variety of values.
Charles E. Lindblom, "Decision-Making in Taxation and Expenditures, "
in Public Finance: Needs, Sources and Utilization A Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1961), pp. 295-336. See especially pp. 314 (footnote) and
316-17. [Hereinafter referred to as "Decision-Making. "] In this essay Lindblom explicitly claims more concern with the coordinating or calculating
advantages of pluralism than with its safeguards against excess governmental
power. But his discussion in some places tends to belie the claim. He recognizes, for instance, a need for a system of weighting values if there is to be
coordination, but his weighting system turns out to be whatever minority groups
demand as the price of their consent. Such a system safeguards against governmental power more obviously than it coordinates.
,
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coordinate as well as can authoritarian
15
societies.

Presumably

this is intended to be a
significant

not have written so
is

much on

it.

But

it

is

significant to the extent that there

indeed a wide plurality of different intensely

societies.

theme or Lindblom would

felt interests in

democratic

Without those differences coordination does
not represent a

severe problem and displaying a solution

to that

problem

is

not

much

of an

accomplishment.

What
istic of

is

coordination?

Lindblom sometimes understands

any relation whatever among decision-makers while

he suggests that
is not clear.

it

is a fuller

concept.

it

as a character-

at other

times

But the nature of this fuller concept

^

15 See footnote

9.

16

The following passages suggest that any decision-maker interaction
coordination and sometimes they show Lindblom's uneasiness with this
con-

is

clusion:

"Since

has been shown that coordination is achieved when X defers to
Y, when X ignores Y, and when X dominates Y, it would seem to follow
that any pattern of yielding or dominance is as consistent with coordination
as any other. This being the case, it would seem to follow that any kind of
it

among decision-makers must be pronounced coordinated. Obviously,
we need a fuller concept of coordination than has yet
been introduced" [Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy p. 162].
"How often these methods for partisan mutual adjustment [methods of
relation

for further analysis,

,

mutual neglect, deference, or manipulation] achieve a rational coordination
of decisions is not realized. That they interlock decisions made at various
points in the body politic is clear enough. ... But what if the interlocking
of decisions is without any perceivable desirable pattern? It has to be shown
that coordination so achieved is rational in some sense going beyond what we
have already said" [Lindblom, "Decision-Making," p. 316].
The tendency to identify coordination and decision-making apparently has
roots in an earlier essay, if we can understand coordination as the achieve-
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What

is

an authoritarian society?

a democratic one.

problem

is that

If

the difference

It is

is

for Lindblom there is

the

not too clearly distinguished
from

measure

of coercion then the

sometimes no sharp

distinction be-

tween consent and coercion. 17

ment

of the public interest (and

Lindblom seems to understand it so in this
essay, see footnotes 101-103).
"Hence, within a certain range the public
interest is represented by an
agreement among partisan interP^
[t
i^ Hrm "Pnr iii-n"q~>~3u]
»
::
Other passages in Lindblom's work attempt
to describe stronger forms
of coordination but they do not clearly succeed.
In "Decision-Making, - the
tests of coordination look more like tests
for pluralism.

Democracy, Lindblom attempts, only

In the Intelligence o f
indirectly, any fuller concept. He com -

pares the coordinating ability of partisan adjustment
with that of centrality, so
we must look to his definition of centrality for any conceptual
elaboration 'But
the latter concept is itself a weak one. Centrality
cannot be a form of synopsis,
pp. 165-66; it cannot imply consistency in the strong sense that one
policy
flatly contradicts another, p. 193; and it
cannot involve the decreed values
even of a majority as this contradicts the pluralist desire for
dispersed
power, pp. 271-72.
17 In M

"Bargaining,

"

Lindblom distinguishes between the two decision
processes of bargaining and hierarchy. He clearly associates bargaining
with
pluralist democracy and intimates that hierarchy, in its purest form,
is associated with dictatorship.

pluralism develops the complex distribution of control necessary
the monolith of control useful to the dictator"
"
[Lindblom, "Bargaining, pp. 19-20].
".

to

.

.

democracy rather than

But Lindblom also notes, pp.

18-19, that pure hierarchy is impossible. One
must, therefore, conclude that the difference between democracy and authoritarianism is not for him an absolute one.

That the status of the distinction between consent and coercion is also
fuzzy is apparent from the following passages:
"Because every demand one makes, every preference one feels, and
every value one holds already reflects a compromise between individuals
and circumstances ... we cannot draw a nice line between 'This I agree
to' and 'This I am under the circumstances going to accept' " [Lindblom,

The Intelligence of Democracy p.
"Even if the distinction between
,

one

is

forced to do

is

obscure and

224].

that to which one consents and that
at best only a

which
matter of degree, there
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Features of Pluralist Democracy
A.

II.

Within pluralist society there must
be consensus on fundamental

procedures and values or minorities would
not be accepting the decision out-

comes

of the society. 18

But what is this consensus--an
inarticulated cultural milieu, a deliberate

a difference between a chief executive
who consents to step down when he
hears the election returns and one who will
not do so unless his
is

life is

threatened.

.

.

" [Ibid

.

259].

p.

,

In general,

Lindblom claims he can simply avoid the question
of coercion
is not dealing with the traditional
theme of pluralism where it is most
important. He makes this claim explicit in the
Intelligence of Democra cy at
pp. 206-07 footnote.
But the claim seems misleading; for clearly
the point of
Lindblom's writing is to show that the coordinating virtues
of pluralism are
since he

additional to

wants

its

show

to

virtues for avoiding tyranny, not substitutes for
them. He
have both, and to do this he must deal also with the

that one can

traditional theme.
l

fin

...

the alleged precondition of democratic government:

that citizens

must agree on certain fundamental values and procedures, despite

their

disagreement on others" [Lindblom, "Decision-Making,"
p. 317].
Lindblom sometimes gives particular emphasis to the procedures:
".
we sometimes place a value on certain social processes that
.

.

resolve conflicts rather than place values on possible outcomes of the
conflict.
The obvious example is the widespread approval given to the process
called majority rule.
for a large category of policies we are indiffer.

.

.

ent to outcomes provided only that the outcomes are chosen by
majority
rule" [Charles E. Lindblom, "The Handling of Norms in Policy Analysis, "
in The Allocation of Economic Resources
ed. by Morris Abramovitz and
,

others (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959),
[Hereinafter referred to as "Handling of Norms. "]

p.

171].

For other similar comments, see: Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of
Decision p. 73; Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy p. 259; and Lindblom,
,

,

"Bargaining,

"

p.

32.
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majority decision, or something
else? 19

Apparently

scriptive or normative theory in
the positivist sense.

alternative

is

consistently adhered to, however.

come" means depends on which
II.

B.

of the

it is

neither de-

No other

single

What "Accepting an out-

above alternatives applies.

return for the consensus, minorities must
be granted a veto

In

power on any issue they wish.

Experience suggests that

in the

United States,

Evjdence that the consensus is an inarticulate
cultural milieu appears
The essence of Lindblom 's position in many of
these
is that the attempt to verbalize our
values often produces apparent conflicts
which obscure a deeper but inarticulate agreement.
An example of this view
in

numerous passages.

follows:

"... agreement reached

through these methods [of fragmented policy
much explicit and elaborately articulated
ideological disagreement, which is, however, largely
irrelevant to the
actual choices being made.
words about values make the most of disagreement while the actual handling of values in analysis quietly
achieves
some important degree of agreement.
much agreement emerges
simply because the practicioners share a common culture.
"
[Lindblom,
"Handling of Norms, " p. 176].
analysis]

is

quite consistent with

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Also see Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
p. 133.
This inarticulate consensus embraces the current economic system.
Hence, that system appears as a given, not a deliberately chosen
ideology.
See Lindblom, "Policy Analysis, " p. 310.
,

On
writer

the definition of the consensus as a majority decision note that
this
here speaking of majority decision as the way to reach agreement.

is

He
On

is not speaking of the doctrine of majority rule as the
outcome of agreement.
the latter topic, Lindblom sometimes takes an affirmative position
(see
footnote 18, second quotation) and sometimes a negative one (see footnote
22,

second quotation). But on the topic now at is sue --whether the agreement is
achieved by majority decision- -Lindblom is also ambivalent. Sometimes he
implies that agreement cannot be reached this way.
Majority rule
".

limited use.

Policy-makers do not know what the majority
wishes on any but a very few issues on which the citizens have expressed
themselves.
Moreover, citizens are greatly dependent upon policy.

.

is of

.

makers

.

.

" [Lindblom,
for advice as to what they should prefer.
"Tinbergen on Policy -Making, " Journal of Political Econom y, LXVI (December,
.

.
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at least, the price will not be too
high. 20

Though

if

the consensus is an inarticulate shared
culture,

how can one

set conditions for it?

The Impossibility
A.

III.

There

is

of Synoptic

Decision -Making

a conventional theory of rational decision-making
which

Lindblom calls synoptic decision-making.
should be clarified

in

According

to this theory,

values

advance, all the alternative implementing policies and

1958), 534].

Lindblom elsewhere implies, of course, that some agreement among the
majority must be possible --at least on certain basic values and procedures
--or

democracy could not survive. See this writer's footnote 20, second quotation.
Sometimes Lindblom seems to "throw everything into the pot" and leaves
the reader to interpret this consensus for himself. He does this, for
example
in

speaking about the procedural "conventions" of democracy.
"The conventions are explicit or implicit prescriptions that specify to
some degree, though only very roughly, what goal values and side values
can and cannot be sacrificed to the achievement of other values. Some conventions are written into law, others come to be traditionally accepted
without force of law. Others not written into the law are themselves the
product of the kind of interchange [partisan mutual adjustment] we are
describing in this book.
Where these are not law people may accept
.

them

.

Or they simply

acceptance.

their accepting them.
is

.

out of the conviction that the stability of the system

.

.

.

may

,

pp.

their

strategically calculate the advantages of

Presumably the acceptance

traceable simply to social indoctrination"

Democracy

demands

some conventions
[Lindblom, Intelligence of
of

91-92].

Incidentally, this appeal to social indoctrination is particularly ironic in a

work

supportive of minority group freedom. Yet it also appears at the very beginning
of that thought sequence which culminates in Lindblom 's Intelligence of Democ -

racy

.

See Lindblom's "Bargaining,"

20

p.

39.

"Societies can be thought of as purchasing this agreement, or consent

to continuation of democratic government, by conceding to each interest

group whatever it requires as a price for its consent" [Lindblom, "DecisionMaking, "p. 317].
".
in the United States and other successful democracies some of the
.

.

148
all the

consequences of each policy should
be considered, and that policy

shonld be chosen which best serves
the chosen values. 21

This conventional

theory has severe problems, though,
which can be avoided by frankly accepting
the kind of society mentioned in

The Problem
III.

B.

and

II.

of Value Conflict --

One problem

1.

I

22
of synopsis is that people disagree
on values.

common

values (including democracy itself) on which
citizens unite are
more important to them than the values on which they
disagree. Were this
otherwise, a large minority would rather abandon
democracy than be
" [Lindblom, "Bargaining, "
outvoted.
p. 32].
.

.

2]

For a particularly concise statement of this theory, see
Charles E.
Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process Foundations of
Modern Political Science
Series (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice -Hall,
Inc.,
,

1968), p.

22

Some

13.

illustrative quotations are the following:

decision-makers, to say nothing of the electorate, do not in fact
wholly agree on objectives or values. To be sure, on many
they agree
roughly; but the scope of government decision-making is not
".

.

.

limited to

their areas of agreement"

is

[Lindblom, "Decision-Making, " p.
302J.
It seems, indeed, that even on some basic
procedural matters there
no agreement.
"Despite conflicting preferences among citizens, might a decision-maker
.

.

.not simply follow the principle of equality in the weighting of individual

preferences?"
"This is a defective criterion.
differences in social function call for
inequalities in the weighting of preferences.
The case for equality in
weights has never been pushed seriously except for the special case of
.

.

.

.

.

equality in a kind of 'last say' decision, as in elections.
.But even in
'last say' expressions of opinion we are not agreed on equal weights; many
persons wish to depart from them to take account of intensity" [Lindblom,
Intelligence of Democracy pp. 140-41].
.

.

,

universal or general criteria such as majority preference are
inadequate for the solution of complex problems" [ Ibid
p. 185].
".

.

.

.

Also see Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy

of Decision

,

,

p.

35.

'
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But usually Liudblom
emphasizes that large scale choices,
at least, are

agreed
III.

democracies. 23

in

B.

cant.

2.

This

is

not to say, however, that all
value conflict is signifi-

Disputes over grand ideological
alternatives such as

Communism

Capitalism are not very much so. 24 A11
real world

va.

systemg are

mixed.

Though

in his

most recent work, Lindblom does intimate

alternatives need discussion and

23 See point

II.

may

that

grand

be disputed. 25

A.

2 4See footnote
19, first quotation.
In the book he wrote with Dahl, Lindblom

was particularly explicit in
rejecting the significance of ideological disputes,
and this view does not change
in most of those later writings we consider.
"In economic organization and reform, the
'great issues' are no longer
the great issues, if ever they were. It has
become increasingly difficult,
to find meaningful alternatives posed in the
traditional choices between soclahsm and capitalism, planning and the free market, regulation
and laissezfaire.
[Actual choices are not so grand].
.because, at least in the
Western world, most people neither can nor wish to experiment
with the
whole pattern of socioeconomic organization to attain goals more
easily won"
[Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics,
and Wei fare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved
into Basic Social
.

.

.

Processes
p.

,

.

Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row Publishers,

1953),

3].

2 ^The

economist

correct to take the main structures of society as given. Otherwise his analysis would be irrelevant to the circumstances in which policies
are actually made.
".

.

.

is

The consequence, however,

as a policy analyst he has to pracand superficial kind of social science.
it does not
ask radical questions about fundamental features of the social structure"
tice a conservative

is that

.

.

[Charles E. Lindblom, "Integration of Economics and the Other Social
Sciences through Policy Analysis, " Integration of the Social Sciences through
Policy Analysis ed. by James Charlesworth (Philadelphia: The American
,
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B.

Significant conflict is conflict at the
margin.

3.

blom often means

zero-sum
in

some

But

a conflict over trade-offs --a
conflict in an essentially

situation

other.

where an increment

There certainly

maybe there

isn't.

is

in

one element implies a decrement

substantial conflict here. 26

Elsewhere, Lindblom

decision situations are zero-sum. 27

Academy

By this Lind-

in effect questions

He also suggests, elsewhere,

and Social Science, 1972), p. 1].
"Someone ought to be asking such questions ..." [Ibid.

whether
that

of Political

,

p.

4].

26

Lindblom's common example
unemployment.

is the

trade-off between inflation and

"...

abstract values command wide agreement. ... But evaluations at
the margins at which policy choices are made are much disputed:
one
citizen or policy-maker would rather see another million unemployed
than
see prices rise by 3 per cent; another prefers the opposite" [Lindblom,

"Tinbergen on Policy-Making, " p. 534].
"Whenever values are in conflict --that is, whenever one has
some of one value in order to achieve some of another value --a

ment of a goal value requires
system be related to the cost
Strategy of Decision

,

p.

to give up

full statethat its ranking or position in a deductive

of achieving it"

[Braybrooke and Lindblom,

29].

"In short, both because values sometimes conflict and because they sometimes complement each other, those actually relevant to policy choices are
values of increment and decrement, that is, marginal values --rather than
abstractions such as defense, full employment, liberty, or better highways"
[Ibid

.

,

p.

31].

The mention of "complementary" values in the last quote does not weaken the
basic emphasis on value conflict. It is just because resources are limited and
values basically conflict that the partial achievement of one value suddenly

makes it worthwhile to pursue another. Without this zero-sum relationship,
values would have no necessary connection with each other, either positive or
negative, but would relate only to the valuing individual.

27 "In the market, trade offers benefits to both parties, hence public
good.
But in bargaining in government it often appears that one's victory is another's
defeat.

I

shall show, however, that bargaining almost always (perhaps with-

out exception) takes place because of the possibility of mutual gain to all the

15.1

marginal values are equivalent
28
policies.
is

to policies

Furthermore, sometimes

all

and

that people often

agree on

he means by a marginal conflict

the small difference between
two social states, and thus conflict
at the

bargainers

although sometimes the only mutual
gain
existing conflict by reaching a
settlement"

is in abating a pre[Lindblom, "Bargaining, " p. 3]
This half-hearted confidence in the
mutuality of values becomes less o
further
lurtner
on in the essay. See p. 31.

In the Intelligence of Democracy there
are numerous intimations that the
social situation is not zero sum. For
example:
"A central coordinator.
may easily fall into the habit of believing
that what one party gains another
must lose, a fallacy that plagued economic
thinking until Adam Smith made it abundantly
clear that for many transactions
all parties can gain" [Lindblom,
MeUigence o f Democracy p 210]
This confident statement, also, becomes
half-hearted as Lindblom adds, on the
same page, that the mutual advantage may be only a
Pareto
.

.

optimum.

Pareto optimum

some do

not

gam and

not to gain, in a changing world,

In a

is to

lose.
28

Since Lindblom has frequently held that general
values in a democracy
are agreed, it follows that if marginal values are
also agreed there is no place
left for conflict.

That we can often agree on policies
".

•

.

it

is

commonplace

is asserted in numerous places.
that individuals can often agree on policies

they cannot agree on ends" [Lindblom, "Tinbergen
on Policy-Making,
Also see Lindblom, "Decision-Making, " p. 309.

"

when
534]

p.

That policies are identical to marginal values is less commonly
asserted
but consider the following passage:
"Instead of choosing among values in the light of which alternative
policies
can be rated, we often choose among alternative policies directly.
That

say_,

instead of choosing

among

a group of abstract values,

is to

we compare and

choose among combinations of them in which their proportions differ.
Now because, in our society, change proceeds almost always through
incremental steps, it turns out that we often evaluate only a restricted set

which are only incrementally different from each other
Hence, our values are not total or average values but are instead values
at the margin" [Lindblom, "Handling of Norms,"
pp. 170-71]. [First
of alternatives

.

emphasis

is this

writer's.

]
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margin

is

mild by

specific things

HI. B.

terms

4.

definition.

^

Finally he says

we are against though

we can

we are

not those

for.

Value statements are not really
meaningful

of choices at the margin.

often agree on the

30

until stated in

The evaluator cannot really know what he
wants

except in terms of the options and
costs apparent at the

moment

he

is

con-

fronted with the need for a choice. 31

29 Lindblom makes the
claim that marginal differences are
incremental
differences and that the incremental is small.
"... a 'small' change is a change in a relatively
unimportant variable
or relatively unimportant change in an important
variable.
... a small
change in an important variable will also be denoted
as an 'increment of
change"* [Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy
of Decision
64].
,

p.

the notion of 'small' is not so subjective and
personal.
society there develops a strong tendency toward
convergence in
".

.

.

what changes are important or unimportant.

.

.

"

[Ibid.

,

p.

... in any
estimates of

62].

30"

'Another hypothesis

is that in the practice of these
[pragmatic] methods
often find ourselves agreeing on what we are against,
even if we cannot
agree on what we are for" [Lindblom, "Handling of Norms, "

we

p.

177J.

"Policy aims at suppressing vice even though virtue
cannot be defined.
[Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
102].
pp.
See also Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy,
147, 149.

"
.

.

,

pp.

The agreement on what one

is

against has no apparent temporal endurance,

however.
"(It is in their

conception of social ills as well defined 'problems' with
aspirants to the synoptic ideal go wrong. ) In a nonstatic
society, objectives and other values continue to shift and so
do actual possi'solutions' that

.

.

.

change" [Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
See also Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy pp. 146-47.
bilities for

,

124].

p.

,

"For national economic policy

only in the vaguest and least helpful
as citizens or policy-makers know our values except by inference
from our actual choices.
.

.

.

way do we

Aims cannot be
not always
pp.

known

rationally chosen without regard to costs, but costs are

in

advance" [Lindblom, "Tinbergen on Policy-Making,

"

534-35].

Elsewhere Lindblom intimates

that the costs (i.e.

,

the trade-off values)
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Consequently, the synoptic goal of postulating
values

5.

vance of choices

is

impossible.

deducing choices from values

is

And

this

means

in

ad-

that the synoptic goal of

also impossible, supposing as

it

does a greater

conceptual division between the two than
exists.
But then there are no conflicts of
values, there

is

only interaction

among

choices, and Lindblom does not want to say
merely that interaction can

achieve coordination.
one of his major points

He wants
is the

to

say that conflict can do so.

After

existence of value conflicts, probably

large scale values, the kind one would deduce
from, but certainly

values at the margin.

values were

it

He

often writes as

if

all,

among

among

one could deduce choices from

not that the values conflict. 32

can never be known in advance. If they could, then it would be
possible, presumably, to determine how many people preferred one side of the

trade-off
not possible to do that.
"No one can know the facts about that subtle kind of value or preference"
[Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, p. 254].
In his very next paragraph, though, Lindblom partly retreats
from the aforementioned assertion.

rather than another.

And,

it is

on

The following passage

illustrates the view that

were

it

not for value

conflict, one could

deduce choices from values.
".
whether a set of decisions are fully coordinated or not, other things
being equal, depends, finally, on the values by which one judges the set. A
set of policies nicely adjusted to achieve a maximum of price stability is not
necessarily nicely adjusted to achieve a high level of employment" [Lindblom,
.

.

Intelligence of

Democracy,

p.

165].

But Lindblom also adopts, on this matter, a similar approach to that taken
elsewhere. That is to say, he sometimes embraces both sides of a question
though in such a way that their mutual exclusivity is obscured (see this writer's

footnote 19).

present instance, Lindblom suggests that value conflict,
on the one hand, and the knowledge of values only at the decision moment, on
the other, are alternative reasons against a welfare function.
In the
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The Problem
in.

problems
if

C.

of Deficient

In addition to the

1.

of synopsis are the

--

Knowledge

problem

problems

of

of value conflict, other

complexity and of uncertainty.

there were values apart from implementing
means

impossible to consider

consequences.

process

it.

all the available

Not only

33
I

is

major

means or

it

would,

in

Even

any case, be

to foresee all the possible

the information limited but so is man's capacity
to

shall refer to these two problems together as the

problem

of

deficient knowledge.

Are

the

problems

of complexity

and uncertainty really additional to that

of value conflict or alternative to it?

Meaningful conflict among large scale

values (such as ideologies) would suggest that something substantial was at

In synoptic analysis the

common requirement

that values be clarified

and systematized in advance of analysis is impossible to meet in many
circumstances in which, on the one hand, the relevant values are unknown
until the analysis is far advanced or in which, on the other hand, disagree-

ment on values guarantees that no stated principles or welfare function can
command the agreement of those whose values are presumed to be governing"
[Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 139-40].
aforementioned quote, neither the presentation of the two possibilities as
live alternatives nor the phrase "many circumstances" must be allowed to
obscure the fact that these two possibilities can never occur together. If values
In the

conflict, then they must have been statable in advance of decision. And if they
are not so statable they cannot conflict. Yet Lindblom apparently wants to say
both things. He wants to say that there is a sort of automatic coordination of

values since they only become specified when the battle of interests is resolved
and a choice made. But he also wants to say that this coordination is a product
of conflict.

^These

criticisms of synopsis, like those based on the presence of

value conflict, occur throughout Lindblom's work.
presentation, see Lindblom, "Decision-Making,

"

For a particularly clear
pp.

300-02.
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stake, and this in turn would
imply that such values could be applied.

The

effect of applying values so wide
would be to decree a conceptual closure in

support of the values-and with closure,
knowledge would not be deficient.

For there would be a designed limitation

of

means and

a designed interpre-

tation of all consequences.

Neither would knowledge be deficient

mental values.

there was conflict over incre-

Meaningful conflict among incremental values, as
distinct

from incremental choices, would imply
in

if

advance of choice.

that such values could be articulated

But to articulate and then debate incremental
values

presupposes, according to synopsis, the capacity to consider

Thus

it

then there

III.

C.

seems
is

2.

that

if

there

is

all variables.

a problem of value conflict for Lindblom,

no problem of deficient knowledge.
If

one had adequate theory, meaning by theory the sort that

positivists call descriptive theory, then knowledge would not be
deficient.

fortunately there

is

no such adequate theory.

What there

serve an "orienting function" but not to guide choices

Un

is is sufficient to

at the

margin.

3

'

34Although Lindblom expresses
belief that theory of a certain sort
structures our facts (e.g.
see Braybrooke and Lindblom, St rategy of Decision
pp. 98-99), such theory, he says, is not what the synoptic decision-maker
wants. For such a decision-maker there must be
,

"...

highly structured bodies of generalizations that systematically

employ concepts offering some approximation

of axiomatic treatment.

"
.

[Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision p. 117].
On the inadequacy of such theory, see the previous reference, pp. 117-19,
also Lindblom, "Muddling Through, " p. 87.
,

.

,
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What does orient mean? How can

a theory aid direction and yet
not

aid choice?

If

this

knowledge

means

is deficient

from lack

of adequate descriptive theory, then

that large scale values cannot be
successfully fitted to social

reality since

on which to

we cannot achieve a large-scale description

fit

And

them.

if

knowledge

is

deficient

of such reality

from lack

conceptual closure then such values have not been
applied.

between large scale values cannot be very significant

Furthermore, the lack

of

of

decreed

Thus, conflict

in either case.

adequate descriptive theory prevents an over-

view of

all

variables and makes impossible the articulation of incremental

values.

If

they cannot be articulated then they cannot be known to
conflict.

Thus one reaches the converse conclusion
to HI. C.

If

1.

there

is

to that

reached

in the

proviso

a problem of deficient knowledge then there

is

apparently no problem of value conflict.

The

Possibility of

IV. A.

Given the impossibility of synopsis for social coordination,

complex cases,
is

Democratic Decision-Making

it is

necessary only

to

not necessary to

show

that

show

democracy

that

is

democracy can do

better.

in

It

a possible coordinating device. 35

^^Lindblom would deny, sometimes, that synopsis and democracy are
same class and would thus deny that they are alternatives. The
alternative to synopsis is incrementalism, according to him, and the alternative to democracy (understood as "partisan mutual adjustment") is centrality.
These other alternatives rest on the distinction between decision method and
sociopolitical process, however. Synopsis and incrementalism are alternative
decision methods while centrality and democracy are alternative sociopolitical
even

in the
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IV. B.

The processes

of

democracy which enable

ation include two major
components:
political process which

Though

processes.

it

often

And

employs

seems

the decision

to

achieve coordin-

method and

the socio-

that method. 36

that these two

this distinction

it

components collapse

between method and process

is

into one.

itself

37

»„

... to look upon an overview of mutual repercussions
among decisions
as a merit of central coordination
is to conceive of central
coordination as
an exercise
synoptic problem solving. But
synopsis . . is an impo sible
method of problem solving for complex
problems. We do not prove byTht
argument that central coordination is
impossible or that, by default of it
partisan mutual adjustment is a
desirable alternative. We make the
point
only that one traditional claim
[many would say the distinguishing claim
though] for the superiority of central
coordination over other forms of
adjustment is invalidated for sufficiently

m

.

complex problems
This limited move in the argument
somewhat changes the perspective
with which one regards partisan mutual
adjustment.
[It] lm poses on no
one the heroic demands for information,
intellectual competence time
energy, and money that are required for
"
an overview.
[Lindblom
.

.

.

.

.

'

Intelligence of

Democracy,

pp.

170-71].

36 Throughout

his writings, Lindblom makes an explicit
distinction between these two components. For example, the
distinction is a cornerstone of
the essay on "Policy Analysis" in which
he first explicitly argues that incremental policy analysis is the method most appropriate
for incremental politics
And ln the Strategy of Decision he and Braybrooke again
make the point as they
speak of "Matching Practices to Political Contexts. "
In The Intelligence of
Democracy, Lindblom tends to identify only the incremental
element of
decision-making with decision "strategy. " Though he speaks
of the strategy as
both incremental and disjointed, it is primarily the
former features which he
discusses. The disjointed element of decision-making
appears more fully when
he speaks of "The Need for a Multiplicity of Decision
Makers. " See Lindblom,

Intelligence of

Democracy

,

pp.

148-52.

37 One indication
that the distinction between decision method and sociopolitical process is often conflated is the description of
incremental politics
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IV.

lems

C.

These two components are associated with
the two major prob-

of synopsis.

problem

The decision method

of deficient knowledge.

the problem of value conflict.
itself to solve either

in

is

particularly responsive to the

The socio-political process

Neither component, however,

problem.

Each depends upon

is

responsive to

is sufficient

by

the other.

almost the same terms used

to define the incremental method.
shall call this typical pattern incremental politics
for two reasons.
In the first place, we have referred to its
preoccupation with small or
incremental changes as one of its defining characteristics"
[Braybrooke and

"We

Lindblom, Strategy of Decision p. 73].
"It becomes clearer now why political policy,
in its focus on increments
of change, also shows the other characteristics --it is
remedial, serial,
and exploratory, for example --that we identified as part of incremental
,

politics" [Ibid.

,

p.

74].

Another indication of a conflated distinction is the fact that incremental
method and incremental politics seem to be necessary conditions for each other.
If we understand incremental politics as a competition
and adjustment among
many interests then such a politics is necessary if the incremental method is to
achieve any degree of comprehensiveness. In an incremental, serial process
it is only the presence of such competing groups
which assures that most
interests will be represented. Hence, a necessary condition for the incremental method is incremental politics. See Lindblom, "Muddling Through, "
But conversely, a necessary condition for this incremental politics,
p. 85.
this interest group politics, must be the incremental method.
It is the only
method available for solving complex problems, and, therefore, must be the
analytical basis of any politics whatever.
We need not look so far as we have, however, to see suggestions of the
identity of decision

method and

That suggestion is apparent
Lindblom 's major works. He speaks about
The Intelligence of Democracy - -that is, he speaks of the analytical method inherent in democracy itself. The subtitle of A Strategy of Decision suggests the
same point. It is called Policy Evaluation As a Social Process implying that the
decision strategy is this process. In "Handling of Norms," Lindblom makes
in the

very

titles

and subtitles

political process.

of

this point explicit.

customary to think of an analytical process as going on in one mind
or within the minds of a small group. But the analysis of policy problems
"
can also be seen as a social process.
[p. 174].
"It is

.

.
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IV.

in

As

D.

it

commences

to

make

agreement on certain problems-the

decisions, a democracy finds itself
ills in

society-even though different

individuals and groups cannot agree
on the solutions to those problems. 38
But since the nature of a problem
closely determines the range of possible

why are

solutions,

the

problems agreed when the solutions are not?
Lind-

blom elsewhere suggests

The Method
IV.

E.

of

problems are not agreed either. 39

that the

Incrementalism --

Taking those known

1.

ills

as

its

democratic decision method, "Incrementalism.
the

method considers only

and only a limited number
analysis

it

may

departure point
"

In

40

the peculiarly

dealing with those

policies that differ slightly
of those.

is

Furthermore,

from

ills,

the current ones,

in the

process of policy

conclude that the problem should itself be incrementally altered

and hence so should the objectives. 41
suggest new goals.

)

Though small,

(New technologies, for example, might

the policy changes are frequent and thus

successively compensate for errors of oversight. 42

Lindblom sometimes describes the decision method not only as incre-

38See footnote 30, first part.

^See

footnote 30, last part.

most extended description of the method is given in Braybrooke
and Lindblom, Strategy o f Decision On the present point, see pp. 83-93 in
.

that work.

41 Ibid.

,

pp.

93-99.

42 Ibid.

,

pp.

99-102.
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mental but also as disjointed. 43

and

political process to

IV.

E. 2.

It is

This practice assimilates decision method

each other, as previously noted.

by the reliance upon small increments both

in

problem

formulation and policy choice that incrementalism resolves
problems of complexity and foresight.

This method

thus a

is

way

of

assuring that social inter-

relationships will be under control despite deficient
knowledge.

however, adequate by
IV.

E.

3.

itself to

The reason

it

assure
is

not,

this.

not adequate is that incremental policy choices

are not small primarily because there
large changes.

It is

is

a value in safety and no great need for

They are small because they are marginal, because they are

zero-sum choices between alternatives both

of

which are greatly desired.

That

they are marginal means that the values on which they are based are determined
at the

moment

except

in the

But in

of choice itself.

We

don't

know what choice

is

small or marginal

choice proce ss. 44

many passages Lindblom

treats marginality itself as

ness and not as a zero-sum relationship.

^

43it is so described primarily in the Strategy of Decision

book the chap.

5 title

mere small-

.

See in their

and pp. 104-06.

44 Textual evidence for this statement is basically the same as given in
footnote 31. We don't know what we want until we know the trade-offs. And
trade-off choices are often what Lindblom means by marginal choices. But we
cannot know the trade-offs or margins except at the instant of choice since they
are constantly changing as a result of new technologies and prior choices.

45 See footnote 29.
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The Process
IV.

F.

1.

of Partisan

In a

Mutual Adjustment --

democracy, the customary choice process

mutual adjustment.

" 46

ments only through

this process.

But

maybe

And there
IV.

F.

is

2.

not.

In a

democracy incrementalism can

There are apparently social

ills

"partisan

is

identify its incre-

known by

democrats.

all

a convergence of estimates on what are small
changes. 47

This decision process

of a pluralist society struggle with

is

one

in

which the many diverse groups

each other over their different problems

and policies. 4 ^

4oThis i s the term used in The Intelligence of Democracy
Elsewhere
Lindblom refers to the apparently same process simply as mutual adjustment
or as incremental politics.
.

47

See footnotes 30 and 29.
The issue raised in footnote 30- -whether there are known social problems which have some t emporal endurance --never is resolved. Following are
some further passages which suggest that social problems are indeed more
enduring, have more the nature of givens, than do social goals.
Incremental decision-making is:

"...

better described as

moving away from known social

ills rather than
as moving toward a known and relatively stable goal" [Braybrooke and
Lindblom, Strategy of Decision p. 71].
,

The incremental-decision-maker:
".

deals with specific features of observable situations, which we
suggest can be evaluated regardless of whether there is any way to deal
conclusively with the more abstract conceptions of value" [Ibid.
p. 132J.
.

.

,

Adjustment of means and ends is:
".
caused by observation of empirical discrepancies between given
means and suggested ends.
there are well established techniques,
accepted throughout the scientific community and beyond, for making
.

.

.

observations of this kind"

.

[Ibid.

,

p.

135].

AO

They struggle

in at least the

minimal sense

that they each

make decisions

calculated to serve their own particular goals, not goals presumably shared by
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But perhaps they don't often struggle. 49
different matters to each other. 50
to

whomever moves
IV.

F.

become clear

3.

And many other times they simply

adjust

^

first.

only through this struggle that policy costs to
each group

is

It

Often they cede authority on

(see point

III.

B.

4.

)

and thus

it is

the struggle that is both the

choice process and the policy evaluation process.
unlike the ability claimed for

it)

or one cooperative group.

is

It

Unlike synopsis (or, rather,

evaluation here cannot be

made by one person

a social process. 52

others. These partisans may be openly hostile to each other or they
may be
subtly manipulative. See Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy
p. 29.
,

49 Lindblom's
different

seem

forms he

view of partisan mutual adjustment

is

so broad and the

identifies are so varied that only a small fraction of

to imply, necessarily, a partisan struggle.

them
Of twelve separately listed

forms, only four clearly do so- -negotiation, bargaining, partisan discussion,
and reciprocity. Ibid
pp. 33-34.
.

50They do so

,

in the "deferential"

form

adjustment and in the "calculated"
They also do so in accepting the "authoritative prescription" of others. Similarly a kind of authority is presupposed when one
person "unconditionally manipulates" another or is able to make a "prior decision" which constrains the alternatives of another. And "compensation" too
appears a kind of authority since it is of little effect unless the power of the
purse is unequally distributed. Ibid.
These concessions of authority are multilateral. There is no single highest
prescriptive authority in government which prescribes to all others and concedes
authority to none. Ibid.
pp. 77, 99.

which

is

a variant of

of

it.

,

^They

apparently do this in "parametric" adjustment where one decision

maker simply adapts

to another's decisions without considering the

quences for that other person.
5 2 "It is

Ibid

.

,

p.

conse-

33.

customary to think of an analytical process as going on in one
mind or within the minds of a small group. But the analysis of policy prob-
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But Lindblom

must assume

that evaluation is not always such
a process

or else his own writings will not be
very significant.

Lindblom 's writings

are addressed to persons or to groups
acting as persons and hence cooper-

One cannot, after

ative.

blom appears

to be giving

to those readers.

address his writing

all,

more

than

His description

plies that evaluation can be

made

is

mere

to a struggle.

And Lind-

description of the policy process

also a recommendation. 53

in other

This im-

ways since Lindblom himself

apparently intends to do so.
IV.

ment on

F.

4.

The outcome

of the struggle is

always a simultaneous agree-

policies and values.

That

it is

always one

is

a definitional truth

the process of policy choice and

if

if

policy choice

adjusts conflicting interests to each other.

values are determined in
is

a social process which

But Lindblom elsewhere says

agreement often rather than always results and

that policy

that

it

does so

lems can also be seen as a social process. ..."
"The weighting [of different values] does not take place until actual policy
decisions are made. At that time, the conflicting views of individuals and
groups

are brought to bear on policy formulation. Policies are set as
a result of such conflict.
The weighting or aggregation is a political
process, not an intellectual process" [Lindblom, 'Handling of Norms, "
.

.

.

.

p.

.

.

174].

53 See footnote

9.

54m

because choice of value and choice of policy are made simul"
taneously, evaluation is achieved automatically in decision-making.
[Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision p. 132].
See also footnote 52.
.

.

.

.

,

.
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even when people disagree about values. 55
claim

is that

The implication

of this latter

values and policy are distinct and that evaluation

is not

always

a social process.

The question whether
truth

is itself

all individual

point IV.

F.

4.

unclear depending on what

is

a definitional or non-definitional

is

meant by "agreement.

"

Since

preferences already represent compromises between individual

and environment there

is

no sharp distinction between free agreement and

coerced agreement, says Lindblom. 56

The Coordinating
IV.

G.

1.

set of policies

If

Ability of Partisan Mutual Adjustment --

values could be distinguished from policies, then whether a

was coordinated would depend on whether

to achieve a certain value or values,

even

at the

it

was nicely adjusted

expense of others, and thus

it

would further depend on whether there was agreement on those values. 57
But this implies what elsewhere is called a naive view of consistency.

There

it

is

suggested that numerous different sets of policies can be con-

sidered consistent

in

service of any single value

if

one distinguishes between

CO
different relevant considerations

--say between short and long range ones.

S^See footnote 28, first part.
5°See footnote

17,

last part.

"^See footnote 32, first part.

^"One

— hence,

by inference, of consistencyis to be immediately rejected as troublesome.
One hears, for example, that
a government is inconsistent (and hence foolish) if, on one hand, it encourages
naive view of inconsistency
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IV.

G.

Now

2.

there

is

value agreement but

it

is

not on values distin-

guishable from policy choices, and the values
chosen are not the deliberate

choice of individuals.

They are

a resultant of

But see the proviso to point IV.
IV.

G.

each other

is

G.

it

4.

automatically does so.

in a context of value

tion as is possible

IV.

conflicting interests.

The mutual adjustment process thus does

3.

achieve coordination but
to

F.

many

anyway given

And

4.

resource slack 59

this

For

agreement, and

it

not deliberately

adjusts policies

this is as

much coordina-

the deficiencies of knowledge.

amount

in the society

of coordination is

enough since there

and a shared

crop restriction and, on the other hand, undertakes expensive projects for
reclaiming productive soil from wasteland.
These are inconsistent
.

.

.

policies only in the trivial sense that in each of these cases one can think of
a value toward which one of any two paired policies advances while the

other of the pair

is

indifferent or opposed.

two policies can always be shown
always be found.

By such a test, however, any
to be inconsistent, for such a value can

11

"In the light of a

number of relevant values, rather than only one, and
most single values, such pairs of policies turn out to

even in the light of
be quite consistent.
is easy to find a combination of short- and longrange objectives, and of objectives with respect to growth as well as to
distribution of income, that make crop restriction and acreage increases
It:

consistent.

.

.

"

[Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy

,

p.

193].

59 See footnote 27.
This writer does not know that Lindblom ever explicitly mentions resource slack in connection with his own work. But he and Hirschman do so
favorably in discussing Hirschman's thesis that the unbalanced economic
growth inherent in a market system may be preferable to deliberately balanced growth.
"Admittedly, the process is likely to be more costly in terms of resource
utilization, but the imbalances at the same time call forth more resources

and investment than would otherwise become available.

The crucial, but
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culture^ which provides

MffiJfe , basic agreemeM on values> policies

_

procedures.

The non zero-sum notion

zero-sum notion

of

The assertion

of

resource slack conflicts with the frequently

marginal choice.
shared culture conflicts with the often substantial

of a

emphasis placed on value

conflict,

even conflict over values

at the

margin.

Furthermore, given system slack and wide cultural
agreement, the
claim that pluralist systems can coordinate
be surprising, indeed,

The Lindblom

The conclusion

of

if

the systems could not.

in his

my

attempted
its

summary

would

See the proviso to point

I.

thus reconfirms the problei

beginning.

Lindblom concepts and diversity, even

arguments.

It

Position as a Dialectical Concept Examinati on

which have faced that attempt from
uity in the

very significant.

is not

The result

is

a very great

There

is

substantial ambig-

to the point of inconsistency,

number

of different concepts

and

plausible, assumption here

is that there is some 'slack' in the economy.
[Alberto. Hirschman and Charles E. Lindblom, "Economic Development,
Research and Development, Policy Making: Some Converging Views, "
Behavioral Science VII (April, 1962), 212J. [Hereinafter referred to as
"Converging Views. "]
In any case, there are numerous tacit references to resource slack besides
,

those in footnote 27.

For examples, decision makers can defer to others and
still have enough options left to achieve their own goals.
Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy pp. 47-50. And even in the case of finite resources, as
in a budget, additional funds come in from time to time (and apparently one
can always afford to wait for these). Ibid. p. 199.
,

,

See footnote

19,

first part.
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positions.

I

interpret this diversity as a response
to an inherently conflictual

social reality.

blom

is

And

interpret the response as an "inner
debate" which Lind-

I

having with himself-a debate he
undertakes in the course of his partic-

ipation in an "outer debate" with
others over the worth of comprehensiveness.
I

understand Lindblom to be on one side of the
outer debate.

ipation takes the

form

of concepts developed

of a position on that side.

In the

those concepts and arguments.

my

view,

it is

remainder

of

III is

and arguments advanced

support

in

inner debate he argues both for and against

The presence

practically impossible to

Chapter

His partic-

of this inner debate is

summarize Lindblom's

why,

position.

in

The

an attempt to partly trace the progress of this inner

debate.

The discussion

to follow,

Mannheim, represent,
these discussions that

examination.

In

and a similar discussion

in a sense, the

I

utilize

what

II,

core of the dissertation.

call a dialectical

one sense, of course, the core

by the problem statements given

Chapter

I

for both the

ceptual possibilities.

in

of writing

Chapter

I

is

method

represented

It

by Karl
is

through

of concept

fully as

much

and the methodology considered

problem statements and the method delimit

in

the con-

Nevertheless, the early chapters are intended to intro-

duce the later ones rather than to stand by themselves.

The Ceaseless Quest

for Proof

cept examination the emphasis

is

.

In

many present day approaches

placed on meaning

why we understand universals or essences, how
we

in fact use certain

words, and so

on.

to

.

to

con-

Typical questions concern

make our

ideas clear, how

By contrast, the emphasis

in the
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approach presented here

is

always on cogency

I

,

assume

that conviction does

not arise out of understanding but
that understanding arises out of
conviction.
I

further

assume
such

fruitful as

Hospers, that
I

cogency

is a

perpetual one and that

it

is

.

expressly reject the assumption, typified by
some passages of John

I

view

that the quest for

it

is

not fruitful to ask for ultimate proof.

As a specimen

oppose, these passages are worth quoting at
some length.

speaks of the foundations of logic.

of the

(Hospers

)

we are so accustomed

to being barraged by the request "Prove it"
that
to think that this is required also of the very
bases of proof themselves ... But the principles of proof themselves make
proof
.

.

.

we tend

cannot prove them in turn.

possible.

61

.

We

.

Still, the uneasiness may persist.
We want every statement to rest on
another one. We are in the position of the lady and the rock: The
earth
rests on an elephant; what does the elephant rest on? A rock.
What does
the rock rest on? Another rock. What does that rock rest on?
Another
rock
and so on ad infinitum. A lady in the audience keeps asking this
question over and over again; finally in exasperation the speaker says to
.

.

.

,

her, "Lady,

rock all the way down !" All the way down --to what? The
speaker can stop her endlessly repeated question only by teaching her a
little astronomy and curing her of naive notions of up and down—though
perhaps she will never quite overcome a feeling of dissatisfaction with the
it's

You too may remain dissatisfied with our conclusions about
logic unless you get over the idea that the ultimate principles of proof must

explanation.

themselves be proved ...

We

have to start somewhere, and this

^John Hospers, An
Englewood

Cliffs,

New

62 Ibid.

Ibid.

,

p.

212.

is

where we

start.

63

Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (2d ed.

Jersey:

Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967),

p.

213.

;
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This warning away from the quest for ultimate proof
assumes that we
all

share Hospers' faith

pursuit

is

sciences,

in certain

not worth undertaking.
it is

Now

certainly not clear that

And, more fundamentally,

laws.

bases of proof and/or that a ceaseless

ness of the laws of logic.

it is

in the sciences,

we share

same concepts or basic

the

not clear that

Breakthroughs

well as the sciences are supposed to be possible and

If

neither

we agree on

the absolute-

Contextualists do not agree, for example, that

absolute identity statements can be made.

in question

even the "hard"

may

philosophy as

in

well depend on calling

what previously went unquestioned.

shared
is the

faith is not obviously

adequate to stop our demands for proof,

ceaseless nature of those demands.

seems

phy

itself

that

such philosophy

to represent

is

Indeed, traditional philoso-

such a ceaseless process and

is

it

not obvious

therefore useless.

Synopsis of the Discussion

.

In the following

discussion

I

trace the

pattern of that apparently ceaseless struggle with himself through which Lind-

blom seems
like

to

argue the case against comprehensiveness.

I

think this struggle,

every other conceptual struggle, occurs within a hierarchy.

nations, let us say, struggles ideologically with another group.

time the struggle

is

non -violent, taking the form of a debate.

share the ideology there

is

group

Most

of

of the

For those who

an additional inner struggle or debate over ways to

gain the peculiar advantages of that ideology while escaping

If

A

its

disadvantages.

the first struggle is said to be between friends and enemies then this second
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one

may

be said to be

friends and enemies

among

is

friends.

In actuality, the distinction

only one of degree, however.

Now

there

between

may

be an

indefinably large hierarchy of debates within
debates but at whatever level one

looks there will be spokesmen
at that level.

The perpetuity

who attempt

of the debate,

to

summarize and defend

and

of its hierarchical order,

ultimately go on within these spokesmen themselves.

Thus

that there appears that limitless quest for proof of which
1

a position

it

is in this

must

form

Hospers (mistakenly

think) denies the legitimate existence.

Context of the Lindblom Debates -- The outermost debate
the

primary debate)

pluralist position.

in

which Lindblom

According

undesirable because

it

shall call

it

involved concerns the traditional

to that position the politics of central control is

produces overconcentration of power and thus becomes

a threat to individual liberties.

competition

is

(I

among groups and

One acknowledges
individuals

may

that the cost of pervasive

be a deficiency of governmental

coordination but one then holds that this deficiency

is

not serious since there

exists a general consensus over procedures and policy in pluralist political

systems.

Lindblom

The outermost debate
is

is

between liberals and "authoritarians.

"

certainly a participant in this debate, though only indirectly as

regards most of those writings examined here.

^

^Lindblom leaves no question about his support for liberal democracy
over dictatorship. He does not believe that coordination is incompatible with
liberalism. That is the main point of his writings. But wherever it may
appear to be incompatible, coordination must be abandoned. For example,
coordination seems to call for at least some equilibrium

among

different
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Within the outermost debate

is

another, secondary, debate

among

the

liberals themselves --a debate over the extent to
which central coordination

may

replace political competition, given the consensus which

This debate

like

Lindblom.

the debate concerns precisely what

65

traditional one.

As

I

Here he

is

a direct participant, for

have called the converse pluralist

hence apparent that the converse theme

is

(It

assumed.

particularly evident between the central planners of Western

is

Europe and Americans

theme.

is

is

subordinate to the

)

a participant in this secondary debate Lindblom takes the side which

denies that central coordination

he does so, at least

in part, to

is

appropriate for liberalism.

I

suggest that

avoid reducing the primary debate to triviality.

group interests. This condition is not obviously achieved if a minority can
exercise an absolute veto, can effectually blackmail the other groups. But in
that case it is the requirement for consent that must prevail, even at risk of
a veto, rather than the requirement of equilibrium. See Lindblom, "DecisionMaking, " p. 317.
Putting this point another way, one might say that coordination is often

associated with the need for relatively greater social equality. But the need
for minority consent may result in inequality. Where it does so we must

abandon the equality criterion.
"Most of us in the Western tradition would, if faced with a practical
choice, probably sanction any degree of inequality necessary to maintain
a government based on consent rather than a high degree of repression"
[Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, p. 260].
65" it

w ill

processes
But

my

.

.

be apparent to

many

that in exploring these [decision-making]

I

am

.

interest [is turned] toward the calculation aspects of these

following the tradition of the pluralists in political theory.

processes rather than the control aspects. More concretely, where a
political scientist asks whether these processes safeguard us against an
overconcentration of power, I ask whether they can aid us in rational
choices" [Lindblom, "Decision-Making," p. 314, footnote 14].

Central coordinate cannot
be compatible with liberalism
unless there

widespread consensus.
substantial minorities.

harm

is

Otherwise, coordination will involve
a rebuff to
But

if

there

is

widespread consensus then no great

done by choosing central
coordination over individual liberties,
as a

governing approach, and no great
benefit

matter much which approach one chooses.

what

I

would want

Now
of a

is

it

to do

it

gained either.

What do

I

It

simply doesn't

care that

I

am

told to do

anyway? 66

would be easy

widespread consensus

ments for

is

to

in

argue that Lindblom does assume the
existence
pluralism and that, consequently,

all his

argu-

do tend to become trivial-for he makes
numerous references to

To what this writer has just said, the likely criticism
will probably
be that he fails to distinguish between levels
of freedom.
Because we may
agree on the most important matters does not
mean, it will be argued that
our right to disagree on lesser matters is not
worth protecting. The writer
concurs but asks for examples. It is doubtful that
examples can be found which
will allow us to distinguish clearly between
authoritarian and democratic
regimes. Consider the freedom to speak on matters
other than the politicaleconomic system itself. This is not proscribed, for example,
in the Soviet
Union. Indeed, it is encouraged through vigorous
letters to the editor columns
and the injunction to report problems to party members.
Granted that the
line

between sensitive and nonsensitive topics

in the

is

unclear.

But

it is

that, also,

United States.

Furthermore, if one emphasizes effective freedom of speech then the
distinction between two countries becomes particularly obscure.
In the United
States it is true that one can speak to acquaintances and to political
represent-

atives in

more daring ways

than would be permissible in

But access to wider audiences

some other

countries.

under the control of the political-economic
system, in the guise of advertisers and interlocking directorates between
business and the mass media.
is
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American
if

political consensus. 67

we accept

tins view.

I

Lindblom appears much more consistent

believe

it

likely,

however, that he means to make

his views significant even at

some expense

dence for

neither consistent nor wholly clear in his
discussi
sion

this belief.

of consensus. 68

He

is

in

consistency.

And there

is

evi-

Suppose, therefore, that Lindblom does want to
make signif-

icant claims for pluralism and consequently
that he is

of substantial value conflict.
will fail to coordinate and that

Is

it

assuming

the existence

he not then forced to conclude that pluralism
will instead produce, probably violent,

disorder? His colleague, Robert Dahl, has drawn just

this conclusion in those

circumstances. 69

Clearly Lindblom would not like the conclusions.

faces a challenge.

He must show

that significant

Thus he

pluralism—a pluralism

widely different values --can coordinate these values even

if it

of

does not

"centrally" coordinate them.
It

the light of this need for a claim that is both significant and

is in

favorable to pluralism that we should see the debate between Lindblom and the
central planners of Western Europe.

on the need for some coordination.

67 ".
of the

.

.

Both sides are liberals and both agree
But the

Europeans seem

to

assume

the

United States and the other successful democracies some
values (including democracy itself) on which citizens unite

in the

common

are more important to them than the values on which they disagree" [Lindblom, "Bargaining, " p. 32J.
See also footnote

18.

68 See footnote 19

69 See Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 98-99.
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existence of social consensus in
assuming the possibility of a social welfare

70

function.

Hence they face

What Lindblom needs

to

the

show

danger that their liberalism will be

is that

coordination and yet allows for

more

trivial.

his style of liberal coordination is
truly
conflict than does theirs.

It

is in his

attempt to do this that we can trace the
relation between this most proximate
outer debate, where Lindblom stands on
one side, and the ultimately inner
debate, which he has with himself.

Relation of the Proximate Outer Debate to the
Inner Debate and

The proximate outer debate

which Lindblom

in

is

engaged

is,

this tenuous position, the safest

way

to

seems a

make

The

logically tenuous one.

one's

own case

is

Given

by an indirect

proof- -a proof for the logical impossibility of one's opponents' views.

blom gives

-

to repeat, a

debate with fellow liberals over the virtues of central
coordination.
position he wants to defend in that debate

Theme

Lind-

just such a proof.

The concepts

of

comprehensiveness and central coordination involve the

idea that general goals can be formulated in advance of decision, that the

relevant

means

to these goals

and consequences

means can be ex-

of these

haustively canvassed from a central position, and that from the central position

A

70
'^Consider the following statement by Jan Tinbergen
Strategy of Decision

in his

review of

.

"It is not quite true
that no social welfare functions have been constructed; Van Eijk, Frisch, Sandee and Theil may be quoted to the contrary"
.

.

.

[Jan Tinbergen, review of

Charles E. Lindblom,
1964), 1094],

in

A

Strategy of Decision

,

by David Braybrooke and

American Economic Review

,

LIV (December,
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one can choose the most appropriate
means.

argues against this idea
logically impossible.

A

person cannot know what he wants

advance goals
until he

is

knows what

know the applicable ones except

at the

of decision. 71

The above argument
In

suggest that Lindblom constantly

to the effect that the formulation
of

the options and costs are and he
cannot

moment

I

is

so cutting, however, just because

denying the possibility of advance goals

of deliberate individual decision.

it

seems

to

it is

two-edged.

deny the very possibility

For one cannot then differentiate between the

spontaneous interaction of an animal with his environment
and the thoughtful
action of a

human on

that

environment.

By

itself,

simply once again reduce the general concept

this indirect proof

of pluralist politics to triviality.

Of course there can be both value conflict and coordination

more, say, than the interaction

in a

would

if

the conflict is no

bee hive.

Consequently, Lindblom also needs a direct proof- -a proof that his own

form

of coordination through conflict is possible.

I

think he tries to

meet the

need by showing that evaluation and decision are both social processes and
processes

of conflict.

Such decisions are not the direct reflection

of individual

deliberation since, on the one hand, they are not individual decisions and, on
the other, they are not a result of cooperation and advance agreement.

they do not, in these senses, involve advance goals.
still

Thus

But such decisions are

deliberate since they are the result of an initial conflict over values.

71 See footnote 31.
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Consequently they do seem

to involve

Lindblom seems to be saying either

advance goals indirectly.

that social conflict _is deliberate
unified

decision or, at least, that social conflict
leads to such decision.

are expressed

can coordinate. 72
he pursues

in

own earliest language, as

in his

The statement presents

the central

in

my argument

suggest.

I

between different sorts
vance goals, after
ation.

which

In that

theme which

I

believe

attempting to complete the indirect proof for his
position

At this point
I

These views

the statement that bargaining

argument against comprehensiveness) with a direct

curious as

In effect,

all,

it

may

be asked

(the

one.

if

Lindblom's theme

is

as

apparently assume that no distinction can be made
of

advance goals.

even

if

But

maybe bargaining can have ad-

they are different from those of central coordin-

case perhaps Lindblom does not find himself

in quite the

dilemma

describe and accordingly need not respond with what appears to be a

I

contradictory thesis.

I

don't believe that Lindblom acknowledges such a distinction in advance

goals as can relieve him of his dilemma, however.
tinction.

It

of separate

tion

pervades his writings.

more or

embedded

in

It

is

Certainly there

is

a dis-

the difference between an aggregate

less atomistic goals, on the one hand, and a goal integra-

our very culture, on the other.

The

latter

may

be otherwise

described as a conceptual framework.
But the existence of this sort of advance goal in bargaining

is

precisely

am arguing that bargaining is a method of coordination, not a tolerable obstruction to coordination" [Lindblom, "Bargaining, " p. 4].
7 2"I
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the cause of dilemma, not a
solution to

amine Lindblom wants

show

to

it.

least not for those within

stand at least a

little

blom does seem

to

is

of his writings that

The interaction involved

mistake to suppose that

it.

To be

in conflict

in a

soc-

would logically require one

summarizes

his writings.

It

seems

to

Now Lind-

this last conclusion at certain points
but
it

(if it is

not evidently a matter of conflict,
however, at

distance outside the conceptual framework.

draw

we ex-

that a conflict of interests can result
in

not in fact identical to) social coordination.

ial-conceptual framework

most

In

I

think

it

a

to represent,

instead, a basic transformation of that thought sequence
which culminates in
the Intelligence of

Democracy

.

Within the thought sequence, Lindblom focuses on the concept
of bargaining, of partisan adjustment, of

showing how there can be
defines social values.

another concern.

group

conflict.

And he has

the

problem

this conflict within a pervasive culture

which

of

itself

But even in the "Bargaining" essay Lindblom anticipates

He sees

a need to investigate the formation of the culture,

as manifested by social consensus. 73

In his

subsequent comments

in

Nomos

VII_(1967) he explicitly describes the problem of values as one of cultural

formation rather than the aggregation of individual values.

And

in his

remarks

on integration of the social sciences (1972) he urges the need to ask radical
questions about the social structure. 74

73 Ibid.

,

74 ".

.

.

These comments

of 1967

and 1972

ppT 39-40.

because values are

problem of
which contemporary analysis

in fact culturally aggregated, the

'aggregation' is in fact a 'formation' problem to
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follow the Intelligence

... and imply

the question of

how

escape from a

to

dominant conceptual framework.
say then that Lindblom works over one problem
and ends by trans-

I

forming

it

into another.

He

first struggles with the

problem how there can be

value conflict within a pervasive culture which defines
our values.

Just after

he has developed his fullest answer to this problem he
apparently transforms
it

to the different

alter

it.

It

is

problem how we can escape from our culture

primarily his first problem that we examine.

does seem to present the dilemma which
explanation of what he

Now odd
seems

as

it

is

I

That problem

describe and hence to justify

might seem, this explanation of the theme and

F. 4. of the illustrative

summary).

That inconsistency

of the contrary claims, first, that values are derived

decision

moment

its

purpose

of a central incon-

sistency in Lindblom's thought (mentioned in the provisos to
IV.

my

doing.

For such an explanation can make sense

plausible.

sufficiently to

III.

B.

is the

5.

and

presence

from choices

at the social

and, second, that people disagree about values, the latter

claim implying that the values must endure over time.
If

we assume

that the central

theme

of

to affirm contraries, then the support of that

an intellectual struggle.

is insensitive"

A Comment, "

Lindblom's thought does appear

theme obviously will constitute

The struggle could be conceived as a primarily linear

[Charles E. Lindblom, "Some Limitations on Rationality.
in Nomos VII: Rational Decision ed. by Carl j. Friedrich
,

(New York: Atherton Press, 1964, p. 227].
Also see footnote 25 for reference to the 1972 work.
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process leading to an increasingly
more exact and less inconsistent concept

human decision-a discovery
it

that the struggle

was only an apparent

one.

of

But

could also be conceived as a primarily
circular process which represented

progressively expansive restatements of
the struggle
conceive the theme and the struggle

itself.

I

propose to

second sense.

in this

Before considering how this inner struggle
seems to generate develop-

ment

of Lindblom's central theme,

comment about what has
1.

dom

just

I

need

to

make some

summary and

points of

been said.

Liberals must show that as they emphasize individual
and group free-

in the

conduct of a polity they can yet achieve enough
social order

in that

polity.

2.

is

Some

liberals propose to do this by showing that central
coordination

compatible with liberalism --that liberal democracies can plan as
well as

can authoritarian regimes.
3.

But to be able to

show

this,

it

seems

wide consensus among a country's populace.

that one

must

And given

this

doesn't greatly matter which political system one chooses.
for liberalism is really a

be consensual.

recommendation

consensus

is

may

to

also

)

his position trivial a liberal might want to

enough so that a pluralist competition

it

enough

(And since consensus comes easier to the rich, one

To avoid making

a

A recommendation

that a society can be consensual enough for coordination and that
flictual

assume

that the country be lucky

be recommending, in effect, that the country be rich.
4.

first

it

the better politics.

show both

can be con-

Such a
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liberal,

and Lindblom

fellow liberals

one, would then be engaged in debate
with those

is

who espouse central

planning.

would seem as logically shaky as theirs was
5.

Because Lindblom *s position

Unfortunately, his position
trivial.

in this

"outer" debate does indeed appear

shaky, his safest approach apparently would
consist in logically discrediting
the liberal planners.

would be
6.

all that

If

he could do so, his own position, tenuous though

of this

approach cannot be too much emphasized.

conventional formal logic, to show a contradiction in some
position
to proving its contradictory.

This procedure

argument or an "indirect proof.
is

I

assumption
8.

planning
ble.

"

not so sharply

tion of this principle, but

7.

it

is

is

The debate between
drawn as

enough so as

my

dissertation, reality

may

But he

to logically

to suggest

demand

the applica-

it.

According

to a

indicate that

most

critical

not be such that the principle holds.

He does so by showing

must then

equivalent

pluralist liberals and

Lindblom shows, by an apparently conclusive argument,
is illogical.

is

In

called a "reductio ad absurdem"

cannot accept this principle, however.
of

was,

remained.

The importance

planning liberals

it

that

that central

advance goals seem impossi-

some human decision-making

is still

possi-

ble or he has reduced pluralist politics to non-conscious animal interaction.

An

indirect proof alone would not let us take notice of this problem but

9.

It is

just in

moving from indirect proof

debate over liberal planning

Lindblom

it

seems

is

we

do.

to a direct proof that the outer

evidently converted to an inner struggle.

to be a struggle to maintain the view both that

For

human values

181

are consensual,

in

deriving from the social decision
moment, and that they

are conflictual, and hence must endure

The Impetus

for

in

time.

Theme Development

If

Lindblom's thought

is

an

effort to affirm contraries, this is
not necessarily a surprising circumstance.

The need

to do so

may

well be the human condition.

And

if it is,

then

we might

find a certain characteristic beginning
to the development of any person's

thought.

We

might find that

in his intellectual youth

he had a faith

in the

identity of contraries --a faith which in later
years he tried to maintain while

yet differentiating ever

more

finely between them.

I

suggest that Lindblom's

thought does develop in this way.

Lindblom's central theme --the position he holds
the position which in
is that

its

in the outer debate

seeming contradictariness capsulizes

bargaining can coordinate.

I

does begin as an identity statement.
that conflict is coordination!

his inner

want to make the bold claim
I

and

debate-

that this

theme

think Lindblom takes the tacit position

In his early

essay on "Bargaining" (1955) he

associates coordination with value agreement and with the public interest.
far as one can tell from a very few and vague
tion is.

than that

this is

what coordina-

But then Lindblom explicitly states that the public interest is often

nothing other than bargained agreement
conflict.

comments

So

75
10

it

Now Lindblom might mean
is

agreement --and

this

^Lindblom, "Bargaining,

"

p.

among

partisans

that conflict results in

seems, indeed,

26.

--i. e,

a

managed

agreement rather

to be the simplest

most
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obvious interpretation of his views.

mean

this in the light of later

with this early one.

I

don't believe, however, that he can

works which he apparently treats as compatible

And there seem no other meanings which would avoid

identity of opposites.

More

this

will be said later in defense of this identity
state-

ment. 76

Assuming
there

is

for

now

a constant compulsion to

identity of value conflict

other.

that there is this attempted identity of
opposites then

In a pluralist

move on

in one's thought.

and value agreement would be

model

of politics --one

ground concept and relegates agreement

to

its

be

made meaningful and

to the status of a

not left as a

opposite then increasing efforts must be

rest in the

reduce the one to the

which makes conflict

tion- -conflict would appear to be reduced to agreement.
flict is to

To

mere

made

its

fore-

background assumpIf

the concept of con-

label for what looks like

to differentiate

77
it.

But

these efforts can never be decisive since they will be constrained by a constant

need to reassert the original identity

of the

two concepts.

Otherwise pluralism

freed from consensus assumptions becomes a hopeless attempt to negotiate the

76 See text pp. 210-13.
77 Consistent with his method of
dialectical concept examination, the
writer is treating the development of Lindblom's thought as if it comprised the
elaboration of a concept. He does so even though Lindblom's writings may

appear, on the surface, to be defending a proposition rather than defining a
term. In fact, Lindblom, himself, sometimes speaks as if his thought were a
process of definition.

an exploratory and imprecise paper, I cannot define
If we understand it as poorly as I argue to be the
case in this paper, it can only be defined with satisfactory precision as we
come to know it better" [Lindblom, "Bargaining," p. 2].

"Because this

is

bargaining very sharply.
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non -negotiable.

The Stages
bate) --

I

theme.

of

Theme Development

identify three

The

first is

main stages

(The Progress of the Inner De-

in the

development

represented by an early and

little

of this

mentioned essay which

Lindblom wrote under the auspices of the Rand
Corporation
"Bargaining, the Hidden Hand

from

in

Government" 78

it

and coordination were treated as alternate processes.

In the

fied with value agreement.

of these early statements but

ful

the whole

I

Perhaps

don't believe

For the ambivalences

if

of coordination is vaguely but effectually identi-

Now

since conflict appears to be identified with

coordination

a wholly undetermined concept.

makes

1955 essay the

works.

essay the concept

coordination, then

Entitled

where bargaining

In the

he can do so without rejecting major works which follow.
in those

1955.

coordination seems starkly evident.

is

Lindblom would now reject some

reappear

m

represents some departure

79
the book written with Robert Dahl two years
before

central theme that conflict

ambivalent

is

equivalent to agreement conflict must be

There

is conflict in

theme meaningless, however, and

name

only.

This result

the urge to have a meaning-

statement consequently forces an immediate rejection of the theme as an

identity statement.

78

Lindblom instead acknowledges the possibility

"First reference

79

is in

footnote

of deadlock

4.

Dahl and Lindblom, Politics Economics and Welfare: Planning and
Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes. First
reference is in footnote 24.

"
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and the consequent need
in potential

to distinguish levels of

and not merely

in

power.

There

is

now

conflict

name. 80

After the essay on bargaining, Lindblom wrote nothing
closely relevant
to his central

theme

until 1958.

81

There then appeared

in

rapid succession

four important essays, highlighted by the famous "The
Science of Muddling

Through"

82
in the

1958 followed

in

spring of 1959.

December

of 1958

1959 by "The Handling of Norms

^Elaboration and defense
text p.

"Policy Analysis"

83

appeared

in

June of

by "Tinbergen on Policy -Making" 84 and

in Policy

"

Analysis.

of the points

made

85

in

These four essays

in this

paragraph begin on

188.
O

1

0i He contributed
to a brief published discussion of the

monopoly problem,
see American Economics Review for May 1957, and in January of 1957 his
essay "In Praise of Political Science" was published in World Polit ics. The
comments on the monopoly problem are confusing but Lindblom seems to be
arguing for a broader view of the corporation than that to which economists are
accustomed. Seen in the context of his other writings he is probably removing
the concept of the corporation from a strict market model only to place it in the
not-so-different pluralist model.

essay published in World Polit ics,
Lindblom argues that political scientists possess a degree of systematic theory
beyond what they recognize, namely the pluralist theory. He does not emphasize the advantages of pluralism as a normative theory, however; he emphasized, instead,

its

In the

value as a description of society.

82pirst reference

is in

footnote

8.

8 ^First reference is in footnote 14.

S^First reference

is in

footnote 19.

is in

footnote 18.

oc

First reference
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constitute, to

The concept

me, a second stage

in the

development

of the

of conflict no longer exists only in potential.

as conflict over minor individual values.

It is

actual but only

This conflict occurs within a larger

setting of other individual but widely shared values. 86
in the

Lindblom theme.

It

is

marginal conflict

sense of being mild.

86 What noticeably
separates the essay on "Bargaining" from the four

works

just

mentioned

an emphasis in the latter works on the means /ends
" Lindblom 's main
emphasis is on the point, that
coordination of values occurs automatically in the process of political-social
conflict and that, consequently, there is no need to distinguish between means
and ends because one needs no deliberate ends. There is little evidence that
Lindblom does make the distinction in this earliest essay.
Lindblom needs to introduce the means /ends distinction, however, if he
is to make the concept of value conflict meaningful.
Otherwise, a value and
its implementing action will be identical, and in that case
value interaction
apparently can take only two forms neither of which will constitute real value
distinction.

In

is

"Bargaining,

conflict.

If the interaction involves no shared conceptual framework it will
necessarily reduce to an unresolvable debate over opposing actions --a debate
like those which emotivists envision.
(One actor will insist that he, himself,

should perform Act A. Another will insist that he should perform B instead.
But if there is a shared conceptual framework its existence will imply that
similar values -actions are undertaken by all.

)

Where the means/ends distinction is introduced (i.e. where actions are
considered somehow different from the values they implement), then there is,
,

for positivists, logical space to argue about values.

sarily reduced to a shouting match.

And

The debate

is not

neces-

for contextua lists the presence of

some shared values does not, then, necessarily predetermine, as it otherwise
would, agreement on those lesser values called means.
Having acknowledged the concept of a means /ends distinction, one must
simultaneously admit that it cannot be an absolute; it is a concept about the
relationships between entities and not about any particular entities themselves.
Hence, means are simply lesser values. These lesser values are the marginal
values which represent differing trade-off relationships possible in implementing the more general ones. There can truly be conflict over such marginal
values. See Lindblom "Muddling Through, " pp. 84-85; and Lindblom, "Handling of Norms, " p. 167. This conflict seems to take place within a larger
"
setting of shared individual values, however. See Lindblom, "Policy Analysis,
" p. 534; and
pp. 309, 300-01; Lindblom, "Tinbergen on Policy-Making,
Lindblom, "Handling of Norms, " p. 171.
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Beyond the second stage

I

think

it

possible to identify a third one, though

the differences between second
and third are not as dramatic as those between
the first and second.

major ones being

the

The

Intelligence of

The third stage involves more

A

lengthy,

more

subtle works,

Strategy of Decision 87 (with David Braybrooke)
and

Democracy. 88

It

is in the last of

these that Lindblom

particularly recognizes conflict over "collective"
values as distinct from conflict

over individual ones.
Collective values are those which cannot benefit
one person without bene-

fiting

many

others and similarly cannot be withheld from that
person without

being withheld from others. 89

Presumably

though Lindblom does not explicitly mention

the costs, too,

must be shared

He admits

this.

that collective

values often evaporate from pluralist theories of politics as they seem
to do
his

own earlier works.

But even in

The

Intelligence of

for him, only discrete collective values.

There

is

Democracy there

in

arc,

no "overriding aggregate

of

collective value," nothing that might be called "the" public interest. 90

There also appears, with
lective values a greater

this explicit recognition of conflict

emphasis on conflict as a zero-sum

S^First reference

is in

footnote

^^First reference

is in

footnote 13.

,

p.

situation.

91

That

8.

89 Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy
90lbid.

over col-

,

p.

279.

283.
"

Lindblom consistently maintains that most political
situations are non zero-sum.
(See first quote in footnote 27. ) In later writings
9*In "Bargaining,
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is

to be expected.

Where values are

individual what

a benefit to another so that nobody has
to pay costs.

nursing mother who

is

is

a need to one

A

classic example

supposed to receive as much gratification

child as the child obtains in being fed.

may
is

be
the

feeding the

in

Capitalist theory supposes that

many

relationships are like this.
If

values are collective, though, there

And

to the benefits.

est then there almost
of needs

if

may sometimes

be costs equivalent

collective values are generalized into the public inter-

must be such

costs.

For

if

people have a great variety

and wants which must be satisfied as an aggregate, and for

all

persons, then unless none of this great variety conflict- -a highly implausible

he continues to say this at points while at other points he suggests the opposite.
Those four works which this writer identifies as a second-stage argument reveal only rather brief acknowledgment of zero-sum relations. To be sure,
they speak

much

of value conflict but they do not

exclusivity of these values.

emphasize the possibly mutual
There are allusions to the danger of minority rule,

but only in the essay on "Handling of

Norms,

"

p.

167, is there explicit dis-

cussion of whether social relations are zero-sum. Here, Lindblom does
suggest that except in the price system they usually are.
The balance of emphasis throughout the four works still leans strongly
to a notion of mutual gain, however.
For an example of the prevailing Eone
consider this passage:
"Both in bargaining and in other kinds of strategic interplay, there are
strong motives for adversaries to find what has been called an 'integrated'
solution.
some settlement which, by reconstructing the conflict, gives
.

all parties

.

much

or all of what they want and does not simply 'split the

difference'" [Lindblom, "Tinbergen on Policy-Making,
In the Strategy of

has implied clearly

are zero-sum

Decisio n,

many times

p.

29,

" p.

536],

Lindblom states a position which he

before but then has blurred.

Value conflicts

situations.

"Whenever values are

in conflict --that is,

whenever one has

to give up

..."

[Brayorder to achieve some of another value
brooke and Lindblom, St rategy of Decision p. 29].
The best evidence, in Intelligence of Democracy, for a greater concern

some

of one value in

,
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assumption-conflict over the public interest
must be zero-sum.
Although there

is

no explicit connection drawn by Lindblom
between the

above admissions of collective values and

of

hand, and the greater length of the works

in

I

suggest that there

Lindblom attempts

may

works

It is

at this third stage

tation

it

of the

are so lengthy and so subtle.

converse pluralist theme.

me

only the first but that one is to

Argument

.

In

the

most

I

identify in Lindblom's

Within the limits of this disser-

will not be possible to consider all of

First Level of

and value agreement

claiming that conflict can be rather severe that

These then are the three main stages which
development

perhaps just because

to maintain the identity of conflict
is

conflict, on the one-

which they occur, on the other,

be such a connection.

while at the same time he
his

zero-sum

them

at length.

I

shall

examine

critical stage in any case.

elaborating on the first level of argument

with potentially zero-sum relationships comes not from specific passages but
from the greatly extended discussion of how value conflicts can be reconciled
through partisan mutual adjustment. It comes, that is, from the obvious
implication that the demonstration of this reconciliation is not easy. Almost

material in the last one hundred pages of the book is devoted in one way
or another to this problem. And as significant as length is the progress of the
discussion. It seems basically circular. For example, Lindblom suggests
that we interpret value consistency as a Pareto optimum but acknowledges that
pursuit of such an optimum does not resolve all value conflicts. Then he suggests that partisan mutual adjustment will achieve much value agreement anyway at least in the basic sense that some decision is finally reached. But he
acknowledges that this decision may appear coercive and he can only soften
all the

that fact by de -emphasizing the distinction between coercion and consent in the
first place.

See Lindblom, Intelligence of

Similar advances and retreats occur

Dem o cracy

in later

chapters.

,

chaps. XIII and XIV.
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as

it

presented

is

essay on "Bargaining, \

in the

somewhat extended summary

many provisos

view,

the explicit
will

to

of that

any such

form which they took

now appear as interwoven

work.

summary
in the

.

"

,

shall first attempt a

Of course there must be, on
but

I

shall not give

earlier illustrative

into the very fabric of

my

my

them here

summary.

in

They

interpretation and

analysis.

The Essay
blom suggests

--

The thrust

that in the

of the

same way

essay

is

apparent from the

as the selfishness of

can lead to public good so can partisan bargaining
in this

essay

only to bargaining

is

among

am

arguing that bargaining
obstruction to coordination. 9 ^
I

is

in

men

title.

in the

government.

public officials.

)

In his

Lind-

market
(Reference

own words,

a method of coordination, not a tolerable

.bargaining or negotiation in government is a closer kin to Smith's
"higgling of the market" than third-cousin-by-analogy. 93
.

.

The alternative to bargaining is hierarchy. The author advances the
hypothesis that bargaining is preferable for various reasons, in particular
because the bargaining process tends to insure that all vital interests
obtain a hearing, and because the results of bargaining tend to be in the
public interest.

Lindblom

is

confident that market trade offers benefits to all since,

according to him, there are curbs on the power of any one individual.

acknowledges that bargaining,

in contrast,

^Lindblom, "Bargaining,
93 Ibid.

,

p.

5.

94 lbid.

,

p.

ii.

"

p.

4.

often appears to favor

He

some persons
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expense of others.

at the

But he

almost always occurs because

promises

to

show

of the possibility of

that bargaining, too,

mutual gain to

he concedes that the gain sometimes consists merely
flict.

in

though

all,

abatement of con-

95

The major concepts
ation but only the first one
the idea that

if

is

essay are bargaining, hierarchy and coordin-

explicitly defined.

Hierarchy

is

associated with

one wants to achieve a social goal then one must make

official's responsibility to

of unilateral

in the

pursue

it.

96

It

power and, 97 obliquely, with

is

it

some

also associated with the concept

that of dictatorship.

But

Lindblom

also acknowledges that democracy can take a hierarchical form and, apparently,
not just in the sense that the bureaucratic part of any
Qo
formal hierarchy. yo

democracy

"socialist"

mean

He seems instead
of the

European

to be

sort.

acknowledging

Hierarchy

the deliberate pursuit of the public good. 99

9 5lbid.

,

p.

3.

96 Ibid.

,

p.

6.

government

in

a

is

usually a

planning or

any case seems

This public good

is

to

not

97 Ibid.

op

any democracy the subordination of hierarchy
marked than dictatorship even if it is less marked than
In

government"

Ibid
[

.

,

p.

is

in

always more

American

19].

99

Aside from the price system, we are still wedded to the idea that.
the way to reach social goals is to set them up as organizational objectthe way to serve the public is to motivate individuals to serve the
ives.
public—in short, the way to get results is to organize power hierarchically'
.

.

[Ibid.

,

.

p.

7J.

.
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necessarily a generally agreed public
good, but

it

would be so

is

sometimes

in a socialist

democracy.
Coordination, or social coordination as
less explicitly defined than

is

hierarchy.

referring to a process by which

whole-brought so through
ciples or values.

many

it

One often thinks

called,

is

even

of this concept as

different elements are brought into a

the purposive application of

some common prin-

This makes the concept look much like hierarchy,
and we

shall see later that

it

does seem to look that way to Lindblom-but for
a differ-

ent reason.

The elements which are brought together may be
ever.

other words, coordination

In

provide the

common

in

a

then use to integrate elements other than values.

a social goal,

10 °".
goals
the

10 °

basic sense.

serving the "public interest,

It

"

to

more applied sense can
Lindblom apparently under-

is

associated with "achieving

"finding

common

goals,

"

101

we are still wedded to the idea that the way to reach social
them up as organizational objectives, which means then that
"
coordinate is to make it someone's job to coordinate.
.

is to set

way

[Ibid.

.

"

more

how-

more basic sense may be needed

values which coordination in a

stands coordination in this

different values,

to

.

.

J.

1

^spite his use of the term "coordination" at the beginning of his
essay, what Lindblom mainly tries to do from then on is show that bargaining
serves the public interest, the latter being defined as widely shared goals.
"

An

bargaining power depends in large p art upon the coincidence
of the goals he pursues in bargaining and the public interest, her e defined
as the achievement of widely shared goals" [Ibid.
p. 2 1 j.
official's

,

"improving everyone's position.
coordination thus seems to

or value agreement

It is

mean

02

imprecise and intuitive form

In this

either the achievement of value agreement

itself.

Bargaining, which
negation.

1,1

is

the one explicitly defined concept, is defined by

said to comprise those methods of control over officials which

are multilateral instead of unilateral. 103

It is

a residual category of control

not accounted for in the hierarchical models of government. 104

Of the

many

other distinctions which appear in later works several are

here conflated to the distinction between bargaining and hierarchy.
little

There

is

distinction between the general political process of democracy, the

specific political process of bargaining, and the decision method of incre-

And there

mentalism.

is

similarly

little

distinction between dictatorship,

hierarchy, and the decision method of synopsis.
phasis on the means -ends distinction and

its

Neither

is

there

much em-

deficiencies.

After distinguishing between bargaining and hierarchy, the essay elaborates the point that bargaining

is

proceeds to the main topic which

common

is

in

American government.

then

It

a discussion of the virtues of bargaining

for coordination.

bargaining almost always (perhaps without exception) takes
place because of the possibility of mutual gain to all the bargainers.
102".

.

,

.

[Ibid.

,

3].

p.

103 Ibid.
104 Ibid

.

,

p.

2.

.

"
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Lindblom begins, as so often
argument.

He observes

in his later

works, with a kind of reductio

that bargaining is ubiquitous

and concludes that

hierarchy can be shown to be impossible or clearly inferior

cumstances then facts

impossible

and that

democracy, because

in

of social

and institutional pluralism,

is

also impossible, in certain circumstances,

(Lindblom

is

speaking mainly of democracies, though.

a reductio argument

gaining

is the

He then

that hierarchy actually

it

Now Lindblom

important cir-

have to be persuasive. 105

like ubiquity will

completes the argument with sub-arguments showing
is

in

if

in

any government. 106

)

could end the argument here but he evidently senses that
is

not enough.

best there

is.

In

He doesn't want

to

say merely that bar-

what immediately follows comes the most

interesting and curious part of his total argument.

Earlier

in the

power inequality

essay Lindblom claimed

in the

market system and

less effective curbs in pluralism.

1

07

theory usually holds that there either

power.

But

now as he proceeds

105 Ibid.

,

pp.

15-17.

106 Ibid.

,

pp.

17-20.

to the

to see the

Ibid.

if

is

or can be rough equality of bargaining

most

critical steps of his argument,

this
"

way.

He spoke

But the import

of curbs
would

much the same. In a bargaining polity one need not curb the vices
weak. And to curb the vices of the strong, one must curb their power.

to be

,

curbs on

This was to be expected since pluralist

Lindblom did not put the matter exactly

of the

of

to see the possibility of similar

on "private vices" rather than on "power inequality.

seem

presence

pp.

3-4.
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Lindblom denies

this latter position.

Equality

Bi-partisan equality would lead
to deadlock.
in

is

And

a ridiculous idea, he says.
equality defined as a situation

which no party to the bargain feels
anyone else did better

is

al so undesirable.

Coincidence with the public interest,
not satisfaction of the partisans,
ought to
be the test of a settlement. 108

The public

official with

more power

formal government hierarchy.

in the

various alliances.

»..

.

.

the only

majority of the bargainers.

power

if

"

109

probably one with a higher position

And he should have gained

way
The

is

to

win

is to find

official thus will

he pursues more widely shared values.

common

this

through

cause with a

have more bargaining

Such values constitute the

public interest, the only sort of public interest
there can ever really be. 110

And

the public interest as such, or at least its
achievement,

what

is

apparently

meant by coordination.

At this point

in the

argument Lindblom fears he

will be thought to have

begged the question by assuming that the bargaining objective

more

is

than private gain. 111

is

something

But he assures the reader that he has not.

There

are many different interpretations of the public interest; failure
to recognize
that fact is a basic defect of hierarchy.

108 Ibid.

,

p.

21.

1Q9 Ibid.

,

p.

22.

110Ibid.

,

pp.

23-24.

,

pp.

24-25.

m

Ibid.

And

often these interpretations cannot
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be reduced to a smaller number by appeal to the
voice of the majority.

majority
is to

is silent.

know

Often the only

that they are the

ran Se the public interest
ests, which is the

some

is

way

outcome

know

to

that values are widely

of bargaining.

The

shared

"Hence within a certain

represented by an agreement among partisan inter-

way bargainers see

not a goal or state of affairs having

it,

validity other than as a practical bargained

Thus does Lindblom argue

compro mise.

that bargaining is not

get in the direction of coordination.

12

merely the best one can

a definite coordinating device.

is

It

1,1

It

is

so because those sympathetic to the public interest will have the greater
bargaining power.

This public interest

process, however, but

The crux
points, but

mentioned.
besides

it

of

is

not something above the bargaining

often the outcome of that very process.

Lindblom's argument seems to be captured

elaborated

is

is

For one

its ability to

in

subsequent points and some

of those

see the public interest for what
of

it is.

letting

weighing values, and he

The bargainer believes

his biases.

every group speak for

li2 lbid.

,

p.

to be

The bargaining

in a policy decision.

The hierarchical decision maker sees such reconciliation as

fit

need

every significant group will be con-

sidered in any final reconciliation of interests involved

in

above

thing, there are other related advantages to bargaining

process better assures that the values

own judgment

in the

26.

itself.

is likely to

a

miss the values

that reconciliation will

On

his view,

it

matter

come

of his

that don't

just in

cannot occur in one person's
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H3

mind.

Bargaining also produces better feedback since
big decisions are not

necessarily made at the top of a hierarchy.

demanding. 114

And

But its greatest value is that

it

it is

less intellectually

motivates

men

to

seek

common

goals rather than to be satisfied with a compromise
of conflicting interests.

This

a value because there are countless

is

United States. 11
history but

it is

The reason

goals, at least in the

that there are is partly the good fortune of our

also partly because bargaining makes

government leaders

to

uncover every possible area

Lindblom perhaps alluding
often whatever

common

of

to his earlier point that the

it

the business of our

agreement. 116

(Is

areas of agreement are

emerge from bargaining?)

After discussing the virtues of bargaining, Lindblom very briefly considers

its

deficiencies, suggesting that these deficiencies stem from an excess

of institutional pluralism or

alliances.

In

from attempts

to gain

power other than through

any case, he does not think the objections are very serious.

The paper concludes with some suggestions for further
significant to us being the first.

work

of

That suggestion

agreement, on fundamental ends and on

H3lbid.

,

pp.

27-29.

114 lbid.

,

pp.

29-30.

115 Ibid.

,

pp.

30-31.

116 Jbid.

,

p.

32.

is to

study, the

most

study the social frame-

political

means, within which

197

bargaining occurs.

Lindblom claims that

this

framework

of

agreement

achieved through social indoctrination,
"strategic calculations,
certain groups, through special role
restraints. 117
that the ends

and means

in

It is

"

is

and, for

not clear, though,

question are less fundamental than those
which

earlier were considered to be our historical
inheritance or the product of

bargaining

itself.

(Perhaps bargaining implies the making of
strategic calcu-

and perhaps our historical inheritance

lations

The Dialectical Pattern
or, at least,

--

1

want

is

the result of indoctrination.

to suggest

now

)

that the inconsistencies

ambivalences which must have been apparent

in the

essay on

Bargaining have a point, assume a pattern, when interpreted
as a dialectical

concept examination.
Central Concept

1.

The central concept
as a whole,

in this

essay, and

the concept of bargaining.

is

already comprises,

in

It

embryo, the concept

dominants and subordinates as well as that

117

Ibid.

,

pp.

in the

Lindblom thought sequence

appears to be a broad concept.
of patterns of

of bargaining

It

adjustment among

among

equals.

118

39-40.

110sAs has been previously
said, Lindblom does not explicitly argue for a
bargaining among equals in this essay. Indeed, his explicit statements go in
the opposite direction. But he takes for granted the presence of a rough equality in his very use of the concept of pluralism and in his claim that groups
1

retain

1

some degree

autonomy.
groups working through a
of

".
if
common government retain some
degree of autonomy with respect to one another—and this is what social
pluralism means --they can arrive at governmental decisions only through
.

.

bargaining"

[Ibid.

,

p.

20J.
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Other First Order Major Concepts

2.

The other major concepts are hierarchy and coordination.
never clearly defined but what definition there
it

makes

ily

the two concepts

surprising.

If

we

seem very close

to

These are

is is critically significant.

each other.

This isn't necessar-

forget Lindblom's discussion and consider a plain

view of the two concepts,

it

would clearly seem

For

man

that to coordinate implies the

exercise of hierarchy and that what hierarchy does

is

to coordinate.

We

might

easily say, then, that the two concepts are really just different aspects of a

Now

single one.

headed but he
I

is

this docs

seem

to be the conclusion to

which Lindblom

is

arriving there from a different direction.

suggest that

in his

display different aspects.

view

it

is

value agreement of which the two concepts

Both allude to value agreement and for both there

are limits to purposive action as regards that agreement.

From

the previous exposition

it

appears that coordination means either

social agreement or the purposive achievement of social agreement.

means

the latter then

it

119
If it

shares with hierarchy an assumption claimed for that

concept by Lindblom --the assumption that goals can be achieved by deliberately pursuing them.

But

more

likely

it

means

the former.

Lindblom clearly

doesn't intend to emphasize the idea that value agreements have temporal

endurance and could serve, once achieved, as promises for a hierarchical
process.

To do so would weaken considerably

H9see

text pp. 191-92.

his central theme.

It

thus
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seems more accurate

to

say that coordination and value agreement
occur

simultaneously rather than to say that coordination
achieves agreement.

Hierarchy might be supposed
association Lindblom seems to
But let us give

uses

if

very different concept given the strong

make between

some extended thought

and see

it

a

that concept

and purposive action.

to the implications of the concept as he

the supposition holds.

We

note firstly, and despite Lind-

blom's sometimes claims to the contrary, that hierarchy
must be possible. 120
Since bargaining

then

if

is all

those governmental processes which are not hierarchy,

hierarchy did not exist the term bargaining would refer to any
govern-

mental process whatever.

In that

case some of bargaining would surely co-

Lindblom clearly means

ordinate.

to say

more than

this in his essay.

Furthermore, the hierarchy from which Lindblom wants
bargaining

primarily that of Western social democracies, not that repre-

command economies such

sented by

*

is

to distinguish

as in the Soviet Union. 121

Now

the

2 ^Lindblom 's

contrary claims are explicit.
hierarchy is impossible in American government except as one of
several bargaining controls" [Lindblom, "Bargaining, " p. 17J.
In other words, hierarchy is a subordinate element in the bargaining process.
".

.

.

On the most critical matters, hierarchy is impossible in any government.
"To take an extreme, dictators can exercise power only through employing large elements of bargaining in their hierarchies" [Ibid.
121
±z,1

than

In

p.

18].

emphasizing the coordinating ability of a bargaining polity, rather
protect against power concentration, Lindblom is obviously

its ability to

he was speaking primarily to the Communist East, it
the latter ability that he would most need to emphasize. For it is just that

speaking to the West.
is

,

ability that they

If

would most violently dispute.
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hierarchical forms of democracy must presuppose
value agreement since
values cannot simply be imposed under a democratic
system.

agreement might be
Lindblom that

United States 122 and there

would be

of that

the result of historical inheritance, but
according to

not the whole explanation for the presence of

is

Some

is

agreement

consequently no reason for us to think that

a sufficient one elsewhere.

even for socialist democracies,

is

in the

it

Presumably then the agreement on basics,

associated with something like bargaining.

Thus coordination and hierarchy seem

to be the

same

at least in the

sense that

both are associated with agreement over basic values and that this agreement

arises in bargaining.
If

there

is still

a distinction between coordination and hierarchy

it

must

be that coordination shares with bargaining the bargaining approach over lesser
values whereas hierarchy resolves disputes
deduction from greater ones.

among

those lesser values by

But in the context of this distinction, Lindblom's

major arguments no longer support bargaining over hierarchy as a coordinating
device.

minor

Hence,

if

Lindblom

is to

be persuasive then he must abandon even this

distinction between hierarchy and coordination.

analysis

I

following lengthy

shall try to defend these last two sentences.

122"That we have common values
of our history.

But

it

is

to unite us is in part the

good fortune

also explained by the fact that bargaining makes

the business of our governmental leaders

...

area of agreement" [Lindblom, "Bargaining,
12

In the

"

to

uncover every possible

p.

32].

it

^This writer believes that Lindblom has only two principal arguments
for the superiority of bargaining over hierarchy. There are other lesser
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The

first

major Lindblom argument

is

that the

more powerful

better reflect agreed values (the public interest). 124
is

an argument for hierarchy, not bargaining.

what

is

best for us then

circumstances
It

it

in its

itself,

however, this

our officials will always do

not opt for hierarchical government?

In those

should be both the most efficient kind and the most

second argument that supports bargaining.

is really the

this one, value

why

If

By

agreement arises from bargaining. 125

broader sense seems equivalent

to value

officials

Now

agreement

it

just.

According

since coordination
follows from the

second argument that bargaining can coordinate as well as can hierarchy.

must closely examine
If

the

this

to

We

second argument.

agreement which arises from bargaining

have called the "greater" values then

this

is

agreement over what

accomplishment

I

of bargaining does

not serve to distinguish coordination from democratic forms of hierarchy.

Both coordination and democratic hierarchy derive their greater values from

bargaining, as

I

have just finished saying.

But suppose that there is the further claim that bargaining results in

agreement on "lesser" values as

well.

There are two interpretations

of this

seem very cogent in themselves. He argues, for example, that a bargaining model can accommodate more diverse views, but this
advantage is not relevant unless the many views can be brought together. He
ones, but they do not

also argues that the model requires less intellectual capacity from decision
makers, but that advantage is scarcely relevant, either, if the cost is chaos.

124 Lindblom, "Bargaining,
12S Ibid.

,

pp.

27-29.

"

pp.

23-25.
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further claim.

According

to one interpretation,

agreement on these lesser

values will follo w from bargaining rather than occurring
simultaneously with
it.

But

this is

They do

ance.

Now

if

if

same.

what happens then the values selected have temporal endur-

not necessarily alter with every

move

in the

bargaining process.

the lesser values endure then greater values can be
expected to do the

For example,

a nation sets specific policies both for increases in

if

social benefits and for across-the-board decreases in taxes, and

if

the nation

continues to do this despite any contraindications economically, then these

enduring policies
that of unlimited

may

be generalized into an equally enduring greater value --

economic growth.

And given

possible to deduce other policies from
this

example

I

conclude that

if

it.

this

greater value

Hierarchy

is

it

is

thus justified.

now

From

agreement only follows from bargaining then

bargaining does not seem superior as a method for determining lesser values.
It is

true that bargaining

once achieved,

may

may produce

policy agreement.

be generalized into principles which

But the agreement,

may

then be applied

by hierarchy.
I

think Lindblom's

occur simultaneously

more common claim

is that

bargaining and agreement

Certainly in later works he argues that we cannot even

.

know our values except

in the

process of bargaining over trade-offs.

*

In

other words, the process of coming to know values occurs simultaneously with
the reaching of

agreement over them.

126 See footnote

31.

If

this is so,

however, then there can be
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no distinct decision process called
hierarchy since there are no enduring
values available to be applied.

Thus bargaining must be
by the same token there
cratic hierarchy.

greater values

And without

For

Values change with every step

the superior process as
is

it

no distinction

is

left

it

is

in

bargaining.

the only process.

But

between coordination and demo-

senseless to try to distinguish between lesser
and

none of them endure long enough to be objectively
examined.

if

that distinction the distinction

between coordination and democratic

hierarchy must collapse.

Attempted Identity

3.

If

of Opposites- -Genesis of the Inner

Lindblom begins his argument as

He

a.

I

suggest then he faces a dilemma.

explicitly defines bargaining as the negation of hierarchy.

bargaining refers to a residual category of controls

accounted for
models.

.

in the

it

sometimes

." (my emphasis.

Bargaining
b.

is the

1

explicit but

is the

is

to identify bargaining with coordination in identifying

26.

"Hence within a certain

r

.ge

represented by an agreement among partisan interests,

127 Lindblom, "Bargaining,

p.

implicit hierarchical

97

it,

not a goal or state of affairs having

validity other than as a practical bargained

,

that are not

)

way bargainers see

128 Ibid.

government

".

negation of hierarchy.

He then seems

the public interest

in

commonly

with the public interest as value agreement.

which

Debate

"

p.

2.

compromise

"
.

128

some
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Bargaining

c
to

show

is identical to

But he also
in the

seems

*

coordination.

to equate coordination

immediately preceding discussion.

ently could not sustain his claim that
bargaining

Hierarchy and coordination are identical

and hierarchy as
If

is

to

have tried

I

he did not do so he appar-

superior to hierarchy.

each other.

Let us stop abruptly at this point and look back
over the first three steps
of this "dialectical concept examination" of
Lindblom's essay.

steps are highly significant.

described
the

most

They represent

in the last part of

Chapter

And

II.

my
in

first application of that

method

any application they would be

critical steps.

The basic assumption behind these three
a whole, is one simple idea.

steps, and behind the

method as

THERE ARE NO CONCEPTS WHICH JUST ARE.

There are no concepts which we can gain by

common

These three

sense belief that there are.

pointing, despite the ubiquitous

There are no concepts which we

find ourselves sharing, despite the belief

all just

among many Anglo-American

philos-

ophers that there are.

From

this

simple idea there come two critical inferences.

there are no concepts which

come from

stood in terms of other concepts.
all just share,

From

every concept

is

pointing, every concept

must be under-

But because there are no concepts which

questionable.

these two inferences come, in

our human situation.

Because

my

view, two possible visions of

we
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We may

think ourselves like the person

term, say "democracy,

"

in a dictionary

who seeks

we may

meaning

and finds the defining terms

questionable as that whose meaning he
sought.
But alternatively

the

This

is the

of

some

to be as

skeptics* vision.

think ourselves like the person

who

finds

him-

self in actual struggle against a concept,
say totalitarianism, which he scarcely

grasps but nevertheless

in

concept as democracy.

I

and

I

would

call

it

latter vision that

If

I

contrast to which he comes to understand
such a

believe that this vision

is

a meaningful alternative

the vision of dialectical struggle.

It is

of this

there are no concepts that just are, then even the simplest
subject-

cept about which

we

principally speak.

this concept since without that

There must be the con-

Then there must also be

we could

not understand

be the concept (or concepts) which we predicate of the

must be defined by negation

great social themes we

concept of predication

may

is

if

we are

often find

(1

first concept is in turn

between what seemed

we can have

opposing one.

to

grasp

it.

first.

it.

the negative of

Thirdly, there must

And

this concept,

But, curiously, on the

shall later suggest always) that the

said to constitute the negative of the conceived re-

lationship between the first two concepts.

that

terms

have been examining Lindblom's thought.

predicate proposition becomes conceptually involved.

also,

in

In

other words, the negating of the

negated suggesting a somehow positive relationship

at first to be contradictories.

the best features of both our

own

Hence

it is

often argued

position and the apparently

206

see Lindblom involved

1

He

just described.

known

in

is

in that struggle

meant by one concept- -that

any positive sense, however.

rounds the beginnings of speculation.

might call
present

such conceptual complexities as

finds himself in an intellectual struggle with

democratic planners and

know what

in just

it

it

is

the seed

from which a

and expresses

of hierarchy.

It is,

instead, a

is to

is

not

penumbra which sur-

This does not mean

it

is nothing.

fuller concept could develop.

in opposition to this

We

But for the

vague concept of hierarchy

If

is

Bargaining

is

what

hierarchy were understood as something inherently inegal-

and pursuing an external purpose

then bargaining would be different in these features.

That

The concept

this opposition as the concept of bargaining.

is not.

it

European

he assumes that he and his opponents

itarian, having a chain-of -command structure,

says that

have

only a seed.

Lindblom places himself

hierarchy

I

different in all these ways, and

be expected.

After

all,

But Lindblom never clearly

sometimes he says

the opposite.

the concept of hierarchy is largely undeter-

mined.

At this point then Lindblom has two major concepts --hierarchy and
bargaining- -but since the second

very vaguely defined we
ing

is

only potential.

may say

is

defined by the first and the first

is in a

predicament.

ment we would encounter by defining black as
is.

And

only

that the definiteness of the concept of bargain-

So Lindblom

very clearly what white

is

not -white,

It

is like

when we

the solution is the same.

the predica-

don't

know

One needs a further
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concept which simultaneously separates
and integrates the

This further concept must integrate the
others

what they have
concept

is

in

common.

For we don't know what

the negation of another unless

they have none, the statement

is

we know

meaningless.

)

in the

it

their

first

two concepts.

sense of showing

means

to say that one

common

ground.

(If

At the same time the two con-

cepts must retain their negative relations or they
lose any distinct meaning

because they are absorbed within that "common ground"
which

common
In

no longer

to anything.

the case of white and black

we have such

a concept as

I

suggest.

This concept maintains the separation of concepts because

color.

associated with one of the two sides.

sence

is

of color.

Color implies white.

But the concept also integrates.

Black

is

is itself

it

is

It

the ab-

Color embraces both black

and white.
I

suggest that for Lindblom the synthesizing concept

Coordination

is

is

coordination.

associated with hierarchy as we normally suppose, and as even

Lindblom seems

to believe.

And

it

is

hence the opposite of bargaining.

Yet

coordination embraces both hierarchy and bargaining as different ways of interrelating individual actions.

decision making coordinates.

(Lindblom

That

is

is

not

wrong when he suggests

a definitional truth.

the opposing definitional truth that only hierarchy

is

that all

But there is as well

coordination.

129
)

129The thought that the same concept can both immediately negate another
concept and also transcendently affirm that concept is denied by many people.
With regard to the present example they would claim that the coordination which
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Given the dialectic
cept

is to

have meaning,

of concepts

it

is to

which

I

that matter, will take the

ment may appear

to be an

contrasting

it

form described.

argument over propositions,

For Lindblom

it

is

in the third

have meaning

assertions that bargaining

concept of coordination.

it

is

necessary

But coordination can

Hence

to affirm

is

if

the concept of bar-

what appear to be contra-

coordination, that bargaining

and yet that hierarchy and coordination seem

and have

will actually be a

This affirmation of contradictories takes here the form of the three

dictories.

In

it

While an argu-

an attempt to define bargaining by

only be understood by contrast with bargaining.
is to

any con-

with hierarchy and then to define the contrast in terms of
what

both terms share

gaining

if

be expected that Lindblom's argument, and

any argument for

debate over concepts.

describe as necessary

to be the

too.

This

is not to

not hierarchy,

same.

popular expression we could say that Lindblom
it

is

is

trying to eat his cake

suggest, however, that his attempt

is

merely a

is opposed to bargaining is of a "lower level" than that which embraces both
bargaining and hierarchy and consequently that there is no contradiction. This
writer agrees that there is a difference of levels but does not see how this ends
the contradiction. If bargaining and hierarchy are understood in terms of the

higher level concept of coordination, how is this concept understood? Recall
that we always assume no outside source of concepts. Concepts determine each
other
Eventually, then, even the most sophisticated concept returns to the
.

starting point.

It is,

therefore, useful and correct to think of every conceptual

level as circling back immediately on the next beneath it. In the present example, this means that while coordination involves what is common to both
bargaining and hierarchy the only way we can know what coordination means is
by contrasting it with bargaining (which, in turn, is in the process of being contrasted with hierarchy). In Hegelian terminology, coordination is a negation of
the negation which bargaining is.
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mSliS^S^.

Given the problem of achieving
adequate social coordina-

tion while retaining a bargaining
society the attempt might

might seem a way
they seemed.
stitute

I

to affirm both features,

am

seem

to be so.

however practicably incompatible

suggesting, however, that Lindblom's
position

something more-that

it

may

It

may con-

constitute a concep tual nece ssity.

argues that a bargaining society can
coordinate he

is,

my

on

When

he

view, providing a

definition of bargaining.

If

contradictory assertions are inherent in the
use of concepts then Lind-

blom's apparent attempt to eat his cake and
have

it

too is no criticism.

does concept usage necessarily involve contradiction?

reasons why

I

arguments are
it

think

it

I

have just given some

does, and these recapitulate earlier arguments.

initially abstract

however.

How

convincing

proceeds from the other direction -from the concrete?

convincing

is the

But

claim as

it

appears

in

is

In

my

Those

case when

other words, how

those three propositions which

I

derive

from Lindblom's thought?

The

first proposition- -that bargaining is the negation of hierarchy-can

hardly be disputed.

Lindblom

is

quite explicit on the point.

He says

that bar-

gaining comprises all those government controls not accounted for by hierarchy.

And he

gives no other

more purely

positive definition.

The third proposition- -that hierarchy and coordination are identical—may
be disputable but
in

I

cannot see how, other than by exploiting a certain vagueness

Lindblom's discussion of these concepts.

And

if

the concepts are left vague,
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Lindblom's use of them will be equally vague
and hence questionably significant.

The second proposition- -that bargaining and
coordination are identical-

may seem more
ever,

Before responding to that point, how-

must recall Lindblom's understanding

I

seems

dubious than the others.

to

mean

of coordination.

For him

the bringing together of diverse values
rather than the bringing

together of other things once these values have
been agreed upon.
of the

essay

cussion
is

is that

is that

made

of the

it

(The thesis

bargaining can coordinate--yet the main thrust of the
dis-

bargaining leads to agreement, 130 and very

word "coordinate.

")

little

subsequent use

Hence coordination means cither

achievement of value agreement or the value agreement

in its

the

achieved state.

Of these two meanings the former would emphasize the idea that we reach
goals
by pursuing them and this

is just

what Lindblom does not want

to do.

1

have

suggested, accordingly, that coordination, for Lindblom, means value agree-

ment

itself.

And there

is

one further consideration.

identifies the public interest with

mean

agreed values.

Lindblom explicitly

Hence coordination seems

the public interest.

We
objection

are now ready to consider objections to
is this.

Perhaps Lindblom

is

my

second proposition.

bargaining.

Now

it

happens that

I

have already responded once

jection in discussing the concept of hierarchy.

130See text pp. 201-03

One

saying that coordination (hence value

agreement, hence the public interest) follows from bargaining rather than
it is

to

and footnote

115.

I

that

to this ob-

here shall do so again with
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specific reference to coordination.

The quotation which

for

me most

public interest is the one given

proposition

it is

when

latter

And

*'

that

it is

answer

is

is,

how

the

perhaps imminent

term makes more sense when

question

presented proposition

In that

b.

former term suggests

that the

something to be achieved by bargaining while only the

is

term suggests

first

true that Lindblom refers to the public interest
both as a

"goal" and as a "state of affairs.
public interest

1

explicitly identifies bargaining with the

to

in the

bargaining process.

latter

But the

the quotation is placed in context.

The

determine what values are widely shared and the quoted

in effect,

"whatever arises

in

bargaining.

"

But this

answer clearly

implies that with every iteration of the bargaining process there will be a new
public interest.

strengthened

essay

If this

in later

works, or

to largely isolate

interpretation

I

am

In

it

if

one could find some reason

early

in this

from later ones, then one might perhaps reject

it

giving.

which so far separates
interpretation.

early Lindblom position were not repeated and even

But

I

"

find nothing in the "Bargaining.

from what

follows.

And what

.

.

the

essay

follows does support the

"Handling of Norms" Lindblom argues that the weighting of

values, and hence the occurrence of

some kind

of

agreement,

not an intel-

is

lectual process accomplished in the minds of individuals.

The weighting does not take place until actual policy decisions are made.
.are brought
At that time, the conflicting views of individuals and groups.
Policies are set as a resultant of such conto bear on policy formulation.
flict, not because some one policy-making individual or group achieves an
.
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integration but because the pulling and hauling
of various views accomplishes
131
some kind of a decision.

finally

.

One must not be misled by such terms as "accomplish" and
quotation.

in the

It

would be more accurate to speak

process.

ceases but
political

is

"finally" in this

agreement as imminent

of the

For, elsewhere, Lindblom emphasizes that the process never

a constant succession of small steps.

processes

in

most governments

that

a characteristic of

"It is

any single

office, organization,

or agency pursues a never-ending series of attacks on more or less
permanent,
132

though perhaps slowly changing, problems.

One should
problem --which

'the

is

mentioned

In

is

agreement

is

in the last quotation.

to

means as well as

continually redefined.

"The Science

of

imminent

new item

"Decision makers do not

Ends are adjusted
problem'

.

not be misled, either, by the

truly permanent either.

lem.

.

"

of

permanency- -the

Specific

problems are not

on a nicely defined prob-

fix

the other

way around.

.

bargaining.

Hence

133

Muddling Through" Lindblom again intimates

in

.

that

Sometimes administrators can agree

neither on abstract values nor on trade-off values.
the objectives are established by the agreement.

Yet agreement occurs and
".

.

.

it

ought to be

remember

that objectives themselves have no ultimate validity other than are agreed upon.

131 Lindblom, "Handling of

Norms,"

p.

174.

l3 2r3raybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision

133 Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, pp.

,

p.

146-47.

100.
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Hence agreement

is

method requires advance objectives or does
In all of the

"

the test of 'best' policy.

.

134

.

[whether the decision

not].

foregoing quotations Lindblom

is

not describing a sequential

relationship between a bargaining process and value agreement.
situation he describes is one in which
on.

Hence

it

There
sition

b.

ment were

seems

to

me

agreement arises as

this

Instead, the

process goes

that the first objection is not sustained.

however, a second objection that might be made

is,

According

to this objection one

identical but

would then

cause he assumes consensus.

On

my

propo-

would grant that bargaining and agree-

insist that

view

this

to

Lindblom avoids dilemma be-

it is

true enough that Lindblom's

concept of bargaining involves a sort of imminent, simultaneous agreement.
But there is no

I

is

comparable disagreement.

have responded before

to this

second objection by noting that Lindblom

neither wholly clear nor wholly consistent in his discussion of consensus.

But a simpler and to

me

as persuasive a response

nitude of Lindblom's work.

What

point

the coordinating abilities of pluralism

is

if

circumstance? Why write so much only
cision methods are just fine?

almost forced

to

If

is

simply

there in writing at such length about

to

reassure us that our muddled de-

Lindblom means

draw negative conclusions about both

135 See footnote 19.

mag-

those are just the result of happy

this is all

134 Lindblom, "Muddling Through,

to note the

" p.

84.

to do then

we are

his scholarly ambitions
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common

and his

sense.

Faced with

the above prospect

believe

I

it is

better, as a general rule,

to reject negative conclusions about scholarly work, especially

has a reasonable reputation.
concept of bargaining

Having done so

He wants

substantive.

is

partisans can constitute agreement.

must believe

I

He

is

when

work

that Lindblom's

among

to say that struggle

not saying

the

merely that their inter-

action does so.

Central

4.

I

Theme

as an Argument in Potential

have argued at some length, both on an abstract level and

his essay, that Lindblom faces a conceptual problem.

lem (which seems

to

me

a universal problem)

is that

One aspect

the

problem

is

But:

view of

of this

prob-

none of Lindblom's prin-

cipal concepts have independent meaning, or the promise of

ately depend on each other for their meaning.

in

They ultim-

it.

the other converse aspect of

that nothing meaningful can be said about concepts unless they

are distinct from each other.

Placing the two aspects together

we see

that

concepts must define each other by their differences, and yet unless the concepts are

I

somehow

the

same we cannot even recognize

believe that Lindblom's central theme reflects, in

the first aspect of the above problem.

asserts that bargaining

is

strongest form,

it

of that

theme

dramatically asserts the inter-

Such a theme appears definitional, however,

and hence the argument for the theme appears
that all

its

The strongest expression

coordination; hence

dependence of the two concepts.

we say

these differences.

to be that

unmarried men are bachelors, and

if

very theme

we assume

itself.

If

that the con-
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cepts involved here could not change enough to alter this truth
merely by
social evolution, then the sentence

blom's strongest statement
But

emptied

bargaining just

if

of

of his

is

theme

I

am

saying that Lind-

is like that.

coordination then the concept of bargaining

any distinct content.

lose the concept.

own proof.

is its

In

order

to

keep the theme

it

seems one must

This cannot be allowed to happen, however, or the theme

becomes meaningless.

Hence one wants

to

deny the view above that the theme

as argument and the theme as assertion are the same theme.

emphasizes

We

the

see that there

is

Lindblom needs
This

argument but as an argument

why

I

and deny that these

describe the central theme not as an

in potential.

strongest statement of his central theme

(the quotation in

proposition b) Lindblom does not understand bargaining as a reflection of

power
For

is

to both affirm

Distinction

In the initially

my

so one

a tension developed between the theme as assertion

two themes are the same.

A New

In doing

second aspect of Lindblom's basic conceptual problem.

and the theme as argument.

5.

is

inequality.

at the point

Bargaining seems instead to imply a conflict

where

that statement occurs

Lindblom

is

among

equals.

saying that the public

interest automatically arises with bargaining and that this justifies defenders
of the public interest in gaining

identity is hence the source of

more power.

The bargaining-public interest

power inequality rather than

its

reflection

.

My

interpretation here seems, at least, the most reasonable interpretation of the

s
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rather muddy passages

Lindblom. 136

in

By his initial contrast of bargaining

with hierarchy we have to assume that he mainly envisions a relationship

among

equals.

However, given the emptiness
his initial

theme statement, Lindblom needs

that the development of an

argument

duction of a new distinction.

argument

The

of the concept of bargaining or conflict in

And

make changes.

in potential will

Now

1

suggest

always occur by intro-

suggest that at this point in Lindblom'

I

the distinction advanced is one between levels of power.

distinction between levels of

the concept of conflict.

It

need for a way

to avoid deadlock by

Whereas

for the

power seems necessary

to strengthen

suggests that there might actually be an enduring,

nor merely an instantaneous, conflict

others.

to

theme

of values

and hence that there might be

making some people more powerful than

itself there is conflict only in

duction of this new distinction now

means

that there is

name, the intro-

something more.

There

is conflict in potential.

6.

Cancellation of the Earlier Argument

But the distinction also has another consequence.

It

means cancellation

136 Lindblom, "Bargaining, " p. 26.
The passages are muddy because one does not know whether the more
powerful bargainers --the public officials --created the public interest in the
process of bargaining or whether they only reflect a public interest previously
arising from bargaining

among

equals.

If

they did the former, then

their

relationship to the public interest is circular (a conclusion to which this writer
eventually arrives). But if they only reflect a previously -achieved agreement
among equals, then it must be possible to agree on goals before implementing

them.

Lindblom wants

to

deny that possibility, however.
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of the previous

itself.

It

among

at least

to say, cancellation of the central

theme

He

of the

a

New Argument

does not want to say that this inequality

expressly opposing such forms

is

is

rough equals.

Development

Initial

Now Lindblom
coercive.

is

denies that the bargaining from which value
agreement comes

bargaining
7.

argument-that

of

contrast his position with those of the Soviets, etc.

is

arbitrary or

government, wanting

He argues,

to

instead, that

the inequality results because certain public officials represent
an alliance of

a majority of the bargainers.
8.

Self-Contradiction of the

New Argument

in its Initial State

But note the disastrous situation in which this
it

is

now taken as complete.

new argument places him

Far from having strengthened the concept

flict,

Lindblom has weakened

make

with the consensus assumptions of European economic planners.

value agreement

is built

it-

-for he has

weakened

on majority alliances then what matter

are applied through bargaining or hierarchy?
shut out.

In its

the contrast

In

if

it

if

of con-

needs to
If

the values

any case the minority has been

present form the argument contradicts

its

own

intent:

the

intent to allow for that political conflict of which the conflict between minority

and majority
9.

is the

prime example.

Preservation of the Earlier Argument

One way

to

remove

this

danger would be to reintroduce the

initial

central

218

theme which holds

He now says

this.

W

that bargaining is

agreement.

that the source of

power inequality

Lindblom seemfi
is

not an alliance with a

majority, at least not a vocal majority.

Instead the alliance

agreement which

bargaining.

10.

is itself a reflection of

tQ do

with a general

is

Circularity of the Completed Argument

The argument
between the concept

is

now complete

of conflict

similar emphases of Europe.

in that it

does not weaken the contrast

and the majorita rianism, party discipline, and

And

it

does allow for a conflict which

may

be

real enough to require levels of power.
But the

argument achieves

this

completeness through circularity.

Those

have more bargaining power whose own views reflect bargained agreement
and
bargained agreement obviously results from the influence of those with more
bargaining power.
I

have now completed the

blom's thought.

first level of

There are two sorts

against what has been presented.

argument which

of criticisms

One

I

identify in Lind-

which are likely

to be raised

will be a criticism of the dialectical

137 The passage that most vividly expresses this position is
the one quoted
so many times before, and especially in connection with proposition "b" (see
text p. 203).

That

this should be so

may

confuse the reader. For while this
writer quotes the passage as evidence of what he calls Lindblom 's central theme
and makes it the genesis of a dialectic, the passage does not, in fact, appear
until after the discussion of

power

That is to say, it does not appear
until a late stage in the dialectical concept examination.
The writer does not
believe that this situation presents a problem, however. The identification of
bargaining and value agreement is not presented as the conclusion of a syllogism. It is presented as something one just knows; hence, the point at which
the observation is first

most

inequality.

explicitly

made

is

not critical.
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examination
ity of that

I

have just given.

The other may

examination but will then conclude from

what Lindblom himself has done,

The

first critics will

essay examined.
I

seem

If

at least in the

probably say that

I

it

a

severe criticism of

essay examined.

have read too much into the

concepts are not clear the clarity should not he forced
as

to have done, for

example,

in the

and coordination are indistinguishable.
I

at least partly accept the valid-

process of suggesting that hierarchy
clarity had not been forced then what

If

identify as inconsistencies might not obviously be so,
and, likewise, the

pattern of argument might then be different.
I

made
that

have no conclusive answer to

document the assertions made, insofar as possible, but

to

it

could never be sufficient to remove all doubts.

that a concept or proposition

which

is

should be reasonably straightforward.
is

Suppose

I

I

am

A

work gen-

criticism of that hypothesis

But suppose

said to generate the inconsistency.

afraid

hypothesize

clearly present in an author's

erates a certain intellectual inconsistency.

which

An attempt has been

this first criticism.

it

is

an absence in the work

Suppose, as

1

do, that

it is

pre-

cisely the lack of clarity in certain concepts that explains Lindblom 's thinking.

Clearly no pointing to the text will either conclusively verify or conclusively
refute the claim.

Nevertheless,

why

I

I

think

think so in Chapter

claim.

And

in

Chapter

V

my

assumption

II.

Chapters

I

shall state

III

it

is

a useful one.

I

have tried to say

and IV are attempts to illustrate the

anew and from another perspective.
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But there is no final proof.

To

the second criticism, also, there is no
final proof.

that criticism

it

my work

as concept users, however, then

on that basis.

Whether

to

constitutes a devastating attack on Lindblom, because

captures him in serious inconsistencies.

lot

According

it

is not

If

inconsistency

is

our inevitable

appropriate to attack Lindblom

this situation is thought to prevail depends, finally,

on whether one accepts the assumptions

I

have been using.

CHAPTER

IV

AN AFFIRMATIVE VIEW OF COMPREHENSIVENESS
THE PATTERN OF
IN

ITS

DEFENSE

THE WRITINGS OF KARL MANNHEIM

To examine someone's

thought as, and by, a dialectical concept

exam-

ination is to take a different approach to the expository function than is
custom-

ary.

In this

clarity since

case we don't judge the thought by standards of consistency and

we do

not expect to find only one set of

expect to find opposing sets.

Hence exposition

thought to single main points.

among opposing
I

It

is

is

main points within

a tracing of the pattern of inner debate

ones.

early essay on bargaining.
this is a plausible

I

shall

Mannheim

I

approach

make

in the

hope the attempt

to thought,

even

if

may persuade

of

Lindblom's

the reader thai

an unconventional one.

In this

a second attempt, by interpreting the thought of Karl

same way.

A Problem

In

We

not an attempted reduction of

have attempted to make a dialectical concept examination

chapter

it.

for

Mannheim

perhaps most of what he wrote prior
221

to his

emigration from Germany

222
to

England

in

mid-career, Karl Mannheim argued,

in

one way or another, that

participation within a socio-conceptual
structure was the
least

somewhat free from

heim's position

is

the interpretations

a response to what

if

society with

its

concepts

is

become

to

at

imposed by one's society.

call the social change

I

problem how anyone can independently alter
standing

way

problem-the

human nature or

his

Mann-

his under-

the source of individuality and under-

standing.

The social change problem could be presented
of the contextualist

society

is

approach to inquiry which

I

gave

in

terms

in

Chapter

of that illustration

II.

If

operated according to a liberal model and hence structures

phenomena by

distinctions like political freedom,

bers of that society to so free themselves from

whether or not

it

is

how

its

is it

a certain

its

possible for

social

mem-

perspective as to determine

a distortion?

The Mannheim Response as an Internalized Debate

I

lem,

speculate that the social change problem, like the social control prob-

may

present a dilemma.

And

if it

does, then for Mannheim, as for

Lindblom, we can expect a distinctive response.

We

can expect,

public choosing of sides and, secondly, an internalization of

firstly, a

dilemma within

the debaters as they discover that they each need both sides.

Although Mannheim wants to argue the possibility of some freedom from
one's conceptual framework, he starts with the assumption that knowledge and
society are indeed part of such a framework.

And on my suppositions where
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he starts

is

where he must end.

Hence

I

consider him to be taking an affirm-

ative position on the question of the priority
of concepts.

Now

the priority of

concepts implies the priority of comprehensiveness since
there

comprehensive than a conceptual framework.

heim as on

Consequently

I

is

more

nothing

describe Mann-

the affirmative side of the debate over that concept.

But despite his

wholeness

own conceptual commitment

of a conceptual

to a

view that society

framework, Mannheim wants

to

argue that

is

the

it is

nevertheless possible for a person to achieve some intellectual and social

autonomy.

This

within himself.

how he internalizes

is of

the debate over

comprehensiveness

Like Lindblom he wants to argue against the very conception

which provides his terms

of society

society

is

something fragmented

of reference.

into

Lindblom's conception of

competing interest groups and yet he

expects this society to allow for the development of social harmony.
conception of society

is of

Mannheim'

a conceptual integration which he yet expects to

allow for something at least partly unintegrated.

My

examination of Mannheim's thought will be relatively brief.

of first presenting an extended exposition, as

Summary"

of

Lindblom's position,

I

a few

comments on

the totality of

in the "Illustrative

move almost immediately

shall

dialectical concept examination as such.

was done

However,

I

Instead

to the

do need to make,

first,

Mannheim's work.

Karl Mannheim was a highly prolific but rather unsystematic writer.

Whereas

it

is initially

because so much

of

it

plausible to speak of summarizing Lindblom's work,

seems

repetitive,

it

would not even be

initially plausible
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to say so of

Mannheim's.

passed through a series
his

move

to England.

my summary
sity" of

Mannheim's thought
of phases, the

1
If

I

of Lindblom's

Mannheim's

were

work

position.

generally considered to have

most dramatic

would have

in

Mannheim.

opposing points

Nevertheless,

a thinker

to himself, then

repetitious as they

ment.

If

my

purpose

is

in

in

attempting to

an attempt to show the

on both sides of an issue, and makes

works which appear

seem provided

which occurred with

to be titled the "apparent diver-

summarize Lindblom could equally well be achieved
differences

of

attempt for him something comparable to

to

it

is

the

that this inner debate

Conversely, works which appear different will

"same"

will not be as

shows some develop-

in fact

be less so than

they appear since they will contain points contrary to what are considered
the

main ones.

ment

Such differences as

still

persist

may

here, too, reflect the develop-

of the inner debate.

Of Mannheim's works

I

shall focus mainly on his doctoral dissertation

written in 1922 and entitled "Structural Analysis of Epistemology.

work

is

commonly interpreted

to be

"2

This

claiming that scientific knowledge has an

*Two useful and brief interpretations of these phases are the following:
George W. Remmling, "Philosophical Parameters of Karl Mannheim's Sociology
of Knowledge, " The So ciological Quarterly XII (Autumn, 1971), 531-47; and
Helmut R. Wagner, "The Scope of Mannheim's Thinking," review of Essays on
the Sociology of Knowledge and Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning by
Karl Mannheim, in Social Research, XX (April, 1953), 100-09.
,

,

Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology, " reprinted as
chap. I in Karl Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology ed.
by Paul Kecskemeti (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953).
2 Karl

,
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absolute base, that

not

it is

merely relative

to a historical period.

writings which were studied, and
will be briefly referred

and supposedly different phases

in his thought.

to,

represent later

Ideology and Utop ia (1929) 3

the fullest expression of his
concept of the sociology of knowledge.

argues,

in

apparent contrast to his dissertation, that
knowledge

of the social situation of the knower.

Other

But he also maintains that

is

is

Here he
a function

some

situ-

ational^ determined views are less distortions
than are others and, following

Marx
inate

in this respect,

he sees a need to identify false consciousness
and elim-

With the move

it.

England his emphasis shifted more definitely from

to

questions of cpistemology and methods of inquiry
toward practical aspects of
social change.

The

first

construction (1935). 4
lieving that

it

major

was Man and Society

in

an Age of Re-

Disturbed by the rise of totalitarian regimes and be-

was a response

of private industry

effort

to

imbalance between the increasing rationality

and the lack of rationality

in politics,

he provided one of

the first and strongest arguments for public planning in
liberal political sys-

tems.
In

1950 came the posthumous publication of Freedom, Power and Demo-

°Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology
and Edward Shills, Harvest Books (New
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1936). [Hereinafter referred to as
Ideology and Utopia ]
of Knowledge, trans, by Louis Wirth

.

4 Karl
in

Modern

World,

Mannheim, Man and Society

in an Age of Reconstruction: St udies
Harvest Books (New York: Harcourt, Brace IT"
[Hereinafter referred to as Man a nd Society in an Age of

Social Structure

Inc.

,

1940).

Reconstruction.

]

,
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cratic Planning 5 in which

Mannheim developed themes similar

to those of the

1935 work and in which he also suggested the importance
of religion as a means
to achieving the

of

Our Time

new

(1943),

liberal but planned society.
6

An

earlier work, Diagnosis

further developed the importance of religion to the

planned society and suggested that there should be planning for
religion

These are the principal Mannheim works which

have examined

itself.

in

proc-

ess of writing this chapter, and the chapter focuses, as was said,
on the

first.

The reader may well be perplexed
plicitly on planning,

I

make so

The reason

use of the works ex-

little

and especially since Mannheim

portant writer on that topic.
Firstly,

that

I

is

recognized as an im-

for this neglect is threefold.

Mannheim's planning writings are,

to a large extent, arguing

the need for planning in liberal regimes, but that is not

the need.

I

want

to

know how

Secondly, when

to

meet

Mannheim does

my

concern.

assume

I

7
it.

talk about

how

to plan in a liberal polity

he suggests that the success of the process depends heavily on the existence
of a "democratic personality" --one which is cooperative and open to change.

5 Karl

Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Plann ing, ed. by Hans
Gerth and Ernest K. Bramstedt (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1950).
,

^Karl Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociolo gist (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.
1943).
,

^Dahl takes note of Mannheim's preference not to elaborate answers to
Robert Dahl, review of Freedom, Power, and Demo cratic Planning by Karl Mannheim, in American Sociological Review XV
(December, 1950), 807-10.
these "how to" questions.

,

,

8 See

Mannheim, Man and Society

in

an Age of Reconstruction

,,

pp.

1

99-236;
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But

it

is

another of

produce limits

my

assumptions that tensions, inevitable

to cooperation

and to openness.

Cooperation

to thinking

limited be-

is

cause the inner tensions are partly projected onto the social
world as

Openness

is

conflict.

limited because one side of man's nature seeks security and
long

range commitments.

Certainly Mannheim's image of the democratic person-

ality is a reasonable one.

of truth logic.

Rut

at least: plausible.

the current

man,

It

my own image
And

thus

image connected with what

is the

it

call a degree

I

of an inevitably self -alienated personality is

too

seems

human prospect suggests

that

wortli pursuing

we consider

when

the gravity of

all plausible explanations

of that prospect.

My

third reason for the limited treatment of Mannheim's later works

simply one of time and methodology.

My method

requires that

is

start with the

I

earliest statement of a certain train of thought, and because of the length even
of this first step the introduction of later ones

was

Time con-

not possible.

siderations also prevented the development of the kind of involved

which was prepared for Lindblom and

that is the only kind of

summary

summary con-

sidered appropriate for a method which emphasizes the presence of inconsistencies.

Having once demonstrated

possibility of concise

The

summary

I

felt

it

my

previously.

1

in the

im-

unnecessary to repeat the process here.

dialectical concept examination

same as encountered

reasons for believing

now

follows.

Its

organization

first try to describe the overall

and Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning,

pp.

is the

process by

199-245.
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which Mannheim gives increasing reality

Then

I

examine,

in depth, the first step.

The Mannheim

Position as a Dialectical Concept Examination

Synopsis of the Process

.

Again we want to trace the steps by which an

outer debate between social groups
vidual thinker and then again
that person's

to the concept of conceptual freedom.

own

is

we want

internalized within the
to see

how

work

of

an indi-

the debate proceeds within

thought.

Context of the Mannheim Debates -- The outermost or primary debate

which Mannheim

is

involved might be thought less a debate between political

positions than one between epistemological positions.

Whether

it is

stood, however, depends on one's vision of society and politics, as

shortly see.

At least

primary debate with

until his

move

to England,

the positivists over the

already encountered the issue of the debate
able to explain how

we can

identify objects

in

we can

positivist has difficulty explaining

answer

how we

of knowing.

Chapter

II.

9

we

shall

But he finds

framework

We

in a

have

The contextualist

and construct theories.

verify the "truth" of what the

so under-

Mannheim was involved

methods

cause we have a prior conceptual framework.
us how

it

It is

difficult to

lets us see.

is

be-

show

The

get our concepts but he does have an

for the verification problem.

Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, see Paul
Kecskemeti, "Introduction," in Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of
Knowledge ed. by Paul Kecskemeti; (London: Rout ledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
^For an overview

1952).

in

of

,

229

Mannheim takes
problem.
product

the side of the contextualist and so he has a
verification

But he has another one too.

of,

Our conceptual framework

and also provides the perspective

ing to Mannheim.

10

of,

our social situation, accord-

Hence a person can only perform those acts and see those

problems which the conceptual framework permits.

problem

of conceptual

Now

freedom not only epistemologically but

ties to certain kinds of political

positivist

Thus Mannheim faces the

the contextualist position and the contextualist

single ideology

is

pervasive.

problem have

problem have

affini-

Conversely, the positivist position and the

affinities to liberalism with its

who applies

socially.

systems, notably to totalitarian ones where a

existence of discrete relatively autonomous groups.
especially one

is the

assumption of the

The contextualist, and

his views in the social realm, will therefore find

himself, in one important respect, on the side of the totalitarians and in opposition to the liberals.

This happens to Mannheim.

Consequently,

I

shall focus

henceforth on this political debate rather than on the epistomological one,
although the latter will continue to be mentioned occasionally.

Within the primary debate between liberals and totalitarians (given that

Mannheim

among
it is

is in

one sense an unwitting totalitarian) there

the totalitarians themselves.

This

is

is

a secondary debate

a debate over the extent to which

possible to have freedom from the conceptual framework or ideology while

lOpor a discussion

of the

practice, see the discussion of

Ideology and Utopia

,

pp.

framework affects
the theory-practice distinction, in Mannheim,

way

117-46.

in

which

a conceptual
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that

framework or ideology nevertheless

On one

persists.

side of this debate

are the idealogues who insist that a conceptual framework or ideology must be
absolute and complete or else

it

not effective.

is

ology these people would be called idealists.

His position

is

In

epistemological termin-

Mannheim

is

particularly evident in Ideology and Utopia

.

on the other side.

There he attrib-

utes to the intellectuals an ability to see beyond the situation in which they
first find

themselves.

The combination

grounds, overlayed by their

common

of their diverse class

and status back-

educational background, brings them in

contact with the opposing perspectives.

Some

of these individuals will use

their heightened awareness to attempt a synthesis of the perspectives.

since Mannheim, like

Marx and Hegel, supposes

And

a direction to historical

change, he supposes that these syntheses will have resemblances to each other.

They

will constitute an evolving conceptual framework.

Mannheim's position seems

logically tenuous, however.

the intellectuals do not themselves

form a class,

1

He

insists that

that the perspective

which

the forward looking

among them are capable

among

a synthesis, and that the intellectual syntheses of current

others but

is

of elaborating is not just one

perspectives are not as diverse as those perspectives themselves.

13

But

why

should one accept any of these claims? They seem incompatible with Mann-

11 Ibid.

,

pp.

12 Ibid.

,

p.

13ibid.

,

pp.

154-61.

155.

160-61.
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heim's insistence that there

and

such a thing as a "total" conception of ideology

is

that this conception is only adequate or "general"

when

a thinker has the

courage to critically examine his own ideology as well as that of others. 14

Mannheim

cites

Marxism as

become general because
supposing that

its

it

is

example

is

of

an ideology which has not

Marxism

is

wrong

free of that partiality which

it

attributes to

not self critical.

own viewpoint

all other viewpoints, then

the

But

if

why should Mannheim be any

less

wrong

in

in

supposing

such ability among the intellectuals? Many Marxists are themselves intellectuals and precisely the sort

seems

to

me

that the ability

really explain

who attempt

a synthesis of previous views.

which Mannheim ascribes

how they can escape from

to

It

such people does not

their perspectives but

is

merely

another way of saying that they somehow can.
Relation of the Proximate Outer Debate to the Inner Debate -is

on logically shaky grounds the safest proof to give

is

When

one

an indirect proof.

One

attempts not to prove his own position but to prove the logical impossibility of
his opponent's.

luteness

is

In this

impossible.

two different forms.

case Mannheim needs to prove that ideological absoI

One

think he gives such a proof and that

is

given conceptual framework.

a proof that there

The other

is

is

to

measure

14ibid.

,

p.

relativity.

77.

takes at least

an absolute truth beyond any

a proof that no specific conceptual

framework need be called "relative" since there
which

it

is

no absolute standard by

At first glance these proofs

may seem

to lead to
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opposite conclusions but their impact on the status
of conceptual frameworks

seems basically

same.

the

framework be called
249-51.
Suffice

is the

it

it

to

In neither

The

absolute.

proof

I

case can any one ideology or conceptual
proof

first

is

discussed later, at pages

there describe as being based on self-reference.

say here that this first proof apparently shares the same fatal

defect as the second.

The second proof appears
sketched.

more

In

detail

it

in Ideology

goes like

and Utopia and has already been

this.

If

we assume

that

knowledge

is

situationally determined, this assumption might be called a relativist position.
But to call

it

so reveals that our belief

ough going, but

is

inconsistent, since

belief in absolute static knowledge.

standpoint from which

It

in

it

perspectival knowledge

combines

assumes

we can discern what

we must instead speak, he

says,

^

it is

But the proof is so cogent probably just be-

also so dangerous to Mannheim's own views.

tivism in one sense he embraces
proof,

that there is an absolute

grant the cogency of Mannheim's proof that conceptual frameworks

cannot be accused of relativism.

cause

approach with the older

In a

of "relational" rather than relative knowledge.

I

not thor-

relative and what is not.

is

consistent epistemology of Mannheim's sort

that

is

we now have no standard

the historical process itself.

15lbid.

,

pp.

78-79.

it

more completely

By rejecting rela-

in another.

Given his

for identifying distortion of reality other than

Only the dynamic of

this

process can provide
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such identification.
possible

way

dynamic relationism which

It is

out of a world-situation in which

plicity of conflicting viewpoints.

"
.

16

.

1,17

life,

a "conceptual elasticity.

Given the self-subverting nature

.

offers the only

we are presented with

the possibility of an "open system" 18 at least for

who maintain

.

who recognize

name

than just another

however, as

I

thought

it

systematic direct proof

of his indirect proof,

Mannheim needs
freedom which

for the historical process itself.

Mannheim's

social

"

I

possible to say for Lindblom, that there
in

that there is

some epochs and some

to attempt a direct proof- -a proof that there is a conceptual

more

a multi-

Those can transcend the current

perspectives who acknowledge the "flux of

positions,

".

is

cannot say,
is

any single

His concept of dynamic

thought.

relationism perhaps comes as close to such a proof as does anything else but
it is

There arc other individual items

not developed.

heim's different works.

I

them

will look at a few of

of direct proof in

in

Mann-

examining his disserta-

tion.

The Impetus

for

Theme Development

--

If

ism does somehow constitute a direct proof for
a socio-conceptual structure

curious proof.

On

the one

16lbid.

,

p.

98.

17 Ibid.

,

p.

87.

18 lbid.

,

p.

99.

is

hand

a

it

way

we say

that

dynamic relation-

the claim that participation in

to conceptual

sometimes looks

freedom then we have a
like

a proof by definition.
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To

think relationally

means

to be able to

have

".

.

.

assimilated all the crucial

motivations and viewpoints, whose internal contradictions account for our

present social-political tension.

.

.

If

the investigator, instead of at once

taking a definite position, will incorporate into his vision each contradictory

and conflicting current,

his thought will be flexible and dialectical, rather than

rigid and dogmatic.

On
tation

the other hand even such proofs are likely to be offered with hesi-

and to suggest that the problem

is

not solved.

This unavoidable implicit ideology which is at the basis of our actions.
marks the horizon within which lies our world of reality and.
cannot be
disposed of by simply labelling it ideology. At this point we see a glimmer
of a 'solution' to our problem even though nowhere else in this book do we
attempt to offer one. The exposure of ideological and Utopian elements in
thought is effective in destroying only those ideas with which we ourselves
are not too intimately identified. Thus it may be asked whether under
certain circumstances, while we are destroying the validity of certain
ideas by means of the ideological analysis, we are not, at the same time,
erecting a new construction- -whether in the very way we call old beliefs
into question is not unconsciously implied the new decision.
.

.

.

From passages
for

such as these we are

Mannheim's claim--so far as he

an attempt to affirm identity

left to

knowledge and conceptual freedom he seems

9

German

,

p.

satisfied with

to lean

toward the former,

period, the result of identifying the two would be to

Ibid.

°Ibid.

He cannot remain

sometimes

Since between the poles of situationally determined

that claim, however.

least in his

.

conclude that the argument

tries to give one--is at least

of contraries.

.

88.

at

make

.
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conceptual freedom a meaningless concept.

This

is

what happens

tarian thought where conformity to the prevailing ideology

To avoid

freedom.

this result

Mannheim must

in totali-

simply labelled

is

try to increasingly differentiate

the two concepts of freedom and situational determination
from each other.
Still,

the efforts can never be decisive as they will be constrained
by the con-

stant need to reassert the identity of the two concepts.

For

if

real meaning to conceptual freedom and yet does not identify
vailing conceptual

is

framework then he

is

Mannheim gives

it

with the pre-

saying, with the positivists, that there

a neutral ground of something, such as sense experience, which gives us

He

knowledge.

of a conceptual

is

saying that we can know at least some things without the aid

framework.

The Stages

of

Theme Development

--

It

possible to identify several

is

stages in the theme that a socio-conceptual structure

freedom.

I

is is

a

way

to conceptual

They represent attempts

shall identify just three sucli stages.

to

give increasing meaning to the concept of conceptual freedom.

The

first stage, or level of

argument,

is

represented by Mannheim's

doctoral dissertation- -"Structural Analysis of Epistemology.

theme does seem

to begin as

an identity statement.

"

Mannheim argues

notion of a truth independent of any given conceptual framework

"systematization.

"

And one meaning

of systematization

a system --a closed conceptual framework.

work

is

In this

seems

work

the

that the

is intrinsic to

to

be that

it

is

Hence a closed conceptual frame-

said to be identical to a truth independent of that framework.

existence of an independent truth means there

is

Now

a neutral ground to which

the

-
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knowers can refer and hence
framework.

So

in

This

means

that they can be free of their conceptual

suggesting that a conceptual framework

independent truth Mannheim

freedom.

it

is

initial position

suggesting that

merely a

Mannheim

identical to an

is identical to

would make the notion

wholly undetermined concept, however.
totalitarians,

it

is

conceptual

of independent truth a

The concept would become, as for the

label.

thus goes on to say that there can be a "typology" of system

atization— there can be certain timeless elements which are true
If

Mannheim

is

Individual knowledge would

not be captive of a changeable conceptual framework.
the probable nature of these timeless elements

In

first level of

is

argument Mannheim
O

I

is

But he concludes that

their openness to conceptual

other words the determinateness of the elements present

conceptual framework whatever

freedom

any one.

correct, these timeless elements would provide an epistemolog-

ical base of reference --a sort of neutral ground.

change.

of

in potential

their indeterminacy!

is

in

Consequently

able to show only that there

is

any
in his

conceptual

1

.

consider Mannheim's position in Ideology and Utopia to be a second

level of argument.

who are

Here he asserts, as we know,

in a position to

that there exist intellectuals

see beyond their own conceptual spectacles though

doing so these people do not reach any absolute position; they participate

2lThis writer's elaboration

veloped shortly.

of this first level of

in

in

argument will be de-
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the "flux of

" 22

life.

The emphasis

in Ideology

and Utopia

is

more on knowledge than

however, especially when compared with works which

problem for the forward looking

follow.

action,

The central

of the intellectuals is to identify those con-

ceptual frameworks which are distortions of present social reality and which

serve the dominant classes and the status quo.
calls "ideologies" in a

more

These are what Mannheim

restricted sense of that term.

In identifying

these distortions the intellectuals, in concert with subordinate classes, will

help reveal the conceptual framework or "utopia" which

is

most adequate

the present stage of thinking, and hence to the present social needs.
is a distortion,

though not

case because

in this

it is

to

This too

undesirable but because

it

is not yet realized.

In Ideology

in potential, but

dom

is

and Utopia there
it is

freedom

to

is

now freedom

know more than

in reality,

to act.

and not merely

This more real free-

not a freedom in opposition to conceptual structure, however;

still integral to

23
it.

it

is

This continued melding of conceptual structure and

freedom thus suggests a more expanded contradiction than before.

A

third level of argument

may

possibly be identified in

22 Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia
2 ^This is

,

pp.

because the Utopia to be born

Man and

Society

194-95, 198-99.

is

apparently fated to be so.

age allows to arise (in differently located social groups)
those ideas and values in which are contained in condensed form the unrealized and the unfulfilled tendencies which represent the needs of each

"... every

age" [Mannheim, Ideology and Utop ia,

p.

109].
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in

an Age of Reconstruction

But here the

.

emphasis

is

on methods of broad

scale social control rather than on the visions which guide
this

emphasis

problem

I

am

not certain that

of conceptual

Mannheim

One suggestion

of conceptually

of atomistic

freedom

that he is is his description of the

planning approach as a stage of thought. 24

terms

of

involved any longer with a

freedom (rather than with the kind

recognized by positivists).

still thinks in

is

And because

it.

The description indicates

determined thought and action.

that he

Evidence

to the contrary, however, is present in his notion of middle principles ("prin-

cipia media").

These are particular groups

certain historical setting. 25
of social advancement

In the late capitalist

For example, there

may obscure

is the

general law that hopes

for individuals their real social position.

do, in fact,

remain

hopes of advancement are completely destroyed.

anti -proletarian

Hence

this histor-

ical period does concretely express a general law in a certain setting.

postulate general factors which persist through historical periods

heim

to retreat significantly

24 Mannheim,

Man and

from his sociology

of knowledge,

is

27

for

To
Mann-

however.

Society in an Age of Reconst ruction, pp.

147-55.

His point here seems a pragmatic one. Thought is an instrument for dealing
with the human situation, and at a point in time one sort of thought may be
more adequate than another. Thought is not apart from, but is intimately

bound

to,

action, p.

2(^

period the classes typical of earlier economic forms,

such as the class of small shopkeepers
until their

of general factors operating in a

149.

25 Ibid.

,

p.

178.

26 Ibid.

,

p.

182.

27 Ibid.

,

pp.

181-82.
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I

suspect, on balance, that

Mannheim

is still

inclined to try to identify

the contrary concepts of conceptual
structure and conceptual freedom.

Though

principia media are reducible to general
principles they are to be dealt with in
their concrete setting and within that setting
they do prepare us to perceive

certain things and not others. 28

They are conceptual frameworks

to that

extent.

Furthermore, the discovery

of principia media, by reduction of con-

crete phenomena to their abstract components,
that these abstract

components are present.

media, we must observe them

in

is difficult,

despite the fact

To understand new

process of being born.

principia

This involves an

experimental approach which synthesizes a willingness to intervene

in the

interplay of fundamental social forces with the realization that one can only act

as a strategist to reinforce possibilities but not to create them. 29
to be through such a process of experimentation and openness that

thinks

it

It

seems

Mannheim

possible to reconcile social determinism with large scale planned

change of society.

In

Men and

Society there

is

an apparent attempt to make

conceptual freedom real not only as the freedom in knowing but as freedom

in

acting.

By the time Mannheim writes Diagnosis of Our Time he seems to have
clearly ended, though, the train of thought which began with his doctoral

28 Ibid.

,

p.

179.

29ibid.

,

p.

190.
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dissertation.

Now he emphasizes

not the situational determination of thought

but the almost reverse problem of planning for religious
experience, such

experience being understood as a device for social integration. 30
It

my

is not,

however, the ending

discussion essay

crucial beginning.

is

primarily concerned.

The discussion

First Level of Argument
tion as a first level of

of his thought.

developing

my

A

of this great train of thought with

.

argument

1

its all-

follows.

have identified Mannheim's doctoral disserta-

in

what seems

--

to be a dialectical

is,

development

once more, the first step

The "Structural Analysis
Although

its

the key concepts in terms of which this
shall attempt a

It

now

with

in

position.

complex and subtle work.

lences.

am concerned

of that beginning

review of the dissertation

The Dissertation

I

I

which

summary,

but the

purpose
is

Epistemology" 31

is

some

explicitly stated,

a

of

done appear to be ambivalent ones.

summary

will not, in a sense, be a single

Mannheim begins with

is

of

will itself reveal these

ambiva-

summary.

the idea of a conceptual "systematization. "

He

claims to reject, at least for the cultural sciences, the abstracting analytical
posture which holds that general principles and concepts

(in

his term,

"com-

plex structures") can be understood by breaking them down into simpler

^^Mannheim, Diagnosis

of

Our Time: Wartime Essays

com-

of a Sociologist

,

see especially pp. 122-25, 1.30-31.
31 "Structural Analysis of Epistemology,

"

reprinted as chap.

heim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology

.

I

in

Mann-
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ponents.

Explanation

simpler forms
to this

in

is,

terms

more complex

for him, the contrary process of understanding-

of the

more complex.

structure. 32

There are three basic types
philosophical.

It is

of

And one part

of systematization,

among winch

is the

of philosophical systematization is cpistemology.

course the latter with which Mannheim

Now

the reader needs no

concerned.

is

more background

acquire, already, a sense of unease.
title of

And "systematization" refers

Mannheim's work suggests

than what

For against

at least a

that

I

have just given to

background the very

near contradiction.

analyze the structure of epistemological systematization.

In

He claims

to

other words, he

identifies epistemology as a conceptual structure which is philosophically

prior to

its

components but

at the

same time he proposes

to isolate

some com-

ponents which are particularly fundamental to that structure.
Disquieting as

it

may

be, this near contradiction in the dissertation title

and purpose should not come as
inherent in the project

a surprise.

Mannheim

The danger

sets himself.

I

of contradiction

seems

have suggested that Mann-

heim's thought was always directed toward a social change problem—the prob-

lem how someone enclosed
exert

in an

some independence from

in his earliest

evolving socio -conceptual structure could yet

that structure.

It

is just

Mannheim's purpose

published work to assert confidently that this can be done.

But

he does so at a more abstract level and more indirectly than will be the case

32jbid.

,

pp.

16-17.
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later.

Here

the claim is for existence of truth which is
at once independent of

33

systematization and yet intrinsic to

it.

The accessibility

of

such independent

truth does imply, however, the possibility of
that conceptual freedom which

Mannheim

later argues for directly.

Put another way, the argument for an independent truth
connected with

systematization

Mannheim

is

with which he

primacy

is,

in

my

view, one expression of that inner debate which

having with himself.
is

It

more immediately

is of

course related to that outer position

identified- -the position which asserts the

of conceptual structure, vis -a -vis a

more

positivist approach,

what-

ever the problems such a position may raise for social change.
1.

In

its first

Three Sets

of Distinctions Relative to Systematization

proceeding with his dissertation argument Mannheim devotes most
section to several sets of distinctions.

For purposes

the importance of conceptual structure, these distinctions

usefully separated.

of

emphasizing

may perhaps

But, at least in the context of his inner debate,

that the distinctions tend to reduce to each other.

And

I

of

I

be

suggest

also suggest that they

represent just in themselves a succession of promised solutions to the social

change problem --even though, ostensibly, they are merely preliminaries

to

such solutions.

One major

distinction is between adequate theoretical systematization

33ft will be clear that truth is

somehow independent

of the systematization.

That this independent truth is also intrinsic to the sysSee text pp. 249-53.
tematization, it is this writer's particular purpose to show.
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and minimal theoretical systematization. 34
concept very early

ment

in his

essay

at the

for a contextualist epistemology.

Mannheim introduces

time he

is

making

the latter

his strongest

argu-

That argument asserts that even a

reality consisting of nothing but isolated individuals, which are identifiable

only by proper names, cannot be identified without a systematizing presupposition.

One must assume,

of

such a reality, that the names themselves

constitute a kind of conceptual framework.

In the

absence

of these

names

there could be nothing stable to identify- -and hence there could be nothing but

an indefinite variety.

3S

This minimal theoretical systematization, which produces cognition
discrete givens, seems virtually opposite, however, to Mannheim's

of

initial

concept of systematization according to which

it

constitutes the epistemological

priority of the complex over the simple.

if

one

from

the complex, one

tematization

is

must know

For

the complex.

not knowable as such.

If

But

is to

explain the simple

minimal theoretical sys-

systematization generates the con-

sciousness of external givens, such systematization cannot be brought to consciousness by those external givens.
in a circle.

that

it

could would be to argue

Of course positivist theory could be brought

from those givens but
I

To argue

that is not the sort of theory

to

consciousness

Mannheim wants

to expound.

have already noted, however, that Mannheim identifies another sort of

34Mannheim, "Structural Analysis
35 lbid.

,

p.

19.

of Epistemology, " pp.

19-20.
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theoretical systematization.
not

merely a collection

structure.
to

know

of

This latter

is

a pattern of interrelated concepts,

proper names. 36

It

is

more

But of this pattern, as of the first, one

the pattern

when

may ask how

it

is

possible

that pattern is a prior condition for the existence
of

those very concepts by which

Mannheim may

truly a conceptual

it

would be known.

be reaching for an answer to these problems of theoret-

ical systematization in his implied position that the difference between

and adequate theoretical systematization
is tacitly

suggesting that because the

is

only one of degree. 37

minimal

Perhaps he

minimum systematization could generate

solid givens which lead to knowable positivist laws, and because the adequate

systematization

is truly

a conceptual structure, and then because minimal

systematization and adequate systematization only differ

in

degree, therefore

one can to some extent articulate his or her conceptual structure.
so, then the social change

A

this

were

at least partially solved.

related set of distinctions, and a second promise of solution, are

36 Ibid.
37

problem would be

If

Ibid.

,

p.

20.

Mannheim

is not

wholly consistent on this point.

He

the principle which underlies minimal theoretical systematization

states that

is in

sharp

contrast to that which underlies the adequate form. But he persists in using the
degree term "minimum" as he says so. He also makes the following observation.

"That the concepts with which we actually have to do in the sphere of
theoretical thought are not 'minimal concepts' in this sense, i.e. that they
"
are more than such 'proper names, hardly needs detailed proof.
"
"
Here, again, he speaks of interrelated concepts as being more than
proper names when it might be more logically consistent to say that they are
'

wholly other than proper names.
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constituted,

I

think,

by Mannheim's distinctions among aesthetic,

and philosophical systematization.

scientific

Aesthetic systematization refers to the

existence of numerous conceptual structures each of which
exists on

Acceptance

of one aesthetic

Aesthetic systematization

progressive movement.

period does not mean rejection of another. 38

is

neither an open process nor a closed step in

entific systematization is an

39

open process

in

it

replaces.

Sci-

which conceptual structures do

Philosophical systematization represents a

with science, the solutions to problems change, but,

same problems endure.

in

midway process.

As

contrast to science, the

Thus, earlier solutions are not wholly rejected. 40

This second set of distinctions has close ties to the
cept of adequate theoretical systematization

is often

first in that the

,

pp.

,

p.

con-

treated as synonymous

with scientific systematization or with philosophical systematization. 41

38 Ibki.

some

By contrast, in scientific systematization a new truth

will force rejection either of itself or of the old truth which

change.

own.

its

More

20-21.

39 Ibid.

40

Ibid.

4 *Ibid.

21.

For examples see

pp.

20-21, 34.

"This fundamental dissimilarity
'systematizations'

(of the

t

in the guiding principles of these

heoretical as against the artistic sphere)

two
is

also

responsible for the difference in the structure of their respective histories.
of science can only be adequately represented as a
unilinear series of approximations towards the one and only possible form of
whereas the history of art shows the most varied works of art
truth.

The historical pattern
.

.

existing side by side without contradiction" [pp. 20-21].

[This writer's
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important, the impact of the concept of philosophical
systematization has
affinities with the

combined impact

theoretical systematization.

vanced only

to be then

of the concepts of adequate

In both

cases a major distinction

weakened and made a matter

and minimum
is first

of degree.

ad-

For philosoph-

ical systematization the result occurs in the following way.
In philosophical systematization solutions

remain.

But

Mannheim would probably agree

may change

while problems

(and certainly would do so in

later works), both that statement of a problem strongly limits the range of

possible solutions and conversely that problems themselves

appearance. 42

emphases.

Now

,

limit solutions

35, 36.

pp.

There

of a problem.

is a

striking what stock
.

.

"

[p.

all, the

character of

.

where Mannheim says

"It is quite

is

change

]

.

He

at least

the concept of philosophical systematization suggests, at

"Philosophy has in common with science, first of
"
being a theoretical pursuit.
[p. 34J.
42ibid.

may

clear suggestion that problems

may

that:

we always

take in the correct formulation

35].

talking about the need to seek various possible solutions given a correct

formulation of the epistemological problem.
And, despite his statements that philosophy and epistemology deal with
enduring problems, it seems that there might well be alteration in such problems as they appear to us at different points in time. Though the problem s per
se may endure, the questions may perhaps change. Mannheim refuses to go
far into this issue, however.

"one of the most fascinating logical inquiries would be the examination of
the logical structure of problems, and of the difference between problems

and questions" [p. 35].
"Because there is no denying that there can be but a single truth, that
accordingly for any question in any field only one solution can be correct and
that the history of thought is only the road, through error and confusion, to
truth,

from

this indisputable postulate

it

does not follow that the shape of
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first glance, the contradiction that

we are constrained by

the conceptual

structures implicit in changing solutions, and yet that
we have a bench
of truth in persisting problems.

and relativity

But since the absoluteness of the

of the solutions apparently only differ

mark

problems

from each other

degree,

in

therefore we can at least partly break out of prevailing
conceptualizations and

there

no contradiction.

is

A

third and possibly the

most fundamental

part of Mannheim's dissertation
architectonic --in particular
to conceptual structure.

is that

among

(in

"

It

is

Both of these first two refer

an "entire set of serially con-

is a "constitutive

form" which

Kantian terms) "transcendental logical subject.

heim describes system as
"empirical subject.

"

44

"is really doing no

Apparently there

more than push

must always be

"

43

is

Mann-

a "reflected methodological form" created by the

subjects, however, since the individual

the path

systematization, system, and

the first two.

Systematization

nected mutually defining elements.

created by the

among

set of distinctions in the first

the

is

a continuity between these two

who orders

his thought into a

system

to its logical conclusion a tendency already

same"

[pp.

35-36].

"ultimately the structure of a problem can only be understood from the

structure of the entire systematization

— and

it

may

well be that the present

discussion will incidentally provide a few clues to this topic as well"
[p.

35].

Also see

[This writer's emphasis.

p.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

37.

,

p.

24.

]
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prescribed

in the

very systematization.

" 45

Besides a difference in the subject, these last
two concepts differ in that

systematization

is

always open-a

concepts --while a system

Here again, we see

An

is

still to

be completed chain of interdependent

always closed.

that a distinction is

made

only to be then bridged.

individual as a logical subject can identify facts of
experience because he

finds himself already operating within a systematization.

structure

is

prior to thought.

The conceptual

But this individual can also push tendencies in

this systematization to their logical conclusion, thus creating
a system.

And

this suggests that the conceptual structure is an object of thought.

I

suggest now that the distinction between, and connection between, sys-

tematization and system does not add more helpful information, relative to the
social change problem, than what
distinctions.

Instead

it

we have already acquired through

the prior

parallels the information contained in the distinction

between minimum and adequate theoretical systematization or the distinction

among

aesthetic, scientific, and philosophical systematization.

My

reasons

for this assertion are fourfold.
Firstly,

it

Mannheim's use

seems

that there cannot be aesthetic systematization despite

of that phrase.

process nor a series

of

The aesthetic sphere

closed steps in such a process.

tinuity does not hold, he says for aesthetics.

4 5lbid.

,

p.

25.

is

"In

neither an open

The principle

of con-

primary experience a work

249
of art is taken to be an isolated monad. " 46

Secondly, there cannot be a system so far as true
science
Scientific activity

may well produce systems

is

concerned.

but their persistence, as such,

is

antithetical to science.

Thirdly,

it is

in philosophical

of systematization are synthesized.

mix

of conceptual closure (in

it

is just

in the connection of

now on
that

And

solutions)

such a mix of closure and openness which

is

also found

minimal and adequate theoretical systematization.

to

mean

48
I

And

since systematization always

theoretical systematization for Mannheim, despite his contrary

shall initially use that phrase in referring to systematization, and

shall always intend

it.

Independent Truth Inherent in Theoretical Systematization

2.

At any given time there

is

not just one theoretical systematization but

several, these being associated with the various sciences.

46 Ibid.
47

,

p.

See text

49

Some

of these

20.

p.

245.

4 ^A contrary claim is that there exists aesthetic systematization.
text p.

From

therefore shall treat the other two sets of distinctions as reducible to

I

claims,

(in

similar

between system and systematization.

between system and systematization.

seems

in that synthesis one finds a

problems) and conceptual openness

to that found in the relationship

Finally,

systematization that the other two forms

245.

49 Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology,

" pp.

21-22.

See
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systematizations are "primary" in that they can comprise all elements.

Whatever

the status of any systematization, however, the fact that

one implies that

has a final form according to Mannheim.

it

introduces the critical notion of an independent truth.

By saying

it is

he

this,

Mannheim supports

his

claim of an independent truth with two different lines of defense.

One

line of defense is

based on self -reference and appears

Concepts have meaning because they are members

such a systematization, are either true or
is

such a statement.

meaningless (because
meaningful
bility of

that of others, then

if

Now

,

p.

The statement

that there is

assertion of this statement

is

must

not simply

at least

be

since the validity of one proposition implies

there must be the possibility of independent truth for one

say that there must be a possible truth, a possible final form,

to the systematization as a whole.

5Q Ibid.

If

false.

of the contradiction involved) then there

an independent truth.

may

sequence of inter-

and there cannot be the latter without the contrasting possi-

falsity,

statement we

this.

Statements made within the context of such a chain sequence,

related concepts.

no truth per se

of a chain

go like

to

^

27.

"Any single statement --even

the proposition that there is no truth, no

validity in se--can by virtue of the structure of theoretical systematization
only be either true or false. It follows that the content of this proposition

contradicts those presuppositions that are inescapably implied by its form
meaning if its
after all, this, like any other statement, only has theoretical
that
expressed—
content can be said to be either true or false. If the content
thought valid
there is no truth valid in se- -is true, then this at least must be
it still must
then
or it would be meaningless to assert it; if it, too, is false,
;

J
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An argument by
could as well be used

self reference is

to attack

that our concepts have

no independent validity
is

as to argue for his views.

meaning by their location

presumably contained within

It

It

The proposition

systematization

seems therefore

is itself

to

have

at all.

his first line of defense.

as such. 51

in a

a systematization and

not surprising, then, that

ity of truth

dangerous for Mannheim, however.

Mannheim concedes

But he concedes only that

And

that

was not really

it

the insufficiency of

does not prove the valid-

the point at issue anyway.

On

the question whether such final truth is implied in systematization
he remains

firm.

He bluntly asserts

postulate involved

sort of statement
first defense.

sphere that

it

the existence of a theoretical sphere as such. 52

in

is

not new.

"It is

must

that the notion of a truth valid in itself is an inevitable

Similar ones appeared

in

This

connection with the

thus implied in the very structure of the theoretical

itself

be assumed as atemporally valid.

" 53
.

.

be recognized that falsity is meaningful only if we assume the possibility of
truth, or self-sustaining validity. And the validity of a single proposition
at the same time implies the entire context, from which alone.
the
sentence derives its full meaning. ... It is thus implied in the very structure of the theoretical sphere that it must itself be assumed as a temporally
"
valid, and this in the form of one or more continuous, chain -like sequences.
This writer's first interpretation of this passage is not the only one he makes.
See text pp. 252-53 for the second interpretation.
.

5I

Ibid.

,

p.

28.

52 Ibid.

53

Ibid., p. 27.

[This writer's emphasis.

.
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In his first line of defense

must be true or

fal se

Mannheim seems

and that since statements only exist

text, the context, also,

must lead

which assert the reality

of error--e. g.

open

to error.

.

to be saying that statements

." 54 --seem,

to final truths.

tome,

".

All those of his

it is

.

.

remarks

sense

may

tell us that the possibility of

imply the necessity of a final truth.

Perhaps

Perhaps

error does not necessarily

is

it

possible to knowingly re-

cede from error without, at the same time, knowingly approaching truth.
I

am

common

unconvinced by

And on

But

sense arguments for reasons given elsewhere.

logical grounds the two situations do

is

the absoluteness of the

true -false distinction and thus to belong in this first line of defense.

common

con-

a fact that actual thinking

assume

to tacitly

in a theoretical

seem

tightly connected.

I

^

con-

clude, then, that the first line of defense takes the form of a standard syllo-

One simply assumes

gism.

,

as a first premise, a clear division of truth and

One then infers

falsity regarding statements.

that the possibility of truth

be inherent in the theoretical content of these statements,
zation.

in that

In

other words,

if

truth

is

possible in a part then

whole without which the part would not

In his

second

line of defense

Mannheim

in their

it

must

systemati-

must be possible

exist.

is

asserting that

it is

just in that

theoretical statements are mutually defining that they must be true or false.

Since they exist

54ibid.

55

,

p.

in a context,

unless that context has a -temporal validity the

27.

See text, chap.

II,

pp.

106-07.
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statements can have no meaning.

Thus

be less an argument than a definition.
nature of a conceptual structure

this

second

According

to

line of

defense appears to

Mannheim

b_oth that it constitutes

it is

the very

one's experience and

form which can be knowingly approached 56 and

that the structure has a final

consequently leaves one free to move from one conceptual structure to another.
If

fetched

my
it is

interpretation of Mannheim's second line of defense

nevertheless similar to an interpretation which has elsewhere

been made of Mannheim's later works.
works, Paul Kecskemeti observed that

working out

of the categories of

a strange conclusion:

After reviewing a number of those
".

.

the survey of this process of the

of

knowledge leads us

to

the demonstration of the dependence of thought on social

The Existence

"

57

Typologies

of

Mannheim was an advocate
such a person

.

Mannheim's sociology

reality serves to open a road to freedom.

3.

seems far-

of rather fundamental social change.

to maintain that the conceptual structure is intrinsically

opportunity for freedom

is,

I

suggest, no

more surprising than

it

is

For
an

for a

also the writer's second interpretation of that key passage
which he quoted in footnote 50. Even that passage might as plausibly be understood to be part of the second line of defense as to be part of the first. The
assertion that any single statement must be true or false "by virtue of the
structure of theoretical systematization" seems readily interpretable as ident-

56This

is

ifying independent truth and conceptual structure.

On

text pp. 275-77

second line
argument.

,

this writer suggests that

of defense rather than his first,

Mannheim must adopt

his

given the purpose of his general

57 Kecskemeti, "Introduction," in Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of

Knowledge,

p.

27.
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liberal to suggest that the process of
bargaining, of negotiated social conflict,
is itself

social order.

In

any case, the virtual identification of conceptual

structure and conceptual freedom does not remain

heim's dissertation.

In his

concern

to

in the

forefront of

Mann-

analyze a systematization, that of

epistemology, he retreats to the more positivist view that
there are some
specific timeless elements involved.

We

can be confident that this

says, since all epistemologies are called by the

reason we can be confident that

it is

same name. 58

For the same

a single problem which they all address. 59

These timeless elements must be interdependent
epistemological systematization.

he

is so,

But

we

don't

know

interdependence occurs and so we must consider

in

if

they are parts of an

what specific way

this

all the logically possible

sys-

tematizations as equally possible ways of solving the one epistemological

problem. 60

Some ways, however, may

58 n However

much

be

more

historically advanced than

the various epistemologies

ical development, they all belong to the

same

may

differ in their histor-

continuity of one idea (which

reason why all are called 'epistemologies, 'theories of knowledge').
There must accordingly be some concepts at any rate, some perennial problems, some constellations which always recur and thereby make this continuity possible" [Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology," p. 31].
is the

'

59"The sole remaining assumption, then, would be that the successive
words forming the historical body of 'epistemology' are commensurable up
to a point and may be taken to be attempts to solve one and the same theortheories of

... As

mere chance that the individual
to
knowledge have a common name it ought to be possible.

etical problem.

long as

it

is

not

.

consider their divergencies as the ramifications of a
take at the start" [Ibid.

60Ibid.

,

p.

32.

,

pp.

32-33].

common

.

path they all
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are others.
Structural analysis

the exploration of these various solutions.

is

analysis of typologies of epistemology.

problem however. 61

from

The structure

It

of the

is

the

It is

not the exploration of the one

problem could only be understood

the structure of the entire systematization and that would
apparently

include the whole succession of solutions --something that

is

never completed

in finite time.

The epistemological solutions are a
identified through a pure logic.

period.

History, which

is

not

priori possibilities and

But not every solution is possible at a given

random

but a directed flow, will "materialize"
^

ft

different solutions at different times says Mannheim.

perplexing, however.

Docs

it

must be

mean

that

Mannheim

is

This statement

is

now making a retreat

back to the sort of conceptual relativism which a history bound systematization

would imply?

Is

he abandoning the concept of timeless elements

246

in a

systemat-

regards to Mannheim's approach to the
epistemological problem as distinct from his approach to its solutions.
See also text

Ibid.

62 Ibid.

,

p.

29.

p.

There

is

for

in

Mannheim

a pure logic which is not in-

fluenced by historical origins --a logic by which one can examine, apparently
with neutrality, the enduring concepts of epistemology. But this logic cannot
say which epistemology is more correct.
63".

.

.

it

is

perfectly possible to view cultural manifestations histori-

cally without plunging into historical relativism.

.

.

.

Historical factors

determine only the materialization of the mental content in question.
The process can still be conceived as a quest, as a necessary, roundabout
.

way

to the only correct solution.

flow towards

some

ultimate goal"

.

.

history

[Ibid.

,

p.

is

.

.

not just a flux, but a directed

39].
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ization?

".

.

.

is

He

I

doubt

it.

to

work

out the solution of the

first leaves the question open.

problem

And then he apparently concedes

validity. "

He emphatically

The task

of historicity

for philosophy

and timeless

to the critics of historicism.

denies that the ultimate categories by which we grasp things

could change 65 (though in the same footnote he acknowledges that the categories we now use and by which we think we grasp things could change).

This

concession ends the first part of his dissertation.

The Question

4.

of Ultimate Presuppositions

second part

In the

of his dissertation

and timeless features of epistemology.

Mannheim

There

is

identifies three distinctive

a problem (the question of the

ultimate presuppositions of knowledge), 66 a unique value (truth), 67 and a

fr4ibid.

~p~39.
,

6^"This latter conception would finally lead to the postulation of a 'dynamic' logic according to which not only the matter of history but also the
categories by which it is grasped are subject to change and evolution.
Yet, we believe that such a doctrine is bound to become entangled in difficulties.
owing to the relativism to which it necessarily leads. The indubitable fact that everything in history is subject to change must not be
carried over into the realm of meaning and validity; by doing so, we should
unwittingly controvert our own assertions" [Ibid.
p. 40, footnote lj.
.

.

.

.

.

,

66".

epistemology achieves the status of a theory entirely sui generis
only because it answers a primitive question in a peculiar way not met with
What is common to all theories of knowledge.
in any other science.
is that they transform the question about the nature of knowledge into a
" Ibid
p. 44].
question about the presuppositions of knowledge.
[
,

,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

67 "The value of being-known, the fact of being-true, is specific to the
epistemological approach, and has come into being together with it"
[Ibid.

,

p.

69].
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68
specific correlation (the subject-object
correlation).

But though timeless

the features are also indeterminate in
themselves, for epistemology cannot

provide

its

own

content. 69

The exact problem

the epistemological approach.

And what

of presuppositions varies with

the presuppositions are depends on

the standard of truth and the exact nature of the subject-object
correlation.

The content

of the

above features of epistemology comes from one of the

three primary systematizations- -those systematizations which can
comprise
all

They are psychology,

elements.

there

is

a "priority contest"

logic,

and ontology.

among them. 70 Where

it

can be said that

It

is

psychology which

provides the content to the timeless features of epistemology, Mannheim seems
to see an empiricist epistemology emphasizing the experiential given.

argument for the priority
perience.

of psychology is that all knowledge arises

The

from ex-

71

Where

the content

positions of knowing.

comes from

logic,

emphasis

is

placed on the presup-

By these, Mannheim apparently means reality consti-

tuting categories similar to those of the Kantian "transcendental apperception. "

The argument

for this second approach consists in the claim that everything

^"Uniquely
is

specific to the theory of knowledge, as

alone the correlation of subject and object.

69 Ibid.

,

pp.

7QIbid.

,

p.

49.

71 Ibid.

,

p.

50.

47-48.

.

.

"

we have come

Ibid
[

.

,

p.

66].

we

to see,
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are aware of appears

to,

us as known. 72

Ontological systematization produces
two forms as
for epistemology.
is

It

may

it

provides content

take a naive form which fails to
recognize that what

-being- -nevertheless only appears as known

being as consisting in raw givens.

)

Or

may

it

ontological" epistemology which does not
so

This last form of epistemology

not

is

being. 73

(This

form sees

take the form of an "ex-post

fail.

made wholly

clear.

But

it

seems

to

be a synthesis of the experiential given of
psychology with the universal real-

ity-constitutive concepts of logic.

Denying priority

to either alone,

it

em-

braces them both with the argument that both experience and
validity must
This ex-post ontological epistemology

is

be. 74

highly suggestive of that "sociology of

knowledge" which Mannheim will subsequently develop— that socio-conceptual
structure which at once forms our concepts and

According

to

is,

in a

sense, formed by them.

Mannheim, ex-post ontological epistemology

is

associated

with a special way of stating the epistemological problem --one which does not

^Mannheim's exact words seem

to be a paraphrase of Kant:
pleaded on the following counterclaim: granted that
everything the sciences can talk about is first encountered at the level of
experience, it still is by no means proved that all we can know about this
"

Priority for logic

is

original experience is also given in experiential immediacy" [Ibid.

73 Ibid.
/4

,

pp.

].

50-51.

"Priority for ontology

urged on the ground that everything
to be met with at all is an instance of 'being* in the most general sense.
From this point of view, both experience and logical validity also appear as
modes of being" [Ibid. p. 50J.
,

,

in turn,

is
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go directly to ultimate presuppositions as that approach
associated with logical
systematization appears to do.

Instead

it

explores which of

all

possible postu-

lates (psychological, logical or ontological) will finally
be revealed as an esscntial

assumption.

75 Ibid.

,

And

it

The argument

49-52.

pp.

reaches the conclusion that

is

it is

the ex-post onto-

cloudy bat seems to go something

like this:

There are three approaches

1.

presuppositions of knowledge,

p.

to the question

which seeks to know

49.

Which approach to the question is chosen will determine in advance the nature of the answer --that is, it will determine the underlying sys2.

tematization,

p.

3.

approach in the
can be asked!

49.
But,

it is

apparently the systematization that constitutes the

first place since the ultimate presuppositions

determine what

This third step in his reasoning

Mannheim's dis-

is

implicit in

cussion of the different priorities. There he sometimes treats the arguments
for one or another systematization as if they were arguments for an approach
even though previously he spoke of the approach as a way of choosing among
the systematizations. For an example, consider the phrase
"
Priority for psychology is assured according to the psychologistic theory
"
of knowledge.
[p. 50].
.

.

Sometimes

the third step

seems

explicit:

"This dispute [the priority contest] reveals most clearly the hopeless and
yet unremitting aspirations of all epistemology to do without presuppositions.
The problem of priority simply cannot arise within the various sciences
"
which may serve as fundamental disciplines.
[pp. 49-50].
4.
Now, it is piecisely one of these approaches --the ex-post ontological systematization or ex-post ontological epistemology- -which incorporates
the initial question as to which of several possible approaches is ultimately
.

.

correct.

"So we see there is nothing accidental about the type of epistemology that
starts with logic and ends up with an ontological postulate" [p. 52].
would cm"There can be no doubt but that this type of epistemology.
logical
structure
qua
analytic
of
just
this
science
ploy as its fundamental
doctrine of systematizations, and that it would recognize, as its ultimate
presupposition, the primary systematization laid bare by such an analysis"
.

[p.

52, footnote

1].

.
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logical epistemology itself which will be so
revealed! 76

The above proposition
impact.

is

And as an argument

not presented as an

it is

tightly circular

epistemology drawing from a sophisticated view
is led to

argument but

has that

and self-referential.

An

of ontological systematization

conclude that just this systematization provides the indispensable

postulates for epistemology.

epistemology

in

terms

And those

postulates call for an analysis of

primary systematizations, which

of various

what the current discussion, and indeed the entire second part
tion, has

it

been manifesting.

According

to this

given that view, one already knows what one

This apparent circularity
It is

in the

it

must

precisely

of the disserta-

at the postulated

primary systematizations be revealed as

of history will one of these

interesting.

view only

is

end

best, but,

be.

discussion of epistemological content

is

suggested that ex-post ontological systematization will win

the priority contest, and that this tells us that knowledge

ended constructive nature which would

Mannheim concludes

let us

reach

this discussion with a

is of just that

open

this conclusion.

somewhat related

point.

He

unmistakably the outcome
[the one that] begins by exploring which
indirect approach.
of the.
one of all the possible postulates will finally stand revealed as an indispensable assumption" [Ibid.
pp. 51-52].
Mannheim, himself, seems to acknowledge the circularity apparent here.
At the end of his footnote on page 52 (see 5Xt footnote 75) he remarks:
"Whether such an epistemology- -which would have its own logic as
basis --would in fact amount to a m eta-critique of all epistemology in gen-

7°"Ex-post ontological theory
.

.

.

of

knowledge

.

,

1

eral presents an exceedingly knotty problem.

"

is
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observes that the arguments for

made

at the

all three

same time, since he has

primary systematizations can be

just done so,

reveal the basic fact of the other two, though from

One must assume, however,

in

and concludes that each can
its

own "alien" perspective.77

view of what we have just heard, that

this

mix-

ing has a certain tendency toward one particular systematization.

The Subject -Object Correlation and Truth Value

5.

content of the subject-object correlation also circularly determined?

Is the

It

seems

so, but to

understand how one must distinguish the ways of mediating

between subject and object, on the one hand, from the correlation as such on
the other.

Mannheim.

The former

less fundamental to epistemology, according to

78

Mannheim claims
to mediate

is

that there are, at present, only three recognized

between subject and object.

These are

that the object world is spontaneously evolved

Kantian position

is in

independent of

~77"lbid.

78 ".

.

it.

p.

,

.

of

the copy theory, the theory

from the subject (possibly the

mind), and the theory of pre-ordained harmony between

knower and known (perhaps a Hegelian

The ways

ways

view).

79

crossing the subject -object gap are not, however, really

They are also ways

of identifying that

gap

in the first place.

52.

the various

ways

of

media ang are

a less specific

and clear-cut

criterion of epistemological thinking than the subject -object correlation is"
[

Ibid

.

,

p.

79 Ibid.

62].
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And they apparently

derive, in both their aspects, from the three
primary sys-

tematizations of psychology, logic, and ontology. 80

Hence the outcome

priority contest will simultaneously decide both what

is

ject-object gap and

how

to successfully bridge

essence of epistemological systematization
volved

in

formulating the problem—it

ing to this reasoning

I

presume

that

is to

if,

is to

the nature of the sub-

As Mannheim puts

it.

of the

it,

the

resolve the correlations in-

resolve a self

made

gap.

81

Accord-

for example, one accepts psychology as

ultimate systematization- -if one accepts the view that knowledge

is

a matter of

experiential givens--then the subject and object will "by definition" be of that
sort where only the copy theory could apply.
If

the content of the subject-object correlation

of its formulation and of
of the

its

is

mediation then we know this matter comes from one

primary systematizations.

And

the priority

among

appears to be established, for reasons already given,

^ ^Ibid

understood as the matter

in a

those systematizations

circular manner.

That the ways of mediating are also ways of identifying the gap

.

is

a point to be elaborated shortly.

This writer's claim that the ways of mediating derive from the primary
systematizations might be called an oversimplification. Mannheim recognizes
two other variables which influence these ways --the distance between subject
and object and whether one starts from the subjective or objective side. But he

immediately intimates that these other variables are reducible to the first. For
example, a given way of mediating already suggests whether one starts from
subject or object—that characteristic consequently becomes definitional.
81_Ibid.

,

p.

61,

82 The reasoning here

analogous to that which Mannheim employs later
in arguing that the standard of truth, also, is determined by the presuppositions.
See p. 67 of his work.
is
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Hence

this content is itself circularly determined,
though in

an indirect way.

But what of the subject-object correlation itself,
as distinct from the

ways

of bridging the subject-object gap?

Mannheim claims

that this correla-

tion is unique to epistemology and he displays a triadic
structure of knower,

known, and to-be-known which apparently
to this claim however, he has

subject since the subject
it.

83

And

way

the

object correlation

is

supposed

argued the point

always a vehicle

this point is

is itself

is

of

to constitute

it.

Prior

that science cannot find the

experience, never an object of

developed strongly suggests that the subject-

circularly determined.

In

what next follows,

I

shall

try to show how.

For the subject-object correlation, even more clearly than
of mediating

sciences.

for the

content comes, says Mannheim, from one of the primary

it,

But this condition creates a problem

reaches the subject.

In that

if it is

true that science never

case science can provide only an objectified sub-

ject appearing in the form, say, of consciousness, truth, or objectivity.

There

is

subject which

ways

a solution to this problem

is

a

complement

in the fact that

84

we can "construct"

to the objectified subjects.

a

But this solution

only raises the further problem that since all these reconstructions are based

on objectifications they would appear to be the same, regardless of the funda-

mental science, the primary systematization, involved.

83 Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology,
84lbid.

" p.

56.
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According

awareness
meanings
of logic,

that

of,

Mannheim,

to

the solution to this further

some primary sciences can

objectify

more

problem comes from
than can others.

The

say, psychology refer to something less objectifiable than those

and the constructed subject can therefore vary accordingly. 85

Let us consider now the implications of what has been said about constructing the subject.

It

is

held that the subject-object correlation

epistemology but that the substance
alien, systematization.

tematixation which

is

It

is

of its

is

unique to

uniqueness comes from another,

also held that there

is

more

than one alien sys-

a primary systematization and from which the correla-

tion in question might come.

The

latter claim

seems an essential

one.

If

there

were only one primary systematization from which content could come, we
could not meaningfully speak of the systematization as "alien" either to episte-

mology as a whole or
Regarding

to

such a feature as the subject-object correlation.

this subject-object correlation,

alien systematizations, however, unless
of objectifying- -unless

others.

But then

atizations that

85 Ibid.

,

it

is

we can

p.

some are

only as

it

is

we cannot

distinguish different

through their different degrees

less successful in objectification than are

we invoke

the

most successful

of these

system -

identify a subject-object correlation in the first place.

86

57.

86We are not told which systematization would be capable of the greatest
degree of de-subjectification. This writer presumes that it would be the one
which is involved in ex-post ontological epistemology. Only for that one does
a person objectify not only the subject but the various systematizations through

265
In that case, the only

provides

determinate content which the primary systematization

is that built into the identity test.

however;

This test

tells us nothing further

only affirms that the subject-object correlation

it

The other apparent possibility for establishing
lation is to find

it

in the entire

is a possibility for

Mannheim

is

whatever

indicated by his claim that

That this

we can always

identify by inspection the degree of objectivity present in any
meaning. 88

we can do

that then all the

evident to us.

To

87

die content of the corre-

range of primary systematizations.

is

it is.

If

primary systematizations must be simultaneously

find content under these circumstances, however, is to

which the subject is conceived and, thus, objectified.
In any case, the writer anticipates an objection to his claim that only by
the most de -subjectifying of systematizations could we identify the subjectobject correlation. The objection may be that since every systematization
loses the subject,

we

gain nothing by depending upon the one that does so
"most.
This objection, however, either supposes that we cannot identify a
subject-object correlation at all (because there is no subject) or that we can
"

do so but that the differential
systematizations.

heim since

Now

to

do so

is

not significantly large as between

the first alternative apparently is not accepted by

he, himself, recognizes a subject-object correlation.

If

Mann-

the sec-

ond applies, then we have what the writer calls the second apparent possibility
See the next paragraph in the

for establishing the subject -object correlation.
text.

87
0/

We

can never learn anything about something merely by applying the
Wittgenstein illustrates an analogous
point as the situation of someone trying to verify a newspaper article by
another copy of the same paper. See text, chap. II, p. 56.
criterion which identifies that something.

88"Meanings always clearly show a greater or lesser degree of objectivity.
and it is always possible to ascertain this degree of objectivity
"
by inspecting them" [Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology,
.

p.

57].

.

-
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determine the correlation precisely by

its

indeterminacy.

the subject-

If

object correlation incorporates different
degrees of objectification in
identity then clearly

it

has been internally, circularly determined.

more, the subject-object correlation then becomes,

in itself,

sible solution to the social change problem.

the

Though

We

very

Further-

more osten-

primary systematica

tion structures our concept of the subject-object relation,

escape from any particular conceptual structure.

one

its

we apparently can

can do this because the

differences in extent of objectification are only matters of degree, and
further-

more, can always be

For

identified as such.

preceding reasons

all the

epistemology and

its

I

conclude that both the unique question of

unique correlation do not

from alien systematizations.

What they

seem

to gain substantive content

gain, surprisingly,

the very indeterminateness which those systematizations

To complete my

exposition

I

shall

now argue

that the

is

a reiteration of

were supposed

same

to end.

situation also char-

acterizes epistemology's unique value--that of truth.

As

the subject -object correlation involves two distinct aspects --the cor-

relation itself and the ways of mediating, so does the value of truth- -there

both a value of truth as such and there are standards of truth.
of truth are immediately implied in the different

object.

The standard

in a Kantian one.

89ibid.

,

p.

the

Now standards

of connecting subject

of truth is different in a copy theory, for

And furthermore

66.

ways

89

is

and

example, than

same systematization which provides

267

both the standard of truth and the

way

of connecting subject

and object will

also answer the unique question of epistemology— the question about
presup-

The result

positions.

tions

we already know
It

this

is

is

the paradox that once

we employ

certain presupposi-

the standard of truth. 90

the value of truth, however, which is unique to epistemology and

must always involve, says Mannheim, an

ositions do not really have the value of truth

Epistemology

systematization.

yu ".

.

.

is

thus a

alien systematization. 91

if

Prop-

they are wholly within a single

mixed systematization, and, despite

the truth criteria occurring within an epistemology are closely

related to the particular science that supplied the analytic means for the

quest after ultimate presuppositions.

presuppositions

is

The locus

also taken to be that of the cognitive value standards.

knowledge is claimed to be experience
be the bearer of value and its guarantee;
If

logical, then
[Ibid.

,

it is

at

bottom, then experience will

if it is

asserted to be ultimately

logic that will provide the criterion of truth.

"
.

.

67].

p.

Ibid., pp.

Mannheim,

of the ultimate cognitive

but he

69, 71.
is not.

The writer may appear to be misrepresenting
One must be clear as to how alien systematizations

standar d of truth, epistemology borrows from an
alien systematization. But the value of truth is unique to epistemology. Alien
systematizations are involved in the latter because truth value and epistemology are alien to themselves --they are mixed systematizations. To speak

To acquire

are involved.

its

absorb the borrowing process, described previously,
only as we recognize the borrowing, the alienation, that

of the value of truth is to

into a concept.

there

is

It is

value.

"Nothing can appear as valuable or normative as long as we remain
within the context of psychological, ontological, or logical systematizations.
normative only if
A state of things which merely 'obtains' may become.
.

another, alien systematization.

from
ness' involved in every valuation"

we

look at

it

[p.

71 J.

.

.

.

there

is

a 'related-
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Mannheim's elsewhere suggestion
it

that there might be other such mixtures, 92

appears to be the only one there

"Epistemology.

is.

.

.

alone enables us to

place ourselves outside of the various universal systematizations.

Here again we have encountered something unique

to

"
.

93

.

epistemology- -the

value of truth- -but here again the determinate content of that something turns
out to be

its

very indeterminacy! To know the content

not to

know merely how epistemology

tions.

That epistemology can do so

of this value of truth is

lets us be outside the

is

what we mean by

pure systematiza-

this value.

An

alien

systematization gives us the value of truth and the value of truth consists
the confrontation with an alien systematization.

My argument

in

94

that the three unique features of epistemology are all

circularly determined

may appear

a bold one, but

it

has some justification

in

Mannheim's own words.

92 Ibid.

,

pp.

93 Ibid.

,

p.

22-23.

71.

y4 In other words the borrowing process yields truth value and truth

value consists in the borrowing process.
Mannheim associates what he sees as the intersystematic nature of
epistemology with another concept also. He calls it "free choice of reference.
Both the concept of truth value and of free choice of reference appear to
solve the social change problem by definition. That epistemology can get outside any one conceptual framework is precisely the point at issue. The free

choice of reference also seems a concept which simply begs the question.
According to Mannheim, ours is the sort of mind which can get away from the
"natural" approach directed entirely at objects. We can think about thinking.
".

.

.the presu ppositions of knowledge a r e always capable of becoming

objects of knowledge in their turn" [Ibid.

,

p.

45].
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Any theory of knowledge is hard put to it when it
comes to the point of
proving the ultimate presuppositions to be
true values. That is the explanation for the well-known paradox in
the Kantian system, whereby Kant
grounds the necessity of synthetic a priori
judgments in the concept of
spontaneity, justifying the latter in turn by
means of the a priori The
circularity is anything but accidental.
it is the necessary consequence
of the paradox involved in any epistemology. 95
.

With that parting thought

I

.

now turn from

the

more expository aspect

of

discussion to the more analytical one.
Tile Dialectical Pattern --

and complex work than
that the former, as

is

much

Mannheim's dissertation

seems

It is

true that there

of initial distinctions

Yet, on a larger canvas, the
to

embody

the

more

lengthy

Yet

believe

I

as the latter, can be fruitfully examined as the first

logical twists within the inmost structures of the

denied.

a far

Lindblom's early essay on Bargaining.

step in a dialectical thought process.

ample, the various sets

is

same general

seem

It

is

to be

Mannheim work.
to be both

Mannheim essay,

pattern.

seem

my

numerous

For ex-

affirmed and

like that of

Lindblom,

purpose now to display

that pattern.

My

identification of a certain inner debate within Lindblom's thought

be disputable.

But there is little dispute about the existence of a correlative

debate within the thought of Mannheim.
his life he struggled with the question

escape the danger

of relativism.

occurred within the context

95 lbid.

,

may

p.

69.

of

And

Critics widely agree that throughout

how a sociology

of knowledge could

they further agree that this inner debate

an outward position expounding and defending
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such a sociology of knowledge. 96
Central Concept

1.

The central concept within Mannheim's inner debate
that of conceptual freedom.

It

is

unquestionably

the concept of being free not

is

from the ab-

stract laws of a deterministic science but from the
constraints of a total

conceptual framework.
one's very reality.
In

is

a

freedom from the concepts which structure

^

Mannheim's dissertation

indirectly.

6

It

It

What

the concept of conceptual

appears as independent truth or

freedom appears

final conceptual

system.

But

if

writer calls Mannheim's outer position--his defense of a
sociology of knowledge --is too well known to need documentation. That he
engaged in a life -long, or at least almost life -long, struggle with relativism
is acknowledged by numerous scholars.
this

"The objections

to

Mannheim's theory.

scepticism, that of self-contradiction.
difficulties

.

.the ancient

.

.

argument against

Mannheim was aware

.

and much of his intellectual effort went

of these

into attempts to deal

with them, either by denying that his own theory was relativistic.
or by
arguing that the 'perspectivistic' character of his own theory did not
diminish its value" [T. B. Bottomore, "Some Reflections on the Sociology
.

of Knowledge,

"One

of

"

British Journal of Sociology

VII (March,

,

.

1956), 55].

Mannheim's fundamental questions --perhaps

the fundamental
how, in the face of the demonstration
that the spirit is socially conditioned, can I still do right by its inexhaustibility and unforseeability? Or perhaps: how can I, nevertheless, save it?"
[Kurt H. Wolff, "Introduction: A Reading of Karl Mannheim," in From Karl

question- -might be formulated thus:

Mannheim
xiv.

p.

,

ed.

by Kurt H. Wolff (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1971,

]

^Mannheim makes clear that a systematization
framework which structures one's very reality.
"Systematization
.

.

.

any

'fact of

is

is,

indeed, a conceptual

constitutive to such an extent that anything 'given'

experience'.

.

.

must already belong within one

existing systematizations, in so far as

it is

of the

theoretically grasped at

The simplest, most primitive way of 'objectifying' an element

is to

all.

range
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there

independent truth then obviously there is a way
to be free of any

is

particular conceptual framework.

And

if

we can know

of a final

We become

so by reaching out to that truth.

system which does not simply incorporate the

imminent system then we must be somehow free from them

we could

Otherwise

both.

not notice the difference between them.

Both these two variants of the concept of a conceptual
freedom are defined, effectually, by negation.

truth which

Independent truth

any of the series, orders,

is not,

etc.

is

truth independent of, i.e.

which currently appear

underlie our theoretical propositions and concepts. 98

systematization

is that

which we do not possess and never

form exists we can affirm,
tion of any

but what the

form

and of system.

.

will.

form

99

of

any

That the

we can know only as

the nega-

system which we now have.

The two other major concepts seem

it.

is

final

Other First Order Major Concepts

2.

tion

The

to

.

with one of these inevitably presupposed orders.

true identity.
'

.

.

mology,

"

pp.

.

it

.

is

apt to sound as

if

its

belongs.

.

as partly erroneous.

"ibid.

element already had

... An

its

'ele-

proper identity by adopting the structure of the
" [Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Episte.

is distinct

from

the current one.

possibility of this ultimate form, the current one

p.

'Ranging' an

.

insists, of course, that there is an ultimate

systematization which

,

.

24-25].

Mannheim also

98 Ibid.

this

.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

.

only gets

in fact,

series to which

systematiza

Although numerous other major concepts are presented

element with a series.
ment,

to be those of theoretical

26.

form

of

any

By contrast with the
be recognized

may perhaps
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they

seem

reducible to these two. 100

Aesthetic systematization

is

an im-

possibility, as defined, and philosophical
systematization is largely equated
to theoretical systematization

Minimum

sense.

1

the latter concept is used in its broadest

theoretical systematization

the adequate variety;
find, as

when

it

is

different only in degree

is not qualitatively different.

Once again

1

from

therefore

did with Lindblom, that there are two major concepts other than
the

central concept.

I

also conclude, once again, that these two major concepts are very

close to each other.

(From now on

I

qualifying adjective, "theoretical").

shall refer to systematization without the

Systematization

is

reality-constituting chain of interdependent concepts.

form

to this evolutionary

process

it

it

a closed chain and

was reached.

is

how

Although there

will never be reached.

tion always contains erroneous and tentative elements.
is

an open, evolving,

the final

form

is

a final

Any systematiza-

System, by contrast,

of systematization

would appear

There may also be intermediate systems when an

if

individual,

at a certain time, pushes to its logical conclusion the tendency already present

in the systematization.

It

first

appears, then, that system and systematization

are distinctly different, even contrary, concepts.
the status of historically intermediate systems

At the very beginning

of his dissertation

is

But they do not

seem so once

taken into account.

Mannheim makes a fundamental

distinction between the discrete, on the one hand, and the all-embracing or

i00See text pp. 242-49.
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continuous, on the other. 101

He asserts

sition can only be understood in
sitions.

02

1

order to use

Now we
it,

terms

that the discrete concept or propo-

of a

continuum

of concepts

don't have to consciously understand, say, a concept in

and usually we are not aware

comes our understanding.

But

doubt about the concept arises.

continuum from which

of this

we do become aware, says Mannheim, when
And he implies

that such doubt

since the continuum of concepts changes and evolves. 103

become aware

of our intermediate partially

from systematization.

The problem

if

is that that of

system

which does display such error, the continuum

A system

is

we can

of

be conscious.

I

from

in

time.

,

pp.

16,

while that

(or systematization),

it

is

circular but the contin-

The

A

latter is continuous

concept cannot be brought

lOlMannheirn, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology,
102lbid.

distinguished

shall explain.

its infinitude.

as an open process, not as a closed stage

is

in itself

systems

a conceptual continuum because

uity of systematization results

Therefore we must

which we can be conscious,

an individual conceptual system, does not display error

not something of which

must arise

erroneous conceptual frameworks.

Just this necessity creates a problem, however,

is

and propo-

"

pp.

19-20.

20.

primacy among logical forms belongs to systematization. The
only in terms of this 'highest
simpler forms can be understood.
form" [p. 16].
Adequate theoretical systematization comprises:
".
.a continuum of closely interrelated elements" [p. 20].
".

.

.

1

.

.

103 Ibid.

104

,

pp.

See text

p.

18,

248

39.

.

.

.
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to conscious understanding, however,

if

understanding depends on a grasp of

the continuum and the continuum is never complete in time.

On

the other hand,

are complete
concepts.
nition that

in

But

if

time then

we could

we had done

there are intermediate conceptual systems which

it

would be possible

to consciously understand our

move from one system

not

to another with any recog-

For the move from system

so.

place within the infinite continuum, not a closed one.

was more than one closed system and
be a metaphysical claim

in the

that one

Kantian sense.

to

Thus

was superior

^

infinite

seems then

that the distinction

to

claim that there

to another

would

would be a claim for

It

which an equally convincing case could be made on either
It

system would take

side.

between a circular continuum and an

continuum removes any opportunity for a meaningfully critical stance

toward concepts.
Given the situation
often

seems

I

have described,

to conflate the

it

is

not surprising that

aforementioned distinction.

Mannheim

At one point he speaks

of closed circles in connection with systematization although these are supposed

to be distinctive of

systems instead.

l° 5 Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason, " trans, by J. D. Meiklejohn, Vol. XLII of Great Books of the Western World ed. by Robert M. Hutchins
,

(54 vols; Chicago:

Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), pp. 135-45.

106 "In the theoretical sphere, one has to presuppose a closed chain of
continuously connected propositions" [Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of

Epistemology,

"

p.

20J.

an early discussion of systematization before this
concept has been explicitly distinguished from that of system.

The context

of this quote is
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At another point hs speaks of system as a matter
of identifying a
"tendency" prescribed in a systematization and developing
that tendency. 107

seems

But this

a discrete

to

make system simply an

monad which happens

The very proposition
with doubt

is still

integral part of systematization, not

to be located within

it.

that consciousness of conceptual structure arises

further evidence that the distinction

is

conflated since with

systematization there could be no consciousness and with system no constructive doubt.

Finally, one might consider

Mannheim's assertion

directed flow toward an unreachable end. 108

system because
history

uum

is

it is

He

directed toward an end, and

also systematization because the end

is

is

is

is

that history is a

saying that history

a

is

thus a closed circle.

But

unreachable and the contin-

thus "closed" only by infinity.

3.

Attempted Identity

of Opposites- -Genesis of the Inner Debate.

be assumed that Mannheim begins with the conceptual situation

If it

have described, then a case can be made that he attempts an identity

I

of

opposites:

a.

He

explicitly defines final

system

(in

other words, independent truth)

.an individual reflecting subject, who orders his thoughts into a
complete system in strict accordance with a principle, is really doing no
more than push to its logical conclusion a tendency already prescribed in
107".

the

.

very systematization"
108 Ibid.

,

pp.

39, 26.

[

Ibid

.

,

p.

25].
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as the negation of any conceptual system which
Independent truth

He then

b.

we have

yet developed.

the opposite of system.

is

virtually identifies this final

Independent truth

men have

system with systematization.

identical to systematization.

is

to take

for granted that an ultimate, true and complete
any systematization exists objectively, independently of our
own
contributions. This is.
to be interpreted.
.as a stringent logical postu late implied.
in every theoretical construct 109
.

.

form

.

it

of

.

"It is

must

.

.

.

.

.

thus implied in the very structure of the theoretical sphere that

itself be

assumed as

valid in itself.

.

.

[is]

a -temporally valid.

.

," 110

an inevitable postulate involved

»,

,

it

.that truth is

the existenc e of a

in

theoretical sphere as such.
c.

But he has also virtually identified system and systematization, as

have tried

to

show

preceding subsection.

in the

If

I

he had not done so he appar-

ently could not explain the existence of conceptual criticism.

System and systematization are
If

this is a correct reading of

that conceptual

like that

freedom

is

identical to each other.

Mannheim then he

which Kecskemeti finds so strange

10 9ibid

26-27.

He

conceptual structure.

in later

pp.

H Qlbid.

,

p.

27.

[This writer's emphasis.

]

m-Ibid

,

p.

28.

[This writer's emphasis.

]

.

112 See footnote 57.

is

indeed trying to say

making a claim much

works,

[This writer's emphasis.

,

.

is

]

though

I

suggest
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that this early expression of

which Kecskemeti takes
Central

4.

it is

even more

flatly contradictory than that of

note.

Theme

as Argument in Potential

Mannheim's central theme

is at

least the claim that the

dominance

of a

conceptual framework over one's thought and action can lead
to conceptual

freedom.

I

have suggested that

in its original

stronger claim that conceptual structure
that is true then the

seem

form

theme makes the even

this

identical to conceptual freedom.

is

theme would include an inner tension, and

it

If

does indeed

to do so.

The

final truth

which

is

of the theoretical sphere is

implied

in the

never attained.

very structure, the very existence,

Therefore

it

cannot be understood

as the goal at the end of a chronological sequence, despite Mannheim's claim
°

to the contrary.

And

For we cannot know

that the sequence is progressive.

therefore, also, this final truth cannot be understood as neutral ground

outside one's conceptual situation.

by definition,

is

final truth (and

imminent

in

It

must instead be seen as something which,

systematization as a process.

hence conceptual freedom)

in this latter

But to understand

sense

is to

empty

it

of

distinct content.

Thus,

in

order

to

assert the theme that conceptual freedom

zation one must lose the concept of such freedom.

H3por
"

the contrary claim see

is

systemati-

Here again a tension seems

Mannheim, "Structural Analysis

of Episte-

See also this writer's footnote 41.
It is true that Mannheim does not argue, on page 39, that the final truth
can be such a goal. He simply asserts it.

mology,

p.

39.

-
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to develop between the

would

like to

theme as assertion and

theme as argument.

the

One

say that the relationship between
conceptual freedom and system

atization is as close as identity and that
the theme as assertion and the theme as

argument are consequently
meaning

distinct

themes must be

to the

die

same theme.

But one also wants to give

some

concept of conceptual freedom and to do so the two

different.

So again one must describe the central theme not

as an argument but as an argument in potential
5.

I

A New

Distinction

suggest that

it

ceptual freedom, that

curious purpose.

I

is in the

attempt to add substance to the concept of con-

Mannheim introduces what otherwise seems such

a

refer to his attempt to give a structural analysis of e piste -

mological systematization--to give an analysis of something beyond analysis.
This curious purpose

is

capsulized

in the distinction

between historical

and typological aspects

of epistemological systematization. 114

Mannheim one can

some

same

find

to

single elements in any epistemology which are the

There are, furthermore, logical patterns, typologies,

for all periods.

composed

According

of these elements, although which pattern is correct could be

known

114"g ver y individual work in its actual historical form, e.
g. any particular epistemology, contains elements which can be explained only with
reference to the individual personality of the philosopher concerned, and
others which can be interpreted only
ity of the

age

in question.

Now

the

in

terms

of the structure of the

more completely we succeed

mental-

in identi-

fying those features of the epistemological systems which stem from the

nature of the problem, from the persistent, timeless task
it

will be to distinguish those features which,

differently" [Ibid

,

pp.

36-37].

if

itself,

the easier

present, have to be explained
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only at the end of history.

The notion

of typologies of systematization

concept of conceptual freedom.

It

appears to strengthen the

suggests that the comprehensive final truth

inherent in systematization, but itself unreachable,
must be

somehow connected

with the separate elements which persist throughout the
systematization, and
thus are reachable.

concept.

It

If

this is so, conceptual

has at least potential substance.

freedom

is

no longer an empty

One could become free

of one's

conceptual structure by reaching the absoluteness of final systematization, and
the persisting truths in any systematization give promise that there is a

way

to

get there.

6.

Cancellation of the Earlier Argument

Without modification, however, this new distinction would cancel the
central theme.

Mannheim wants

to

say that the elements which persist are

nevertheless part of a systematization which by definition
in this sense, all-embracing.

to the systematization then

persisting element

is

it

But

is

if

is

basically open and,

these persisting elements are fundamental

not basically open and all-embracing.

element

is

And

this

must be true for

all time.

Similarly,

if

" in

Mann-

one persisting

the standard of truth as correspondence with the empirical given

then again systematization

If,

one

the presupposition that empirical experience is the source

of all knowledge then systematization is basically "psychological,

heim's terms.

If

is

psychological.

on the other hand, the persisting elements are not fundamental to sys-

tematization then they can give no promise of a final systematization, an
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independent truth.
7.

Initial

Development

Mannheim's response

of the

to the

New Argument

above problem seems

suggestion that while the openness of
systematization

concept of a typology this

is

to consist in the tacit

may

not a serious consequence.

be unsettled by the

It is

not serious be-

cause enduring concepts do not exist apart
from epistemological systematization.

Instead they are integral to

ual openness; they structure

A

it.

115

Hence they do

not eliminate concept-

it.

typology of epistemology does commit us
to a course even though

does not exactly determine the path.

It

it

provides the a priori quasi axiomatic

structure of conceptual correlations.

... how far is it possible to deduce from the structure of epistemological
systematization both the uniformity of epistemological
thinking and the principle of differentiation which

makes for the sundry individual systems?
the evidence available so far we can already state:
the uniformity
is guaranteed by the correlations that are
posited with quasi -axiomatic
necessity.
.The logical structure of epistemological

... On

systematization

.

which commits us

—

to a certain

course but does not exactly determine the
116
path to be followed- -must be recognized as the pivot of any
typology.
.

These points seem consistent with Mannheim's earlier claim
directed flow.

that history is a

Apparently the logic of epistemological systematization

is

an

instrument of that flow.

115 Ibid

The creations of the mind are grounded in timeless
p. 39.
rules but these rules constitute a directed flow. A-temporal elements are
thus an inherent part of evolutionary openness.
.

,

116 Ibid.

,

pp.

64-65.
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8.

Self -Contra diction of the

New Argument

The foregoing argument has
cept of conceptual freedom.
potential or, at most,

If

a devastating impact, however, on the con-

the concept before had

was empty,

some substantive

now worse than empty.

it is

claim made for an embracing conceptual framework but

framework

dom

is

is

determined, at least

not merely an

empty concept;

This particular stage which
to

me

I

I

much

of

it

basic nature.

is

one which

have identified

an especially significant one.

reactive nature of

III

in its

it

in

In its structure

Mannheim's work.

is

Not only

now said

the

that this

Hence conceptual free-

is

positively absent.

Mannheim's thought seems
I

think

it

explains the

And looking back

to

my

Chapter

think this stage also explains the similarly reactive nature of the thought

of Lindblom.

Neither Lindblom nor Mannheim can be satisfied to rest at this

stage of their respective arguments.

Lindblom doesn't want his

bargaining to be identified with a politics of majority choice. 117

heim

is

is not satisfied

ically, they both

Lindblom

with the "freedom" in historical destiny.

seem

is

to

need these positions

engaged

in

home ground- -the advantages

in

of planning.

And he

with his fellow liberals in the

oriented countries.

His critical problem

Ill,

Yet, paradox-

an outer debate with the totalitarians on their own

more inward debate

chap.

And Mann-

order to identify their own.

tries to defend a classic

minority rights liberalism on precisely that ground.

117 Seetext,

politics of

p.

217.

is

how

But Lindblom also has a

more

socialistic planning-

to distinguish himself

from
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these people so that he need not abandon his outer position.

how

to retain the classic minority rights liberalism in this
situation.

the European economic planners, especially Jan Tinbergen,
to

His problem

development

of his thought,

become

is

Hence
the goad

and he begins most of his work as a more or

less direct reaction to theirs.

Lindblom says that he attacks the Tinbergen type model because

common

a fallacy.

model

to

suggest that the more important reason he does so

I

own method

define his

of

incrementatalism by contrast.

show how his own

of political

it

is

He needs

is

so

is to

this other

different in the face of his apparent assumptions

consensus which would make

decision-making there must be real

it

the same.

conflict,

In

Lindblom's model of

and by juxtaposing his model with

Tinbergen's he hopes to make evident the reality of conflict without abandoning
his

theme

that bargaining (as conflict) can coordinate.

think

I

it

not too fanciful to say that

Mannheim's thought

mentally reactive --first to ideology generally, later to

its

also funda-

is

specific expression

in Hitler's totalitarianism.

H£>The most direct evidence

of Lindblom's need for the Tinbergen model
This
most critical concept in his work is
is his way
never given a clear positive definition. In the essay on bargaining, it is defined by contrast with hierarchy and thus obviously requires the Tinbergen

of defining bargaining.

model.

In the

much

later book on the Intelligence of

Democracy

,

Lindblom's

of "partisan mutual adjustment, " but
deference
at one extreme and unconinclude
as
to
so
broad
this concept
ditional manipulation at the other. Since a concept this broad would seem to be
amenable to European planners, Lindblom must refer to their thinking if he is

argument focuses on the broader concept
is

to

show

that

it is

not.

See text, chap.

And, he implicitly does so
Ill,

pp.

171-74, 192.

in Pt.

5 of his book.
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Mannheim

engaged

is

ground—the virtues

of

in

an outer debate with the liberals on their home

personal freedom.

He

ture on that ground but he is also engaged in a

tarian.

He

is

tries to defend conceptual struc-

more inward debate with

totali-

urgently concerned to distinguish himself from the latter so

that he, too, need not abandon his outer position- -that he need
not accept the

view that prior conceptual structure determines
I

suggest that as Lindblom needs Tinbergen for a contrast model so

Mannheim needs something

Mannheim
to

it.

all thought.

is

It

is not just that

so disapproving of the Hitler phenomenon that he so often reacts

He needs something

light of his

like Hitler's totalitarianism.

like

it

to

show how different his own position

claim that conceptual freedom

apparently, to the historical process.

and by contrasting

is

In his

integral to systematization and,

model there must be real freedom,

his position with that of Hitler he apparently hopes to

this without abandoning his basic theme.

The best evidence

that

is in the

show

119

Mannheim

actually needs something like Hitler's

totalitarianism, as a contrast model, is Mannheim's

way

of defining

conceptual

freedom. He defines it by negation. In his dissertation, conceptual freedom is
described as that truth which is independent of any present system, and so he
must at least intimate the existence of defecis in any present conceptual system.
In Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia he identifies certain "intellectuals" who can
,

Hence, he must contrast these people with
others who only claim to take such a view. He must show that some people can
be the conceptual leaders without at the same time being, say, fascist ideologues
and propagandists.
See text pp. 270-71.
There are two qualifications to these points: Firstly, Mannheim does not
place himself in explicit written opposition to fascism until he moves to England.
take a relatively uncommitted view.

But prior to that he

liberal ideology.

was attacking

the conceptual constraints of then -current

Consequently he was, even then, concerned with the constraints
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For both Lindblom and Mannheim

it

therefore seems necessary to con-

tinually reintroduce a threatening contrast
model.
is

so threatening

it

is

But then because the

always necessary to move away from it--showing

model
in

Lindblom's case that bargaining

is

not just a

name

for democratic consensus

and

is

not just a

name

for historical-conceptual

in

Mannheim's

that

freedom

destiny.

9.

Preservation of the Earlier Argument

One way

to help prevent

weakening the concept

of conceptual

to say that while there is a typology of epistemology

heim says

just this

statement

is that

and he says

it

freedom

indeterminate.

it is

both directly and indirectly.

is

Mann-

The direct

the enduring elements --the question, the value, the correla-

tion- -do not have content in themselves but derive

The indirect statement consists

systematizations.

from one

it

in

of the

primary

frequent use of the word

"typology" with the indefinite article rather than the definite. 120

conceptual systems.

Secondly, it is recognized that Mannheim does eventuabandon altogether his historicist-conceptualist position. A
growing positivism is apparent in his late English period and, specifically, in
such books as Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning
in

ally

seem

to

.

l^Mannheim acknowledges

that

any historical typology

is likely to

be

incorrect.

"This essay of mine is an attempt to do justice to the historical process
culminate in a typology.
on the basis of static logic; such an effort must.
Even though a structural analysis should turn out differently if it were
at another age, it is true for this, as for all theoretical
carried out.
.

.

.

.

works, that one solution alone can be the right one" [Mannheim, "Structural
Analysis of Epistemology, " p. 40, footnote 1].
Also see, in the previously cited work, pp. 36, 58.

-

285

To
it is

it

leave the typology indeterminate

not satisfactory, however, since

is

to have timeless concepts which are
empty.

would return the argument

which those steps seem

The typology

atization.

and

4

and

this result

were accepted,

to the initial contradiction

to represent.

is not left

by reintroducing the

to steps 3

If

initial

indeterminate.

It is

made determinate,

central theme that conceptual freedom

is

in effect,

system -

The typology --that which represents timeless concepts --becomes

determinate through the open-ended evolutionary process which

is

systematiza-

tion itself. 121

10.

Circularity of the Completed Argument

This process of determination clearly involves circular argument, how-

Consider one timeless, a-priori, element--the question unique

ever.

epistemology.
edge.

This question

But the

answer

is

that of the ultimate presuppositions of knowl-

to the question, says

ex-post ontological approach.

to

And

that

Mannheim,

will be found to be the

approach repeats the question. J22

Again, consider that timeless element of "truth value" which provides
a

benchmark

atization.

It

in

systematization.

must come,

that is,

This value must come from an alien system

from a mixing

of systcmatizations.

121 See the quotation in footnote 120.

But this

Apparently later typologies are
more accurate than earlier ones and for that reason more determinate. At
least we would expect them to be more determinate in those circumstances.
Existing typologies are indeterminate precisely because the priority contest

among

basic systematizations has not yet been settled.

122

See text pp. 258-60.

-

286

mixing
zation.

is

simply the reaffirmation that one_can put oneself outside a systemati-

We

want

atization but the

to

know what

answer seems

from outside--that

it

that value is

to be

merely a reiteration

involves mixture.

123see text pp. 266-68.

which comes from an alien system

*

that

it

does come

CHAPTER

V

WHOLES WITHIN AND AGAINST WHOLES
URBAN PLANNING AS A DIALECTICAL PROCESS

I

have laboriously examined the arguments

of

Lindblom and Mannheim

over comprehensiveness, and have done so on the ground that
these arguments

are

in

themselves elaborations

of that concept.

What

is

.

the use of this in-

volved intellectual effort?

The use

of a concept

examination depends on one's viewpoint.

The em-

piricist wants to ostensively and unambiguously define objects and events so

he can look for correlations.

But one cannot unambiguously define concepts by

pointing.

Many

contextualists believe they can reveal the conceptual

framework

implied by our present day concepts and can show us how to see the world
differently and better.

like

But people

may

now and on what would represent a
Other contextualists, a minority

concept examination

is to

disagree both on what the world looks
better view.

at present, believe that the

reveal the deep contradictions inherent

ceptual framework and to help us endure them.
pose.

In

previous chapters

I

I

use of a

in

any con-

have adopted this third pur-

sought to identify the contradictions in the abstract
287
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concept of comprehensiveness.

In this

chapter

I

look for the

same contra-

dictions in planning practice.

Abstraction- -Both the Essence and the Dilemma of Planning

The practical implications for public planning, which
concept examination, are radical ones.
that they go to the roots of a problem.

They are radical

I

my

draw from

sense

in the classic

case they go to deep roots --the

In this

conventional rationalism of Western thinking.

The Centrality

of Abstraction

.

In the

West we place a high

(one might

say the supreme) value on abstractions and on the formal logical relationships

among them. With few exceptions we reserve our
history, for those through

vivid expressions of the

highest honor, the esteem of

whose mental capacity and/or

most abstract

thought.

we gain new and

effort

We assume,

furthermore, that

the reality around us has a structure analogous to such thought.

These values and assumptions

of rationalism

as in our normal view of science, the view of

process of abstraction from certain obvious

forms there

is

much

criticism.

In its

it

have their esoteric forms

as a relatively straightforward

And toward these esoteric

facts.

more mundane

almost always take our rationalism for granted.

guise, however,

Science

matter of abstraction but we expect the one who says so

may

to

say

not be a simple

it

in

way, his book being organized by general headings and subheadings.
ask the reader

of this

we

an abstract

And we

book to abstract and summarize the "main points.

conventional measure of a good student

is his ability

to do this

"

Our

and his ability
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to then rethink, by logically recombining, a

different books and
In its

number

main points drawn from

of

from personal experience.

mundane form our Western rationalism

philosophy often calls empiricism or realism.

It

is

is

not opposed to what

not opposed, that is, to a

belief in real objects which are independent of our thinking.

example, that the sequence
ambivalent

We make

in

meaning,

of

words

at least

in that

but usually

we

to a

meaningful sense

don't think about

is

perplexing,

relatively un-

is

sense interpretation of planning and

of Abstraction

of the concept of

Comprehensiveness or wholeness

it.

on that interpretation.

if

How we

we

can get

think about

it,

it.

mundane rationalism provides our most deeply

central to

for

on an elementary level, and can be summarized.

Wholeness (Planning) as a Product

is

book on science

similar assumptions about our personal experiences.

from shapes on a page

things,

We assume,

We know

is

As

.

the concrete, or individual, and the abstract.

cluding

human

beings, are concrete wholes.

does for other

believed,

most common

comprehensiveness which
not a conceptual problem

very well what wholeness

sorts:

it

They are

is.

There are two

Material objects, inindividuals.

All other

wholes represent abstractions, of varying levels, from these objects and from
the relationships

among them.

For mundane rationalism there

is

no intellectual difficulty

wholistic view, no difficulty in "seeing the big picture.

government do so and they do so

all the time.

"

in taking a

All higher levels of

One simply raises one's level

of
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abstraction to an appropriate point.

Of coarse higher level abstractions

give a distorted view of social
reality

(i.

e.

of the relationships

beings), but that is the price
of social order, so

it is

argued.

may

among human
And, further-

more, constitutional protections and an
improving social science are looked
with confidence for

common

This

and practice
view, T.

some

J.

of

mitigation of the distortion.

sense approach to reason

urban physical planning.

manifest

is

no serious theoretical difficulty
1

in

in

most

of the theory

Speaking for an orthodox and long held

Kent emphasizes that the urban plan

the concrete city.

to

is

a general plan, and he sees

connecting the abstractions of this plan with

The urban plan

and there may be numerous others.

is

only one level of abstraction however

Some

plans would represent subordinate

levels --the plan of a geographic portion of the city
such as a neighborhood, or
of a functional

deal

more

element such as the transportation system.

closely with concrete wholes.

Some

These plans would

plans would represent superior

levels --a metropolitan area, a river basin, or a state--and would
be
distant

more

from the concrete.

The view
abstraction has

that one can achieve

its

wholeness through appropriate levels

advocates not only among planners themselves but among

the sociologists and political scientists from which they often

theoretical insights.

*T.

J.

of

Kent, Jr.

Max Weber's

,

Chandler Publishing Co.

classic model of bureaucracy with

The Urban Gen eral
,

1964).

draw their
its

Plan (San Francisco, California:
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hierarchy of roles

an important source. 2

is

In recent times,

strategy of "mixed scanning" has been influential. 3

is

It

Amitai Etzioni's

not clear to what

extent Etzioni acknowledges any concrete wholes, but he
does articulate the
belief that general overviews of a situation are possible and can
be integrated

with

more

detailed studies of particular aspects.

The common sense view
The wholeness

of planning

seems

to be

fundamentally correct.

of social entities is clearly an abstraction.

Hence abstraction

could be called the essence of planning.
Self -Alienation Inherent in Abstraction
tially a

.

The

fact that planning is essen-

matter of abstractions does not necessarily mean, however, that

planning

is

free of conceptual problems.

might be precisely the presence of

It

abstractions that would produce such problems.

In

what follows

the process of abstraction alienates the thinking person

According

1.

to contextualist

epistemology there

between the concrete and the abstract, and
person

is not

this

I

I

argue that

from himself.
is

no sharp distinction

assume such epistemology.

A

a Cartesian combination of thinking soul inexplicably aware of

material body, but

is

something more complex.

Both the critics of rationalism and most of the sophisticated rationalists

agree with

this view.

They agree

that the belief in the

immediacy

of concrete

Weber, "Bureaucracy: The 'Ideal Type', " in Comparative Politics
Notes and Readings ed. by Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (3d ed.
Homewood, Illinois: The Dor sey Press, 1968), pp. 449-55.
2 Max

;

,

3 Amitai Etzioni,

chap.

12.

The Active Society (New York: The Free Press,

1968),

:
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objects

a mistaken one.

is

Concepts are not formed by observing a number

of

objects and abstracting from their differences so as to retain
only what the
objects have in

common.

abstraction. 4

Ernst Cassirer suggests a description for

For there are no objects except as

abstracting and objectifying process.

It

is

appearance

of

simultaneously

this

a spark which jumps

across an intensely focused experience such as that
jective excitement the experience

the products of

becomes

somehow

storm.

of a

In that

sub5

objectified as a personal god.

what we call abstract concepts

is

merely a

later and less

The

im-

portant transformation of these personal gods.
2.

According

logic, this

to that

form

of

contextualism which

I

call a degree of truth

something more complex than Cartesianism involves a concurrent

evolution of "abstract thought" and "concrete reality" toward each other.

personal selfhood appears to be developmental and,

ever be
3.

Thus

no one would

in that case,

fully seLf -conscious.

But according to a degree of reality logic, abstract thought and con-

Hence every person

crete reality are already identical.

and reality and

is fully

conscious.

^In this writer's sense,

I

Hume,

is

a unity of thought

adopt this second view.

himself, is a rationalist.

Even

for

some-

one as supposedly respectful of the empirical as Hume, there appear to be no
sense objects. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature ed. by L. A.
,

Selby-Bigge (Oxford:
sec. VI, first par.

The Clarendon Press,

:

[Bk.

I,

Pt.

]

^Ernst Cassirer, La nguage and Myth
(n. p.

1888), pp.

15-16.

Dover Publications,

Inc.,

1946),

p.

,

trans, by Susanne K.
33.

Langer

I,
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4.

If

a person

must be thought

not thought to be divided between body and soul, he

is

to be divided within the soul itself, so to speak.

self conscious is to

employ abstract thought

Having acknowledged

object.

Comte, take

this

For

to be

to divide oneself into subject

and

so fundamental point some philosophers, like

the heroic step of denying self consciousness. 6

But others, like

Hegel, affirm the subject-object relationship and accept, at least temporarily,
the self -alienation to which
that

human

alienation

abstraction expresses

For help

in

is

it

leads.

inherent

in

7
I

1

shall postulate

abstraction and in the objectifica tion which

.

making

my

point clear

existential and pathological alienation.

for thinking man, but

shall do so as well.

it

I

suggest that

we

distinguish between

Existential alienation

is

unavoidable

should not be confused with such often pathological

alienation as personal maladjustment, the alienation of a worker from his
o

product, or the alienation of citizens from government.

^Comte's position is noted by Charles Landesman,
Encyclop ed ia of Philosophy 1st ed. II, 192.
,

Jr.

,

"Consciousness,"

,

7

See George Lichtheim, "Alienation," International Encyclopedia of the
I, 265.
Social Sciences, 1st ed.
The concept of self -alienation, like that of self -consciousness, is at the
,

very center of Hegel's thought. On this point, see G. R. G. Mure, The Philosophy o f Hegel (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), chap. I, especially
pp.

10-19," 34-37.
8

In identifying a form of existential alienation, this writer is particularly
objecting to the Marxist position on that point. The position is concisely sum-

marized by Bernstein:
"Alienation does not result from the fact that man objectifies himself,
produces objects --this is man's distinctive character. Alienation results
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Reflection on our personal and cultural experience
tends to confirm that

there

is

As an

illustration

a

form

phenomenon as
a

It

of self -alienation

the freshness of travel to
is

in

thought and

unavoidable.

is

new places.

The

first

encounter with

wholistic--a total impression of sights, sound, activities.

also disorienting, however.

environment

is intrinsic to

from personal experience consider such a commonplace

new environment
is

which

One's normal instinct

is to

search out this

order to achieve orientation and thereby capture and hold the

total experience.

But this instinct is self-defeating.

abstraction and by abstraction the

full

experience

Orientation

is lost.

In

achieved by

is

time

will be

it

possible to travel through the environment with reference to only a few visual

The travel

clues.

will

now take place over an abstract route

mind.

in the

In

reaction to this result there will thence appear the instinct, once again to find,

and

this

time successfully to capture, a newer fresher experience.

But once

again, and ever after, the instinct will defeat itself.

Our cultural experience,
alienation is a durable one.

In

also, suggests that the

phenomenon

support of this view there

fact that mystic and rational philosophies provide the

is,

of self-

first of all, the

major division

culture and that for the former the self -alienating nature of thought

of

is

world

the

such a way (conditioned by the political economy in
which he finds himself) that his products are at once an expression of his
labor -power and at the same time are not a true expression of his
" [Richard Bernstein, Praxis and Action: Contemporary
potentialities.

when he produces

in

.

.

Philo sophies of

Huma n

Press, 1971),

Also see pp. 45-49].
44.
to assert, in contrast, that alienation does result

University of Pennsylvania

p.

This writer wants
objectification.

Activity (Philadelphia:

from
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central point. 9

But, additionally, the great

the cultural divide and

seem

return to wholeness after a
of an

to reaffirm this point.

life of self

"empty" Nirvana, the plenum

in the arts.

construction.

It

often

seems

The development

There

Mohammedan

And there

alienation and return within life itself.

of religion

is

and art cross

the

theme

This

is

is

paradise or some mid

the corollary

theme

of self-

major substantive

not only a

to be, indeed, the very principle of artistic

of great

themes

in tension

with each other and

then the affirmation of such tension as itself a form of resolution --this

an apt description

of

much

of

struggle, whether this be the wholeness

of a

position as in the Christian Heaven.

theme

themes

artistic design

and particularly the design

may

of its

be

non-

verbal forms such as music and sculpture.
5.

If

abstraction

is

the essence of planning and

herent in abstraction then there

is

a dilemma.

We

and social lives but we can do so only at the cost
such a dilemma then

it

must be

the fundamental

if

self -alienation is in-

want to plan our individual

of self -alienation.

dilemma

If

of planning as

there

it

is

must

^Mystic philosophies, and those associated with them, seek to deny or
reject objectivity as they affirm its self -alienating character. The writcr
accepts their analysis of objectivity while rejecting their practical conclusions.
He wants to ask how one can live with objectivity, assuming that it is, indeed,
self-alienating.

any case, there is probably as large and respectable a literature
asserting the alienating character of thought as there is a literature denying it.
For samples of the former, see: the Bhagavad Gita one of the three canonical
books of Hinduism; writings of Zen Bhuddism, in particular those by D. T.
Suzuki; I and Thou by Martin Buber; Romantic poetry, such as that of William
Wordsworth; Theodore Rcszak's The Making of a Counter Cultur e; and the
In

,

writings of such existentialists as Jean Paul Sartre.
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be, also, the fundamental

dilemma

Self -Alienation Intrinsic to

alienation and hence
vious.

"yes

-

Human

culture.

Beings.

Should we try to avoid

Western culture with

it?

of a

The answer
If

is

alienation

human

not ob-

is

the

person from that person's self then perhaps the answer

is

But perhaps a degree of self -alienation is the condition for achieving

"

human

of

Western

depends on how we understand the condition.

It

severance

total

much

of

personality, and perhaps a degree of social alienation

human community
expediency,

in

.

1

shall give

We

both from theory and from

support of this view.

Arguments from Theory
cal health.

some arguments,

a condition for

is

call a

-- Consider, first, the concept of

person physically well not because he

human physi-

free of disease

is

but because the disease processes are in a state of subtle controlled tension;
his

own physiological defense mechanisms are

struggle with the

germs always present

in his

in

a continuous moderated

environment.

If

the struggle

ceased, because the defense processes had decisively overwhelmed the external
threat, this would be as deadly to the organism as

it

would be

if

the struggle

greatly intensified.

Moving away from
itself,

the physiological toward the personality structure

and beyond that to

clusion.

The person

is

its

social base,

we may perhaps draw

same con-

characterized both by an enduring sense of self and by

a series of specific personality traits which

remains.

the

These two characteristics seem

may

alter while self identity

to be in tension,

however.

To

develop his personality, and hence his characteristic traits, a person must
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assert his traits against what

develop a conscious identity.

is

outside him.

In other

Unless he does so he cannot

words, without conflict, and

in that

sense an atomistic voluntaristic relationship to other
people, a person cannot
be conscious of himself as a unique being.

The

achieve self -hood just when he sees himself

when he no longer sees them as extensions
Is this conflictual

element

in the

in

infant apparently begins to

confrontation with his parents,

of his

own

production of

subordinate to a harmonious one? The latter

is

being.

human personality perhaps

also important.

cannot be conscious of his self except through social conflict,

If

the person

still it

seems

that he cannot have an enduring self of which to be conscious except through a

measure

of social

harmony and shared meaning.

every human confrontation would

Without that social grounding

totally jeopardize self identity. 10

One can

10This writer sees a connection
between these two aspects of self and
the concepts, in social theory, of "alienation" and "anomie. " But what Marx

Durkheim calls anomie are for this writer two opposing tendencies in the self- -tendencies which together produce alienation in this
writer's broader sense of that term
calls alienation and what

Marx, every human being has many possibilities for creative self-development and what is most important about man in society is that
he have the opportunity to realize these possibilities. The requirement of
capitalist society that man should be confined within fixed and limited roles
removes that opportunity, hence producing alienation. This Marxian view is
similar to what this writer calls the atomistic model of personality formation,
but it is a more mixed position since it supposes that cooperation and the
growth of personal relationships, rather than conflict and impersonality, will
According

accompany

to

self-realization.

According to Durkheim, a human being becomes fully himself by the
limitation, and hence definition, provided by stable social roles. For Durkheim,
the weakening of such roles destroys human identity in destroying human community. This position is similar to this writer's organicist model of personality formation, but here, again, the view is more mixed since within Durkheim 's

298
illustrate the effects of these two personality forming processes by
contrasting

the schizophrenic, but often intellectually vital, character of disintegrating

urban societies

(for

example, Berlin between the great wars) with the self-

nourishing, but often intellectually unreflective, character of any primitive or

peasant culture.
I

don't agree, however, that the social, organicist base of personality

formation

way

is

more fundamental than

the atomistic, conflictual one and

to settle the question without appeal to the

assume

that

this social

human

meaning

conflict

is

is

very points

at issue.

I

If

see no

we

only identifiable through social meaning, then

obviously primary.

Individual differences exist but they

are minor and they arise from the social nexus

example) rather than through individual

ideal of social order there would be

itself (class relationships for

initiative.

room

But this position has no

for an equal opportunity based on

merit.

The preceding summary descriptions of alienation and anomie are derived from Steven Lukes, "Alienation and Anomie, " in Philosophy, Politics and
Society Third Series, ed. by Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (Oxford:
,

Basil Blackwell, 1969).

According

"...
is

to Lukes:

one can plausibly argue that

inseparable from

life in

some degree

an industrial society.

.

of alienation
.

some

and of anomie

alienation

must

exist wherever there are reified social relations, socially-given roles and
norms; while some anomie must exist wherever hierarchies disintegrate

and social control is weakened" [p. 152J.
This writer is trying to make a similar point, but he wants to emphasize
that both alienation and anomie must occur simultaneously. Industrial society
It conis always in need of a fixed social structure as a control mechanism.
fronts this need because of social complexities and the necessity for long leadtime plans. But it is similarly always in need of a weakening of the present
social structure to

make

it

more adaptable

to change.
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explanation for the existence of major
in

human

differences.

asking about such differences then a changed answer

persistence of the question.

primary and

that social

for example,

It

must be

meaning

is

is

If

obvious from the

the case that individual conflict is

possible precisely in such conflict.

we perhaps understand

seems, then,

personality formation

1

is

obviously superior, as

The person must risk himself

nourish himself

in

I

describe them.

neutral.

ential.

If

I

there

in

is

that

it

is

To

I

for his

his society.

cannot and do not re-

it

self refer-

is

between the view that there

I

shall not argue here for the correct-

That argument

a dialectical relationship

is

intrinsic to the argu-

among concepts and among

call a concept dialectical is, after all, just another

self-alienated.

Here

such a

is

is not.

view of human alienation.

ments made previously for
persons.

human

a legitimate conflict, between theories of personality form-

and the view that there

my

from himself and

myself adopt the atomistic view and then make

Aside from the preceding comments
ness of

the essential

why

is

Hence the condition

adopting this view

ation then clearly the ultimate conflict

conflict

is

This

new social environments, yet

to be a kind of alienation

should be noted, however, that

main

in

persisting social environment.

very existence does seem
It

)

that neither the organicist nor the atomistic base of

suppose that both are necessary and that alienation

condition.

(Thus,

the concept of communication itself by

contrast with opposing concepts of atomism and alienation.
It

someone persists

I

want only

to

way

argue the usefulness of

as a "working hypothesis," given present social conditions.

of saying

my

view
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Arguments from Expediency

--

From

the science of medicine

that desperate conditions require desperate
remedies.

that our conditions

approach desperation

time

at the

I

is

It

am

we know

widely claimed

writing.

The energy-

population squeeze, the world-wide inflationary spiral, and
the capacity of
nations for mutually annihilating

war are major pieces

more important

little

still,

and only a

more

of evidence.

illusive, is the

Probably

sense that we are,

indeed, in a state of growing alienation from ourselves and from each
other.

At such a time as this no diagnoses of our condition should be rejected out of
hand.

My

diagnosis

alienation.

may show

is that

we are

ill

precisely because we are trying to avoid

Apparent physical illness

is

successful struggle with a disease as

successful struggle with environment.

may

sometimes a sign

be an indication of human

only increase

it

life

and,

In the

if

to pathological levels for

may

of health.

Fever

high adrenalin levels a

same way, moderate

alienation

so, then the attempt to avoid

it

some people, while reducing

it

may
to

levels equally pathological, but less apparently so, for others.

The Horns

of the Planning

Let us suppose, then, that alienation

would we see public planning and
I

the

is

Dilemma

intrinsic to

human

beings.

problems which planning seeks

propose that we take as our model the alienated personality.

How

to solve?

As described,

personality represents a dialectic between changing personality traits (the
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process of self-realization which Western culture has
largely and strongly
extolled) and an enduring self identity.

personality directly;

might be

this:

it

But planning does not usually deal with

deals with society.

Hence, the analogous dialectic

Planned society represents a process which must simultaneously

allow for personal and social commitment while achieving a conscious
ordering

The element

of social change.

hood

in the single individual.

of

commitment

And

parallels that of enduring self-

the element of conscious change parallels

that of individual self-consciousness.

The element

of

commitment cannot be overemphasized.

taken for granted, and sometimes even tacitly rejected,
planning.

The result

and consequently a less important function than
in their

own ways.

The large-scale physical

both physically and socially.

often

it is

discussions of

in

that planning appears an easier,

is

Yet

more simply

rational,

But things do endure and

it is.

an enormous commitment

city is

Planning would be easy

if

this

commitment could

11
be abandoned, as some writers (Buckminster Fuller for example)
seem to

suppose and as American society has pretended
recently in

its

suburban escape.

time of tightening resources

A

person's

life

work

is

it

But the

will

also a

to

do

commitment

remain

in its frontier

is still

and more

there, and in a

so.

commitment—a

Planning would be easy and, again, less necessary,

psychic and social one.

if

this

commitment,

H For

too,

a brief but apt description of this attitude, see the discussion on
Fuller in Paul Goodman and Percival Goodman, C ommunitas: Means of Live
revised; New York: Random
lihood and Ways of Life Vintage Books (2d ed.
to as Communitas ]
referred
[Hereinafter
House, 19C>U), pp. 76-82.
,.

,

.
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could simply be abandoned.
a severe one.
to be

very

And

main response

the

flexible, in other

trivializes a severe

At the time of writing, the problem of job loss

words

of officialdom consists in exhortations

abandon the commitment.

to

is

problem for which

the better response

This response

might well be a

serious attempt at manpower planning.

The element
sized, but that too

of

conscious change

may

easily happen.

is

perhaps less apt to be under-empha-

For the physical environment, the goals

of

growth management and environmental protection are sometimes interpreted

in

such a way as virtually to stop

all

change.

For

the

the seniority principle has often had a similar effect.

planning

is

absence

of

no more difficult or important

To

commitment.

plan

Community and Opportunity
particular dilemma of

In

.

In

Clearly, the process of

absence

of

change than

in the

work with dilemma.
what follows

commitment and change

inology and an expanded meaning.

Haworth.

is to

in the

employment problem,

but

I

I

shall be talking about this

shall use a different

term-

The terminology comes from Lawrence

Th e Good City he expressed the problem of planning as follows

(but did not himself see

it

as an enduring dilemma).

Specialization of activities and of the person is the source of the distinctive contribution that the urban environment

makes

to the

good

life.

But

also the source of that condition of cities which renders them least likely to sustain a good life. What specialization contributes to the good life is
opportunity. Because urban life is specialized it is diverse; the person conit

is

fronts an unlimited wealth of opportunities to act, to express himself, to

develop his potentialites. What specialization removes from life is community. By promoting a plurality of individual worlds, specialization
dissolves the continuity of persons, their sense of living a common life and
their common concerns. The problem is that of restoring community to
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the city in such a

way

that the distinctive contribution of city life,
the
wealth of opportunity it offers, is not lost. 12

I

shall use Haworth's

By "community"

I

terms

We may

it

maintain that thought and action are intimately

is

we are committed

to a high

material standard

our concepts which determine what a high

definition of

community

is,

I

definitions which characterize

think, consistent with other

it

more

as having small scale, simplicity,

face to face relationships, or, in short, a rural-village character.

people would agree that the larger society
fluid

assuming

In

is.

The

common

I

think that

of living, for example, but

standard

broader way.

mean, most basically, conceptual commitment.

a contextualist epistemology,
interrelated.

in a similar though possibly

and open than

is

the small.

is,

in

it

Some people would

ments clashed.

commitment—a

a lack of

still

see in this larger

view

Because the latter view assumes there

it

is

Others, however,

lacunae within which opposing commit-

fundamental conceptual and action choices
this latter

more

in its conceptualizing,

society a conceptual commitment, although an evolving one.

would see

Many

more room

is

in that society

I

accept

indeed true that conceptual commitment

is

it.

for

And on

associated with

the smaller scale society.

As our commitment

framework which

is the

is

primarily conceptual, so

most important object

12 Lawrence Haworth, The

University Press, 1963),

p.

19.

it is

our conceptual

of conscious change.

Good City (Bloomington,

Indiana:

By

Indiana
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"opportunity"

mean, therefore, an openness

I

reasons already given,

this definition

to conceptual change.

seems consistent with

definition of opportunity as involving a large scale,

face to face relationships are less

Haworth says,

common.

It

the

And

more concrete

complex society,

is in

for

in

which

such an urban society, as

that there is the greatest wealth of opportunities to act

and to

realize one's potentialities.

What

I

have called the dilemma of planning, this dialectic of opportunity

and community,
planning.

is

a recurring

theme

in the

seminal literature

The physical environment has always provided one

and most easily perceived canvases on which
of self -alienation is vividly

to sketch

human

is

ideas.

of people into

The "country"

only a suburb scarcely distinguishable, socially and

economically, from what they

left.

Probably the most influential of recent planning theorists

Howard whose work was
elsewhere.

The idea

renew themselves; for

people never truly succeed and the movement never ceases.

which they return

of the greatest

expressed by the pulsating movement

the city to find themselves then out to the country to

to

of physical

the basis of the

Howard spoke

of three

new town movement

magnets.

is

Ebenezer

in Britain

and

The "town magnet" provided

social and economic opportunity but at the cost of unhealthy working and living
conditions, the closing out of nature, and the "isolation of crowds.

"

The

"country magnet" provided the beauty of nature but lacked the advantages of the
town.

And

it,

too, often

provided an impoverished

life.

Howard saw

this
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dilemma as resolvable through

a "town -Country

magnet," 13 and

town-country phenomenon has come about, partly

more commonly

as suburban growth.

But

in the

form

suburbanization

if

of

in fact this

new towns but

may seem

to

have

resolved those parts of the dilemma connected with material living standards,
it

has not obviously resolved that deeper problem hinted

"isolation of crowds.

by the phrase

at

"

Lewis Mumford speaks more directly

to the latter

guishing between individuation and socialization.

problem by distin-

In the past,

according to

him, these two were treated as alternative social philosophies.

The one em-

phasized the privacy of individuals and the importance of personal freedom.

The other emphasized
But

Mumford

Except within

it

too, denies that there is

human

reason (probably a kind
individuals are

community.

the importance of the

any dilemma,

individuation would not arise.
of evolution) society

now highly differentiated and

which freedom does not mean empty chaos, and

(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.

I.

For some inexplicable

14

in

'Good planning

it.

dynamic equilibrium,

Thus

is

an

in

which discipline does not

To-Morrow

,

ed. by F.

J.

Osborn

T. Press, 1965), pp. 45-49.

14 Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York:
& World, Inc. 1938), pp. 454-56.
,

primary.

the theory of individuation is as

in a state of

13 Ebenezer Howard, Garden Cities of

is

becomes complex, however.

valid as that of socialization, but without negating

attempt to keep the whole environment

Society

Harcourt, Brace
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mean

an even more vacuous death.

"

15

Today

to provide a generic, equalized, standardized,
it

an individualism which

possibility

comes from an abundance

The Goodmans,
dilemma.

is specific,

is

it

communal base and

of

also, identify what to

me

belt plans, "

and for similar reasons, they see no problem

and

for the first time in history

...

a technology of free choice.

pilot

".

way

of abundance.

experiments.

.

.

of life,

we want

if

we can do

The theme

ISibid.

,

1

.

.

in

.

to

And with

.

p.

19 Ibid.

,

pp.

into

in the

United

this technology of choice,

that could underwrite

combine town and country values

that.

sweeping reforms

which appear

to be

12-13.

an agrindustrial

opposed but really are not

458.

11.

in

"

17 Goodman and Goodman,

,

"

Like Mumford, though,

combining these interests

16 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

and "industrial plans,

we have, spectacularly
.

is to

8

of dual values

p.

life,

whose purpose

^

integrated plans which serve the whole man.

"...

This

reflect the horns of the planning

latter for the sake of the former.

we have an economy

to rest upon

energy and resources. 16

quarantine technology from domestic and social

States,

Mumford,

standardized, even aristocratic.

They distinguish between "green

which sacrifice the

possible, says

Communitas

,

Pt.

I.
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is thus

central to classical planning theory.

abundance which saves us from dilemma.
however.
us from

I

According
I

to that theory,

it

is

disagree with the classic theory,

shall argue that abundance aggravates the

dilemma instead

of saving

it.

In the

examination

of the thought of

Lindblom and Mannheim,

I

therefore

see myself tracing out the two sides of the planning dilemma and elucidating
the social and personal alienation which that

dilemma must express.

Each side

represents, on this view, a perennial effort to resolve the dilemma by simul-

taneously cancelling and preserving the opposing position.

The

effort appears

as an inner debate within the writer's thought.

Lindblom, Liberal Planning

,

and Opportunity.

Lindblom 's Position --If one begins with an emphasis on conscious change,
even at some cost

in social

call "liberal planning. "

blom seems

commitment, then one takes

The writings

of

the approach which

Charles Lindblom illustrate

to accept the reality both of an existing conceptual

democratic culture)

9

f)

somehow independent

it.

of that defined

by the framework.

It is

Lind-

framework

and of individual interaction, or bargaining, which

I

(the

is

this apparently

contradictory vision which puts him in debate with himself.

For anyone who agrees

that conceptual spectacles help color our thought,

the existence of those spectacles

blom.

is

the first assumption, and so

Yet for him these spectacles do not have

20See

text, chap.

Ill,

p.

136 and footnote

a.

8.

it

is for

comprehensive impact.

Lind-

What
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exists

is

only a structure of sharing and agreement

competing interest groups.
not

seem

to imagine, in

It is

most

Adam

among more

Smith's hidden hand.

Lindblom does

of his writing, that the conceptual

which we are implicated might affect not only the matter

or less freely

framework

of social

in

agreement

but the very nature of, and structural relationships
among, the groups them-

selves.

is

Perhaps, however, the social division which

is

really

most important

a class division and perhaps that division limits the autonomy
of groups and

the

amount

of free competition

which

is

open

to

them.

Despite the fact that Lindblom's concept of democracy does not seem to

be a complete conceptual structure, he treats
not

merely a

set of rules

they take action.

It

is

which are referred

the

phenomenon

something basically harmonious.

it

as

to by

if it

Democracy

were.

competing groups before

of the competition itself,

Good policy

is

is just that

understood as

which results from

the competition and policy evaluation is the competition process. 21

What

specifically generates Lindblom's inner debate is his continually

more elaborated attempt
ity- -and not as

of a cohesive

to identify a

group competition which exists

an empty category- -but which nevertheless

and pervasive culture.

It

may seem

that he

is the

2*See

text, chap.

Ill,

p.

22 See text, chap.

Ill,

pp.

162 and footnote 52.

153,

162 and footnote 52.

manifestation

never reaches that

state of truly free competition- -that his so-called bargaining is

bee -like interaction process which he sees as democracy.

in actual-

22
It

merely

the

may seem,
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then, that the need for conscious social change
it is

ual

the other need which

is

never met.

This

is

a culture of sharing

never met.

In fact,

however,

because the apparent concept-

is

commitment from which Lindblom departs

culture of democracy

is

is that of

non-commitment! The

among atoms;

it is

not an organic

whole.
Both Lindblom and

commitment while

at the

Mannheim seem

same time

of conscious conceptual change.

image as

it

were.

If

to be trying to

more

giving ever

But Lindblom

one's conceptual

makes

acknowledge conceptual

reality to the

phenomenon

the effort in its reverse

framework interprets human action as

atomistic competition and thus, ironically, as something free of the conceptual

framework, then

to

make such competition more

petition over conceptual

truly free

frameworks themselves, including

terprets action in that way.

The problem

To be

so-called paradox of democracy.

is,

fully

in

is to

make

it

a

com-

the one which in-

form, something like the

democratic

is to

be able to vote

away democracy.
The attempt

I

see in Lindblom to make his concept, of bargaining increas-

ingly real reaches its terminus,

ing

may

racy.

of lesser

Lindblom comes close
In that

to

goods but

is

saying this

"

where

this collective

good

is

not

an overall vision of the public interin

1965 in the Intelligence of

work he acknowledges piecemeal

overall one. 23

"Z3

suggest, in the attempt to show that bargain-

take place over a "collective good,

merely an aggregate
est.

I

Democ -

collective goods, though not an

But in 1972 he clearly suggests that there could be competition

See text, chap.

Ill,

p.

186.

310

over total world views and hence over the broadest interpretations of the collective good.

^

Lindblom does not specify,

in

much

what different kind of social

detail,

structure could be implied in a new world view.

But he suggests that such a

social structure might not have the atomistic character of bargaining or market

exchange.

Instead

relationships.

it

would presumably involve more organic and communal

Hence the competition between world views would be ultimately

one between a competition view of society and a non -competition view.

If,

in

this process, the organic view prevailed then liberalism, in attempting to re-

seem

solve the planning dilemma, would

to

have destroyed

Liberal Planning -- Lindblom 's position
ical foundation for

what

I

call liberal planning.

itself.

one expression of the theoret-

is

saying this

(In

I

don't acknowl-

edge any significantly real distinction between theory and practice --but there
is

an analytical distinction and

The

it is

its

which

means,

is its

to try to achieve the latter.

in planning is the

individual competition.

achieved

refer.

is

)

dilemma

of conceptual

decision to embrace the former and,

Of course

ceed or further change would be impossible.

approach

I

distinctive response of liberalism to the

change or conceptual commitment
by

that to

Put

it

more

must not

finally suc-

concretely, the liberal

continuous attempt to achieve community through

The irony

in this

approach

is that

the

community

always a community of competitors, not of organic relationships

24 See text, chap.

Ill,

p.

149 and footnote 25.
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and cooperation.

Many
scribe

it,

professional planners would deny that liberal planning, as

represents a form of planning.

For them, planning means

conventional theory of rational policy-making. 25

Writers

like

I

the

Lindblom or,

on another side, John Friedmann are considered to be anti-planners.
advocates of the rationality model admit that
but they claim, nonetheless, that

The

rationality

missing

model points

in liberal planning-

to

it

is the

it

de-

The

poorly accords with practice

proper normative theory.

1

an important something which, for me,

disagree.

is

-an awareness of the reality of individual decisions

25This statement can be misleading.

Until the decade of the 1960s,

American urban planners were
process.

relatively little aware of planning as a general
Before that time, a course in planning theory was most likely to

focus on goals and, specifically, on the ideal city literature. Such discussion
of process as there was tended to be hortatory or to refer to techniques, although there were some classic works, like those of Patrick Geddes, which

might be mentioned.
An important sign of change was the discussion of the conceptual scheme
in Meyerson's and Banfield's case study of Chicago public housing policy. This
study articulated that rationality model previously implicit in American urban
planning and, at the same time, it cast doubt on the realism of the model. See

Martin Meyerson and E. C. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955).
Despite the practical difficulties of the rationality model, Meyerson and
Banfield still considered it a worthwhile ideal. In 1%2 it received a more
extended discussion in the pages of the planning profession's own journal. The
article also emphasized the value of planning for widening the range of choice,
and thus it brought together the earlier Utopian interests and the new rational
process interests of planning. See Paul Davidoff and Thomas A. Reiner, "A
Choice Theory of Planning, " Journal of the American Institute of Planners
XXVIII (May, 1962), 103-15."
Impressed by the apparent rigor attainable in the transportation planning
of the 1960s, much of urban planning has tried to adopt the same systems
analytic approach to its own concerns. The rationality model now tends to
appear in the guise of such an approach. The goa] of the rational process may
,
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and of zero-sum conditions.

The insights

What

it

wrong with

the theory -practice gap.
action, and

In

we cannot have

my

helpful for action.

the rationality

view there

it.

Some writers on
a social policy even

is its

no such gap.

When we describe how

not providing a neutral observation.

either how they should be

is

model

dependence on

Planning

is

a

human

a cognition of such action without simultaneously

making a practical judgment on

we are

model cannot be very

provides will need to be incorporated into some other model.

basically

is

But the

We

made or perhaps how

policies are

made

are simultaneously describing
they should not.

social policy-making would allow something to be called

if it

was purely capricious from

the standpoint of the

society as a whole, being the outcome merely of the competing deliberations
of individuals and groups.

Other writers would insist that there

is

no policy-

making, properly so-called, except where someone acting for the society as a

whole has based the policy on deliberations over alternatives and their consequences.

Lindblom

model belong

is

one of the first group.

to the second.

It is

Advocates

apparent that the principal dispute between

these two groups concerns how to identify policy making.
policy

is

not at issue here since

be one outside the system or

it

it

of the rationality

is

The goodness

of

such

implicit in the identification.

may

be the equilibrium of the system itself. In
confidence in our ability to gain detailed quanti-

any case, there has been much
fiable knowledge about the urban system, and hence to approach the kind of
comprehensive calculation possible according to the rationality model. For an
example of this confidence, see J. Brian McLaughlin, Urban and Regional
Planning: A Systems Approach (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969).

"
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My

point is that

if

to fully conceptualize

ly

because

it

human

a

in theory.

it

The

possible in practice

is

rationality

has not been fully accepted.

know what we are supposed

don't

action

fy general goals apart

from

to accept!

When

is

and how we can know

advance of choice.

in

defective not simp-

Lindblom asks how we can identi-

This

is

all

a con-

theorists mostly leave this problem for the practition-

ers they are not adopting a feasible division of labor.

own

is

has not been accepted because we

all the relevant trade-offs

these trade-offs (which keep changing)
ceptual problem.

It

model

we must be able

responsibilities since the problem

simultaneously solved

in theory.

They are evading their

cannot be solved in practice unless

Until

it

is

solved, rational planning

is

it

not

a very legitimate theory.

The theory
because

it

of liberal planning is a

more

legitimate theory.

better describes what actually happens.

happens because

it is

a

more

legitimate theory.

It

It

is

so not

better describes what

In distinguishing

between

theory and practice, advocates of rationality are, of course, assuming an
empiricist epistemology according to which there
But

be

if

there

more

is

none,

if

is

a neutral social reality.

social concepts and social reality mesh, then there can

than one planning theory that appears to be "merely descriptive,

provided there are competing world views.
Although there

is still

among American urban

a substantial allegiance to the rationality model,

planners,

~26see, for example

;

26 allegiance

is shifting

toward the theories

Donald N. Rothblatt, "Rational Planning Reexamined,

"
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of liberal

and radical planning.

had been speaking prose

Like Molicre's gentleman

all his life,

many

practitioners, and even

theorists, have realized that in "applying" their theory

they have really adopted the liberal model.

among

who discovered he

(i.e.

in

more

completing

it)

They have functioned as brokers

city agencies, business interests, etc. or have lobbied for a
planning

interest

among many

other interests.

^

These newly realized liberals may

still

eschew Lindblom's work

(de-

spite his explicit claim to be propounding another kind of planning rather than

opposing planning).
similar things.

But they are increasingly influenced by others

who say

Altshuler's case studies of planning practice are required

reading for the American Institute of Planners membership examination.

In

these studies, Altshuler echoes the Lindblom point by claiming that general
goals provide no basis for evaluating concrete alternatives.

According

Altshuler people prefer to work at lower levels of generality even

fragmenting policy choices.

And

obviously superior to another.

at these

if

to

this

means

lower levels no one point of view

The planner

is

a specialist

is

among other

Journal of the American Institute of Planners XXXVII (January, 1971), 26-37.
The rationality model has probably had more application in Western and
Eastern Europe, where legislatures are less fractionated, than in the United
,

States.

This writer's discussion principally concerns American planning.

27 0ne sign of this new realization comes from statements of candidates
for office in the American Institute of Planners and in the American Society of
Planning Officials. Another is the more or less frankly acknowledged national
lobbying efforts in which the Institute is now engaged.
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specialists.

In

^

an influential 1967 review of planning approaches,
Bolan acknowledges

the difficulties of the rationality

largely abandoned.

model but holds

out hope that

it

need not be

9Q

By 1969, however, he has developed a supposedly value-

free description of the planning process from which he
concludes the import-

ance of incremental decision-making and negotiated conflict resolution. 30

He

intimates that the planner must become a sort of broker Ons own terms are

motivator, coordinator, and consensus builder).

The brokerage role

ad-

is

vocated explicitly by Rabinovitz who suggests that the planners will have to

assume such

a role,

if

long-run urban problems are to be resolved.

The

politicians, she says, have not successfully applied the role to that end. 31

Within the profession, the most influential and explicit of the liberal
planners

is

liberalism

there

is

probably Davidoff.
is

Yet, though he claims to be a pluralist, his

perhaps more classic than that of others.

He, too denies that

a single interpretation of the public interest, and he concludes that

2$A.lan Altshuler,

The City Planning Process:

New York:

Cornell University Press, 1965).
City Planning Process ]

A

Political

An alysis

(Ithaca

[Hereinafter referred to as The

.

2 ^Richard S. Bolan,

ican Institute of Planners

^Richard
Planning,

"

S.

,

"Emerging Views
XXXIII

(Juty,

of Planning, " Journal of the

Amer -

1967), 233-45.

"Community Decision Behavior: The Culture of
American Institute of Planners XXXV (September

Bolan,

Jo urnal of the

,

1969), 301-10.

31 Francine F.

ton Press, 1969).

Rabinovitz, City Politics and Planning (New York:

Ather-
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planners should be advocates for interest
groups.

sary planning process

is

But his

image

The

latter

have been as hopeful for the advancement of minorities
and

purpose with which Davidoff
its

adver-

the discovery of truth, as in the criminal
proceedings

32
of a court, rather than the striking of a
bargain.

ness of

of this

is

particularly concerned.

image would not

it is

that specific

Despite the explicit -

pluralism, Davidoff's views are perhaps the closest,

among

liberal

planners, to those of the radicals in planning.

Though from within

the rationality

structively noted the defects

moved

in

model planners have clearly and con-

liberalism, they have not yet done so as they

within the embrace of the liberal model

easier from the outside than the inside.
one of disillusion and cynicism, as
Politics

33
.

in

itself.

The problem looks

The new response seems

often to be

Catanese's book on Planners and Local

Planners are just not convinced that an interest group competition

really can constitute a form of community.
In the end,

model than with

American urban planners seem
that of technical rationality.

little

happier with the liberal

The frontier

of planning thought

09

^Davidoff presents two different directions

in his writing.

His essay on

a choice theory of planning (see footnote 25) incorporates the model of rational
decision, but his essay on advocacy planning could lead away from that model.

See Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning, " Journal of the
ican Institute of Planners, XXXI (November, 1965), 331-38.

Amer -

^Anthony James Catancse, Planners and Local Politics: Impossible
Dreams, Sage Library of Social Research, Vol. VII (Beverly Hills, California:
Sage Publications,

Inc.

,

1974).
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seems already

to

have moved on to radical planning.

The deepest theoretical

foundations of radical planning are traceable, in part
at least, to Karl Mannheim.

Mannheim, Radical Planning, and Community
Mannheim's Position

--

Mannheim expresses

commitment and conceptual change more
appears that Lindblom *s problem,

the dialectic of conceptual

directly than does Lindblom.

in theory,

how there can be real

is

It

conflict

within a democratic culture so consensual that negotiations are usually con-

sidered to be satisfactory just
in practice, is the

being made.

But

I

suggest that the problem,

reverse one of determining how a competition of atomic

individuals and groups can

competition

in

make

a

community which

more

is

than just that

itself.

Unlike Lindblom, Mannheim begins his thought with a certain emphasis

on
it

full

conceptual commitment.

the idea of

would

do.

challenge

ment.

It is

non-commitment as

commitment which does

the conceptual

Mannheim's position yields
is to

of the

market system

a radical approach to planning.

The

achieve conscious conceptual change despite conceptual commit-

Again unlike Lindblom, Mannheim sees

merely a

model

not contain within

our conceptual spectacles not

in

set of shared preferences but a definition of the very social structure

which would color those preferences.
sequent to his dissertation.

34

some passages --for example

But

in the

I

This becomes clearer in works subsuggest that

it

claim that one

34 See text, chap. IV, pp. 225, 237.

is

present there, also,

may

in

see cultural manifesta-
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tions historically, without thereby falling into
35
relativism.

What generates an inner debate within much

more elaborated attempt

his continually

establish that there can be people

of

Mannheim's thought

to realize conceptual

is

freedom- -to

who achieve some escape from

their per-

spectives --while he yet maintains that the perspective has the character of a
total

world view.

This effort might be said to reach

its

goal in 1943 when he

suggests that individuals are so free that they can plan for religious experi-

He sees

ence.

purely intellectual "perspectives.
gives meaning.

If

man can

"

It is

that

become

effort in this way, his distinctive

priority of the conceptual

saw more

which ultimately integrates and

in radical

in liberal planning, as regards the planning

conceptual commitment to become free of

to

one can interpret

planning

is

the reverse of that

Here one embraces

Specifically, one wants to provide

for opportunity, for self realization, within the bounds of community.

community
planning,

is

is

usually meant a small community.

a sophisticated concept.

It

35 See text, chap. IV, footnote 63.

36 See text, chap. IV,

p.

240.

is

the

have been destroyed.

dilemma.

it.

if

commit-

approach—the emphasis on

commitment- -seems

Radical Planning -- The intent

truly free of that

dilemma,

But in thus trying to resolve the planning

Mannheim's

that earlier he

freely plan his conceptual commitment, by planning

for religious experience, then he would have

ment.

way

religious experience in the

And by

Radical Planning, like liberal

not blindly anti -system nor funda-

^
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mentally violent (although for some people

One can develop

from

a supposedly

in

may mean

that).

"merely descriptive" theory

the radical perspective as well as

mistaken

it

from

the liberal one.

of planning

Lindblom

is

supposing that the description of existing policy processes will

necessarily favor his own view.

Consider the following contrast.

Bolan

develops a descriptive theory of the planning process on the foundation of the
rationality model as modified for group decision-making.

He builds the bar-

gaining model into key steps of this process and concludes, not surprisingly,
that

planners adopt this bargaining approach they are more apt

if

action.

Grand efforts

to

to affect

change institutions or reallocate resources are less

likely to be effective than efforts at incremental change, in his view. 37

Friedmann proposes

a different descriptive theory of planning.

It

is

organized

around a basic distinction between allocative planning, which distributes existing resources within an existing institutional framework, and innovative planning, which builds

The conceptual

new

institutions and fundamentally reallocates resources.

division which

Friedmann makes would be almost useless

for

Bolan since the latter denies that there can be any significant amount of innovative planning anyway.

planning

in a

But

it

leads Friedmann

to

look at instances of national

country like Chile where the model seems

to

apply better than

37 Bolan, "Community Decision Behavior: The Culture of Planning,
p.

"

306.

38 John Friedmann, "A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning
Behavior," in A Reader in Planning Theory ed. by Andreas Faludi (Oxford:
Pergamon Press, 197377 pp. 345-70. See especially p. 349.
,
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does Bolan's.

(It

must be admitted, however,

model" does not seem

to reflect his fully

The more developed theory

Grabow and Heskin,

is

mass

Friedmann's "descriptive

developed theory of radical planning.

less applicable.

)

building in particular on the insights of Roszak, 39

have set forth some of the main features

We

that

in a radical

concept of planning:

presently live under a world view consisting of the maintenance of a
technocratic society governed by the myth of an objective conscious-

ness, through the demands of the rational-comprehensive model, with
emphasis on an accommodating economic growth. The paradigm rising to
challenge this present concept of reality is based on systems ch ange and the
realization of a decentralized communal society which facilitates hum an

development by fostering an appreciation of an ecological ethic based on the
spontaneity and experimentatio n. 4ir
~

evolutionary p rocess:

The authors do not mean, by
process continues only

the above passage, that the evolutionary

until a decentralized

realization of this society

is

communal

society

is

realized.

The

a perpetual effort, a sort of permanent revolution,

which the radical planner helps

facilitate but

which he does

not, in the tradi-

tional sense, "plan.

The process

of evolutionary experimentation is,

feature of radical planning.

It is

a process that

I

think, the central

somehow synthesizes

rational

action and spontaneity so that the person engaged in social learning does not set

39xheodore Roszak, The Making of a Counterculture: Reflections on the
Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition Anchor Books (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1969).
,

,

40Stephen Grabow and Allan Heskin, "Foundations for a Radical Concept
American Institute of Planners XXXIX (March,
of Planning, " ~~
J ournal of the
,

1973),

109.

41

Ibid.

-
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himself apart from what

is

learned. 42

what he calls transactive planning.

Friedmann develops

this

process into

Transactive planning involves subject

matter communication together with the more personal

"life of dialogue. "

The

transaction occurs between the abstract processed knowledge of the planner
and
the

more personal

less generalizable knowledge of a client. 43

While the process

of radical planning is learning, rather than bargaining,

the context of such planning
of

competing interests.

is

the small

community, rather than a large society

The Goodmans, whose classic work describes

the goals

of radical planning, though not the process, see these communities as relative
ly fixed.

44

group. 4 ^

Recent works see them more as task forces which group and re-

What matters

in

any case

is that

the relationships

among

those

people within them are fully personal.

The promise

of radical planning is the

achievement of a society

in

which

people are known as wholes, as they would be in a small community, but which

does not have the provinciality or rigidity
it

is not a fixed

tributes to

community.

of the usual

small community since

Put another way, the learning activity which con-

human development does

not alienate the person, as abstract thought

42 Ibid.

43John Friedmann, Retracking America: A Theory of Transactive Flan ning, Anchor Books (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press /Doubleday, 1973),
chap. 7. [Hereinafter referred to as Retracking America ]
.

44 Goodman and Goodman, Communitas
45 Friedmann, Retracking America,

p.

,

chap.

196.

6.

322

would

do,

because the activity

is

not

merely abstract.

It is

an evolving merger

of the rational and the spontaneous, the abstract and the personal,

At the present time, the theory of radical planning
influential

there

among academicians

than

among

a sense of optimism which allows

is

The posture

self-criticism.

is in

is

practitioners.

little

room

marked contrast

probably much more
supporters

In its

for second droughts or

to that of the liberal plan-

ners who, though they also are often optimistic, show a recognition

even dilemma,

culty,

What makes

of diffi-

in their views.

the

optimism

of radical planning so particularly frustrating

to critics is that the language of the theory tends to preclude its knowing appli-

cation, and so

it

is

an illusive target for criticism.

an unspecifiable combination

know when one

is

engaged

hence complete, and

it

of the abstract

in it?

seems

If

the learning process is

and the personal, how can one

The theory seems impossible

to apply

and

thus to produce as serious a gap between theory

and practice as does the rationality model.

Promised Resolutions

of the Planning

Dilemma

.

At the level of planning

practice neither liberal nor radical planning obviously resolves the planning

dilemma --the problem how

to

have both conceptual commitment and conscious

change of that commitment, or how to have both community and opportunity.

There

is disillusion

with the results of planning interpreted as liberalism.

planning
there perhaps ought to be equal disillusion with radical

amined

carefully.

At the level of abstract theory, however,

it

if it

is

And

was ex-

possible to
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P romise a solution without being held immediately

to account.

I

suggest that

such promised solutions are provided by both Lindblom and
Mannheim.

Lindblom maintains that there
is

is

a consensual democratic culture which

nevertheless a culture of bargaining and exchange, and

is

hence, by impli-

cation, one consisting of beings atomistically related to each other.
that the beings are so related he

must show

that they can question the very

exchange culture which defines them as atoms.

This he seems to do in 1972

by himself arguing the case for such questioning.
his earlier support of bargaining.

somehow

A.

To show

reader

But he does not then abandon

is left

with the impression that

the values of a competitive society and those of a

more cooperative

organic one are compatible.

Mannheim argues
ism

in that

it

for the existence of a culture which goes beyond

structures the very identity of individuals and groups, as well as

their relationships to each other.
culture, at least

show

some

Despite the pervasive influence of this

individuals can loosen

that individuals can

that they can

atom-

become

its

influence, he maintains.

truly free, however,

form the culture which forms them.

To

Mannheim must show

He appears

to

do this in

1943 in arguing the possibility that one can plan for religious experience.

But

neither then nor later does he explicitly abandon his claim for a culture -bound

consciousness.

Perhaps the immediate reason why neither writer acknowledges a pers istent

dilemma

is

because each assumes the prior achievement of one side and

324
thus has only to focus on establishing the
other.

assumes

assume

is that for

which the other argues.

In that case,

Lindblom does indeed appear

the reality of that atomistic individualism which,
seen

viewpoint as conceptual freedom,

Mannheim

in Large part

assumes

it is

what each
to

from Mannheim's

the tetter's purpose to establish.

And

the reality of conceptual wholeness which,

seen from Lindblom 's viewpoint as social coordination,

it

is the latter's

plan

to reveal.

But this kind of logical interdependence should cause

the two sides.

If,

say, Lindblom leaves

lish that social reality really is a

Mannheim succeeds

in

his assumption

someone

like

Mannheim

to estab-

doing so, then the latter has said that social reality

seems

Whatever may be

to

the

Yet Lindblom wants to say that

to preclude

him from saying

it is

and

immediate reason why Mannheim and Lindblom are

suggest, because both accept
Intelligence of

is

so.

willing to hold apparently contradictory positions, the ultimate reason

The

to

matter of competing atomic individuals, and

not a matter of organic wholeness.

now

it

embarrassment

some kind

of theory-practice gap.

Democracy Lindblom observes

is,

I

At the end of

that his attempt at a

formal

evaluation of partisan mutual adjustment must be inconclusive, both generally

and

in particular situations .

must use
advance.

In

choosing among policy making methods, one

the incremental method, a

method which cannot

set forth standards in

^

46 Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making
through Mutual Adjustment (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 296-300.
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Although Mannheim,

appear

to

in

"The Sociology of Knowledge,

"

sets up what

be fixed absolute principles --such as the principle of
situational

determinism- -he suggested

that

it

is

not by absolutes but in what he elsewhere

calls the flux of life that a person reaches

And even were

spectives.

among perspectives were

this not so,

-

some freedom from

-even

if

partial per-

some formulae

moving

for

attainable --this fact, too, would be something only

discoverable as one works with the empirical data. 47

Thus Lindblom and Mannheim both say
while in theory these

seem

likely to be resolvable, only in practice can

Dilemma Avoidance

my

in

in

it.

we know

in

particular, then planning theoreticians must

supposing that the planning dilemma

is

avoidable.

the durability of alienation would imply the durability of a
of

that

as Class Exploitation?

views are correct, as regards the status of social concepts

general and of human alienation

be wrong

problems

know how.

for sure and

If

of their respective

On

the one hand,

dilemma expressive

And, on the other hand, there would be no theory-practice distinction

to

allow for a promise of solution, at the theoretical level, which was not immediately called to account

by practice.

Given the above conclusions,

I

trace out, in this section, the expected

Mannheim, "The Sociology of Knowledge, " chap. V appended to
An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge trans, by
Ideology and Utopia
Edward Wirth and Edward Shils, Harvest Books (New York: Harcourt, Brace
& World, Inc. 1936). See pp. 300-05.
47j<arl

:

,

,
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social consequences of continuing to

enough rough parallels

assume away dilemma.

Marxist thought so that a preview

to

The analysis has
in its

terms might

be useful.

1.

It

is

hypothesized that there

is

a contradiction in

human

thought.

By

abstraction a person splits himself into subject and object
and thus becomes
self-alienated.

Once

in existence this subject-object split --this self

contra-

diction- -impels the person to increasingly higher abstraction
and self aware-

ness—the object pole— but also
and

object.

The development

to increasing efforts at reunification of subject

of civilization,

and of

cities,

may

be seen as the

material expression of this mental struggle.
2.

There

a fundamental class division.

is

It

is

based upon relative

facility at abstract thought, since abstraction is the principal control

ism

Planners and planning theoreticians belong to the upper

in the society.

class, or "meritocracy.

3.

There

is a

"

process of exploitation.

It

results from the attempts of

the meritocracy to avoid the contradiction in thought, by obscuring

and hence

mechan-

to delay its

development.

its

existence,

Liberal and radical planning are instances

of this attempt.

4.

In these

continues to do

its

attempts at avoidance, however, the contradiction really

work.

and affluence which
is self-limiting

It

at first

and as

it

generates a process of increasing material control

obscures the contradiction.

But the growth process

slows the contradiction becomes increasingly painful

to the lower classes without their being able to articulate the cause.

This
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growth process

is

manifest in the physical environment as the
development of

the low density urban region.

The limits

to that

growth are also increasingly

evident in the form of intolerable congestion
and pollution.
5.

The contradiction reaches a kind

of fruition in the natural tendency of

a meritocratic society to overproduce the

number

most abstract

expressed by widespread higher

education.

The tendency

functions.

There

is

is

a three-fold result.

of

persons needed for the

Firstly, increasing

people become self-conscious about their world views.

numbers

of

Secondly, upper levels

of the meritocracy, in order to justify their positions to this increasingly
artic-

ulate audience,

must give more attention

to the applications of their abstractions.

Thirdly, this growing merger of theory and practice reveals

basic dilemma in thought.

become more

more

clearly the

For as these inherently contradictory abstractions

relevant, those

who apply them become more stressed;

the stress

can no longer be concentrated on others.
I

have already discussed the

character of thought.

first of the

In this section

of class exploitation, as

it

is

I

above five points --the alienating

briefly describe the hypothesized process

outlined in points two through four.

Point five is

elaborated in the following section.

The Meritocracy.

There does exist

theory-practice distinction and
society.

it

seems

a class division corresponding to the

to be the

most fundamental division

in

Tocqueville observes how the administrative class persisted in France
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through the Monarchy, the Republic and the
48
Empire.
so. 49

rv-i
Djilas
identifies a

new administrative

classless society of the Soviet Union. 50
this class looks like the old Czarist

assumed
the

to

class

industrial

economy

is

But in its meritocratic attributes

bureaucracy which Lenin confidently

The presence

America, however.

The

Galbraith finds that

no longer controlled by entrepreneurs but

by highly trained experts and managers whom he
techno -structure.

continues to do

in the self -proclaimed

be eliminable but quickly found was not. 51

American

It

calls, collectively, the

of a technical elite is not really

old entrepreneurs

may have

often

new

for

combined product

expertise with their other skills.

Prabably the fundamental attribute of this administrative class
ability of its

members

to think in abstractions

and

to

is

the

organize knowledge by

48 Alexis de Tocqueville, The
Old Regime and the Frenc h Revolution,
trans, by Stuart Gilbert, Doubleday Anchor Books (Garden Gity,

Doubleday and Company,
class

is

49

Inc.

not the chief point of

New York:

The persistence of the administrative
Tocqueville's work but it is an important one.
,

1955).

See, for evidence, Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon,

Phoenix Books (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964),

^Milovan
ed. by Arthur P.

308.

"The New Class, " in Essential Works of Marxism,
Mendel (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), pp. 319-46.

Djilas,

^Vladimir Lenin,
ism,

p.

ed. by Arthur P.

"State and Revolution, " in Essential

Works

Mendel (New York: Bantam Books, 1961).

of

Marx-

See

especially pp. 131-35.
5 2 John Kenneth Galbraith,

York: The
and XXV.

New American

The New

Library, 1967).

Industrial State, Signet Books

(New

See especially chaps. VI, VIII
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means
class

of these abstractions.

The

justification for the British administrative

particularly explicit on this point.

is

For

the British

ular subject knowledge that defines an
administrative class

past what defined such a

member was

with a liberal education.

it is

not the partic-

member.

In the

a certain family background combined

But in recent times the

membership

criterion has

been, increasingly, one of mental capacity. 53

With the rapid obsolescence

of technical knowledge, other countries

like Britain, begin to see in their administrative class
less a subject

may,

matter

expertise than a capacity for rapid learning through freely abstract thought.
I

shall follow Michael Young, Richard Herrnstein, and others in calling such
a

class the "meritocracy.

Perhaps
divisions.

55

it

is

possible for a person to rise through the meritocratic class

But even

if it is

the division itself

seems highly durable.

Our

53 For a concise discussion, see Anthony
Sampson, Anatomy of Britain

Today Harper Colophon Books (New York: Harper & Row,
,

54

It is

1965), pp. 257-66.

not suggested that the new administrative class includes no special-

ists but that the specialist/generalist distinction is no longer the decisive one

for determining

On

membership

in the

higher British administration.

social class division as intelligence -based, see Michael Young,

Rise of the Meritoc racy

1870-2033;

:

An Essay on Education and

Penguin Books, 1958); and R. J. Herrnstein,
Press Book (Boston, Massachusetts:
Monthly
Meritocracy, Atlantic
Brown and Company, 1973).
(Middlesex, England:

^ 5 See Herrnstein,

ligence

is

I.

I.

Q. in th e

Little,

argument that intela class division based on intelligence

Q. in the Meritoc r acy

largely hereditary and that

The

Equality

,

for the

consequently would allow little mobility.
Herrnstein has been vigorously criticized. The specific issue of the heritability of I. Q. is highly, even passionately, controversial. Hence, although
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admissions criteria for professional level work and for higher education constantly reaffirm

it.

The Unequal Burden
tocracy

is

the facility of

of Alienation

its

members

.

The defining

attribute of the

at abstract thought.

If

meri-

alienation is a

product of abstract thought, then as abstraction becomes more pervasive
alienation will

become more

intense.

In

my

view of alienation this means that

an individual will find conceptual commitment (community) must be purchased
at a higher cost in conceptual change (opportunity)

and vice versa.

Conventional wisdom identifies typical examples of this conflict.
is

the ambitious business executive

who

sacrifices family,

and geographic roots for self advancement.

community

Conversely there

--often visualized in the United States as a second generation

is the

There
life,

individual

immigrant—who

Q. scores have been widely used in education and although the assumption
of native differences in intellectual capacity seems to pervade industrial
society, when the assumption itself is commented upon it is often hotly denied.
1.

Yet it persists. Runciman, in arguing that all people should receive equal
respect but not equal praise, speaks about the different activities which children are "good at," the fact that one person may be more "gifted" than another,
differences in "talents" some of which are more admired than others and so on.
W. G. Runciman, Relative Dep rivation and Social Justice: A Study of Altitudes
Unito Social In equality in Twentieth Century England (Berkeley, California:
passim.
274-84,
versity 'of California Press, 1966), pp.
Lukes, after questioning the conclusiveness of the hereditarian findings
concludes
on I. Q. admits that perhaps, after all, these findings may hold and
so that the
that our objective, in any case, should be to organize society
realized. Steven
fully
be
will
powers of its members, whether great or small,
Leszek KolakowLukes, "Socialism and Equality," in The Socialist Ide a, ed. by
,

ski and Stuart

Hampshire (New York: Basic Books,

Inc.

,

1974).
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sacrifices goals of individual
development in order to remain

in the

old

home

neighborhood or town and concentrate on family
nurture.
believe that because of the meritocratic
class division the burden of

I

increased alienation
claims.

not spread so uniformly as conventional

is

The emphasis may well

wisdom pro-

shift in the direction of opportunity as

regards

the upper class but overall that class benefits
both in terms of opportunity and

community

while, conversely, the lower class is deprived in both
respects.

This inequity

is

not primarily attributable to any self-interested exercise
of

overt power by the meritocracy.
abstract thought in society.
to

any one political system.

and

in

communist ones.

It is

merely the consequence

Furthermore
Its effects

Whether

it is

this inequity

of applying

does not seem unique

are apparent both

in capitalist

eliminable in the "third world"

systems
is

un-

certain.

Abstract thought appears both as analysis and synthesis.

Through

analysis such thought increases the apparent complexity of reality.

synthesis a similarly abstract thought

Hence, those who deal

in

is utilized to

abstractions find

more

because they can see more richness

in their

munity more easily because

power

in their

represent smaller groups than do those for

For example,

Through

control that complexity.

opportunities open to them

environment.

And they

com-

find

of high synthesis they necessarily

whom

the synthesis is provided.

that ambitious business executive is one of a class of

professional and managerial people.

The class, considered as a whole,

is

a
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relatively comfortable one, regardless
of whether

Russian class.
lating

The work

of its

members

is

and their opportunities for social and

is

it

an American or a

usually challenging and stimupolitical participation, on a high

level, are also greater than are those
of the lower class.

Clearly they have

opportunities for conceptual change and growth.
But the class

community.

It

seems

not to fully pay for these opportunities by a loss in

does not encounter as

much

loss of personal ties or as

traumatic change to long held beliefs as one might expect.
professional

is

often cosmopolitan and personal at the

The few doctors, lawyers, or planners

both worlds.

know one another,

The world

much
of the

same time --the best
in a

of

region can easily

often be able to be together and, through the operation of

professional ethics, have seldom in the past had to come in severe conflict.

And

the professional will be treated

example,

to

more personally- -more

cope with family problems and more collegial concern for them.

Of greater importance, however,
his belief system.

Because the system

can appear less subject

to change.

vocates a change of principles

The cost
and thus

is

it

flexibility, for

it is

is the

is

professional's ability to maintain

more abstract

than that of others

When

the professional or executive ad-

not he

who

is likely to

pay most dearly.

imposed largely on those who must put the principles
rests

more heavily on them

than

it

would

if

it

into practice

uniformly distributed.

Consider the alienation of the industrial laborer from his work as a
result of a major conceptual change --the extreme rationalizing of the

work
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process.

The

intensity of that alienation results,

ment supposes

that the logical analysis of

substantial change in the
of that supposition that

boring.

56

supposition

work

I

suggest, because

details does not imply any

more general management

work

is

principles.

It

the burden of change is to be uniformly spread,
then

is

wrong, however.

One might resynthesize complex industrial work

an entire product.

is

because

allowed to become highly fragmented and

If

rather than small ones.

manage-

Workers would become

into large

management's

components

specialists, say, in assembling

And having now become more

valuable, and hence

more

independent-minded, their coordination by management, with respect to any
future organizational change, might well
for that management.

But at the

of alienation would decrease.

individual isolation or

mass

words, when the burden
change

same time

it is

difficult

and stressful

probable that their own sense

would become less a Hobson's choice between

action and

of a

in basic principles,

It

become more

change

more

a matter of group conflict.

in social

organization

is fairly

In

other

spread, the

and hence the impact on their custodians, may be

as risky and unpleasant as the change

5^For an extended examination

in details.

57

of the effects of industrial organization on

Chris Argyris, Personality and

personality, one valuable though older source

is

Organ i zation (New York: Harper & Brothers,

1957).

57i n a review of efforts for industrial democracy, which she finds to be

limited so far, Hirszowicz suggests that the relationship between effective
leadership, on the one hand, and worker participation in management, on the

The two principles can only coexist by
constant clashes and readjustments. The movement toward socialism

other, is inevitably contradictory.

means

of
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The only way
That

to eat one's

this is the relationship

cake and have

it

too

is to

someone

take

else's.

between the meritocracy and the lower classes

is

a hypothesis compatible with what we know of the latter as well
as of the former.

That second generation immigrant, mentioned earlier,

lower class.

Most

of the class are,

opportunities for self realization.
ful

community

community

ties part of

class that the family

is

But they

it

work

life,

is

what was lost

in

in

career success.

of a

in

meaning-

in a

family closeness and
Actually

most seriously degenerating. 58

not being replaced by

member

seldom find themselves

of child care, even child abuse are indications.

cline

a

comparatively speaking, deficient

Supposedly this individual gains

either.

is

it is

in his

Divorce, deficiencies

But though the family is in de-

some broader community

relationships.

In his

for example, the lower class laborer does not find his personal needs

to be treated flexibly- -he

works by

the time clock.

And he

is

more

apt to have

to see his fellows as adversaries, competing for his job or setting an intolerable

work

pace.

^

does not resolve this contradiction but only reveals it in a new form --the conflict of small groups (not just in production) against the power of large-scale
bureaucratic organization. See Maria Hirszowicz, "Industrial Democracy,
Self-Management and Social Control of Production, " in The Socialist Idea ed.
by Leszek Kolakowski and Stuart Hampshire (New York: Basic Books, Inc.
,

,

1974).

is

CO
^That the lower class has more incomplete families than do higher classes
well known. As one item of documentation, among many, sec S. Kirson Wein-

berg, Social Proble ms

in

Modern Urban Society

Jersey" Prentice -Hall, Inc.

,

1970), pp.

(2d ed.

;

Englewood

Cliffs,

New

153-56.

59 This entire discussion of the unequal burden of alienation

is

not heavily
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The lack

of

community

as evident in the matter of belief systems as in

is

that of personal relationships.

The simplest part

of a belief

system

explanation of the immediately tangible— the physical environment.

is its

Unfortun-

ately the physical environment has grown beyond the appreciation
of those not

comfortable with high abstractions.

We

live today in great

"urban regions" where the functions of industrial

society are coarsely scattered. 60

such a region can

exist.

It

is difficult to

appreciate

why and how

By contrast, the purpose of a small agricultural

market town was apparent.

It

is difficult to

and the major highways are dully abstract.

move around

in

an urban region

The old market roads displayed a

varied scenery and what difficulties there were (such as mud) were easily

understood

if

not always correctible.

The market town had, indeed was, an

identified center, but the urban region is so multinucleated that only according

to

each one's interests can he identify any very clear focus.

To
it

the meritocracy the nature of the urban region is understandable and

may even

be exciting.

merely describe.

Melvin Webber, Raymond Vernon and others don't

They even seem

to celebrate these

documented. It seems unnecessary that it should be.
general the upper levels of society live a better life
,

polis;

new megalopoles.

We

f\ 1

recognize that, in
in all ways than do the lower.
all

60por one good overview of this phenomenon, see Jean Gottman, MegaloThe Urb anized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States (New York:

Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).
61 Melvin M. Webber, "The Urban Place and the Nonplace Urban Realm,
in Explorations into Urban Str u cture ed. by Melvin M. Webber (Philadelphia:
,

"
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But not even the meritocracy particularly

more concretely demonstrates

nothing

much wants

to live there.

Indeed

the usefulness to the meritocracy of the

theory -practice gap as the fact that many of the managers of megalopolin
society themselves flee to the outer suburbs which they try to recreate as small

^

villages.

In

closing this section

I

want

to

emphasize a previous

point.

The kind

of

exploitation engaged in by the meritocracy does not necessarily involve overt
action.

If

self-alienation is intrinsic to thinking man, then thinking

a severe zero-sum situation and so
is

easy

is the

society of which he

to identify the exploiting class in a

more comfortable

class.

Those members

is

a

man

member.

severe zero-sum situation.
of the

is in

It is

It

the

meritocracy who must take

overt action to protect their status will not be the most comfortable members.

Those

will be

who need

not take such action but will get the important benefits

anyway.

University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), pp. 79-153; Melvin M. Webber,
"Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility: Toward an A. I. P. Consensus on the Profession's Roles and Purposes, " Journal of the American
Institute of Planners XXIX (November, 1963); and Raymond Vernon, The Myth
,

and Reality

of

Our Urban Problems

Harvard University Press,
62

(2d ed.

;

Cambridge, Massachusetts:

1966).

major theme among celebrants of the new urban regions is that these
provide the life style which the middle class—and the poor also—really want.
The point is misleading. The fact is that each suburban resident wants this
others away.
lifestyle mainly for himself. He would usually prefer to keep the
signs of
His desire was to move to the country, not to a suburb. The physical
urbanity, such as sidewalks, are anathema to him.

A
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The Growth Ethic --Compensation and Exacerbation

Western

Associated with the

.

ideal of abstract thought is the ideal of thought's development.

Since

the Renaissance this development has been understood in the sense of prog-

ress --particularly scientific progress and

Through abstract thought

is

its

consequence

in

material progress.

achieved, supposedly, an increasingly rich analysis

of experience and an increasingly broader synthesis and control of that experience.

It is

assumed

usually

that there is a perpetual surplus of

major elements associated with

this

development process.

most

of the

Firstly, there is a

surplus of mental capacity in the most gifted of society's members.

This

is

supplemented by a surplus of the mechanical energy and other physical resources needed

provide adequate computers and to power and supply the

to

technology of a computerized science.

^

There

is,

thirdly, a surplus of

opportunities for total personal growth, despite the role specialization required

by the technical society. ^4 And there
aptitude which

is

is,

finally, a surplus of that nurturing

sensitive to the concrete wholeness of personality and

critical to the growth of the child and the maintenance of

this last surplus despite

^3

optimism,
^4

community there
;

is

an environment which makes increasing demands for

For a particularly enthusiastic presentation
"

is

of this "technological

see the writings of R. Buckminster Fuller.

The Horatio Alger novels are a classic expression of the belief in
surplus opportunity. For a recent incarnation, see Richard Bach, Jonathan
Living ston Sea gull (New York: Macmillan, 1971).

338

an abstract, complex, and fragmented response

to life situations. 65

The

belief in mental and material progress,
together with the assumption of surplus,

may

be called the "growth ethic.

effects on the

problem

because certain

of the

"

This growth ethic seems to have varying

of class exploitation—effects

which result,

assumptions about surplus are

The most immediate

suggest,

false.

effect of the growth ethic is to

increasing loss of opportunity and community.

I

compensate for an

In a highly

organized technolog-

ical society opportunities for total personal growth do not appear
to be in surplus.

They appear scarce.

The best opportunities go

to the

this is true both with respect to

mental and manual work.

for example, those whose

is still

work

meritocracy and

Regarding the

latter,

craftsmanship rather than physical

routine, are apt to be the college educated and to be working for a relatively

small clientele

in

museums,

art shops, etc.

The chances

for development of

^Symbolic 0 f this belief is the emphasis in the women's movement on
day -care facilities for pre -school children. Here, the argument is not that the
father and mother should share more equally in child rearing, but that perhaps
neither has to do so.

This writer is not speaking about the justification of such
facilities for one -parent families where the parent has to work. Nor is he
talking about mother or father substitutes where one person cares for only two
or three children. What is meant is the use of day-care facilities where a few
adults care for many children and as a means to provide greater freedom from
child-care responsibilities for both the spouses of a complete family. Such
child-care authorities as Benjamin Spock have argued against this practice,
claiming that children of three years or younger need much more attention than

such facilities can provide and that any family which is capable of giving it
should do so. Spock is saying, in other words, that the nurturing aptitude is
relatively scarce because so much is needed. Some parts of the women's
movement are saying that it is in surplus because much less is needed.
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community also tend

to

appear scarce, for reasons given previously.

The resulting increase

in alienation

appears as a loss of self-identity.

For the middle class, material affluence becomes

comes

the

measure

of self

advancement.

of close personal relationships.

And

architecture, rural character, etc.

wider community. 66

surrogate.

Gifts substitute for the

Wealth be-

community

costly physical appearance (colonial

becomes a

)

its

partial replacement for the

But though the material side of the growth ethic

sates for middle class alienation,

does so unobtrusively.

it

compen-

The Alger myth

of

surplus opportunity and the Jeffersonian myth of small scale agrarianism
persist.

The assumption

of a surplus of

a myth, however, and

if it is

energy and other resources may also be

then the ultimate effect of the growth ethic

may

be to exacerbate the problem of class exploitation rather than to compensate
for

it.

When

self identity is tied to

something quantifiable, then

relative; one has a self to the extent that one is

ially

generous than another.

becomes

insatiable.

But

if

affluent and

becomes

more mater-

Consequently, the desire for material prosperity
there are limits to resources then the result of such

material greed (understandable as

it

may

be)

distribution of resources between those with

power and those with

more

it

is

an increasingly inequitable

more overt political-economic

less.

66This analysis of the psychological use of wealth is similar to that made
by such social critics as Paul Goodman and Herbert Marcuse but they identify
somewhat different reasons why such compensations are needed.
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Now

the assumption of resources slack

may

indeed be false.

Resources

are resources only because of an available technology to use them,
and technology

may

be self-limiting.

For one thing there

information overload involved

upon each other.

measure these

But, for

in

measuring

increasing problem of

the reciprocal effects of

another thing, there

effects. 67

is the

may

The technology employed

phenomena

be an increasing need to
to solve

problems almost

always creates others --such as the pollution problem caused by industrial
technology, or the problem of job contraction caused by management technology.

Hence, on the above analysis we can expect

The higher meritocracy

process of exploitation.
of alienation by shifting

it

less successfully to shift

to the middle classes.

it

to find a trickle -down

will try to avoid the burden

The middle classes

will try

further downward but in addition they will try to

compensate for alienation through material wealth.

The

that the lower classes are placed in increasingly tight

final result will be

zero-sum

situations

since the achievement either of opportunity or community does require

resources (education, land,

etc.

and characteristic descriptions:

most simply, "stress.

).

These zero-sum situations have

some

distinct

"cross pressure," the "double bind" or,

"

67 For persuasive statements on both points, though not connecting the
points directly with each other, see Kenneth E. F. Watt, "Planning—So There

Will Be a Future," in Ecocide --and Thoughts toward Survival ed. by Clifton
Fadiman and Jean White (Santa Barbara, California: Center for the Study of
,

Democratic
see

p.

137.

Institutions,

1971), pp.

109-39.

On

the first point, in particular,
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Consider an example

of this

trickle-down process.

An academic planner

writes a book in which he argues for a
massive shift of economic resources to
public needs (translation = "a massive
increase in taxes") on the ground that

planning problems are otherwise unsolvable.

acclaim giving

welcomed

its

into a

critical

author a sense of self advancement, and he finds
himself

community

his position though they

great change

The book receives

of scholars

may quarrel

in public policy.

If it

who recognize

with

its

the articulateness of

substance.

But the

had seriously threatened

to

book makes no

do so, the

writer would probably have become an outcast and have gravely endangered
his career as the price of his creative ideas.

practice gap.

The price

of his salvation

He

however

is

saved by the theory-

is that

there

is

not that

mas-

sive increase in public funds which might have occurred, had he been taken

more

seriously.

On

a lower level of mental activity

who would

like to get involved in

is

a freshly graduated planning student

minority group advocacy but discovers that

the financing for this has dried up- -partly because the arguments of that
ic

planner were not effective.

ments are so

Even

tight, partly for the

if it

hadn't, the budgets of local govern-

same reason,

of prying out a greater share for the poor.

his

new ideas and

academ-

that there is little likelihood

So the fledgling planner lays aside

joins a suburban planning agency which he well

oriented to traditional exclusionary practices.

knows

To make matters worse,

is

not

only must he foresake his ambitions for creative self development but he cannot
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even be confident

of a pleasant

The agency budget
petitors.

The

own family as

working environment- -a community

so short that each

is

effect of this is to

member must

damage

make up
need a
out"

for what

missing

is

public

On

this

rests in crushing form, on
its partial

The alienation
stress,

I

argue,

the poor are

is

made

opts for money.

luncheons and gifts can help

of office

and home.

system

money

is

money

There

is

my

will

member

of the

working class

of the

wealth— since

it

constitutes his

working poor and those beneath him

interpretation, that excess of alienation which

avoidance by higher social levels.

of a

person from himself

essential.

to face.

But there are

focus of

And he

available to help him--partly because that

member

my

a

But

A

it is

is

stress in

a matter of stress and
its

many

boring poorly paid work

specific

some

most extreme forms which
life

over-dense and often dangerous residential environment
festation.

Let his

didn't have to.

is little

identity.

results from

but his

for the criticism he receives for "selling

fledgling planner cannot afford to share his

very self

like

community

the bottom of the social

There

poor.

in the

Things

money- -to compensate

from those who

Near

community

com-

well.

display self advancement.

lot of

see the others as

not only his office

Faced with these prospects, the new planner
life style

of peers.

juxtaposed to an

is the

general mani-

dilemmas which relate directly

to the

particular illustration.

a necessity to

work and

rigid

working hours but there are no
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affordable facilities for child care.

There
or programs

There
is

is

unemployment but there are very few public recreation

in the

is

areas of greatest need.

more

incentive to crime as an outlet for frustrations but there

also a harsher response by authority to such crime.

Other illustrations could be given

claim

of the

growth ethic merely exaggerates the inequality
But enough has been said.
in

facilities

in the United States.

process.

After

all,

in the

Having looked generally

dilemma avoidance we must look

that,

on balance, the

burden of alienation.

at the exploitation inherent

specifically at current planning practice

That practice seems to contribute to the exploiting
the planners themselves occupy relatively high positions

in the meritocracy.

Failure of Liberal and Radical Planning
liberal planning

it is

According to the theory of

possible to have a decision process in which through the

incremental interaction
If

.

of individual choices a unified social result is achieved.

this theory is correct then the

problem

of self -alienation, as

expressed

through a conflict of opportunity and community, should be resolved when we
act in terms of the theory.

It

should be resolved because each individual in

realizing his own opportunities will be contributing to community.

theory

is

problem

a false promise then action in terms of
of alienation into

new forms

The major physical product

it

But

if

the

will simply convert the

not previously recognized.

of twentieth century liberal planning is
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middle class suburbia.
its

As a product

of liberalism, suburbia should provide

residents with opportunities for conceptual
growth-opportunities provided

by interaction with the numerous viewpoints present

And

the suburban

phenomenon should

action rather than an imposed order.

itself be the

in a

metropolitan center.

product of individual inter-

Suburbia does indeed have these char-

acteristics.

But liberal planners

provide for community.
stability,

promise

It is

that the suburban

to unintellectualized

Only superficially does this occur, however.

experience of the

A suburb

socially or economically, a small town.

And even

which

to society generally.

terms

it is is

purchased

of provision of

to the center.

at great

urban

expense

its

this superficial

facilities to low density

It

is not,

community

is

costly in

areas and of transportation

Consequently, suburban residents resist efforts to also share the

costs of the central city, though they use

upon

will also

supposed that the suburbanite will encounter the

small scale, and closeness

small town.

phenomenon

its

services and ultimately depend

existence for their jobs.

The inadequacy

of revenues,

and the loss of middle class interest and

leadership, in the metropolitan cores has a truly disastrous effect, though,

on community and opportunity for the lower classes.
the financial support of public education

commerce and

is

siphoned

Opportunity declines as
off to the

suburbs and as

industry follow in the wake of the suburban residents.

ity declines with the neglect of

most inner

city housing,

Commun-

and with the expulsion
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of current residents and frequent
disruption of

community

life

which occurs

in

those few areas of redevelopment. 68

Liberal planning does not seem to
just in allowing for opportunity.
in both respects in

promise

The lower classes

find

to

achieve community

themselves deficient

order that the middle classes can have the physical appear-

ance of community, though often without
If

fulfill its

substance.

its

liberal planning holds forth a false promise that mainly serves
to

perpetuate the inequity of alienation, radical planning scarcely does better.

According

to the theory of radical planning

process which

somewhat

is

it is

possible to have a decision

rooted in an ongoing social system but which yet can operate

free of that system.

avoiding self-alienation

if it

is

This theory, also, implies the possibility of
correct.

But, again,

it

may

be only a false

promise.

American radical planning, as part

of its central belief in

collective consciousness, usually incorporates

an evolving

emphases on ecological aware-

ness, widespread citizen participation, and flexibility in decision.

Because he

participates, and does so free of strict rules, the individual

theoretic-

ally,

merely a captive

of the prevailing socio-conceptual

because his participation
ness of his place

is

is not,

system; and yet

part of a collective contribution, involving aware-

in all nature, neither is he

separated from system.

68 For one concise statement of the problem, see the foreword by Senator
Charles H. Percy in Social Science and the Urban Crisis: Introductory Readings
ed. by Victor B. Ficker and Herbert S. Graves (New York: The Macmillan

Company,

1971).

,

-
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Closeness

to the natural

environment has always been considered

a

fundamental part of a person's community and
a major constraint on his
possibilities of self development, since

control.

Those

in the

it

poses constraints over environmental

environmental movement promise that this constraining

effect need not be too serious.

But that

shifting of constraints to lower classes.

promise only seems

The movement

to obscure a

justifies, for

example,

69
physical growth controls which inhibit lower class mobility to the
suburbs.
It

justifies pollution controls which, at least in the short run,
reduce their job

opportunities.

The curious notion

that change -oriented citizen participation can be built

into an established political

system

is

United States federal grant programs.
opposition.

In

one that continues to be part of
But a

many

system does not willingly fund

its

physical planning the most acceptable and successful forms of

citizen participation have been those of middle and upper class neighborhoods

which have much

to protect

hood associations.

and can do so via restrictive covenants or neighbor-

When lower

classes, with less to protect and

attempt to use participation devices for making major changes

ary priorities they usually

fail.

more needs,

in public

budget

70

6^For a perceptive environment-oriented view of the general issues, see
Charles E. Little, "The Environment of the Poor: "Who Gives a Damn?" Conservation Foundation Letter July, 1973, entire issue.
,

^°For an overview of some of the federal programs for citizen participation--and their problems --see Donald G. Hagman, Public Planning and Con
trol of Urban and Land Development: Cases and Materials (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co.
1973), chap. VI.
,
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Perhaps the most important element of radical planning
theory
notion of openness or flexibility.
intellectuals this

As expressed by

was a central feature

in

is

the

the open mindedness of the

Mannheim's thought, and

it

contin-

ues to be central for Friedmann and others in the notion of
experimental
learning.

But there is a strain of elitism in this notion

are naturally quicker to learn than are others.
practice

There

is

if,

What we

in fact,

find in urban planning

not inconsistent with this view that radical planning is elitist.

increasing flexibility in American urban planning but

is

some people

it

tends to be

associated with increasing administrative discretion in which the average
citizen has less voice rather than more.

From

these instances

it

7

appears that radical approaches

to planning

have not uniformly produced a society with both community and opportunity.
Instead, the possibility of opportunities for change and growth, without such

costs to the community as ecological degradation, seems to be provided

mainly

to

upper classes.

How

At

this point,

to Live with

some words

of

Dilemma

summary are

appropriate.

I

have argued

that abstract thought is the essence of planning and that on one view of such

71 ln fact, planning flexibility is generally defined as an increase in administrative discretion. For one revealing indication that citizens and other

planners will reject flexibility if it implies discretion for someone else, see
Anthony James Catanese, "Plan? or Process?" Planni ng; The ASPO Magazine

XXXX

(June,

1974),

14-16.

,
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thought
view.

it

necessarily leads to self-alienation.

it

I

I

conditionally accept that

suggest that the avoidance of self -alienation poses
a dilemma in that

seems

to require individuals

and societies

to be

characterized both by con-

ceptual change and conceptual commitment.
In public planning the

two sides of this dilemma are confronted respect-

ively by the liberal and radical approaches.

of theory, to show

while avoiding

given

my

it is

But neither approach obviously succeeds --and

possible, however, for those

most successfully avoid

are helpful

its

who are most adept

alienating effects.

at abstract thought

The theories they contrive

respect by obscuring the irresolvability of the dilemma.

in this

The consequence

intensify the

is to

lower social levels.

In trying to

increase further both

its total

still

a promise, at the level

possible to achieve the advantage of each side

disadvantage.

its

is

view of self -alienation neither could.

It is

to

how

Each

dilemma by concentrating

its

impact on

escape this impact some of these classes

severity and

its

concentration on social levels

lower.

Whatever else may be said
be admitted that

in the

mid

for this view of the

1970's dilemmas do

human

situation,

it

must

seem increasingly common.

Within the industrialized nations the relation of inflation to unemployment, of

energy needs

to

environmental protection, of public expenditures

consumption—all

of these

to private

appear not only as zero-sum (they have always been

that in the short run) but as harshly zero-sum.

And

the relations between the
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living standards of the industrialized
nations and those of the third world also

appear to be

in this condition.

That these situations are truly dilemmas, however,
denied.

Optimistic labelling

employment,

ma when

the

pression.

"

in the

midst of

is

the crudest device.

inflation,

former condition

is

various ways

is in

Declining productivity and

presumably poses a less severe dilem-

labelled a "recession" rather than a "de-

Optimistic promises are a more frightening device.

They involve

the need to trust, say, that the widespread harnessing of the energy in
wind,

waves, or sun would have no catastrophic
That there

is

effects.

a specific dilemma of physical planning also

is evident.

In

defense of community one finds increasing need for effective governmental
decentralization both to the city or town level and beneath

Some

neighborhood.
centralization.

two

of the

cities

seem

it

to that of the

danger of social collapse without such de-

in

Neighborhood school boards and neighborhood corporations are

most dramatic recent responses

to this need.

The need for community and for decentralization
hind the suburban movement.

But the suburban

is the

basic truth be-

movement has

not really

met

that need for the middle class and has posed a financial impediment to its

achievement
In

the

in the central cities.

defense of opportunity there

new scale

of the

urban region.

is

a pressure to accept and consolidate

While the urban region provides multiple

opportunities for work, education and social

life,

this

new scale also creates
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severe problems of pollution, congestion, and energy demands.

To

deal with

these problems, strong regional and state planning seems
essential.

We

have already seen, though, that the theories

of liberal

and radical

planning operate to deny the dilemma of planning as other dilemmas are
denied.

Cynicism and Despair— A Destructive Response

to

Dilemma

.

Not far

beneath the optimistic words and promises there seems a present mood of

pessimism which

tacitly

For some observers --the cynics --this mood

cannot avoid them.

marked

admits that there are severe dilemmas and that we
is

less

than for others.

About our

cities there

may

disaster impends and, anyway,

be serious problems, says Banfield, but no

we can do

little

Granted that

about matters.

there are concentrations of the poor in our central cities, with accompanying

problems

of

crime and unemployment.

The majority

live in

major changes

in

comfortable suburbs and cannot be expected to accept

income distribution

reason they should since poverty

is

the poor are themselves to blame.

summarized

in

A more

or'

similar changes, nor

is

there any

primarily a cultural phenomenon for which

72

Banfield's cynicism

may

Daniel Moynihan's slogan of "benign neglect.

be nicely

11

active and despairing brand of cynicism is often found

those taking a broader view.

72Edward
chusetts:

These people are a minority however.

C. Banfield,

Little,

Brown and

among

The environmentalists Ehrlich and Meadows are

Hie Unhea verily City Revisited

Com piny,

1974).

(Boston,

Massa-
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concerned about the dilemma of world population growth
and resource limits,
but they have

little

will respond to

confidence that governments, or perhaps even most people,

it.

individual families.

from

self

the

And so

their writing is directed to the self interest of

The theme

coming crises

"every man for himself.

of

is

what you individually can do

energy and food. 73

It

is the

to

save your-

cynicism of

"

Finally, there are those

human prospect nor about

who are

optimistic neither about the general

the ability of individuals to save themselves

For them, cynicism gives way

to despair.

Robert Heilbroner

is

from

it.

concerned

about the dilemma of population growth and dwindling resources, but he sees
the

emphasis on individual

self interest not as a constructive response, even

for the individual, but as an aggravating one.

Only social-structural solutions

could respond to the dilemmas, in his view, but just because of self interest
these are unlikely to be forthcoming either from capitalism or from

ism.

The prospect

is

for great

wars

such as critical crop failures or

fatal

commun-

of redistribution and for "lesser" crises

urban temperature inversions.

Instead

of our controlling events, the events will control us, and not in a benign way.

Small Scale Wholes --A Constructure Response

to

Dilemma: Part

I.

74

If

there are severe dilemmas which confront our cities and nations, and the

73 See, for example, Paul R. Ehrlich, The End of Affluence (New York:
Ballantine Books, 1974).

74 Robert L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the

W. W. Norton & Company,

Inc.

,

1974).

Huma n

Prospect (New York:
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current literature of cynicism and despair acknowledges that there are, then

perhaps that literature also represents the appropriate response.
it

does not.

my

In

view

ultimately spring, and
to

bear more of

come much

its

if

it

is self -alienation

upper classes

in

But perhaps

from which social dilemmas

alienated society could be persuaded

burden, these dilemmas would, while not vanishing, be-

less severe.

75

In this last part of the dissertation,

of conceptual relationships, and upon

my

I

shall

draw upon the Hegelian model

applications of that model, to suggest

a constructive response to dilemma generally and to the dilemma of planning

While the response

in particular.

planning thought

it

is

may

represent a somewhat new direction in

less alien to trends in its practice.

The response

is in

three parts.
In part

1.

I

consider again the problem of achieving community

in

a

'^Consider this point. If we agree that the root of the world's ecological
dilemma is population growth, then a close connection can be drawn between
attempts to reduce self -alienation in advanced societies and the severity of the
ecological dilemma. This writer argues that the urban region is one important means for attempting to avoid alienation. But it is costly in money and in
its demands for the technical knowledge of civil servants and consultants.
These particular knowledge demands, added to the many other such demands

met within those nations
themselves. The result has been a brain drain from the poorer industrialized
nations to the richer and from the underdeveloped nations to both. Within the
underdeveloped nations an analogous brain drain occurs from country to city.
Assuming that the only really effective way to change family planning practice
in industrialized nations, have been inadequately

by face to face contacts throughout the rural areas, and by an increase in
their living standards, then the population problem is indeed one costly side
is

effect of the attempt in industrialized societies to avoid alienation.
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meritocratic society.
if

If

there are levels of competence in abstract thought,

society is a social-conceptual whole, and

exists at the highest level then

community?
by

its

I

if

the totality of the society only

how can those below

that level be part of a

answer, with Hegel, that the social-conceptual whole

"smallest part" and that this part

The re-creation

of

is

expressed

is

the whole as truly as is any other. 76

complete small scale community would reduce the need

in

the lower meritocracy for the compensations of material affluence and hence

would reduce

the

dilemma -intensifying

An emphasis on
left,

to

the small

effects produced by the growth ethic.

community

some environmentalism, and

to

is

some

central to thinking of the new
third world ideology.

But there

does not seem to be an equal emphasis on opportunities for self development.

There

is

indeed emphasis --an emphasis on the simpler more understandable

opportunities associated with small scale enterprise.

For some people

kind of opportunity represents a widening of opportunity.
culture generally

it is

apt to be a narrowing.

But for

The frontiers

Western

of the arts

sciences are always associated with relatively large scale societies.

very often omitted

in

such literature as that of the new

discussion of these larger scales.

In part 2.

argue for their importance and persistence
I

want

to

of

my

left is

and

What

is

any adequate

discussion

in the field of

this

I

shall briefly

urban planning.

argue that there can be societies which are not only small scale

76 For Hegel, only when the concept is fully developed --when Spirit is
initial
fully realized—can we speak of the whole. But it is also true that the
concept of Being is already Spirit in potential.

354

socially and economically but also conceptually.

societies must be part of larger wholes.

How

be truly competing views of society when one

and how can the competition persist?

main part

the

that

of the

answer again as

answer
it is

is this

more

is

reflected in

I

insist that these

possible?

How can

I

have already given

In part 3.

1.

some very recent planning

I

shall

now

there

inclusive than the other,

will be found that

to this question in part

Having mapped the way ahead,
fully the idea of

It

Yet

1

consider

theory.

start out by considering

small scale conceptual syntheses.

I

more

look firstly at the need

for such syntheses, secondly at the problem in meeting that need, and finally
at

some

resolutions of the problem.

For many people, some would say for
large and

its

composition

is

the scale of society is too

all,

too homogeneous.

I

have already described this

condition as regards the physical environment and have alluded to

gards the working environment.

On

age worker does not know, except

in the

most obvious way, how

that organization contributes to the total

cultural environment has also

become

too large.

is

his

And he knows

economy.

ture of church, school, and civic associations

mass

as re-

the latter point, the fact is that the aver-

contributes to the total product of his organization.

how

it

The

The scale

work

still

less

of the

local participatory cul-

increasingly eclipsed by a

culture centered on television.

When

a
the stated point of the aforementioned criticism is to reinstitute

more humane

society- -as

it is

for

Mumford or

the

Goodmans - -the criticism
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is often

considered merely visionary and perhaps even mistaken. 77

revival of the small community
alienation than for the
politics

taken

it is

is

defended less for

more immediate purpose

more

seriously.

78

its

But

the

if

value in reducing

human

of defusing the thread of a

mass

serving this latter purpose, com-

In

munity revival usually appears as community control —especially control over
neighborhood schools or neighborhood police.
in

such control

may

Official acceptance of increases

often be a clear response to the danger of riot.

Without a strengthening of community perceptions
that

,

community control would stem mass movements. At

that this

would happen

Those inner

if

however,

it

least

unlikely

it

is

is

unlikely

assumptions about resource limits are accepted.

city residents fighting for better schools, in

New York and

else-

where, have apparently accepted the society as a largely unintelligible but
a competitive affluent one.

They ask only a better chance

pay-off which the middle class gets.

79
I

mean

at their

still

share of the

the pay-off, in large scale

77 For an articulate defense of anonymous technological urban society,
see Harvey Cox, The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theo logical Perspective (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

78

For the argument that a mass politics grows out of the elimination of
social groupings, see Hanneh Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New
1951).
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
,

79This

wholly true. Some advocates of community control of
schools want to ground education on a less materialistic vision of society. The
main source of support probably comes, however, from those concerned with
the educational failure of their children as indicated by the standard measures
of reading levels, jobs attainable, class mobility and the like. See Maria
Fantini and Marilyn Gittell, Decent ralization: Achieving Reform (New York:
is not

Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 41-44.
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society, for abandoning
is

no longer available

most claim

(i.

e.

if

to intellectual participation.

the living standard declines) then the

options remaining to these residents

seem

to be either to join a

of negativism or to claim back an intelligible

the pay-off

If

major

mass

politics

community- -one which, though

materially poorer, has an understandable economy and a participatory culture.

There
syntheses
ics,

and

if

is

relatively

little

problem

in the revival of

the large scale ones are to be

abandoned— if

politics of nation-states are to disappear.

part of anything larger.

But

if it is

small-scale conceptual
the technology,

econom-

For then the "small"

is

not

part of something larger then any attempt

to assert the completeness of small perspectives confronts what Whitehead

called the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.

The Fallacy

of

Misplaced Concreteness

taking the abstract for the concrete;
zation.

Whether or

not,

and

the process are ubiquitous.

it is

^
is

the so-called fallacy of mis-

similar to what

is

called hypostati-

in

what sense,

In

physical planning a classic example

it

could be a fallacy, examples of
is

the

proposal of Vitruvius to orient streets so that unpleasant winds would always be
diverted.

He mistook

the abstract concept of prevailing wind direction for a

0
01
concrete phenomenon, supposing that the direction was wholly invariant.
1

80Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World
(New York: The New American Library, 1925), pp. 52, 59.

,

Mentor Books

81 The views of Vitruvius are noted in Kevin Lynch, Site Planning (1st ed.

Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.

I.

T.

Press, 1962),

p.

95.

;
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For Whitehead

were
of

it

was

the nature of science that earlier abstractions

less abstract than supposed.

Scientific advance

was a continuing process

escape from the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.

of motion nicely illustrates

how a concept which

gradually be appreciated for what

Toulmin's discussion

highly abstract can only

is

Aristotle supposed that motion

it is.

was

the

result of a force overcoming a resistance and this idea of motion was
close to
the concrete experience of a horse pulling a cart.

Newton,

in

abstracting from

the abstractions of Aristotle and the later ones of Gallileo, developed a

com-

pletely idealized view of motion as something not the product of force but
pletely free of any force including even that of

The

scientific base of urban politics

its

own weight.

com-

82

and planning largely builds on

this

Whiteheadian view.

Consider an urban region within which there are numerous

local governments.

An understanding

of

how

this region operates

will be relatively complete and relatively abstract.

An understanding

smaller locality within the region can be less abstract but
standing will be

A

more narrow and hence

frequent suburban self-image

community which

presumably

if

of a

so this under-

less complete.

is of

a small relatively self-sufficient

retains the virtues of neighborliness and civic participation.

This image plays the critical role

in the

attempt of suburbanites to overcome

82stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding: An Enquiry into the
Aim s of Science Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row, 1961),
pp. 44-59.
,
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the alienating effects of city

image

life.

From

the regional viewpoint, however, the

a prime example of misplaced concreteness.

is

been valid

in

pre -industrial times.

The image would have

But today the suburb is

interdependent part of a larger whole.

merely one highly

The suburban self-image hypostatizes

the self sufficiency of an international, moneyed, large scale industrialized

economy as
The

the self sufficiency of a farming village.

belief in the relative intellectual superiority of higher abstractions

over lower ones
is

is

very persuasive.

a moral superiority.

Some people would even argue

Regarding the present example,

I

that there

myself have previ-

ously said that the small town pretensions of suburbanites are at the expense
of increased alienation downtown.

view that hypostatization

want

I

more

but then

make

in

.

.

it

is

who

patronizingly acknowledge

merely within

quite clear that the place of the lesser is always

representative instance of this pervasive view

that the

following

is the

which Harris argues that a city plan cannot grow out

hood plan but
".

want to argue against the

abstract and the less abstract viewpoints both have their place

A

the greater.

I

either an intellectual or a moral mistake.

to take specific exception to those

that the

passage

is

Nevertheless

of a neighbor-

neighborhood plan should "carry out" the city plan.

equally mistaken to assume that in principle or in practice a large

metropolitan or city plan can grow out of neighborhood planning, and
that a broad

comprehensive plan can be effective without steps

the neighborhood level.

83

n
"
.

to

to

assume

carry

it

to

83

.

Britton Harris, "Plan or Projection:

An Examination

of the

Use

of
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In this dissertation

I

have assumed a contextualist epistemology--one

which asserts an intimate interdependence between "concepts" and

"reality.

"

Hence, for me, the abstractions to which Whitehead refers cannot simply

mirror the concrete.

They must

to

some

extent structure

it.

But

I

disagree

that the process of structuring is one in which concepts and reality together

evolve toward an increasingly closer
instead one in which the two already

This reality which

is

fit.

fit

identical to

I

suggest, following Hegel, that

we understand

all other

its

concepts

is

a paradoxical one.

thesis

is

A

it

the later ones could not exist.

84

in potential all the

Consequently this

merely as important but also as complete as

not

synthesis

an abstraction, an effort of thought.

is

It

is

Thus,

concepts can we truly understand the one with

which we begin, but the beginning concept contains

and without

is

exactly.

differentiated as the concepts act to negate and thus define each other.

only as

it

others

initial

syn-

the later ones.

One probably cannot

sustain an abstraction in one's mind unless one continuously either broadens or

deepens

it.

To broaden

Models in Planning,
(November, 1960),

"

the synthesis is,

I

suggest, to destroy

it

and provide a

Journal of the American Institute of Planners

,

XXVI

266.

84

"In different senses absolute spirit is both prior and posterior to its
self -alienation and return. So far as geometrical expression is applicable

whole series and each triad within it as Hegel himself suggests,
If it were worth
is better symbolized by a circle than by a straight line.
dialectic
as a series
the
imagine
might
we
further,
while refining the symbol
"
[G. R. G. Mure, The Philoso
of spirals bent back on itself in a circle.
phy of Hegel, p. 37.] [This writer's emphasis. ]
at all, the

,

.

.
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replacement

more abstract

at a

level- -a level capable of systematizing a wider

range of what passes for experience.
of

Misplaced Concreteness.

quite different.

to

It is

It is

ing

it is

I

mean

activity

enterprises

the supposed Fallacy

make ever more connections between
It is

to

the present ab-

entrench the supposed fallacy.

the distinction between broadening a synthesis and deepen-

analogous, within

academic

It is

it,

overcome

But to deepen the synthesis is to do something

stractions and the apparent experience.

As

to

some professional

discipline, to that between

And

and practical experience.

within each of these two

parallels the distinction between "young turks" and "old fogies.

it

also related to the distinction between inner and outer debate which

employ

in analysis of

is

I

claim that a deepened synthesis

because

it

is

As

so the purpose

merely

We

of abstraction is not

summary

is

as complete as a

the latter which enables us to

planning requires summarization.

do so in a

summarize, and

the essence of planning is to abstract,
to mentally capture reality but to

form.

normally think that summarization means simply

sufficiently high level.

journal article.

I

Lindblom and Mannheim.

The reason why
broadened one

"

to abstract to a

Thus for example, we provide an "abstract"

And we describe our army leaders

to a

as "generals" because chey

experience
are required to abstract the general principles from more concrete

and hence

to

understand

in a brief

form how

the parts

fit

together.

We

not do so, for
take for granted this summarizing ability but we should

usually

it

is

a
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very odd phenomenon indeed.

We

suppose that we can brief a government

leader about the most highly complex and varied matters and
that on the basis
of those briefings he can
logically be expected to

make informed

know very

abstractions with which he

deliberate decisions.
the concrete

little of

meanings

we teach

withheld until the student

change

my main

student to

point.

The

older or has
fact is that

somehow understand

as

it

I

more background

but that does not

the import of highly abstract concepts without

That this summarizing process

seems, as

fill

we expect both government leader and

first encountering all the aspects of the

apply.

him subsequently

Granted that some subjects are

his experience.

is

most

a student by first presenting him with

the fundamental principles of a discipline and then letting

from

of

presented.

is

Again, we suppose that

in increasing detail

Yet he might

phenomena
is

have already indicated

to

which the abstractions

actually possible is not so obvious

in

attempting to apply the process to

Lindblom.
In

from

any case, our

first explanation of this curious ability is that

But that explanation

intelligence.

is

it

comes

useless, amounting merely to the

circular claim that those who can understand concepts can understand concepts.

More

significant explanations

come, respectively, from empiricist and

contextualist epistemology, but both of these explanations are incomplete.

empiricist tells us how to establish the non-arbitrary meaning of a concept,
only he could find

a.

stable concept.

The
if

Unfortunately, the operational tests give
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us a new "concept" with every
replication of the operation.

In the

end the

empiricist seems to conclude that some
concepts are just forced on us by
experience.

The contextualist
ceptual framework.

meaning.

But,

tells us that

Now

if

only

we already have

we could

a relatively stable con-

find a touchstone of non-arbitrary

again unfortunately, the conceptual framework seems
to pre-

clude any outside test. 85

In the

end the contextualist tends

to

our concepts have non-arbitrary meaning simply because we

conclude that

all

share the same

ones.

Although Lindblom adopts contextualist views

(in

emphasizing

that differ-

ent groups have different perspectives and sometimes in his notion of a
cratic consensus) he also has empiricist leanings.

He argues

demo-

that individual

people don't deliberately summarize since they do not know what general concepts mean.

Instead, through the process of bargaining

concrete policies the social system as a whole
unity

among concrete
Mannheim, who

events or objects
is

a

is

may

among

be said to summarize.

such.

more straightforward

contextualist, concludes that

The perspectives

frameworks, or world views) which they share may be called

Consequently they too do not summarize deliberately.

8 ^For a discussion of the virtues

contextualist positions, see text, chap.

and
II,

The

forced upon us by a hidden hand.

people already find themselves within a kind of summary.
(or conceptual

individuals over

Concepts are

difficulties in the empiricist

pp. 24-33.

and
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apparently more a matter of
recollection.

Are we

to be satisfied with

such answers?

Is

summary

to be either the

product of sense tyranny or of the tyranny
of the community of concept users?

Of course neither Lindblom nor Mannheim

what

find in their ultimate responses

I

is satisfied

seems more

with his initial view but

like a

swapping of views

than any third alternative.

How
to

"come

then

is

deliberate summarization possible?

to the point?"

concepts.

I

suggest that

it

that

Bits of color or texture

quintessential abstract.
of objects or self he

we

the empiricist

it.

He was

really speaking of ab-

are not the quintessential concrete but the

Thus when Hume observed

was talking about

that he had no impressions

the result of abstraction.

86

The result

confront only flux, not specific wholes.

To know about
to

When

sense 'experience was wholly discrete he was not speaking of

sense experience as the plain man knows
stractions.

ever possible

is it

through the hypostatizing of

Pure abstractions could not bring us there.

Hume argued

is that

is just

How

summarize

that

a phenomenon

knowledge

turning them into things.

it

we must

abstract, must broaden, but then

seems we must narrow

the abstractions by

Empiricists and some contextualists say we under-

stand these things by sense experience or recollection, respectively, but their

answers do not allow us

86 DavidHume,

A

to play

much

deliberate part in that summarizing

Treatise of Human Nature
sec. VI]; and pp. 251-63, [Bk. 1, Pt. IV, sec. VIJ.

,

pp.

15-17 [Bk.

I,

Pt.

I,
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process.
suggest that we understand the hypostatized
concept just because

I

We

hypostatized.

understand

evasive knowledge which
point

it

must embrace

it

its

the point of the discipline

which condemns

it.

larger syntheses

is

it

by contrast with that more freely abstract but

solidifies.

For an

intellectual discipline to have a

enemy, "oversimplification.
is

it is

"

only understood through that

Although similarly,

same broader view

This logical-conceptual relationship between smaller and
analogous,

I

think, to the relationship

between community

and opportunity.
Perhaps the most vivid example,
of broader and

narrower syntheses

is

in

urban planning, of the interdependence

the debate over zoning.

central planning power in the United States.

form,
use.

it

It

In its traditional

There are the simple nuisance

And there are

positive relationships as between major highways and

The value

,

11.

ed.

;

sufficiently stable

use.

87

some given
and simple,

approach to zoning, see Philip
in Local Planning Administration ed. by Mary
Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1959),

8?For a description
Green, Jr. "Zoning, "
(3d.

it

the simple

commercial

of a hypostatized concept of land use is in taking

scale of urban industrial pattern and making

chap.

or "Euclidian"

recognizes only a very few major uses and recognizes only a few

relationships, as between residence and industry.

McLean

is the

can be easily described as a hypostatization of the abstraction of land

standard relationships among these uses.

P.

Zoning

of a largely Euclidian

,

365

common

relative to one's

of

it

"experience,

an individual can control a part

" that

and be personally identified with that control.
It

may seem

system on which
According

to a

and atomistic.
clearly

curious to think of zoning, and of the private property

it is

based, as evidence of a concrete element in society.

more common view,

the concept of private property is abstract

But all things are relative.

more abstract

than the version

The obvious disadvantage

The concept

we owe

of social property is

to Locke.

of Euclidian zoning is that in its pure

cannot allow for the complexities of a large scale society.

form

it

Many present day

functions planned as large units, such as shopping centers., require subtle

decisions about location and internal design.
ficable in advance.

These decisions are not speci-

They require a richer knowledge

of

economics, for ex-

ample, than the traditional zoning relationships express.
ing, Euclidian zoning rigidifies

ly psychic opportunities

more

Like all hypostatiz-

and thus makes economic, social, and ultimate-

difficult.

One may increase opportunities

in

use of land by replacing fixed zoning

with a broader syntheses --specifically with one which sees the subtle, volatile
relationships in land usage and proposes to control these by a process of case
oo
00
by case development permission.

Alternatively, one

greater opportunities within the Euclidian structure

88 The

proposes

American Law

Institute in its

tins kind of approach.

Planning, 1964, pp. 56-67.

M odel

may

itself

try to incorporate

by making the latter

Land Development Code

Also see John W. Reps, "Requiem for Zoning.
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more

flexible.

I

this

argue that because both syntheses are necessary
for each other that

second alternative, which deepens the existing land use
synthesis, con-

stitute as

is the

much completeness

as the first, which broadens

it.

Euclidian zoning

completeness of the more concrete, while the approach of
development

permission represents the completeness of the more abstract.

The broader view

of land use associated with

development permission

a view lifted out of the matrix of individual property relations.

an almost completely public and abstract concern.
not

make a whole,

as

Hume

showed.

tends to lack unity and direction.

In the

city developed through

not.

even claim

now

This highly abstract vision of the city

In Britain,

United States the

which employs a process of

more

to as the

mockery

of

inclusive understandings of the

mathematical simulations and systems analysis often do

to be anything

The process

is

But pure abstractions do

development control, such control has been referred
on
ad-hoc -cry. oy

Land use

is

more

of zoning as

than

Humian

associations.

^

development permission involves a constant

inner struggle to attain, within the bounds of abstraction and flexibility, the

89For the difficulties in both the Euclidian and flexible approaches to
zoning, see Richard F. Babcock, "Key Issues in Land Use Controls," Planning
1963, pp.

^In

,

14-20.

a review of the large -scale models of urban phenomena undertaken

in the 1960s, Lee concludes, among other things, that the models were too
comprehensive, too complicated, and too abstract to be very helpful in deciding
what to do. Douglas B. Lee, Jr. "Requiem for Large-Scale Models," Journal
,

of the

American

Institute of Planners,

XXXIX

(May, 1973), 163-78.
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guidance of something more concrete
and fixed.

has affirmed the need for
as elsewhere,

"form.

something. 9 *

this

no point u nless

lias

it

A

recent state court decision

The broader syntheses

,

in

zoning

incorporates a narrower synthesis as

its

"

Of course, no conception of one's situation
could be purely concrete.

An approach, such

as Euclidian zoning, which

faces a reverse problem.

Unless

within a broader framework,

it

it

becomes

ceases

is

relatively

more concrete

self critical, by placing itself

to be effective.

Hence,

it

involves a

constant inner struggle to achieve, within the bounds
of a relatively concrete

and stable mapped plan,
In other

words

whole which

this

is its

a flexibility

based on more abstract urban science.

narrower whole only becomes one as

"material

From an examination
an example of that logic,

I

it

fits

within a broader

"
.

of the apparent logic of

summarization, and from

conclude that small scale syntheses, the intellec-

tual perspectives of "less educated," "less intelligent" people are as important

and as

fully

complete as those of others.

91 In Fasano vs. Board of County

But they are no

Commissioners

of

more

so.

Each needs

Washington County

(Oregon), (507 P2d 23, 1973), the Oregon Supreme Court declared that certain
zoning decisions will no longer be granted presumptive validity. In cases of

zoning flexibility where decisions are made on a case by case basis the
burden of proof shifts to the governing body. It must show that the zone change
is harmonious with the comprehensive plan.
The court does not say that the
comprehensive plan must be a mapped plan but presumably it must be a fairly
rigid document or the problem of arbitrary discretion will simply reappear in

a

new form.

the other.

^

Wholes Against

The

Wh oles--A

Constructive Response to Dilemma:

literature which argues for the small

as have

I,

community usually does

Part

II.

not claim,

that there can be equally complete conceptual
wholes which are

nevertheless on different levels.

need be no larger wholes or

Instead

that, if there

it

tacitly suggests either that there

must

be, that these larger ones

need

be no more than loose confederations.

The Goodmans propose an

ideal

community based on syndicalism,

integration of physical and mental work, the integration of personal and
life,

and relative community autonomy.

autonomy they say nothing more.
According

the

work

But on this last crucial point of

^

to Alperovitz, the basic issue for radicals,

and one they have

not clearly addressed, is whether society can ever be organized humanely

an influential essay, Alexander argued that the city did not have a
tree -like structure coming to a point but instead was of the nature of a "semilattice" with much overlap. In saying so, Alexander argued against smallscale syntheses --or any conventional syntheses --but he did so, ironically, in
a beautifully-organized paper which itself had the classic structure of a tree.
See Christopher Alexander, "A City Is Not a Tree, " Design February, 1966,
,

pp.

46-55.

By contrast, Aitshuler, in a previously-cited work, has taken the view
that there can be small syntheses.

.every concrete object of planner attention is a miniature of the
whole. The important analytical problems that arise in planning for an
entire urban area arise also in planning any section of it" [Alan Aitshuler,
"The Goals of Comprehensive Planning, " Journal of the American Institute
".

.

'

of Planners,

XXXI

(August, 1965), 191].

'Goodman and Goodman, Communitas,

pp.

153-60, 170-71.
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without generating a highly centralized authoritarian
system.
that

He suggests

can be --that the local communities can be the building
blocks for larger

it

political -economic units.

If

But in the end he too is vague as to

how

this is done. 94

society is sufficiently affluent then the deficiencies of coordination

which may arise from a confederate system need not be serious.
tion of material affluence

seems

the ultimate reason

why neither

The assumpthe

Goodmans

nor Alperovitz attempt a more specific discussion of larger scales. 95
I

disagree with the literature just sampled but will not argue the matter

at length.

In

research what

one's point of view.

For

is

obvious and what needs explanation depends on

this dissertation

it

tensive world, regional, and state planning

is

is

considered obvious that ex-

necessary.

My

the conceptual logic of contrived social wholeness, not with

concern

is

with

necessity.

its

A

few arguments for this necessity will nevertheless be advanced.

The development

of

very large scale social units was made possible by

certain methods of organization such as capitalism.

may

result

tunities of

which

scale

more from
it is

But the desirability of this

the artistic, scientific, and technological oppor-

both product and process.

People

come

to great cities

not only, and probably not even primarily, for a better physical existence.

They come because those

cities represent the cultural frontier.

Many advocates

94 Gar Alperovitz, "Notes towards a Pluralist Commonwealth," The
Review of Radical Political Economics IV (Summer, 1972), 28-48.
,

95 See

Goodman and Goodman, Communitas
"Notes toward a Pluralist Commonwealth," p. 43.

,

pp.

11,

160; and Alperovitz,
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of a

smaller scale do not accept

of his

life in

New York

City, as

Of course the provision
tions of the current size.
to

demand

it

for themselves.

Lewis Mumford

still

of cultural opportunity

And there are obvious

example --in the current scale

for

Paul

Goodman

Will

itself

New York

may

not require institu-

dysfunctions- -responsiveness

of business

and government.

up mainly as a defensive response to small competitors?

City be broken up into neighborhoods mainly by the action of

disintegrates into small

It

seems

But

Would General

those neighborhoods, and can most functions then be handled by them?

"yes. "

most

does.

decentralization primarily by local initiative seems unlikely.

Motors break

lived

armed camps,

the

answer

to both questions

But under less catastrophic circumstances that
that large societies are

may

answer seems

society

If

be

unlikely.

needed not only for their own cultural ad-

vantages but as the necessary means for producing decentralization.
Proposals for decentralization are made within the context of an existing

world population, much
technology.

Where

of

which lacks basic necessities, and

of an existing

this technology directly contributes to the necessities

probably will not be abandoned for less effective forms.

Nor

is it

it

likely that

those other parts of technology and social organization, which support this
effort, will be abandoned.

At present the relevant technology

with large scale social organization.

exercise great power.

is

associated

States and nations are pervasive and

There are many commentators who assume

that this

371

condition must remain and that assumption

While

I

agree that decentralization

for social survival,

I

seems

is

to be the safest one. 96

not only desirable but necessary

also agree with those commentators

who

believe in the

necessity for centralization.

Can there be a clear

division of responsibilities between centralized and

decentralized social units? That there can

is

a

common

assumption.

questioned, of course, by both liberal and radical planners.

But

is

it

Lindblom argues

that this division of responsibilities ignores the extent of interdependencies

among

decision centers.

an agency

is likely to

It

also ignores the problem of agency bias.

have a distinctive viewpoint on a given matter,

lect other considerations important to the

would

not.

97
7/

same matter

Because
it

that a different

Friedmann presents another important reason.

may

neg-

agency

The rapidity

of

change militates, he notes, against a clear division of responsibility. 98

9fS

In describing the decentralist- -participatory

theme among emerging

nations, Worsley points out that these nations still see the need for a strong
state.

See Peter Worsley, The Third World (Chicago:

University of Chicago

Press, 1967), p. 173.
Besides the arguments for the continuation of die nation state, there are
also numerous arguments for a new governmental entity larger than cities or
counties but less than the state.
97

David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom. A Strategy of Decision
A s a Social Process (New York: The Free Press, 1970),
Policy Evaluation
"
pp.

:

104-06.

98 "Where the 'activities to be managed' are themselves subject to frequent redirection and reorganization (because of rapid changes in environmental conditions and the quick response times of the system), [i.e. guidance system] work and guidance can no longer be conceptually distinguished"
,

[Friedmann, K ctracking America

,

pp.

208-09].
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Now

there

is

substantial evidence (for example in federal-local
relations)

for the subtle interdependency

tney change. 99

among

And Altshuler,

social units and for the speed with which

for one, has demonstrated in his case studies

the value of multi-agency perspectives on the
fore, that division of responsibility is not a

same

way

100

topic.

It

of avoiding the

by the need for both centralization and decentralization.

seems, there-

dilemma posed

This conclusion

is

not

the one which liberal or radical planners draw from the above
arguments since

they reject, anyway, the concept of deliberate centralization.
clusion which

is

most

But

it

III

The literature

.

con-

significant to me.

Wholes Within and Against Wholes: A Constructive Response
Part

is the

of

urban planning theory has given

little

to

Dilemma

:

previous

recognition to the concept of a simultaneously conscious and conflictual social

whole.

The

traditional theory of centralized planning and systems analysis --

theory almost totally divorced from practice 1 ^ 1 --always assumes that the conflict

can be overcome.

^One
the Advisory

102

The more relevant theory

important source of evidence

is

of liberal

comprised by

Commission on Intergovernmental

and radical

the publications of

Relations.

100

Altshuler, The City Planning Process

*^This writer

is

.

referring primarily to the United States when he says

that the theory of centralized planning is largely divorced

from

political practice.

^•^To overcome social conflict is to find an agreed public interest or a
For evidence that planners believe they have found
social welfare, function.
one, see Altshuler, The City Planning Process.
.

-
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planning does not acknowledge conscious
central planning.

pre-conscious part of the social fabric intrinsic

to

Wholeness

is a

bargaining or to exper-

iential learning.

There
dilemma.

is

some recent

literature, however, which acknowledges a planning

While the literature

is

small, and focuses upon the struggle for con-

trol rather than a struggle over conceptual

grow and broaden.
In

For

it

to Bolan this

it

seems

likely to

touches upon some very current and sensitive issues.

1967 Bolan hypothesized a tension

According

frameworks,

in

the general

domain of planning.

tension existed not within planning itself, but between

planning and decision -making.

Furthermore

or meanings but one of mechanical control.

this

was not

Bolan's

a tension of

concepts

comments are nonetheless

suggestive.

In

any decision environment, as the number of independent decision-

makers increase, and as

functional responsibilities

become increasingly

fragmented and specialized among independent decision-makers, the
capacity of the system to utilize comprehensive forms of policy-making
decreases, while the needs of the system to utilize comprehensive forms
of policy-making increases. These counter requirements produce tension
between the decision system and the planning system; a tension directly
proportional to the degree of dispersal of decision -making. -^3
Bolan did not

seem

to

accept the tension, however.

later literature, he proposed to reduce

if

it

At that time, and

by adopting incrementalism.

^4

in

But

an incremental strategy will resolve this tension then the independent decision

lO^gQiaj-,^

*^fbid.

,

"Emerging Views

of Planning, " p. 244.

and see this writer's footnote 30.
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makers

of his hypothesis

must not be deciding anything very important or

long range, and hence the hypothesis

Some recent

is both,

from
I

call

action,

it

less interesting than

literature accepts dilemma,

poses or describes response to
distinct

is

I

it.

shall call

it

Where

the "dialectics of action.

They ask how one could see

response

is

"whether

is

"

one of words, as

Where

the response

"

is

a 1974 essay by Hudson and

the impact of regional public service

systems "from the concrete and unique viewpoint
them, the basic question

appears.

only grudgingly, and pro-

if

"heuristic dialectics.

One proposal for heuristic dialectics
others.

this

it

it is

of neighborhoods.

1,1

05

For

possible to consider simultaneously

the neighborhood's and the larger city's perceptions of costs and benefits.

"
.

106

They suggest

.

scanning.

it

is

and propose a method of "dialectical

"

Dialectical scanning

It

that

is

a device for analyzing points of disagreement.

isolates the parts which are clearly differences in values so that those

differences can be juxtaposed.

than on resolving

The emphasis

is

on presenting a debate more

it.

Another approach

to heuristic dialectics is

"Hegelian Inquiring Systems.

"

Here

it is

Churchman's concept

of

supposed that the confrontation

of

^Barclay m. Hudson, Martin Wachs and Joseph L. Schofer, "Local
Impact Evaluation in the Design of Large -Scale Urban Systems, " Journal of
the American Institute of Planners, XXXX (July, 1974), 255.
*

106 Ibid.

,

p.

256.
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one set of underlying assumptions with
another set of counter assumptions
will result in a synthesis incorporating
the best elements of both.

Churchman there

And there

is

is

Hence

for

confidence in resolution of debate through dialectic. 107

some evidence

corporate enterprise. 108

that this confidence is justified
Its

success

in public

when applied

to

planning has not been demon-

strated as yet.

Most approaches

ma

to heuristic dialectics

but with conflict, and conflict

may

do not claim to deal with dilem-

be resolvable.

approaches would also be useful as responses
they have been proposed

is tacit

As responses

conflicts, not

do the

how

to

dilemma.

recognition that conflict

durable and more large scale than
study.

to

Nevertheless, these

is

supposed

in

It

is

is at

the fact that

least

more

other approaches to policy

dilemma, however, they only

to live with them.

And

tell

how

to display the

only a dialectics of action that could

latter.

We

want

to

know how

to live with conditions

viewpoints both interlock and compete.

where community and societal

As case studies we would look

for

organizations which either have a centralized internal organization or them-

selves act as the central control for a larger organization.

of

Among

the internally

^C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems: Basic C oncepts
Systems and O r ganization (New York: Basic Books, 1971). chaps. 7 and 8.
1"°R. O. Mason,

ment Science, XV

"A

(April,

Dialectical Approach to Strategic Planning,"

1969), B-403-14.

Manage-
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centralized organizations

we would

internal decentralization.

look for those which also allow substantial

An example would

consist of those major corpor-

ations which have developed successful
programs of job expansion and

worker

control.

Among

some

those organizations which act as central controls

look for that subgroup which designates some of

its

members

we

as area repre-

sentatives.

In planning literature the best

the

example

is

perhaps an interview study by

Needlemans on the community planning experiment
109

cities.

to specific

Community planning
areas within the

is the

in

several United States

assignment of individual

Each community planner

city.

is

members

staff

supposed

closely with the district residents in developing a plan for their area.

new approach

to planning

seems

to

have developed as a response

to

of

any agency

staff, the

consisting of those responsible for the city-wide plan or some of

work

This

urban

unrest partly in lieu of money responses, the latter being unavailable.

munity planners represent only one part

to

Com-

remainder
its

functional

elements.

What
ity

the

Needlemans found

in

those agencies which had adopted

planning was evidence of intense dilemma and cross -pressure.

It

communfell

Needleman and Carolyn Emerson Needleman, Guerrillas in
the Bure aucracy: The Community Plannin g Ex periment in the United States
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974). This work was originally Martin Needleman's doctoral dissertation prepared for the State University of New York at
Buffalo, 1972. As a dissertation, it appeared under the more revealing main

•^Martin

title of

L.

Plann i ng again st Itsel f.

-
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principally upon the community planners
but to

This cross -pressure resulted,

in

my

some

extent on the entire staff.

terms, because the agency was attempting

to integrate different levels of wholes.

The city-wide planners were committed

to a relatively abstract whole, this being
the concept of physical land use.

concept was broad, as abstractions can be broad, but
was narrow
that other urban functions

mans describe

were handled elsewhere

in

government.

this traditional planning as "encapsulated. "

as an "elite council"

in

in the

which decision -making was limited

The

sense

The Needle

was organized

It

to a

small group of

insiders.

The community planners

dealt with richer

more concrete wholes.

The

agencies had not intended this result but community residents, many of whose

problems were more social than physical, tended

to insist

community planning became expansionist and intruded
city operating agencies.

upon

into the

it.

Hence

domains of the

This form of planning was organized as an "arena

council" in which decision making became an open forum.

A community
was urged by
this he

planner was placed in a double -bind.

On

the one hand, he

his agency to develop rapport with the community.

had to demonstrate a primary allegiance

to

it.

In

order to do

The most credible dem-

onstration was to effectively pressure the city government on the community's
behalf--it was to follow an expansionist, arena council view of planning.

On

the other hand, his superiors expected the

community planner

provide simply a divisible part of the traditional comprehensive plan.

supposed

to follow the encapsulated, elite council view.

to

He was
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As
ment

the

itself

community planners were cross -pressured, so

became polarized between them and

the

the planning depart-

comprehensive planners.

Polarization expressed itself variously as disputes
over basic planning theory

and failures

in coordination.

One might expect
could not

last.

But the

that a planning approach so organizationally
disruptive

Needlemans think otherwise.

American planning agency already
nature of

its

functions.

its

to put aside other

search services to the city council and

American planning

matters when asked for re-

to operating agencies,

and

it

be ready to take advantage of the latest federal or state programs.

work process and

Because the agency can offer
it

instead offers autonomy.

little

an

pretensions to long range central plan-

ning, in a polity basically hostile to that approach, an

for a crisis -oriented

of

reflects, they suggest, the schizophrenic

To maintain

agency must always be prepared

The organization

must always
This makes

a lack of clear organizational hierarchy.

salary, relative to the abilities

it

requires,

This makes for a chronic lack of coordination.

Given the nature of plan agency organization, a director has few incentives

at

his disposal to keep independent employees in line other than dismissal and the

termination of the community planning experiment.
It

appears then, according

to the

Needlemans, that most professionals

involved in the community planning process have experienced an increase
stress.

This condition results from their attempt to live with dilemma --to

live with an

my

in

agency which embraces two contradictory forms of planning

terms, two different levels of the whole.

or, in
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The principal significance

of the study is that the less a

community

planner was able to avoid being cross -pressured
the more effective he was in
his community.

The

initial intent of

most community planners was

as "urban guerillas" --to operate under cover.

But really effective pressure

on operating agencies or city council was eventually certain
of a

community planner and sharply increase

to function

to

blow the cover

the cross -pressures upon him.

The community, having tasted success, now pressured
the government establishment, stung by unaccustomed

more

for

action, while

demands and by surpris-

ingly knowledgeable lobbying, pressured for less.
It

seems clear

stress.

it

someone

this is

a redistribution of

is

in the socio-political

system has their interests

supposed

at heart.

no foundation-sponsored consultant type advocate planner, nor

somebody dependent on highly capricious federal programs.

whose role

is

what the Needlemans document

Groups previously apathetic and deeply alienated now see the possi-

bility that

And

that

is built into

to be a

the

system and whose commitment

permanent in-depth one.

It

to the

is

is

someone

community

But to build opposition into a

is

system

necessarily to build stress into the adversary role.
In reflecting

upon their study, the Needlemans do not see this redistri-

bution of stress as a long term condition.

For them, the community planning

experiment, given the presently inadequate financing of our
intensify the self-interest of different groups.

problems, however, they consider

In

cities, is likely to

view of present financial

this result to be a

"necessary step backward"
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from a more harmonious and rational
planning process.
But

how can

the financial

the burden of social

dilemma

problem improve? Perhaps

it

can do so only as

dispersed across society and as the compen-

is

sations of material affluence therefore

become

less necessary.

Perhaps only

as the suburbs are organized to fight for meaning
and esteem in the way that
the inner city has been organized to fight
for material goods will the

game

of the metropolis

Needlemans describe
planning as

it is

is

become

not perhaps so

the shape of things to

The natural pressures
this struggle

tion,

less severe.

much

come,

If

this is so, then

a step

backward from rational

at least for a long time.

now aggressively reaching

Through a mass higher educa-

out to the public, the opportunity to concept-

ualize and control his social environment again begins to

skills

what the

of a meritocratic society would further articulate

between community and society.

the average person.

zero-sum

And because a meritocracy

seem

is likely to

a possibility to

overproduce the

needed for the highest positions, there will be increasing numbers of

people interested in intellectual synthesis who find that the only opportunities
for use of those skills are provided at lower levels of abstraction and

among

lower level social institutions than would previously have been the case.
result will probably be an increase in the

perhaps anxious,

to play the role of

comfortable role for them.

Nor

number

of people

community advocate.

who are
But

it

The

willing,

will not be a

will those in higher positions find their roles

so stress free as they once were.
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A

struggle of wholes within but against wholes

burden but

it

is

a burden nonetheless.

may

be a necessary

human

CHAPTER

VI

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Mure has suggested

that:

The reader who tackles a work of Hegel for the first time should, as a
preliminary exercise, take any process of development, the growth of an
organism, an historical movement, or the course of what strikes him as
a well constructed novel or play, and try to reflect on it at a level beyond
pictorial thinking. He should try.
.to think what really is that movement
which he already calls development. Then, as he reads Hegel, he should
treat the triadic notation as an indespensable but rough sign-posting of the
route and watch to see whether there may not be triads (on any scale)
which not only reveal sublation in the very heart of things but suggest that
it cannot be something merely sporadic and accidental. i
.

Tli is is the

much

method

I

have tried to follow

to understand the

I

processes

I

in this

essay but

I

have used

division of objective and subjective self.

I

assume

man

that

is

necessarily a

human

life is

less struggle to recombine these aspects into a whole, thus providing

munity and avoiding anomie, while at the same time

more sharply

as

study as to understand Hegel.

begin by assuming, with Hegel, that thinking

struggle to ever

it

it

is

a cease-

com-

a similarly ceaseless

distinguish them, thus providing opportunity

and avoiding alienation.
I

apply the Hegelian approach primarily by tracing the development of

*G. R. G. Mure, The Philosophy of Hegel (London:

Press, 1965), pp. 38-39.
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two people's thought about wholeness.

see this thought as the attempt to

I

reconcile without eliminating- -to sublate
of the subject-object split.
conflict (the object side of

in

Hegel's

words-two expressions

Charles Lindblom tries to allow for real human

human

society) within a democratic society so con-

sensual (so clearly of the subject side) that the
interaction among people

presumed

to constitute a kind of automatic

Mannheim

tries to allow for a

agreement and harmony.

freedom from the point

I

is itself

Karl

of view involved in a

socio-conceptual order (again the object side) but to allow for
within this socio-conceptual order (which

is

ic

precisely

the subject side).

see the Lindblom and Mannheim efforts not as producing a
resolution

of their respective debates but as internalizing these debates.

And

pattern of this internalizing process as a roughly triadic one.

There

an attempt

to baldly identify the subject

and object poles.

mission

of relativism.

pole there

is

it

is not,

for

Mannheim,

is firstly

really

that "bargaining" is not, for Lindblom, just another

consensus and so that "relationism"

see the

But then there is

secondly an attempt to differentiate out the object pole so that

something—so

I

means

name

for

just another ad-

Following the attempt to give meaning to the object

thirdly the need to recombine subject and object, although the

result of the third step is to destroy those meanings provided in the second
step,

if

1

the

argument

allowed to stop at this point.

see the pattern of debate as a series of circular arguments, contained

within each other.

new

is

Each broader argument begins, however, by introducing a

distinction which denies the totality of the preceding arguments.

Con-
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sequently these arguments are not only circles
within circles; they are circles
within and against circles.

Because Lindblom and Mannheim do not resolve their
debates about

wholeness we cannot apply their arguments directly to the
planning
But

we can examine

themselves to see
society.

if

the dialectical pattern of their continuing debates with

a similar pattern

suggest that

I

situation.

it

may.

I

may

be found in ordered or planned

suggest that planned society

understood as a dialectical pattern

of conceptual

frameworks

is

in

perhaps best

which the ones

smaller and nearer to what we usually call the concrete provide the point and

purpose

to the ones larger

and more abstract, while these larger ones provide

the specialized concepts which serve as the material for the purposes of the

smaller.

1

suggest that our acknowledged ability to summarize and come to

a point, in an intellectual effort,

conceptual wholes are valid.

If

is itself

an acknowledgement that these smalle:

they were not,

it

seems

that

we could

not teach

principles without first teaching their extensive application.

I

have argued that the subject-object conflict

is

expressed,

in a

bureau-

cratized society, through a necessary competition of larger and smaller conceptual frameworks but that the custodians of the broader views --the bureaucrats and professionals --have largely avoided this competition by denying the

legitimacy of the smaller views.
But

I

have also advanced the claim that the natural tendency of a society

based on thought (and thought creates

all the

problems

I

am

speaking

of) is to

educate everyone to the
of

persons needed

result,

I

believe,

in the highest

is

class to avoid the

maximum

ability

and hence

to

overproduce the number

parts of the bureaucratic hierarchy.

The

a self correction of the tendency for the
administrative

human

struggle.

Some members

of that class

must

their best opportunities for intellectual synthesis
at lower steps.

In a

agency they may become advocates

of

board.

In

result

from

industry they

be advocates and agents of a neighborhood school

may

life

for

of these

be spokesmen for functional work groupings which

new demands on administrators

them while probably reducing

of the bureaucratic society.

it

is to

Previously, those lower classes endured sparse

communal

scale of a highly rationalized society had grown beyond them.

men and

society

is

increase the

for those in lower positions

opportunities for self realization and a disintegrated

of

In a

a process of job expansion.

The result
stress of

may

planning

neighborhood perceptions against those

of the city or advocates of city perceptions against those of the
state.

school system they

find

life

But

because the

if

the nature

not rational but dialectical- -not a logical order of one

great whole but a paradoxical order of large and small wholes --then the recognition of that fact will help distribute the necessary pain of being

the entire spectrum of society.

human across

By insisting on the integrity of those smaller

wholes over against the necessary integrity, also,

of the larger, one will

im-

pose greater stress on those who by virtue of their control positions must
straddle both sides.

From

the standpoint of the meritocratic class itself

my

speculation

may
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present a gloomy prospect.

once again
that the

at the alternate

dilemma

Faced with

this

prospect one cannot help but look

promises of liberal and radical planning- -promises

of planning

and

of

planned society

is

avoidable and that no one,

either "great" or "small, " need anticipate a permanent
self -alienation.

Let us look at those promises in the context of the community planning
situation, since that situation

seems

Why

just another expression of partisan

isn't

community planning

justment?

It

seems so with

with each other.
in a

Is

its

to typify the sort of challenges

emphasis on a plurality

I

envision.

mutual ad-

of groups in competition

there not a good possibility that this process could result

mutually satisfactory accommodation?

My answer

is

There

simple.

is

surely such a possibility

certain assumptions about our concepts.

if

we make

Of course we cannot assume that

planning concepts are just "out there" in the physical world.

We know very

well that they are social products, and the concept of wholeness most obviously
so.

But

if

they are social products then on one view they must involve a pre-

conscious consensus.

was

not consensual

Now when

we have agreed

not pre -conscious

we could disagree

but

if it

not be communicating.

these concepts, which are social products, are also about

taneously describe
if

was

we could

society, they are not

concept, then

If it

it.

merely theoretical.

They define action as they simul-

And since mutual accommodation

the concept is consensual- -if

as to when

it

exists.

is

obviously a value

we can agree on what

it

means --

Hence we have agreed on our values.

If
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a community planner and a comprehensive
planner can agree on what constitutes a "mutual

accommodation" between

the locating of a highway and the

protection of neighborhood housing then they have
of course already agreed on

what to

do.

If

we accept

the above logic of concepts --which is what

degree of truth logic --then the theory

we do

that

is

dilemma, though

it

is

may

have called a

well convince us

less the substance of the theory which

convincing and more the sheer fact that we can understand
But

I

not face

of liberal planning

I

it.

do not accept a degree of truth logic, for purposes of

I

this essay.

agree that concepts are social products and that we can communicate them

each other.

But

I

scious consensus.
it is

don't agree that

For

wholly conscious.

into subject

and object.

world

form

We

in the

me

it

communication implies a basic and pre -con-

implies fundamental disagreement because for

Consciousness

is

me

what divides us, within ourselves,

The resulting division

of debates,

to

is

projected onto the social

such as that between conservatives and liberals.

can communicate with those of opposing views because we have the core

of that opposition within ourselves.

The concepts envisioned by a degree

When

products.

in

they, too, are about social reality, they, too, define action

process of describing

now

to

my

If

of reality logic also are social

it.

But here they do so by conflict.

Let

me

return

illustration.

the

community planner does

not reach

agreement with the comprehensive

planner on the highway-neighborhood tradeoff, they both must somehow con-
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ceptualize this failure.

If

both planners have accepted the theory of liberal

planning they will of course describe the failure as a failure

in bargaining.

But

they obviously cannot point to an agreed operational definition
of bargaining.

For

if

they could do so then by theory the bargaining should have issued

agreement.

Hence each must define his concept

will understand the others as

some form

in

in opposition to die others

Each

of hierarchy.

and

will say that the

other really isn't willing to bargain but wants to impose his own views instead.

The community planner

will probably call the comprehensive planner a

tool of the local elite while the latter will reply that the former

radical elitists.
contradiction
that

But each will

Each wants

.

to

would be coordination and

know

is

one of those

that he himself is necessarily caught in a

say both that

if

his wishes

were

to prevail then

that if anyone's wishes prevail over the objections

of another then that is not coordination.

His liberal planning confronts him with

dilemma.

From such

analysis

I

conclude that liberal planning

to the struggle of wholes against wholes which the

not, that is,

if

we deny

is

not an alternative

Needlemans describe.

the assumption of a basic conceptual consensus.

stead the self-styled liberal planners are themselves engaged
struggle though they interpret
In

one sense

my

it

in

struggle

is

is

since on

my

indeed pluralistic.

But in another sense

only an outward struggle then

its intensity,

is

In-

in this dialectical

another way.

view of planning

struggle of groups with each other.

It

I

say that

it

will

it is

I

emphasize the

not.

become

If

the

intolerable in

supposition there is no pervasive consensus to

mod-
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erate this struggle.

is

It

through the internalizing of the pluralist struggle

within each individual person, so that each becomes
aware of the great truth
in his opponent's

views as well as that

own, that the outer struggle be-

in his

comes moderate and endurable.
If

I

liberal planning

is

way

not a

out of the

somewhat unpleasant prospects

describe then why not radical planning? Couldn't community planning be con-

sidered the prime expression of
cile the needs of large

and experimental
Again

let us

did not

learning society? Isn't

and small social units

if

it

possible to recon-

each person remains flexible

in his attitudes?

my

consider

community planner and

we have assumed

a

that

the

illustration.

If

we assume

in

advance that the

comprehensive planner will agree, then

something

I

course

like liberal or radical planning will work.

make such an assumption before and

tradict the basic assumption

of

will not do so now.

It

I

would con-

have made about the inherently conflictual nature

of social reality.

What happens then
agree but

if

if

we assume,

we now suppose

rather than liberals.
failure in learning.

again, that our two planners do not

that they consider themselves radical planners

In that case, failure to

And, again,

it

agree will be described as a

will signal a failure to agree on the oper-

ational definition of the concept.

Each

will define himself as learning, in contrast to the other

said to be caught

in a rigid

conceptual system.

say that the comprehensive planner

is

who

will be

The community planner may

a captive of obsolete abstractions and
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does not appreciate the personal small scale realities of the
prehensive planner

may accuse

The com-

city.

the other of an equally abstract pluralism which

does not recognize that social problems can only be resolved by large scale

system change.
But

it

is true,

wants to say that

advance but yet

if

if

again, that each will be caught in a contradiction.

were accepted then

his views

that

Each

would represent conceptual

anyone's views are accepted by someone who nevertheless

disagrees with them then that

is not

conceptual advance since

it

does not reflect

understanding.

So

1

conclude that the radical approach

lem revealed

in

community planning than

no more an answer to the prob-

is

These planners

is the liberal one.

too are engaged in a dialectical struggle which they describe otherwise.
But as in one sense

1

my

view of planning

is

pluralistic so

it

is

also radical.

emphasize the need for a new consciousness among planners --one which better

accords with their real situation.
ness will reveal, however,

is

not

The enemy which

someone

external.

I

believe this

It

is

new conscious-

the planners

them -

selves in their efforts to avoid inevitable dilemmas.

In these last chapters

I

have developed a frankly speculative hypothesis

about the nature of planned social wholeness.
pessimistic vision of the

I

The hypothesis arises out

human prospect which

feel instinctively that this vision is accurate.

is

common

And

at the

if it is,

then

of that

time of writing.

we ought

consider every plausible explanation for our situation, and every plausible

to
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response.

may

require desperate remedies.

have hypothesized that our problems result
from

I

we

Desperate conditions

usually take as their salvation-human
thought.

It

avoid the inherently alienating effects of thought,
so
the problems so severe.

burden of alienation and

If

I

that attribute

is in

which

our attempts

to

argue, that we have made

this is so, our true salvation is to accept
this

to fully

share

it.

It

is to

participate in that very

stressful process of integrating conceptual wholes --world
views --of widely
different scope.

My
There

is

purpose
already

of pressure

I

do not

much happening

in

Perhaps.
like

presenting this hypothesis
in

it.

is not to start

My purpose

those trends—and hence, perhaps, to

I

some new

trends.

higher organization that parallels the kind

system which has been descried.

possible virtue
durable.

in

personally believe that

my

is to

argue for the

make them more en-

hypothesis

is

correct.

But

-

'
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